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This dissertation develops a “dynamic bargaining” thesis, in which a two-level 
bargaining game among three actors (the Chinese Communist Party (Party), the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), and the civilian foreign affairs system) determines the level of 
influence the PLA exerts over China’s foreign and security policy-making since 1978. 
This dissertation is based on 138 interviews with active-duty and retired military officers, 
125 interviews with policy-makers and analysts in China, and original Chinese-language 
sources and secondary documents. 
The dissertation divides China’s foreign and security policies into “high” policies 
– those that are sensitive and core national interests and require the intervention of 
China’s top leader – and “low” policies – those that are tactical in nature and constitute 
the majority of China’s foreign and security policies.  
The dynamics of a “reliance-control model” determine the PLA’s influence in 
“high” policies. The top leader’s political reliance on the PLA is the first and foremost 
necessary condition for such Party-military bargaining to occur. Once this necessary 
condition is met, the extent to which the top leader is able to establish “effective control” 
over the PLA helps determine the PLA’s access and hence the level of its influence.  
In “low” policies, the PLA’s level of influence depends on its bureaucratic 
bargaining with the civilian foreign affairs system, in particular the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA or MOFA). Such bargaining has operated on the basis of four rules of the 
game, namely the advantage of: early entry during times of overwhelming external 
threats; strong allies/weak opponents; strong motivations; and supportive public opinion. 
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The level of influence the PLA exerts in the policy-making process is also partly 
determined by its motivation. The PLA is a military force in transition, and its motivation 
to intervene during the policy-making process is determined by three sets of dynamics: 
inward vs. outward orientation; professionalization vs. politicization; and unity vs. inter-
service rivalry. This dissertation argues that the PLA has a political orientation of being 
“progressive moderates” in China’s domestic politics, which contributes to its 
preoccupation with its internal mission and deepens the differentiation between the 
Party’s and military’s interest, outlook, and goal. As a result of its own evolution, the 
PLA is likely not seeking major armed confrontation, but may be more welcoming of 
continuous friction and low-intensity wars of limited scope.  
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Chapter One: Introduction: Towards a “Dynamic Bargaining” Thesis 
 
 
In any country’s foreign and security policy-making process, civilian and military 
actors make uncomfortable bedfellows. In China, interactions between civilians and 
soldiers in the policy-making process are even more intricate than it is in the West. The 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP or the Party) supersedes and penetrates both the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) and the State/government institutions, and the latter two in turn 
participate in and influence the direction of the Party’s rule.  
Prior to the implementation of the reform and opening policy in 1978, this 
political “trinity” – consisting of the Party, the PLA, and the State – was logical and 
worked efficiently, as there was little differentiation between these three actors. Under 
Mao Zedong, every institution followed his lead, and he was able to exert near absolute 
control over all three of these actors. As the PLA and the State/government continue to 
“professionalize” and “specialize,” power will inevitably continue to decentralize, which 
will in turn lead to the Party’s further fragmentation.1 As a result, in the post-Deng era 
the Party’s top leader relies on the PLA’s support to an unprecedented extent, which 
drives the leader to go out of his way to establish effective and even exclusive control 
over the military.  
The evolution of the PLA itself, typified by its increased professionalization and 
differentiation from the Party, has led to a military that increasingly focuses on its narrow 
institutional interests and is more “extroverted” or “outward-oriented” — targeting 
external threats and exerting influence over issues that strongly motivate the military. In 
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other words, the PLA has become more similar to its Western counterparts. The 
transformation of both the PLA and the Party makes the PLA an indispensible actor in 
the power landscape of the Party, as security provider-of-last-resort. This, in turn, also 
affects how the Party interacts with the military and how the PLA bargains with other 
bureaucracies. The power arrangement that was widely accepted during Mao’s era has 
become an encumbrance and source of tension in China’s foreign and security policy-
making. Such strife between the Party, the military, and the State makes the “bed” even 
stranger for these three “bedfellows,” although the fact that China is generally governed 
by consensus, and that the Party’s control mechanisms within the State and PLA remain 
highly pervasive, have thus far prevented chaos and instability.  
This dissertation introduces a “dynamic bargaining” thesis, in which a two-level 
bargaining game among the three actors (the Party, the PLA, and the civilian foreign 
affairs system) determines the level of influence the PLA exerts over China’s foreign and 
security policy-making process. The basic level of the PLA’s influence over “high” 
policy issues – core and sensitive foreign and security policies in which the top leader 
intervenes to set China’s strategic guidelines – results from the workings of a “reliance-
control model” that describes the interactive Party-military relations. At the lower-level 
policy process, the setting in which the majority of foreign and security policies are 
shaped, decided and implemented, the PLA’s bargaining with the civilian foreign affairs 
system (represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)) operates according to its 
own rules and logic, largely independent of the dynamic of Party-military relations.  
“High” policy issues are those of extremely high strategic importance, which 
touch on China’s core national interests, and may cause major tension with another great 
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power, severely impact China’s external security environment, or affect the top leader’s 
domestic political standing. Some lower-level, “tactical” policies with high stakes, on 
which various bureaucracies hold serious opposing views and cannot establish a basic 
consensus on an approach, may then be elevated to the “high” policy arena. “High” 
foreign and security policies are extremely limited in quantity, since domestic affairs, the 
economy, consolidating his political power, and fending off challenges to his power 
occupy most of the top leader’s attention.2 The top leader can make an enormous impact 
on any specific foreign and security policy, both “high” and “low,” if he is incentivized to 
intervene. However, “low” policies, which are typically handled through a bureaucratic 
process, are more liable to be influenced by other actors once the top leader’s attention 
moves away. 
Specifically, the “driver” (the PLA’s mindset) determines what motivates the 
PLA to intervene in or refrain from exerting influence over various policies. The PLA’s 
policy tendencies are constrained by its traditional values and its mentality, both of which 
have been shaped by its history and evolution. With a political orientation of being 
“progressive moderates” in China’s domestic politics, the PLA is preoccupied with its 
internal mission of acting as “political stabilizer.” However, the revolution in military 
affairs (RMA) and the PLA’s continuous professionalization have driven the PLA to be 
increasingly outward-looking, which this dissertation describes as an “outward-oriented” 
tendency. The PLA’s professionalization elevates the principle of civilian centrality, 
which constrains the PLA and means that it is generally an interested but passive actor in 
Chinese politics. Professionalization, however, drives the PLA to be more budget-
conscious and “no-war anxious” (anxious about military inertia and its potential lack of 
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military effectiveness since it has not fought a war in over three decades). The rise of 
services, particularly the PLA Navy (PLAN), further pushes the PLA to be more 
“outward-oriented.”  
The PLA’s influence over “high” policies is a function of the state of the dynamic 
Party-military relationship. This dissertation employs a “reliance-control” model to 
describe how the political and power relations between the top Party leader and the PLA 
leadership determine the PLA’s degree of policy access and its ability to directly 
influence policy. The degree to which the top leader politically relies on the military’s 
political support and the top leader’s ability to establish effective control over the PLA 
determine the PLA’s political access and hence its ability to influence policy. Whether 
the top leader is reliant on the PLA’s political support is the first necessary condition for 
the PLA to enter a bargaining relationship with the top leader. This dissertation argues 
that all of China’s post-Deng leaders have had a strong political reliance on the PLA, due 
to the top leader’s weakening authority, the deepening crisis of legitimacy and authority 
the Party has been facing, and the increased differentiation between the Party’s and the 
PLA’s goals and interests. When this basic condition – the top leader’s political reliance 
on the PLA – is established, the top leader needs to be confident that he can rely on the 
PLA’s allegiance and political support during his time of need, in order to grant access 
and therefore influence to the PLA. In the post-Deng era, the top leaders do not have the 
same deep and organic bonds with the PLA that Mao and Deng had, making it a daunting 
challenge for the top leaders to establish effective control over the PLA. However, unless 
the top leader establishes effective control, the PLA listens to other master(s), making it a 
political threat to the top leader. On the other hand, if effective control is established and 
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the top leader is assured that the PLA will serve loyally as his last line of defense, he will 
treat the PLA as a strong power base and empower the military by granting it resources 
and access, and allowing it to exert influence over policies.  
Table 1.1 Summary of the Reliance-Control Model 
Reliance Control PLA Influence 
Low High Low 
High Low Low 
High High High 
*Note: While low reliance and low control is a theoretical possibility, it is inconceivable in China because 
the combination most likely indicates the “objective control” framework employed in Western democratic 
countries and therefore it is not included in the above table. 
 
More specifically, the PLA’s influence in “high” policies from 1978 to 2012 could be 
expressed in a simplified graph as follows: 
Figure 1.1 Application of the Reliance-Control Model under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang 
Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping 
 
J1: Jiang Zemin (1989-1994) 
J2: Jiang Zemin (1995-2004) 
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In China’s high politics, every policy actor keenly understands that access to the 
top leader is required if one wants to influence policy. Although informal politics exist in 
Western politics to some degree, in China the ability to enter into the top leader’s small 
circle of advisors (xiao quanzi) and gain the top leader’s trust fundamentally impacts a 
policy actor’s influence. Formal policy-making mechanisms in China provide an 
institutionalized platform for the narration and deliberation of a policy course, but the 
most consequential consultations and decisions are made within this small circle of 
trusted advisers. Providing policy advice in this small circle endows one with enormous 
influence, but also carries with it tremendous risks: advice that the top leader is receptive 
to means the continuation of one’s prestige and influence; advice that the top leader 
rejects could lead to one’s removal from this circle and a political demotion. Therefore, 
access to the top leader in Chinese high politics is not only a necessary condition, but is 
also possibly even a sufficient condition for an actor to influence the policy-making 
process. 
Although the top leader’s political reliance on the PLA and his ability to establish 
effective control over the PLA determines the degree to which the PLA holds influence 
over “high” policies, the PLA’s policy preferences are not necessarily the same as the top 
leader’s. The PLA leadership that is involved in the “high” policy world must advocate 
for the military’s institutional interest, and therefore may not be able to control the PLA’s 
bureaucratic position on a certain policy issue. Thus, supporting the top leader does not 
make the PLA leadership a compliant tool completely at the top leader’s disposal.  
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The majority of China’s foreign and security policy is the result of the workings 
of a bureaucratic bargaining process between the PLA and civilian foreign affairs system, 
which is primarily represented by the MFA, a process governed by four rules of the game. 
These rules are the advantage of: early entry during times of overwhelming external 
threats; strong allies/weak opponents (disadvantage of strong opponents); strong 
motivation; and public opinion that supports one’s position. 
This dissertation assesses the PLA’s influence in foreign and security policy by 
examining the PLA’s bargaining behavior in “high” and “low” policies. The boundary 
that separates foreign policy from security policy is blurry since a foreign policy issue 
could evolve into a security concern (for instance, hypothetically, China’s support for the 
U.S. counter-terrorism campaign could cause tensions with elements of Pakistan and 
worsen the security environment in Northwest China), and a purely security problem, 
even an internal one, could have far-reaching foreign policy ramifications (such as the 
1989 Tiananmen crackdown). Military affairs, which concern China’s weapons testing 
and operational procedures, given the wrong timing, could cause serious foreign and 
security policy complications.  
Military autonomy is not synonymous with military influence. Military autonomy 
could, however, become a source of influence, even if the military does not intend for it 
to do so. The PLA will not consult the MFA on issues that is well within the military’s 
mandate, such as weapon testing and deployment, and issues borne out of its operational 
procedures. The military’s tenet, under which “the authority of firing shots lies in the 
hands of the CMC, but the authority of firing shots back is in the hands of the Fleet,” as 
explained by a senior PLA Navy officer, is revealing about how operational procedures 
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work in the PLA.3 The PLA’s operational procedures, which dictate what the military 
should and should not do under certain circumstances and is based largely on a military 
logic and on what the civilians and the military agreed to in the past, works like an 
automatic machine. Even if a disaster or obstruction forces it to stop, an inertial force will 
make it continue for an extended period of time. Thus, it remains a challenge for this 
dissertation to separate the unintended consequences of a policy from a deliberate action, 
as well as an action taken due to the “inertial force” from disobedience. Despite the 
detected “motions” and policy consequences, understanding the PLA’s intentions is 
probably the key to making such distinctions and determining which category a particular 
PLA action falls under. 
 
Significance of this Study 
Since the late 1990s, the PLA’s influence in China’s foreign and security policy-
making process has become a hot topic, primarily due to the political dynamic described 
above. As each piece on the chessboard moves around, it is harder for the outside world 
to understand the direction and pattern of the changes to China’s political system. 
Additionally, misunderstanding and misjudging in U.S.-China relations will carry an 
increasingly prohibitive price both in terms of the risk of war and “audience costs.”4 As 
China increases its comprehensive national power, the structural tensions between China 
and the U.S. globally and between China and Japan in regional settings make nearly 
every flashpoint in the security arena a stage for each side to demonstrate its strength and 
commitment. Yet not every risk of war is aggravated by a purely militarized rivalry. As 
You Ji insightfully points out, “often times it is hard to demarcate where Beijing’s normal 
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diplomacy ends and where security/military dynamics begin.”5 Foreign policy disputes, 
from disagreements over the South China Sea (SCS) to China’s restriction of rare earth 
exports to Japan, can hardly be examined without looking at how such disputes relate to 
other security concerns, and nor can they be kept separate from security frictions in other 
areas. The PLA remains a black box to other countries, and in their disagreements or 
disputes with China countries have yet to fully understand how the PLA makes decisions. 
Finally, the outside world’s fears of China’s assertiveness are magnified by an often 
unsubstantiated assumption that the PLA both manipulates and leverages China’s 
increasing nationalism to advocate more aggressive policies, or that civilian leaders are 
too fearful of the PLA to resist its assertiveness. According to this logic, countries need to 
resist China and cannot concede an inch, since the PLA will continue to assert itself until 
it is stopped.6  
Each time the PLA seems to keep China’s civilian leadership in the dark during a 
security incident, the outside world raises the question of where the PLA stands and what 
particular role it plays in China’s intricate policy process. Notable cases of this dynamic 
include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) curious 12-day silence following China’s 
2007 anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test, as well as China’s 2011 test flight of its new J-20 
stealth aircraft during U.S. Secretary of Defense Bob Gates’ visit, a test flight of which 
Hu Jintao apparently was unaware. 
Even though it is evident that the PLA’s representation in the Party leadership has 
declined since 1978, there is nonetheless a robust debate about the degree of influence the 
PLA exerts on China’s foreign and security policies. Journalists who cover China have 
tended to conclude that as China’s political system continues to fragment and its top 
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leader exerts less influence, the PLA’s power has been increasing.7 Scholarly analyses, 
however, point in the opposite direction. China specialists in the West (Swaine 1996, Tai 
Ming Cheung 2001, Cabestan 2009, Swaine 2012) seem to have reached a consensus that 
the PLA’s influence on China’s policy-making diminished by the end of the 1990s and 
that this situation did not fundamentally change under Hu Jintao’s leadership.8 As 
evidence, such analysts often point to the PLA’s loss of representation on the Politburo 
Standing Committee (PBSC) after Admiral Liu Huaqing’s retirement in 1997 and to it 
being forced to divest its commercial interests in 1998 as evidence.9 In his 2012 study, 
Michael Swaine reinforced this conclusion by noting that senior military leaders played a 
more critical role only up to the 1990s.10  
It is critical for the outside world to study the Chinese military’s role in foreign 
and security policy-making. As the U.S.-China relationship becomes increasingly 
competitive, policy-makers must understand how the PLA establishes its priorities and 
positions on international affairs and how it then injects those preferences into the 
civilian policy-making system and the policy debate. There are extensive studies that 
look at both China’s policy-making process and its bargaining mechanism,11 and most 
studies acknowledge the PLA’s role in this process.12 There are also numerous studies on 
China’s civil-military relations, as well as the PLA’s evolution as an organization.13 
There is a dearth of literature, however, that links these three aspects together and 
presents a broader paradigm of how the internal dynamics impact and motivate the PLA’s 
policy positioning, and how much influence the PLA enjoys in areas in which it has an 
interest or a stake. Rather than evaluating and interpreting only the policy outcomes, 
while leaving the process as a “black box,” this study attempts to elucidate the various 
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calculations of and interactions between different influential actors. The resulting 
analysis constitutes not only a framework for understanding China’s past policies, but 
also has predictive power for looking at future policy outcomes and helping outsiders 
understand the long-term trajectory of China’s foreign and security policy.  
In this “dynamic bargaining” thesis, I hypothesize that the PLA’s “mindset” 
determines its motivation for policy intervention. Additionally, the top Party leader’s 
political reliance on the military is the first necessary condition for the PLA to exert 
political influence. With the existence of this reliance, the PLA’s direct influence hinges 
on whether the top leader is capable of establishing effective control over the military. 
Finally, the PLA’s influence in tactical foreign and security policies will increase relative 
to the civilian foreign affairs system during times of overwhelming external threats, when 
it has strong allies/weak opponents, when it makes clear its strong motivations, or when 
public opinion supports its position. 
 
Research Rationale 
As Ellis Joffe succinctly summarized, the PLA is a “Party-army with professional 
characteristics.”14 The PLA is not a professional army in the Western sense, as it is not 
politically impartial. Rather, the PLA has played a key role in almost every turning point 
in Chinese politics. For example, the PLA helped lead the Cultural Revolution and 
intervened politically throughout this period (1966-76/77).15 Its support was crucial for 
securing the Gang of Four’s arrest and restoring Deng Xiaoping to power in 1977. The 
PLA was also instrumental during the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. As Fang Zhu has 
pointed out, “for the PLA officer corps, political participation was an expression of Party 
 12 
loyalty, not a violation of military professionalism.”16 The PLA’s involvement in both 
political and policy interventions has traditionally been perceived by civilian elites as not 
only legitimate, but also required. The Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen 
crackdown, in which senior PLA commanders opposed the Party’s policy but nonetheless 
carried it out, is evidence of this.17   
Before 1978, the PLA and MFA’s interests and positions with regard to foreign 
policy could hardly be differentiated. This was mostly a product of the structure of 
China’s overall political system, which allowed military men to occupy senior 
government positions, including in the MFA. Premier Zhou Enlai, after 30 years as one 
of China’s most prominent revolutionary military leaders, served as Foreign Minister 
from 1949 to 1958, while concurrently serving as the Vice Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission (CMC) (1949-57). Zhou’s successor, Marshal Chen Yi, was 
Foreign Minister from 1958 to 1972 and Vice Chairman of the CMC from 1959 to 1972. 
Some senior military officers, such as Geng Biao, were even transferred back to the PLA 
leadership after a long and distinguished career in the MFA.18  
As Deng Xiaoping ascended to the pinnacle of power, China’s political system, in 
which “the whims of a single individual assumed monumental importance,” was replaced 
by a more collective leadership structure, which was combined with a bureaucratic 
system characterized by fragmentation and bargaining.19 The Party delegated more 
responsibility to government bureaucracies such as the MFA. Deng also initiated a drastic 
set of reforms in the PLA aimed at promoting professionalism, as he streamlined its 
personnel and set in motion programs that modernized its training, equipment, logistics, 
and strategic thinking. As the PLA launched a series of programs aimed at increasing 
 13 
professionalization, by the late 1980s the “revolving door” through which most military 
men and occasionally civilians passed had closed.20 The gap between a further 
professionalized PLA and an increasingly institutionalized civilian foreign policy 
apparatus (embodied primarily in the MFA) widened in terms of policy priorities, 
approaches to foreign relations, and definition of national interests. The PLA and MFA 
disagreed on the proper approach to almost all major foreign policy issues, from the 
South China Sea dispute, to Taiwan’s independence movement, the U.S.–Japan alliance, 
and the international nonproliferation regime. 
The symbiotic relationship between the Party and the PLA began to break down 
as the generation of “revolutionary soldiers” passed away in the 1990s. Scholars 
including David Shambaugh thus use “symbiosis” to refer to the “inherent 
interdependence between the Party and the PLA,” but the definition here differs 
significantly from the “dualism,” “interlocking directorate,” or the “symbiosis” model 
originally described.21 Arguably, the PLA, as one of the longest-standing and most 
cohesive bureaucratic institutions in China, with the strongest enforcement capacity, 
differed from the Party and civilian bureaucracies in values, political and policy 
orientation, and outlook, even before the PLA started down the path of 
professionalization after 1978. Such differentiation only deepened, along with the PLA’s 
accelerated professionalization during the 1990s, which made the military “more 
complex, specialized, and inward-looking.”22  
Along with this differentiation with regard to policy prescriptions comes the 
incentive for bureaucratic actors to exert more influence over the policy-making process. 
Prior to 1978, the PLA as an institution rarely attempted to or succeeded in influencing 
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the direction of China’s foreign and security policy-making. The PLA had not been eager 
to either take political action or exert influence over the policy process. This was partly a 
result of Mao’s towering status and predominance in the foreign and security policy arena 
and due to the existence of the “interlocking directorate.”23 In one of the rare cases in 
which the PLA attempted to express its opinion, as military leaders such as Marshals Lin 
Biao and Nie Rongzhen expressed the PLA’s opposition to China’s involvement in the 
Korean War, Mao attentively listened to but then overruled the military.24 The PLA and 
MFA were both to a large extent instruments Mao employed and manipulated, and both 
interacted mostly with the Party, rather than with each other.  
After 1978, the PLA was consistently loyal and obedient to Deng. Deng 
repeatedly made decisions that adversely affected the PLA’s institutional interests, 
including: drastically slashing the defense budget in the 1980s; streamlining the 
military’s personnel and cutting its manpower; putting armament modernization on the 
backburner; directing the military to engage in commercial activities; and appointing 
people with mostly civilian credentials and political officers to top military positions. 
Some of Deng’s initiatives (such as prioritizing economic modernization over military 
modernization) the PLA explicitly agreed to, while others it reluctantly accepted as 
necessary reforms to strengthen the military (such as the massive streamlining of military 
personnel and pushing senior military officers out of the Politburo and the Central 
Committee). Other initiatives simply clipped the military’s wings (such as reductions to 
the defense budget, the deterioration of the PLA’s material well-being that led to a brain 
drain, and the delay of armament modernization). If a military is incapable of keeping 
 15 
issues that negatively impact it to such an extent off the agenda, it does not enjoy as much 
power as the outside world attributes to it.  
According to this assessment of the PLA’s influence in China’s foreign and 
security policy after 1978, the military’s influence started from a nadir under Deng’s 
command, despite the fact that there were elements in the PLA that periodically 
questioned, resisted, and attempted to influence policies that they considered to be in 
conflict with their views. The extent to which the Party’s top leader politically relies on 
the PLA determines how much the PLA can influence policy. If the Party leader does not 
need the military’s support, but can nonetheless establish effective control over the PLA, 
this means the military’s autonomy and influence are lessened. 
Since Deng’s era, the Party’s top leaders have had progressively narrower power 
bases and fewer sources of legitimacy than either Mao or Deng possessed. Therefore, 
leaders are stuck in the dilemma of having to rely to a greater extent on the PLA’s 
support, and as a result they encounter challenges and difficulties establishing effective 
control over the PLA. Whether the top political leader can effectively control the PLA 
has a pivotal impact on the degree to which he can trust and have confidence in the 
military leadership, which in turn determines his proclivity to consider the PLA’s 
positions. If the top leader is able to establish effective control over the PLA, and 
therefore trusts the PLA to serve his interests, he will treat the PLA as one of his 
strongest power bases, and the PLA will thereby gain access to and influence over the top 
leader. Conversely, when the top leader is unable to establish effective control over the 
military, he will treat it as a threat and will attempt to shrink its direct influence as much 
as he can. In such circumstances, the PLA is most likely to use its power to take an 
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indirect approach to counter an undesirable policy or stall the implementation of such a 
policy. 
This study does not offer a unicausal explanation of the PLA’s influence in the 
policy-making process. The PLA and the Party maintain a greatly diminished but 
nonetheless interdependent relationship (the “symbiosis” model and the “conditional 
compliance” model), while having to address constant differences and frictions. The 
Party relies on the PLA’s monopoly on violence and coercive force to maintain its grip 
on power. As power centers continue to multiply and China’s system increasingly 
pluralizes, the PLA’s support is a necessary condition for any of the Party’s top leaders in 
the post-Deng era to consolidate his political power. Yet on the other hand, as the PLA 
becomes increasingly professional and further differentiates itself from the Party, its 
officer corps agrees that progressive changes and fundamental reforms are necessary in 
order to maintain China’s social stability. Thus, while the Party, continuously 
fragmenting, needs the PLA more than ever, the PLA has a different sense of urgency 
regarding how fast China’s systematic reforms should be carried out in order to ensure 
the country’s stability and sustainability of this stability. Many senior commanders 
recognize the country’s biggest challenge lies in maintaining internal stability, and until 
this problem is adequately solved, they feel that the PLA should focus on modernization 
and limit its external missions. The Party largely shares the final goal of reforms and 
sustainable stability, but has not acted as fast as the PLA would like. 
The “Power” or “factional politics” model has assumed the sources of the political 
dynamics of China’s civil-military relations come from conflicts within the Party, with 
the PLA being a part of different factions within the Party. The “professionalism” model 
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has assumed that conflicts between the Party and the PLA contribute to how civil-
military relations are shaped in China. Both models can partially explain the PLA’s 
influence in the policy-making process. The “factional politics” model cannot be 
completely abandoned when examining China’s Party-military relations, since the 
appointment of the PLA’s leadership and top political appointees is still dominated by the 
web of personal loyalties and personalistic politics. On the other hand, 
professionalization, institutionalized through hard requirements regarding age, education, 
and rotations, is still the dominant criteria for officer promotion, especially at the lower 
levels (below the army-grade or junji), which greatly limits the degree to which the 
civilian leadership can interfere in personnel decisions. There are certainly exceptions to 
this trend of professionalization. Political interference, however, is increasingly risky 
since it is more likely to expose the appointees and their patrons to public criticism.  
In order to assess the PLA’s influence in a policy process, this dissertation 
employs three lenses: the PLA’s “mindset” (drivers), the Party-military relationship, and 
the bureaucratic process in which the PLA and the civilian foreign affairs system (MFA) 
compete and cooperate with each other. 
This dissertation first analyzes the PLA’s “mindset,” which determines its identity, 
posture, policy preferences, and motivation to engage in the foreign and security policy-
making process. The PLA is a military force in transition, with dynamics that could 
greatly impact the likelihood that it will intervene in or refrain from China’s foreign and 
security policy-making. Despite its loss of prestige due to its primary role in the 
Tiananmen Incident of 1989, this study finds that the PLA is the largest organized 
interest group that supports China’s economic and political reform agenda, aside from 
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China’s rising middle class. The PLA’s political orientation of being “progressive 
moderates” in China’s domestic politics, as well as its “dual missions,” have contributed 
greatly to its “inward-oriented personality.” In the policy-making arena, the PLA’s 
“inward-oriented personality” equates with it prioritizing its internal mission over its 
external one, and exercising restraint and caution rather than assertiveness during security 
frictions with other countries. The PLA’s traditional focus on its internal mission, 
however, is increasingly counter-balanced by its outward-looking strategy, driven by 
China’s core interest in continuing its modernization and globalization, as well as the 
challenges posed by the revolution in military affairs (RMA).  
This study then examines two other sets of dynamics, namely the tension between 
professionalization and politicization, and the rise of inter-service rivalry. 
Professionalization creates mixed results in driving the PLA to intervene in or refrain 
from foreign and security policies: continuous professionalization helps the PLA further 
internalize the principle of “the military only managing military affairs,” and therefore it 
is inclined to stay out of civilian politics; on the other hand, professionalization makes 
budgetary politics more important to the military than ever. These dynamics make the 
PLA increasingly defer to civilian authority, but at the same time make it potentially 
more budget-conscious and welcoming to continuous limited but militarized frictions. 
This dissertation then examines the context in which the PLA has operated as a 
participant in Chinese politics (the Party-military relationship). What are the parameters 
and factors affecting the realm of overall political influence in which the PLA has 
operated? The central question is the balance of Party-military relations, which include: 
the top Party leader’s reliance on the PLA’s support; and the top leader’s effective control 
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over the PLA. The analysis is divided into two distinct eras – Deng’s era and the post-
Deng era – since Deng’s control over the military as well as the military’s allegiance to 
Deng is qualitatively different than any other point since Deng stepped down as China’s 
top leader. This study finds that despite the military’s relatively greater institutionalized 
representation in the Party-dominated power structure, under Deng it generally had 
minimal influence in foreign and security policies. In the post-Deng era, the military’s 
influence depends on whether the top leader can establish effective control over and 
therefore place his trust in the PLA.  
Finally, how do the PLA and the civilian foreign affairs system interact with each 
other during debates over policies, and when they disagree with each other who wins and 
under what conditions? “Policy process structure” refers to the structural conditions in 
policy making, which decides both the parameters of the PLA’s influence in the policy 
process, as well as the advantages and disadvantages the PLA has when interacting with 
relevant government agencies and private actors. The section on bargaining between the 
PLA and the civilian foreign affairs system examines these entities’ respective 
bureaucratic cultures, differences in policy positions, and their contrasting organizational 
strength and internal coherence. It also looks at the rules of the game in bureaucratic 
bargaining, namely the advantage of entry points into the policy process, strong allies, 
particularly strong motivation, and public opinion that supports one’s position. 
This dissertation utilizes three case studies in order to examine the PLA’s 
influence in foreign and security policy-making:   
I. China’s 1979 Border War with Vietnam: The Decision to Fight 
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II. Timetable Strategy and China’s Taiwan Policy Following the 1995-96 
Taiwan Strait Crisis  
III. The Rise Of the South China Sea Dispute (2009-12): Bureaucratic 
Bargaining In The Internet Age 
The reasons to choose the above three case studies are as follows: first, these three case 
studies fell into the periods of three different top leaders, namely Deng, Jiang and Hu. 
Second, the first and second case studies concerned “high” policies, and the third case is 
mostly about a “low” policy, to which rules of bureaucratic bargaining applied. 
Specifically, the first case study, on the Sino-Vietnamese War, sheds light on the 
decision-making process during Deng’s era. This case is particularly useful because it is 
the last war of significant magnitude the PLA fought, and is generally given less attention 
than China’s role in the Korean War or China’s border war with India. The case studies 
on Taiwan policy and the South China Sea examine China’s foreign and security policy-
making after Deng, when rule by a strongman had subsided and the PLA’s relationship 
with the top leaders had significantly changed in nature. The analysis of Taiwan policy 
immediately following the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis reveals how China’s foreign and 
security policy-making system functions when one of China’s core interests is at stake 
and when the military is most motivated to intervene in the decision-making process. 
Moreover, it is a significant event in that the military and civilian actors took very 
different positions. The third case explores the most likely source of friction in the 
coming years between China and a number of regional countries, and even more 
significantly between it and the United States. It is also a case study that provides a look 
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into a number of new actors that are emerging to drive systemic change in China’s 
policy-making process.  
 
Terminology and Alternative Approaches 
As this dissertation studies the PLA’s role in China’s foreign and security policy-
making process, it is essential to define the subject of this study, investigate the 
alternatives, and examine the measurement and methodology employed. There is no 
consensus among scholars on how to interpret and define influence, or alternatively 
“role” or “autonomy.” As Richard Betts recognized, influence is one of “the most 
important and most elusive concepts in the study of politics.”25 Edward Banfield and 
Thomas Dickson provide a broad definition of “influence,” defining it as the “ability to 
get others to act, think, or feel as one intends.”26 Constantine Danopoulos and Cynthia 
Ann Watson provide another definition of “influence,” positing that the military exerts 
“influence” through “substantial and purposeful involvement in the making and 
allocating of wealth and of social and political value.”27 Richard Betts provides a 
narrower and more manageable definition of influence, which he determines is “causing 
decision makers to do something they probably would not have done otherwise.”28 This 
study adopts an even narrower definition of the PLA’s influence on policy. The PLA’s 
influence is defined as its ability to produce a policy outcome that would otherwise not 
have emerged, which it achieves through a combination of inducing, persuading, or 
coercing others to act and think in the way the PLA desires.  
 
Alternative Subject to Study – Autonomy 
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One could make the argument that “autonomy,” which is more clearly defined in 
the literature, should replace “influence” as the object of this study. Autonomy is 
primarily conceptualized as an attribute of an individual person, and refers to the 
independence and authenticity of the desires that move one to act in the first place, as 
opposed to choices made due to coercion.29 Many scholars argue that autonomy requires 
independence of both will and action, which means awareness of one’s values and 
identity, as well as one’s competence or action.30 Thus, when “a person has autonomy (it) 
is that he does not simply react to his environment and other influences, but actively 
shapes his behavior in the context of them.”31 A prominent branch of scholarship on state 
autonomy emphasizes two conditions: autonomous preferences that require both 
differentiation and coherence; and the ability to translate its preferences into authoritative 
actions.32  
The literature that explores bureaucratic autonomy primarily has three strands: 
The first and most dominant strand defines autonomy as the extent to which agencies can 
implement outcomes that diverge from the preferred policies of their principals. This 
formal principal-agent approach finds that greater policy uncertainty on the part of 
political principals leads to greater delegation to bureaucrats.33 Another useful prediction, 
the “ally principle,” holds that the extent of delegation will generally increase as conflict 
over preferences decreases.34  
The second strand, based on historical case studies and exemplified by David 
Carpenter’s work, emphasizes the process of preference formation, primarily with respect 
to the ability of agencies to shift their principals’ preferences, which the principal-agent 
approach misses. This approach identifies three necessary conditions for bureaucratic 
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autonomy: political differentiation (requires that an agency’s preferences be irreducible); 
organizational capacity (allows agencies to engage in policy experimentation and 
innovation and to translate their preferences into effective actions); and legitimacy 
(dictates that an agency must convince a diverse network of citizens and political leaders 
of its unique capability and conduct a crosscutting “program coalition” in support of the 
agency and its policies). Whether an agency achieves differentiation and capacity 
depends greatly on the agency’s bureaucratic culture.35 
A third major strand of literature on bureaucratic autonomy emphasizes the 
multidimensional nature of autonomy by examining the relationship among bureaucratic 
agencies and departmental ministers in European parliamentary systems. This branch 
argues that agencies with low policy autonomy may have discretion only over 
(sub)processes and procedures prescribed by political principals. Agencies with greater 
policy autonomy are able to select the policy instruments used to implement the policy, 
as well as the quantity and quality of the goods and services delivered.36  
Influence, as the subject of this study, does share many similarities with 
Carpenter’s definition of autonomy – “independent policymaking power.” The PLA’s 
autonomy, as defined by its level of resources, capacity to implement policies, and 
operational freedom, is one of the ways through which it exerts influence. Autonomy is 
both a source of and a way that the PLA can exert its influence. Influence shares all three 
of autonomy’s necessary conditions; political differentiation, unique organizational 
capacities, and political legitimacy.37 Political differentiation, or in other words the 
formation of the PLA’s distinct corporate interest, is a byproduct of the PLA’s 
professionalization, and a starting point for the PLA to exert influence over policy. 
 24 
Without distinct interests and goals, how could the PLA have the motivation to influence 
policy? The PLA has unique organizational capacities, which stem from its responsibility 
to act as the Party’s security guarantor, supply military intelligence, provide military 
opinions, and play the deterrent role in management of any security crisis. Given its 
origin as a revolutionary army, the PLA deeply cares about its legitimacy among the 
public, which is one of the variables that determine whether the PLA will intervene in or 
stay out of certain policy debates.  
This study forgoes autonomy and instead focuses on influence because autonomy 
fails to capture the deliberateness of the intent and effects of conscious bargaining and 
maneuvering to change policy outcomes to the direction that the PLA desires. This study 
focuses not only on how the PLA preserves its independence and freedom of action in 
policy deliberations and implementation, but also on how the PLA bargains and changes 
other actors’ behavior. If this study had chosen “autonomy” as the main subject for 
investigation, it would have had to divert more of its research focus toward the PLA’s 
own evolution. As such, it would not be able to devote as much attention to the dynamic 
and interactive Party-military relationship and the bureaucratic bargaining process, which 
are as important, if not more so, in explaining the PLA’s role in China’s foreign and 
security policy-making. Finally, “autonomy,” if employed in the more narrowly but also 
more commonly interpreted sense of “independence or freedom or self-governing,” may 
distort this study’s main conclusions. 
 
Categorization of Influence 
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This study divides the military’s influence in foreign and security policy into two 
categories: direct influence and relative power. The PLA exerts direct influence over the 
policy-making process by encapsulating and explicitly expressing its formal institutional 
opinion directly to the decision-making bodies or the top Party leader. Such influence is 
mostly visible with regard to policies that the top Party leader personally oversees, or 
relations and crises with such strategic significance that the Party’s collective decision-
making bodies need to choose a course of action. The PLA’s direct influence primarily 
results from the PLA’s position within the Party-military relationship.  
The PLA’s relative power can be generated through multiple means. For instance, 
the PLA can attain relative power through bureaucratic bargaining. Additionally, the PLA 
can use its resources and capacity, for example by providing or limiting certain 
information and access, in order to frame the debate or shape preferences in the policy 
circle or the public domain and therefore establish/revise the basis for official decision-
making.38 The PLA can also exercise operational autonomy, which results in a change of 
the facts on the ground and therefore the context in which a decision must be made.39 
Finally, the PLA can deliberately or unintentionally stall a policy’s implementation by 
refusing to carry out orders or creating difficulties that prevent cooperation or 
consultation with other policy actors (ni zuo ni de, wo gan wo de). The source of the 
PLA’s relative power comes from the PLA’s bureaucratic and organizational capacity 
and military prerogatives (military autonomy), but often results from the top Party 
leader’s lack of effective control over the military. 
 
Alternative Categorization of Influence  
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M. Taylor Fravel has thus far provided the most convincing alternative way of 
categorizing influence. Fravel identified two types of influence that the PLA potentially 
exerts over policy: capturing influence and bureaucratic influence.40 Fravel defined 
“capturing influence” as influence “through lobbying or independent action outside 
existing bureaucratic channels” and “bureaucratic influence” as “the PLA help(ing) to 
shape the content of a given policy through lobbying or independent action.”41 Fravel 
asserts that the key difference between these two types of influence is that “in the 
bureaucratic view the PLA is only one of many actors that provide input and the final 
decision is taken by the party-state.”42  
Fravel’s categorization of influence, however, is incomplete because he neglects 
the fact that, in the context of foreign and security policy-making, policy preference is 
primarily a function of power. It is very rare for PLA officers to expose themselves to 
political risks by trying to “capture” the leadership for the sake of “policy.” If any 
individual PLA officer lobbies on an issue outside of bureaucratic channels, he does so to 
gain political power. In other words, officers will advocate a particular policy position 
because such a position enhances their political power. There are certainly exceptions to 
this rule, but senior PLA officers generally will not sacrifice their individual political 
power for a particular foreign or security policy.  
It is also hard to differentiate lobbying through “inside” bureaucratic channels 
from “outside existing bureaucratic channels,” or individual lobbying from bureaucratic 
influence. It does not matter whether a CMC Vice Chairman speaks during a Leading 
Small Group meeting or in a personal consultative phone call with the Party’s top leader. 
When the CMC Vice Chairman speaks on policies, regardless of the forum, he has 
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substantial, if not complete, support from the PLA. Bureaucratic influence is more visible 
to outsiders because multiple actors may make public remarks or take visible actions, 
while intra-Party bargaining takes place mostly behind closed doors. The fact that 
bureaucratic influence is more discernible does not mean bureaucratic influence is the 
primary venue that actors use to change policy outcomes. Neither does it allow one to 
comfortably rule out the PLA’s “capturing influence,” as defined by Fravel. 
Nonetheless, institutional interests, or bureaucratic influence as Fravel defines it, 
do exist since bureaucracies or institutions have fixed identities, cultures, and policy 
preferences, which are “sticky” and less liable to change. Policy-makers in bureaucracies, 
including the PLA, behave like interest groups that defend previous policy positions. Part 
of personal political power comes from bureaucratic capacity or superiority. Thus, by 
defending their bureaucratic or institutional interests, heads of bureaucracies, either from 
the PLA or a particular service within the PLA, are also attempting to maximize their 
political power. Relative power, as it is used in this study, refers not only to the PLA’s 
direct bureaucratic influence and its resistance to policies under a weak top leader, but 
also describes the power discrepancy between the PLA and other bureaucracies. 
 
Theoretical Foundation and Literature Review 
This dissertation’s findings are relevant to and augment previous studies on civil-
military relations in China, Party-military relations in Communist countries, and the 
military’s influence in politics.  
 
Studies of Civil-Military Relations and Policy-Making in China 
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This section first summarizes the existing theoretical models on China’s civil-
military relations, then examines the literature on the PLA’s role in China’s foreign and 
national security policy, before ending with a brief introduction on the application of the 
“bargaining” or “fragmented authoritarianism” model for explaining China’s policy-
making milieu. 
Several theoretical models have been advanced in the study of China’s civil-
military relations: the “power” model (also called factional politics), symbiosis, 
professionalism, and conditional compliance. These models provide insights into various 
aspects of China’s civil-military relations, and are largely complementary to each other. 
William W. Whitson and William L. Parish first developed the “power” or 
“factional politics” model for looking at China’s civil-military relations, while Michael 
Swaine, Lynn White, and Cheng Li have subsequently further refined this framework.43 
Additionally, Andrew Nathan and Lowell Dittmer first presented this model in its more 
generic form to analyze Chinese domestic politics.44 The “power” model generally 
attempts to interpret Chinese politics through the angle of informal dynamics. Their 
inquiries concentrated on “policy disputes, factional bases, and power contests” among 
major leaders, as Miller summarized.45 The “power” model assumes that policies are 
evaluated in terms of individual or factional interests. Some subsequently borrowed this 
model to examine China’s civil-military relations. One of the most representative efforts 
was a study Michael Swaine conducted in 1992, in which he examined personal 
backgrounds and complex networks largely based on the Field Army system. A series of 
analyses by Cheng Li and Lynn White, however, weakened Swaine’s conclusion by 
positing that professionalization and regional reshuffles had brought military factions 
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based on the field army system to an end. Instead, Li and White, through extensive 
biographical analysis, found that educational and professional backgrounds served as the 
new basis for factions in the PLA. In general, the “power” model has inherent difficulties 
explaining when factional interests will outweigh policy preferences, institutional 
interests, and the equalizing effects of professionalization. The thesis of the “power” 
model, regarding the Party leadership’s personalistic power base within the PLA, has 
some remaining explanatory power when studying officer promotions and power 
struggles in the PLA officer corps. For instance, this model helps explain Jiang Zemin’s 
promotion of General Xu Caihou, and General Xu’s subsequent resistance to Hu Jintao’s 
control. 
Prior to the 1990s, the “symbiosis” model was the dominant framework used to 
explain military and Party elites’ dual identity or the “revolving door” between military 
and nonmilitary posts. Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande argued that China’s 
Party-military relationship had remained essentially symbiotic, and therefore military and 
political elites had had low levels of differentiation based on their earlier careers as 
revolutionary soldiers. David Shambaugh, Jeremy Paltiel, Ellis Joffe, and Fang Zhu 
further advanced this model by introducing what Bullard coined the “interlocking 
directorate.”46 These analysts viewed political intervention as an expression of the 
military’s loyalty to the Party. Joffe recognized the PLA’s influence in China’s policy-
making, which he attributed to the military’s prestige and the symbiosis of the 
revolutionary soldiers with the Party. At the same time, he predicted the weakening of 
this symbiotic relationship. While recognizing the value of the symbiosis model to 
explain historical Party-military relations, Shambaugh argued that there would be an 
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inevitable differentiation between the Party and military elites, which would allow the 
Party to exert tighter control over the PLA. 
The “professionalism” model, as articulated by Harlan Jencks, Ellis Joffe, Paul 
Godwin, and Michael Swaine, identifies professionalism as the “unifying and motivating 
force” for the officer corps.47 This model predicts that the PLA will align itself with and 
provide political support for the leadership that is “most responsive to its professional 
interest” and its policy positions.48 Proponents of this model generally object to Samuel 
Huntington’s subjective control thesis that precludes political involvement by a 
professional military. Among the scholars in this group, Joffe was the most unequivocal 
in arguing that the PLA had differentiated itself from the Party and was reluctant to 
intervene in politics because of this differentiation. According to Joffe, the PLA 
intervened in politics “because Mao or Deng had ordered it,” and was “not driven by 
internal motives or ambitions.” Rather, “senior commanders, who foresaw the dangers,” 
opposed each political intervention.49 As the PLA modernizes and becomes more 
differentiated from the Party in terms of “interests, functions and outlook,” the distinction 
will become even deeper and the PLA will be preoccupied by military affairs.50 
In the “conditional compliance” model, James Mulvenon, You Ji, and Ellis Joffe 
posited that the Party-military relationship is a process of bargaining and balancing, or a 
relationship of “give and take,” which was made possible only after the political 
strongman was gone.51 According to these dynamics, political elites seek soldiers’ 
obedience and support, and in return the PLA looks to further its institutional interest, by 
bargaining for an increased budget, greater autonomy in military affairs, and a role in 
specific foreign policy areas. The PLA’s professionalization and the Party’s 
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discouragement of the PLA’s political involvement, as well as the increased 
institutionalization of succession politics, will simultaneously bolster the Party’s ability 
to control the military and the military’s autonomy, according to You Ji.52 Political elites 
and the PLA, however, may face a more conflictual relationship when their interests 
collide.  
Although models of China’s civil-military relationship are useful for 
understanding the context in which the PLA seeks to influence policy-making, most of 
these writings do not directly address how, under what circumstances, and to what effect 
the PLA has shaped the policy-making process. Scholarly research often concentrates on 
one or two aspects of the PLA’s influence in foreign and security policy-making, and 
findings are mostly presented in journal articles and edited volumes, with the exception 
of Michael Swaine’s book, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security 
Policymaking.  
Earlier work analyzing the differentiation of the PLA’s policy positions from 
civilian elites concentrated on the question of whether the PLA ever had a position on 
policies. William Whitson’s assertion in 1974 that interorganizational disagreements have 
often been accompanied by intraorganizational disputes gave credence to the doubts and 
questions about the PLA’s cohesiveness as an organization.53 As a result, scholarly 
research tended not to focus on the level of the PLA’s influence, what kind of influence it 
exerted, or how it exercised its influence.  
An exception to this general trend was a bold 1977 monograph by Thomas 
Gottlieb. Building on the work of Whitson, Brown, and Lieberthal, Gottlieb applied the 
“factional politics” model to explore the civil-military divide over the evaluation of the 
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international situation that resulted in the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle (1966-
69).54 Gottlieb identified three distinct foreign policy groups: the Moderates under Zhou 
Enlai, the Military under Lin Biao, and the Radicals under the Jiang Qing Clique. 
According to Gottlieb, the moderates, under Zhou and the MFA, consistently “led the 
movement to expose the dangers inherent in the Soviet military build-up,” while the 
military and the radicals “concentrated on dramatizing the potential threat of the United 
States.”55 Mao did not give his unconditional support to any of these individual groups. 
By the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, however, the civilian groups (both the moderates 
and the radicals) realized that the military was threatening the Party’s rule and control 
and agreed to oppose “military dominance in policymaking, even if for different 
reasons.”56 Gottlieb cautioned against “fitting the policymaker to the policy,” since “there 
is no evidence that the PLA as an organization uniformly supported such strategic 
recommendations,” despite the fact that “some PLA leaders did publicly advocate the 
military strategy.”57 Gottlieb’s general thesis that factions will fight for power through 
struggles over policies remains valid. Yet his specific conclusion that the radicals and the 
PLA colluded against the moderate faction is questionable because the radicals 
mistrusted and attacked the PLA in the 1960s and 1970s, which, with a moderate and 
progressive political disposition, sided more with the moderates.58        
Gerald Segal’s 1984 paper on the PLA’s influence on policies updated and 
reinforced Whitson’s powerful warning against treating the PLA as an organization. 
Segal reaffirmed his doubts about the “unified PLA point of view” on foreign policy.59 
Segal concluded that the PLA had few opportunities to become involved in the foreign 
policy process, and even if the PLA was involved in the foreign policy process, “it would 
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be too divided” to take a unified position. Furthermore, according to Segal, the PLA did 
not debate with civilian leaders or institutions, even over major issues related to the 
PLA’s mission such as the degree of professionalism versus politicization, size of the 
defense budget, or purchases of foreign military armaments.60 
Challengers to Whitson’s assertion came along during the mid-1990s, as the PLA 
continuously differentiated itself from the Party through a combination of 
professionalization and the closure of the “revolving door” between military and 
nonmilitary posts. With the passing of revolutionary leaders, the symbiotic relationship 
between the PLA and political elites started to break down. Yet, arguably, the PLA and 
the Party are still inherently interdependent. 
John Garver concluded that the PLA did act as an interest group and intervened in 
the policy process in order to harden China’s policy position toward the U.S. and 
Taiwan.61 Garver asserted that the PLA does not have to be “a unitary, monolithic actor, 
or that it always act as a group” in order to be identified as an interest group.62 As 
evidence of his proposition that the PLA acted as an interest group, Garver pointed to the 
PLA and MFA’s differences over arms exports, maritime disputes, and the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), as well as the PLA’s intensified 
lobbying effort on Taiwan policy from 1992-94. Garver’s sources mostly came from 
Hong Kong-based news sources with dubious credibility. Nonetheless, his overall 
argument that the PLA did act as an interest group has merit because it captured the basic 
characteristics of the policy differences between the PLA and the MFA and the PLA’s 
efforts to push its own agenda. However, his argument that the PLA’s more assertive 
foreign policy preferences reflect “a more nationalistic institutional culture of the PLA” is 
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not sufficiently evidenced and explained. This facet of his argument lacks theoretical 
coherence and is contradicted by empirical evidence, such as the fact that the PLA took a 
moderate position toward China’s dispute with Japan regarding WWII history.63 
In The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking, Michael 
Swaine provided the most comprehensive and authoritative account of the PLA’s 
organizational structure and how it exerts influence during the formulation of China’s 
foreign and security policies, by leveraging both formal, systemic channels, and informal 
and personalistic ones.64 Swaine divided China’s national security policy into four 
distinct but closely related sub-arenas: (1) national strategic objectives; (2) foreign policy; 
(3) defense policy; and (4) strategic research, analysis, and intelligence. Swaine argued 
that the military’s positions on specific foreign policy issues were not determined by the 
CMC as a body, much less by the PLA organs below the CMC. According to Swaine, in 
the late-1990s the PLA did not play a central role in foreign policy, as many foreign 
policy decisions received only sporadic guidance from even the FALSG or the PBSC, 
which were operating largely on “automatic pilot,” under the control of various relevant 
subordinate ministries. He predicted that the absence of a single dominant leader like 
Deng Xiaoping would in the future lead to greater military challenges to critical elements 
of China’s foreign policy and “lengthy deadlocks or messy compromises acceptable to no 
organization, civilian or military.”65 Swaine did mention a few instances in which the 
PLA intervened in foreign policy, such as the Yinhe Incident. He did not, however, 
provide details regarding how the PLA carried out such interventions. 
Swaine’s series of studies published in 2012 reinforced the conclusions he drew in 
1996, namely that many aspects of the PLA’s role during political-military crises are 
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either dimly understood or entirely unknown to outside observers, especially at senior 
levels.66 Swaine argued that at lower levels of China’s crisis decision-making system, 
PLA officers and analysts play important roles as providers of intelligence and analysis, 
overseers of certain aspects of crisis management, and creators of operational plans, 
while senior officers interact with civilian leaders in a collaborative and consultant 
manner through institutionalized channels.67 Yet Swaine also pointed out that little is 
known regarding the level and type of influence these low-level individuals and their 
organizations exert on crisis decision-making. 
Whitson’s factional model started to lose relevance with the rise and subsequent 
dominance of the bureaucratic politics model, developed by Graham T. Allison and 
Morton Halperin, and enhanced and applied to China by David M. Lampton (1987, 1992), 
Michel Oksenberg (1988), and Kenneth Lieberthal (1988, 1992, 2004).68 The field of 
China Studies experienced a theoretical paradigm shift as China experienced fundamental 
political and societal changes after Mao’s passing. Following Mao’s death, the PLA itself, 
its political participation, Party-military relations, and the policy-making process all 
changed. After Deng initiated the policy of reform and opening-up in 1978, Western 
scholars recognized this monumental transition in the Chinese policy-making process and 
the systematic change China as a whole was undergoing. Lampton, Oksenberg, and 
Lieberthal, through a series of ground-breaking publications, introduced the “bargaining” 
or “fragmented authoritarianism” model. This framework explained why, contrary to 
popular belief, China’s top leaders do not fully control the policy-making process, and 
organizational interests lead to competition and debates throughout the process.69  
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The “bargaining” or “fragmented authoritarianism” paradigm, continuously 
updated along various dimensions, has not been superseded in explanatory power by 
alternative paradigms, even though it was developed nearly three decades ago.70 Scholars 
who devised this model, however, initially recognized its limitations, as it was 
constructed based on studies of investment projects, and therefore “reflects research 
primarily on economic decision making.”71 Since China’s political system is far less 
institutionalized at the highest levels of the Party, where decisions on foreign and security 
policies are made, Lieberthal conceded that this model might be inadequate to analyze 
foreign and security policy-making.72  
David M. Lampton’s edited volume, The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security 
Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, overcame this recognized limitation of the 
“bargaining” or “fragmented authoritarianism” model. This volume has thus far provided 
the most updated, comprehensive, and first-rate analyses of the PLA’s influence in the 
policy process, with notable contributions by Michael Swaine on Taiwan policy-making, 
Bates Gill on arms control, and Tai Ming Cheung on the CMC’s structure. While 
emphasizing professionalization, corporate pluralization, decentralization, and 
globalization as the dominant trends leading to the transformation of China’s policy-
making, Lampton revealed the obstacles that China’s policy-makers face: “more 
constrained paramount leaders, more limited bureaucracies, and a society that has 
progressively more space within which to operate.”73  
In the same volume, Swaine concluded that at the height of the 1995-96 Taiwan 
Strait crisis, the PLA interacted with, but did “not dictate policy regarding Taiwan” to the 
civilian leadership.”74 The PLA not only does not dictate China’s Taiwan policy, but also 
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does not control any other policies, including those surrounding sensitive territorial issues. 
Furthermore, according to Swaine, the PLA leadership does not develop and present 
positions on overall grand strategy toward Taiwan. Rather, China’s Taiwan policy-
making process has become increasingly bureaucratic, pragmatic, and consensus-
oriented.75  
In a chapter in this edited volume on China’s policy-making in the 
nonproliferation and arms control arena, Bates Gill argued that China’s internal debates 
on these issues are split roughly along “military” (the PLA and defense-industrial 
community) and “political” lines. This “contentious process,” which led to a bureaucratic 
reorganization that greatly weakened the Commission on Science, Technology, and 
Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and strengthened the PLA General Armament 
Department (GAD), inevitably led to China’s “two steps forward, one step back” 
behavior.  
Finally, in this volume Tai Ming Cheung studied the Central Military 
Commission’s (CMC) structure, workings, and responsibilities under Jiang Zemin’s 
rule.76 His chapter explained interesting interactions between the CMC and the civilian 
foreign policy actors on the Taiwan issue up to 1995. Cheung concluded that the PLA’s 
role in the mainstream foreign policy arena had diminished and its ability to be heard at 
the very top levels of the political leadership cannot be taken for granted, except during 
major crises.77 He argued that the military decision-making process is increasingly 
institutionalized and bureaucratic, and in most cases personal factors are no longer of 
great significance.   
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Cabestan’s 2009 article supported the conclusion that the PLA’s influence in 
China’s foreign policy process has diminished. He argued that the addition of decision-
making centers has required increased coordination between the three categories of 
foreign and security policy decision-makers: diplomats, merchants, and soldiers. China’s 
bureaucratic systems (xi tong), however, are still separated along traditional lines.78 
Based on often well-sourced and interesting PLA writings, You Ji concluded in 
his 2014 study that the PLA has maintained a civil-military consensus on “war aversion.” 
As You puts it, “no other action can undermine China’s rise more effectively than a war 
initiated by itself; and a war may threaten the CCP’s hold on power if it goes terribly 
wrong.”79 The post-symbiosis rules of the game have been well-observed and, no matter 
how reluctant the PLA is in some cases, the PLA “seldom challenges civilian 
decisions.”80 You’s general conclusions are logical, but his case studies, such as the 2007 
ASAT test, are less convincing. He argued that the MFA stayed silent for 12 days 
following China’s ASAT test because its spokesman was probably too junior to make 
spontaneous comments on the test, but this does not explain the MFA’s silence. If Wen 
Jiabao and Li Keqiang were aware of the test, as You argued, why did they stay silent as 
well?81 When actors in China take so long to respond to such a controversial event, which 
attracted fierce international criticism, it is reasonable to conclude that this is often a 
result of bureaucratic deadlock due to internal disagreements. 
M. Taylor Fravel’s 2011 paper on the PLA and China’s national security policy-
making is the biggest contribution, both in its policy conclusions and in its discussion 
about methodology and measurement challenges, which were less discussed and explored 
in previous studies on the same topic. By delving into China’s responses to territorial 
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disputes, a policy area Fravel contributed to most in his book Stong Borders, Secure 
Nation,82 Fravel concluded, “the PLA has not played a significant role influencing the 
initiation of China’s territorial disputes.”83 Consistent with You’s conclusion, Fravel 
asserted China’s recent assertiveness in the South and East China Seas reflects a 
consensus between the Party and the military. Fravel found little evidence in his study to 
support the view that “the PLA has escalated these disputes against the wishes of top 
leaders.”84 Regarding the analytical challenges, Fravel made a subtle but very insightful 
observation: the absence of the PLA playing a visible role in China’s approach to a 
particular issue does not necessarily mean that the PLA did not play a role in influencing 
China’s policy on that issue.85   
 
Studies of Party-Military Relations in Communist Countries 
The study of civil-military relations in states governed by un-representative 
regimes has produced a voluminous literature.86 Within this strand, the study of civil-
military relations in Communist countries, with a particular focus on the Soviet Union, 
has spawned extensive models and theorems, most noticeably the Party-military conflict 
model (Kolkowicz 1967), the institutional congruence model (Odom 1978), and the 
participatory model (Colton 1978).  
Roman Kolkowicz saw Party-military relations in the Soviet Union as adversarial 
in nature, and presented a picture of lasting conflict between civilian and military elites 
due to divergent values, orientations, and interests. He argued that the Soviet military 
operated according to a professional ethic of autonomy. Rather than executing previously 
agreed upon policies, the Soviet military employed a variety of organizational tactics to 
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modify policies it did not wholly agree with. The Party saw the military as a potential 
challenger to its monopoly on power and therefore strived to impose control over the 
military through political indoctrination and institutionalized monitoring. Meanwhile, the 
military tried to blunt the Party’s control and acquire professional autonomy, self-respect, 
and a bigger budget.87 Therefore, in this zero-sum contest for power, the Party viewed the 
military’s attempt to strengthen its influence as fundamentally destabilizing. Kolkowicz’s 
thesis was criticized for its tendency to engage in overgeneralization,88 by examining the 
fates of individuals (mainly Marshal Zhukov, who Khrushchev unseated in 1957), and 
self-contradiction, as he analyzed the “Stalingrad group” of military officers who were 
closely associated with and subsequently favored by Khrushchev.89  
William E. Odom contradicted Kolkowicz’s thesis by concluding that the Party-
military relationship in the Soviet Union was typified by “congruence, not conflict.”90 
According to Odom, the Party and the military had a symbiotic rather than an adversarial 
relationship. Odom believed that the Soviet military behaved like its modern Western 
counterparts, as its military professionalism precluded any politically significant 
intervention. Soviet military officers were bureaucratic executors of the Party’s will, and 
on a majority of issues the military and Party were in agreement. The military’s influence, 
therefore, was broad but shallow, touching on a wide variety of issues but not acting as 
the decisive voice, as civilian and military leaders concurred on all principles and differed 
only over the best instruments to use to achieve those principles. Odom, as a U.S. 
military officer himself, was criticized for failing to account for the contribution of the 
Soviet military’s professionalism to its officers’ mentality and conduct distinct from the 
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Party, and his tendency to overstate the congruence of values as well as the uniformity of 
commitment within the Party to the military’s priorities.91 
Timothy J. Colton and others described a balanced Party-military relationship in 
the Soviet Union, in which neither side attained absolute domination, but both accepted 
the Party’s sovereign power.92 Put differently, the Party-military distinction was clear, 
though the boundary might be permeable. While rejecting the notion that the relationship 
between the Party and the military was a zero-sum game, Colton found Soviet officers to 
be active bargainers and participants in “military-specific decisions – but not, as a rule, in 
decisions concerning societal choice and supreme power – on the basis of their 
professional expertise.”93 As a result, Soviet defense policies were the result of “extended 
bargaining and political maneuvering among a variety of interested institutions.”94  
All three models listed above took the Soviet Party-military relationship as the 
main subject of their analysis, though their discussions also touched on the Soviet 
military’s role within this relationship. These discussions, to a certain extent, provide a 
framework that can help explain the PLA’s influence in China’s foreign and security 
policies. The findings of this dissertation echo Colton’s model. On the one hand, both 
conflict and congruence of these institutions’ larger values are ingredients of China’s 
Party-military relationship. The Party-military relationship is conflictual in that the PLA 
has increasingly separated itself from the Party by strengthening its corporate interest, 
proposing policy prescriptions based on its interests, and executing policies with 
operational autonomy. This distinctiveness in orientation and interests, as well as the 
military’s autonomy, constitutes the basis of the PLA’s professionalism as well as the 
starting point of its purposeful exertion of influence over policies. The Party-military 
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relationship is also conflictual in the sense that the Party’s fragmentation will inevitably 
creep into the military sphere, which will create the problem of who in the Party 
commands the gun. The PLA and the Party share the basic goals of protecting social 
stability and ensuring economic prosperity, and both recognize the necessity of reforms 
to achieve these objectives, although they might prioritize these goals differently. On the 
other hand, while the construct of Party-military relations delineates the overall boundary 
of the PLA’s power in policies, the PLA’s bargaining and interactions with the civilian 
bureaucratic system greatly shape the policy outcomes.  
 
Studies of the Military’s Influence in Foreign and National Security Policy 
It is hard to lump all the literature on the military’s influence in foreign and 
national security policy together, despite the different types of political regime and the 
civil-military relations in which it exists. However, it is useful to look at how this 
problem is tackled in different political settings.  
With regard to mature democratic polities, Samuel Huntington’s formulation of 
subjective control and objective control, the “normal theory of civil-military relations” as 
Eliot Cohen has termed it,95 still stands as the benchmark theory for evaluating the 
military’s influence in policies. Richard Betts, as well as Amos A. Jordan, William J. 
Taylor, and Lawrence J. Korb, have offered differing explanations of the mechanisms by 
which the U.S. military attained its influence in foreign and national security policy-
making.  
This line of inquiry started with Harold Dwight Lasswell, who cautioned in the 
early 1940s that the existence of a sustained external threat could magnify the military’s 
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role and turn democracies into garrison states.96 Louis Smith made one of the first serious 
attempts to map the rise of the military’s influence in American foreign policy after the 
end of World War II. WWII fundamentally changed the U.S. Military’s role in the 
formulation of foreign and national security policies, and, to a large extent, how the 
military related to civilian elites. The military became the dominant governmental agency 
in the formulation of foreign policy.97 The Cold War further enhanced the U.S. Military’s 
role in foreign policy. Writing during the height of the Soviet threat, Smith saw no danger 
of undue military influence. Instead, Smith urged coordinated national security and 
foreign policies, which should clearly state the military’s roles, functions, and missions, 
rather than leaving a policy vacuum that would allow the military to determine policies.98 
Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder argued the military, which was not attuned to 
mainstream values, became a pervasive and pernicious influence in American foreign 
policy. Sapin and Snyder, however, did not analyze why the U.S. military had become so 
influential.99  
Huntington, like Smith, did not see the struggle for civilian control over the 
military as being between the federal government and the military, but rather as a 
struggle between Congress and the executive branch, which resulted in subjective control 
over the military. This created opportunities for the military to play the executive and 
legislative branches against each other in order to pursue its desired policies.100 
Huntington advocated objective control, which kept the military focused on its military 
tasks and limited its political role to only providing advice. On the other hand, once the 
politician sets the goal, the soldier is free to determine how to best achieve it and civilians 
should not interfere with the military’s judgment. According to Huntington, allowing 
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military professionals autonomy within their own realm minimizes the danger that the 
military will intervene in politics by “rendering them politically sterile and neutral.”101 
Subjective control, the opposite of objective control, denies the existence of an 
independent sphere of purely military imperatives and “presupposes military participation 
in politics,” while allowing civilians to maximize their power by “civilianizing the 
military” – promoting senior military officers on the basis of their political beliefs.102 
Huntington’s normative theory has been criticized for various reasons. Eliot Cohen 
rejected the notion that political ends and military means could be clearly separated and 
cited cases in which political commanders interfered in “purely military” plans during 
times of war.103 
Richard Betts, in his book Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, examined 
only the post-WWII cases in which the U.S. military used force.104 His study is 
particularly helpful, as it attempted to tackle a research question similar to the one posed 
in this dissertation, namely: In the U.S. president’s decision on whether to use force, how 
has the military’s influence, relative to that of civilian advisers, varied since WWII? Betts 
defines influence as causing decision makers to do something they probably would not 
have done otherwise. He differentiates between direct and indirect influence. Direct 
influence flows from formal and explicit recommendations or control of operations, while 
indirect influence is exerted when soldiers attempt to control the framing of civilian 
decisions and limit their options through its monopoly on information.  
Betts concluded that disagreement between the military and civilians was much 
more likely when considering the amount of force and the mode of implementation, 
rather than whether to commit American forces at all. In neither of the wars fought by the 
 45 
U.S. between 1945 and 1975, nor during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, did the civilian 
leadership cave to the military’s demands. In decisions on whether to commit American 
armed forces, Betts found that military advisers were usually internally divided, and the 
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held views that were virtually identical to the 
dominant civilian attitude more than half the time. Regarding decisions on whether to 
escalate a conflict, no military adviser was less aggressive than the major civilian 
officials. According to Betts, soldiers have exerted the greatest leverage over decisions on 
whether to intervene during instances when they vetoed it. The U.S. military’s influence 
was highest when it was direct and negative. The military’s level of influence then 
proceeds in descending order: indirect and negative; indirect and positive; and direct and 
positive. Betts’s study concluded that the evidence does not support the stereotype of 
belligerent generals and admirals versus a pacific civilian establishment.105 The U.S. 
military, according to Betts, values control over operational command and tactics most, 
and then access to the president and autonomy over its internal organization and 
operations, more than direct influence over policy decisions.  
Jordan, Taylor, and Korb dedicate a chapter in their book American National 
Security to exploring the military’s role in the U.S. national security policy process.106 
Prior to WWII, it was only in wartime circumstances that the military significantly 
influenced the formation of national policy. For instance, the military’s influence in the 
policy-making process was evident during the occupation of the Philippines immediately 
after the Spanish-American War. In WWII, the necessities of war and the importance of 
logistical support and security in areas behind the front lines drove the services and 
Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department’s general staff to play a leading role 
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in developing war termination and postwar occupation policies. After WWII, the 
initiative in policymaking shifted away from the military establishment and back to the 
State Department. Compared with WWII, during the Korean War the theater 
commander’s autonomy to prosecute the war was significantly curtailed, as evidenced by 
General Douglas MacArthur’s firing. The U.S. military was nonetheless given the 
mission of conducting diplomatic negotiations to end the war, which further deepened the 
military’s involvement in national policy-making. 
Jordan, Taylor, and Korb concluded the military’s increased resources, size, and 
presence led to the expansion of its influence on the formulation and execution of 
national security policy. These authors, unlike Betts, believe access matters for the 
military. Informal meetings between senior military officers and presidents formed an 
independent channel through which the military could influence presidents without the 
secretary of defense interjecting his views. Following WWII, during international crises 
U.S. presidents in general actively sought the counsel of experienced military 
commanders who understood political objectives and the strategic realities on the ground. 
These authors evaluate the military’s influence by looking at its representation in formal 
institutions, the diplomatic missions it is tasked with, the overall structure of the national 
security apparatus, and the advisory role that military officials play for presidents.107 
President Eisenhower, due to his previous role as a five-star general and Supreme 
Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, accepted minimal military advice. Since the 
Kennedy years, however, retired officers have gained influence by serving as the military 
representative to the president. During the 1960s, the military significantly influenced 
U.S. policy toward Vietnam, but its influence remained subordinate to civilian views. In 
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the 1970s and 1980s, military officers continued to influence policy debates through their 
significant participation in various interdepartmental groups within the national security 
council (NSC) system and on the NSC staff.  
Despite the plethora of literature on civil-military relations in authoritarian and 
Communist countries, the scholarly work that directly tackles the issue of the military’s 
influence in foreign and national security policy-making in these countries is relatively 
scarce. 
In the book Civil-Military Relations under Gorbachev: The Struggle over 
National Security, Thomas Nichols and Theodore Karasik conclude that Soviet civilian 
and military leaders conferred and cooperated on a host of prosaic issues, but constantly 
struggled over military doctrine and national security policy. Thus, the authors conclude, 
“the issue is not policy; it is power.”108 The Party’s contested authority in military affairs 
had been a chronic and more fundamental problem in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev’s 
failure to dominate the military in the 1960s and Brezhnev’s unwillingness to oppose the 
military’s priorities in the 1970s heightened the Party leadership’s anxiety over its ability 
to control the military. Under Gorbachev, the Ministry of Defense and General Staff were 
divided over his “new thinking,” which in the military realm translated to reasonable 
sufficiency and thus limits on the military’s growth. Between 1987 and 1990, almost 
every major defense post in the Soviet Union had experienced significant turnover. 
However, tensions between Gorbachev’s inner circle and the military were so significant 
that even this personnel turnover did not solve the problem, since officers taking over 
senior positions were as inflexible as their predecessors. Gorbachev tried to enlarge the 
circle of those who could weigh in on defense policymaking by bringing in outside 
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opinions. Until the military’s monopoly on defense policy-making was broken, the 
military possessed the means and the will to subvert crucial aspects of military reform, 
and it frequently showed an inclination to do so, even when such actions directly 
subverted the Party line.109 
Dale R. Herspring, in his book The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, focused 
on individual decision-makers (in this case high-ranking military officers, namely the 
Chief of the General Staff and Defense Minister), their personalities, backgrounds, and 
relationships, in order to understand the Soviet military leadership’s role in the national 
security decision-making process.110 The Soviet Union’s historical record is littered with 
examples of Soviet military officers having major influence both within the armed forces 
and across the broader political spectrum. For example, Marshal Georgii Zhukov had 
considerable influence both within the military and on the evolution of Soviet military 
politics. Under most circumstances, the Soviet defense minister was the primary 
intermediary between civilians and the military. He represented the interests of the high 
command to the political leadership and in turn ensured that the political leadership’s 
decisions were effectively implemented. If the defense minister was a civilian and lacked 
either the technical or the bureaucratic expertise necessary to keep the General Staff in 
line, he could not be effective. The General Staff was the Soviet Union’s most important 
military structure. It was far more powerful than its American equivalent, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. If the chief of the General Staff strongly disagreed with the political leadership’s 
views and policies, and the latter was not strong enough to enforce its policies, a situation 
might develop similar to that of the early 1980s, when Ogarkov openly argued with the 
political leadership over the nature of East-West relations.  
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Herspring’s book is particularly useful in explaining the Soviet officer corps’ 
sense of reality and their views, differentiated from the Party, about how the Soviet 
Union should have been run. Sergei Akhromeyev, as Gorbachev’s Chief of the General 
Staff, was deeply concerned over the country’s failing economy and was willing to agree 
to a lower defense budget. He also recognized the value of arms control agreements to 
Soviet security, despite the fact that such agreements could potentially harm the 
military’s parochial institutional interests.  
Ilhan Uzgel, in a study of the Turkish military’s role in the formation and 
execution of Turkish foreign policy between the early 1990s and the early 2000s, 
concluded that its role in the making of foreign policy is directly linked with its place and 
role in domestic politics and society.111 With strong credentials in domestic politics, the 
Turkish military enhanced its autonomy and expanded its role in foreign policy, at a time 
when the military declared that internal threats (i.e., political Islam and ethnic 
secessionism) took precedence over external threats. 
 
Methodology, Measurement, and Analytical Challenges 
The following section examines the methodology this study employs, as well as 
measurement and analytical challenges this study encountered. 
 
Methodology 
Broadly speaking, the dynamics of the PLA’s mindset, its internal debates, the 
PLA’s own decision-making system, dissent and differences in policy positions, and 
agenda promoting behavior form a dynamic process that is largely categorized by 
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scholars studying Chinese foreign policy as a “black box.” Though speculation abounds, 
the inquiry into the PLA’s influence in China’s foreign and security policy-making has so 
far not been rigorously or systematically examined, because this black box is so 
impenetrable. China’s military system has remained closed not only to Western scholars, 
but also to most Chinese scholars. Moreover, interactions between the PLA and the 
civilian foreign affairs system are largely either undocumented or classified. The answers 
to the questions posed in this study are mostly buried in people’s minds, and are not 
found in documents or books. The challenge that China’s current political environment 
presents to scholars is compounded by the problem that official memoirs often contain 
“selected truths,” which does not challenge the official history or cause embarrassment to 
the government and the military.112 A designated writing team sanctioned by the CMC 
mostly wrote the memoirs of senior military leaders. For example, General Su Yu’s 
memoir was written four years after his death in 1984.113 Su’s memoir curiously did not 
discuss his accomplishments as a senior commander during the successful Huaihai Battle, 
due to the tense relationship between Su Yu and Deng Xiaoping and their competing 
claims regarding who actually commanded the Huaihai Campaign (November 1948 – 
January 1949). 
As a result of the dearth of archives, documentation, and written communications 
regarding the PLA’s thinking, Party-military relations, and the PLA’s bargaining with 
other policy actors, scholars drew quick conclusions that were often based on 
questionable assumptions, without serious investigation into the falsifiability of their 
conclusions. Additionally, speculation was often put forward as fact.114 The PLA’s 
bargaining behavior remains the least understood area of China Studies. Recognizing this 
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problem, some scholars stick to studying official statements, PLA Daily editorials, and 
published PLA writings, and treat the PLA as a unified voice in complete sync with the 
Party. Some focus on studying the Chinese government’s organizational charts, without 
examining the explanatory power of these sources. For instance, how do PLA officers 
deal with their civilian interlocutors? Links that exist on organizational charts do not 
necessarily mean efficient communication between two bureaucracies. Organizational 
charts certainly cannot reveal how differences in bureaucratic cultures, or the relative 
power of bureaucracies and personalities, facilitate or obstruct interagency interactions. 
Formal power structures represent prestige and influence in most but not all cases, 
as evidenced by Yang Baibing’s Politburo membership after the 14th Party Congress in 
1992. Actions and words are more discernible than intentions. Also, this approach of only 
focusing on “knowns” – written and public statements – will lead to an accurate reading 
of the façade, but an erroneous or seriously flawed understanding of the actual nature and 
dynamics of the PLA’s evolution, Party-military relations, the PLA’s role in foreign and 
security policies, and more broadly the trajectory of China’s foreign policy. Consequently, 
ill-advised policy prescriptions may be given, which are often more dangerous than 
inaction. Therefore, a balance has to be struck between pure reliance on the “knowns” 
and exploration of the “unknowns.”  
This study is based on more than 260 interviews conducted in China, which are 
complemented by memoirs, published personal accounts, secondary sources, and news 
and resources in the public domain. More than half of the interviews were conducted with 
active-duty and retired PLA officers, while the remaining discussions were with Chinese 
government officials, policy researchers in government think tanks and, to a lesser degree, 
 52 
academics. Thanks to my opportunity as a pre-doctoral research fellow at the Brookings 
Institution in 2013-14, interviews with a few former U.S. government and military 
officials, American experts on China, and Western-based Chinese scholars are also 
included. 
The vast majority of the over 130 active-duty and retired PLA officers 
interviewed participated in at least one aspect of the policy deliberations, debates, 
presentation, and implementation of at least one foreign or security policy in which the 
PLA played a role. The majority of these officers are between the ages of 30 and 65, 
although several officers over 65 were interviewed. Those interviewed possessed a 
military rank from colonel to lieutenant general at the time of interview (2011-14). 
Among the military interviewees, in terms of services, officers from the Second Artillery 
had the lowest representation, followed by those from the Air Force. A substantial 
number of these officers have known the author, who worked as a journalist in China 
beginning in the mid-1990s, and others had typically met the author multiple times. The 
interviews were conducted not with structured questionnaires, but rather would always 
cover questions related to the PLA’s political orientation in domestic politics, its role in 
policy-making, and its interactions with other actors. 
The study employs primarily qualitative case studies to assess the PLA’s 
influence in China’s foreign and security policy-making. The case study approach is 
necessary because a comprehensive data approach is untenable, partly because of China’s 
closed political environment and partly because of the natural discrepancy between words 
and motivation of any government or military. Process tracing is conducted for not only 
each of the three designated cases, but also for numerous smaller cases and used as 
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evidence to examine and assess the PLA’s mindset, Party-Military relations, and the 
bureaucratic bargaining process.    
 
Measurement 
The inescapable analytical challenge for academic research is how to precisely 
define and measure abstract, nonmaterial, and non-quantifiable concepts. This 
dissertation attempts to assess the PLA’s influence in China’s foreign and security policy-
making from 1978-2012, and therefore looks to assess “influence,” “political reliance,” 
and “effective control,” all of which are not only abstract, but are also elusive and 
subjective.  
There is no easy way to solve this measurement puzzle. The PLA’s influence can 
be assessed by observing the difference between what the PLA advocates prior to a 
policy decision and the policy outputs, as well as the initial policy preferences of the 
Party’s top leader and the civilian foreign affairs system, and then comparing these 
preferences to the policy outputs. In certain instances, direct evidence of the PLA’s 
preferences may not be readily apparent, in which case one must examine the options that 
best fit the PLA’s interests under the specific circumstances.  
The PLA’s influence under the construct of the Party-military relationship is 
determined by two components: the Party leader’s political reliance on the PLA, and the 
leader’s effective control over the PLA. When measuring political reliance, it is more 
manageable to examine the power landscape and rules of political bargaining in China’s 
top-level intra-Party politics. Therefore, variables that affect the degree to which a leader 
needs the PLA’s political support include: the stability, multiplicity, and authoritativeness 
 54 
of the leaders’ own power bases; coherence and fragmentation of the political opposition 
within and outside the Party; and crisis level or stakes (intense inter-Party rivalries and 
rifts that may split the Party, leadership succession, prosecution of major political leaders, 
and events that threaten the country’s overall national or political stability). These 
variables can be broken down into the following questions: 1. How important is the 
PLA’s political support to the political/policy positioning in intra-Party politics at the 
leadership level? In other words, will the PLA’s political support tip the balance during 
the process of political bargaining? 2. At the national level, is there a grave security threat 
that has made the use or threat of use of force necessary and imminent?  
 
Theoretical Challenges 
Analysts who precisely define “influence,” a great challenge in and of itself, 
would face a variety of theoretical challenges because “influence” has fuzzy edges. First, 
policy outcomes may not be produced immediately. Revisions of some policies may take 
considerable time and a complicated process to muddle. Should the PLA still claim credit 
if its desired policy outcome under its influence takes a significant time, possibly a 
decade and even decades, to emerge? Second, one should also be aware that values and 
goals, consistently desired and pushed by the PLA, could be internalized subconsciously 
by political elites and the public, without a clear link pointing to the PLA’s influence. 
Influence is more discernible in areas where bargaining behaviors are illustrated by 
public statements and evidenced by tangible actions. However, it would be flawed to 
believe the discernible “influence” is then greater. Third, influence over policymaking 
and policy implementation, which Lampton categorized as “policy output” (formulated 
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policy), and the “policy outcome” (actual effects of implemented policy), are sometimes 
hard to differentiate.115 As this study is concerned mostly with policymaking, it should be 
acknowledged that policy implementation cannot be organically separated from 
policymaking, since with respect to foreign and security policies, those who make the 
policies often have to implement them. Also, disagreements between bureaucracies 
regarding particular policies are often carried into the implementation stage, which may 
lead to a review, refinement, and sometimes reversion of policies. Therefore, 
policymaking often bleeds into policy implementation. 
The fourth challenge for this study is the lumping together of “foreign and 
security policy,” since diplomacy and security policies are hard to cleanly separate.116 
Defense policy is often the military component of foreign policy, and each could be the 
extension of the other when serving the same goal. That said, it should be recognized that 
the PLA has different levels of motivation to intervene in different foreign policy areas. 
For example, it probably has little interest in China’s climate change and clean energy 
negotiations, but has immense interest and important stakes in how to secure China’s 
energy supply, since this has implications for the PLA’s doctrine, defense posture, and 
military planning. 
Fifth, although this study will assess the PLA’s level of influence in a particular 
era, it should be recognized that in different policy areas the PLA is motivated by 
different degrees to exert influence, and the influence it exerts in one particular policy 
area, for example territorial disputes, does not necessarily translate into influence in 
another policy area, for example, arms control. In other words, the PLA’s influence 
varies across the different policy areas.  
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Finally, the level of influence the PLA exerts should be distinguished from the 
policy outcome. The PLA’s influence could in fact be exemplified in pushing China’s 
foreign policy both towards and away from a hawkish or dovish position. A high level of 
influence for the PLA does not necessarily mean a military run amok. By the same logic, 
a lesser degree of influence for the PLA should not necessarily be equated with a 
peaceful China. The top civilian leadership and foreign policy makers, as well as the 
military, can be either hawks or doves. 
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When studying the PLA’s influence on China’s foreign and security policy-
making, it is debatable whether the PLA is interested in exerting its influence on foreign 
policy at all. What drives and motivates the PLA to influence certain areas of China’s 
foreign and security policy-making but not others? The multitude of foreign policy areas 
means that the PLA cannot be interested in every one of them, if it is indeed interested at 
all. Which policy areas is the PLA interested in, and which ones do they feel particularly 
strong about? Does the PLA have a unified voice, or is it at least capable of having a 
unified voice in foreign policy positioning? 
In order to answer the above questions, I introduce the independent variable of 
“the PLA’s mindset.” By “the PLA’s mindset,” I refer to the PLA’s identity, values, 
interests, and outlook that are developed based on its historic traditions, war experiences 
and legacies, military characteristics, internalization of societal changes and the ongoing 
transformation to adapt to challenges posed by Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA). 
Second, the PLA’s mindset is also molded by its unique decision-making style, which is 
based on its organizational structure, process, and the unique characteristics and patterns 
of military thinking. I expand on the first aspect of the PLA’s identity in the section 
entitled three dynamics, and the second aspect in the sections, how the PLA makes 
decisions and circumstances when the PLA won’t consult.  
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To summarize the nature and main characteristics of the PLA since 1978, I argue 
that the PLA is by and large a professional military, with peculiar, though diminishing, 
characteristics as a CCP-dominated army.1 The Party demands the PLA’s total 
subordination: the “gun,” the instrument of violence at the Party’s disposal, should not 
have a mind of its own. The PLA and the Party, two of the longest-standing and most 
powerful institutions in China whose fates have been intertwined since their inception, 
still share many core interests and goals. Even in Mao’s era after 1949, the PLA arguably 
had a mindset distinctly different from the Party’s. Since 1978, the PLA, as an institution, 
has been undergoing a dramatic transformation. Its “mentality,” interests, and goals have 
been evolving according to its own trajectory and logic. The PLA’s role in China’s 
foreign policy-making process will depend to a large extent on where along the following 
three dimensions it is heading.  
 
Three Dynamics Inside the PLA 
 Three sets of contrasting dynamics in the PLA’s transformation will 
decide its motivation to intervene in the policy process: inward-oriented vs. outward-
oriented mentality; professionalization vs. politicization; and unity vs. the rise of inter-
service rivalries. The PLA’s mentality demonstrates both consistency, much of which has 
been molded by its historical legacy and past experiences or habits, and a dynamic and 
ever-changing character that challenges its traditional thinking. The PLA is an institution 
in rapid transition, and its transformation is taking place within a complicated polity.  
 
Dynamic One: Inward-oriented vs. Outward-oriented Mentality 
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To understand the PLA’s “introverted personality” or its “inward-oriented 
mentality,” one needs to go back to its history and traditions, and also look at its dual 
missions. The PLA was designed and built as a defensive force with the missions of 
maintaining both external and, probably more importantly, internal peace and stability. 
The dual nature of the PLA’s missions has led to the Chinese military’s dual 
“personality.” In this sense, the PLA has both “inward-oriented” and “outward-oriented” 
tendencies.  
 The PLA has an inherently “inward-oriented personality” or mentality (nei xiang 
xing). The PLA traditionally sees itself as “children of the people” (zi di bing). This self-
image exists not only because the majority of the first generation of the PLA officer corps 
were children of peasants, but also because it sees part of its legitimacy as coming from 
the recognition and acceptance of the people. The PLA’s legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Chinese people was a prerequisite for its military success during the War of Resistance 
Against Japanese Aggression and the Civil War that followed.2 In 1941-42, the Japanese 
army conducted five sweeping campaigns against China to “kill all, burn all, destroy all,” 
which caused the CCP’s Eighth Route Army to lose 100,000 soldiers due to casualties 
and desertion, and the population under the CCP’s control to fall from 44 million to 25 
million.3 The CCP, however, due to its popular support, was able to recruit local militias 
and armed peasants, thereby replenishing its ranks and allowing it to continue fighting.4 
The success of Mao Zedong’s guerrilla warfare was premised on receiving the support of 
the peasants living in rural areas – the “sea” in which the guerrillas needed to “swim.”5 
According to Mao, “without the constant and active support of the peasants…failure is 
inevitable.”6 This self-image affects the military’s self-prescribed role of being the 
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justified and responsible protector of the people and the state, which explains in domestic 
issues its tendency to support long-term political goals even at the expense of its own 
strength.7 
The way in which the PLA involves itself in China’s politics and policy-making 
process has a long history and tradition, which shapes the basic foundation of the PLA’s 
mandate and missions. From its inception, the PLA has been bestowed with the mission 
of protecting and strengthening the CCP’s hold on power, and thus due to its involvement 
in political affairs it is seen as “a peculiar armed force.”8 The PLA looked over and 
protected the CCP as it attempted to seize power from the Kuomintang (KMT) before 
1949. The majority of the PRC’s first generation of political leaders were first assigned to 
important military posts before being promoted to prominent political positions.9 Thus, 
for the first generation of CCP leaders, without the requisite military credentials one 
could rarely enhance his political standing. 
During the Mao era and a substantial part of the Deng era, the PLA was required 
to participate in Party politics and national policies, as this was considered part of 
fulfilling its mission. As Fang Zhu points out, “for the PLA officer corps, political 
participation was an expression of party loyalty, not a violation of military 
professionalism.”10 Although peripheral aspects of the PLA’s mission may change in 
response to China’s internal and external threats and the nation’s priorities, the 
foundation – participating in Party politics and national policies – remains the same and 
is rarely touched.  
Since the PRC’s founding, maintaining internal stability has always been an 
inherent part of the PLA’s mission. After 1949, the PLA was tasked with resisting 
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invasion by China’s foreign enemies and protecting China’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity against such potential invasions, though Mao differed from the professionally-
oriented officers with regard to which task was more important. Mao believed that the 
PLA was designated with diverse missions as “a fighting team, a work team, and a 
production team.”11 At the dawn of the PRC’s establishment, Mao talked about 
transforming “the 2.1 million-strong field army into a work team” and stated “the 53,000 
military cadres are not enough” for “the extremely vast new territory to be occupied” by 
the CCP.12 As Chairman of the Party, Mao assigned these missions to the PLA. The PLA 
was seen as the organization that the government could call upon to complete a task 
whenever a civilian agency fell short, from forging government agencies, to increasing 
agricultural production, and to handling emigration to remote regions of China. Mao 
called upon the PLA during each grave crisis.13  
Marshal Zhu De, the long-term Commander-in-Chief of the PLA and a 
professionally-oriented military leader, took a drastically different angle when talking 
about the PLA’s missions in 1949 and 1950. Zhu clearly believed that China faced 
menacing external threats and defined the PLA’s mission as resisting foreign 
aggression.14 Marshal Peng Dehuai, China’s first Defense Minister and also a 
professional soldier, described the PLA’s main missions during the post-1949 period as 
“liberating Taiwan and completing national reunification, maintaining domestic order, 
and defeating foreign invasions and protecting China’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.”15 Both marshals describe narrow visions of the PLA’s missions, focusing on 
the military’s role as security guard and “protector” against foreign invasion, which 
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stands in contrast with Mao’s expansive vision of the PLA as having a role in agricultural 
production and governance. 
The 1954 State Constitution articulated the principles that defined the PLA’s 
missions, which were reiterated in the 1982 State Constitution (in effect despite several 
revisions), stating that the PLA “belongs to the people” and emphasizing its mission as 
security provider (both points were emphasized more in the 1954 Constitution than in the 
1982 Constitution). The 1982 Constitution reiterated that the PLA “belongs to the 
people,” but in addition to the role of providing security to China and its people, the PLA 
is urged to “participate in national construction” and “work hard to serve the people,” 
probably because Deng intended to focus on economic development.16  
In contrast, during the Hu Jintao era, the PLA’s missions were redefined as the 
“three provides and one role,” which unprecedentedly highlighted the PLA’s position as a 
guarantor of the Party’s rule and enlarged its mission to safeguarding China’s national 
interests – a large portion of which are overseas – and ensuring “world peace.”17 Thus, 
the PLA’s internal mission has been consistently highlighted throughout the PRC’s 
history, while in the 2000s its mission became both more narrowly defined and explicitly 
focused on protecting the Party’s rule, and also increasingly centered on its external 
function. Past history and tradition, to a large extent, have molded the PLA’s 
“personality” and its perception of dual missions.   
 
“Inward-oriented” PLA: Characteristics and Political Orientation 
A typical inward-oriented PLA officer believes that the military’s internal mission 
is its primary mission; he/she is more concerned about safeguarding China’s internal 
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stability and ensuring its economic modernization, and sees the need to undertake gradual 
but genuine political reform as long as stability can be maintained. With regard to foreign 
policy, a typical inward-oriented PLA officer is much more guarded on core territorial 
issues that China has traditionally defined as core interests, namely Taiwan, Tibet, and 
Xinjiang; he/she likes to see international relations in black and white, in which China 
has consistently been victimized, looked down upon, and ganged up against, and the only 
way out of this predicament is for China to “take care of its own business” by sustainably 
strengthening its internal economic strength, political governance, and social 
development; and he/she does not believe that arms control agreements and multilateral 
cooperation/communication have any value. A typical inward-oriented PLA officer is not 
keen on developing military-to-military relations, is suspicious of the intentions of 
foreign militaries, and is hesitant about interactions with Western militaries for fear that 
the West will sow dissatisfaction and disunity inside the PLA, attempt to bring about 
“peaceful evolution,” and gather the PLA’s military intelligence. He/she often has little 
interest in learning foreign languages and distrusts those who are fluent in foreign 
languages.18 Those who have either real combat experience or the experience of being 
stationed for a significant period of time among combat troops who have been involved 
in extremely traumatic battles with foreign militaries tend to be inward-oriented.19  
“Inward-oriented” PLA officers’ primary focus on internal problems stems from 
the PLA’s orientation as “progressive moderates” in domestic politics. A well-respected 
retired PLA general’s confession left a deep impression on me as I started my field 
research in 2011. Knowing him for over a decade, I asked him: “General, what is on your 
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mind lately?” I thought he would discuss the recent tensions in the East China Sea or on 
the Korean Peninsula but heard a surprising answer: 
My pension. These days, I am really worried about my pension. China’s biggest problem 
lies in its house (domestic problems). Under Deng, China’s guideline was that “black cats 
or white cats, as long as they catch mice, are good cats.” Deng meant that it is good to get 
rich no matter what means one uses. Now, corruption runs rampant and power can be 
cashed out for, with the income gap widening drastically. Those in the second generation 
of the rich and powerful are filthy rich, though their wealth is obtained through illegal 
means. Therefore, unlike rich Americans reinvesting and expanding their enterprises, rich 
Chinese, worried about the illegality of the way they got rich, try to move their wealth 
abroad. Even if the Chinese government chooses not to hunt down the rich who 
accumulate wealth through illegal means, these people, insecure about their wealth, will 
try to send money abroad, which could trigger capital flight…With such problems and 
challenges simmering, economic and political reforms are continually kept on the 
backburner because of an overly hesitant leadership (under Hu). As a result, it is 
increasingly difficult to carry out these reforms, and the situation is made more difficult 
by China’s interest groups, which have become more entrenched. Against this backdrop, 
I indeed worry about my pension. Under these circumstances, how could China play 
chicken with the U.S.? On what basis can China play chicken with the U.S.?20  
 
This retired PLA officer’s worry was representative of the sense of grave crisis among 
the PLA officer corps.21 Despite the horrendous image of the PLA using live ammunition 
on unarmed student demonstrators in 1989, the PLA is the largest organized interest 
group in support of China’s economic and political reform agenda, aside from China’s 
rising middle class.22 There is a prevailing though unspoken consensus among the PLA 
officer corps that economic and political reforms are imperative for China’s stability. Put 
differently, stability is absolutely necessary for China, but according to many of the PLA 
officers such stability also has to be sustainable, which can only be obtained by reforming 
China’s political system. 
The PLA is generally open to all approaches to reforms, as long as stability is 
maintained. The sense of grave crisis prevalent in the PLA officer corps deepens the 
differentiation of the PLA from the Party. In the revolutionary era (1921-49), the Party 
represented an advanced ideology and ignited hopes for a modern and strong China. 
Since 1978, as China moves toward economic modernization and social pluralization, the 
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Party has faced increasing challenges to its legitimacy from an empowered society that 
began to see how China lagged behind the long-demonized capitalist world both 
economically and politically. The existing political structures the Party dominated could 
not effectively solve the problem of systemic corruption and social injustice. The Party’s 
crisis of legitimacy and authority in the 1980s was ameliorated by China’s economic 
miracle. However, as China’s society is increasingly empowered and its citizens become 
aware of their rights, the Party faces a delayed but probably more violent crisis if it 
chooses inaction.  
Both the Party and the PLA have recognized this looming crisis. The PLA, 
however, differs from the Party over the direction and pace of political reform. PLA 
officers are open to a wide range of political reforms, as long as they meet one absolutely 
necessary condition: the maintenance of China’s overall stability. The Party realizes it is 
faced with a crisis of governance and legitimacy, and therefore it recognizes that it must 
enact further political reforms, but it will still try to hold on to its power and 
unchallenged position in Chinese politics. The PLA officer corps has a deeper sense of 
crisis and urgency for reforms than the Party does, and does not believe the Party is 
moving quickly enough to enact reforms.  
Stability is repeatedly raised as the primary concern during any discussion of 
political reform. As some PLA officers suggested, the CCP could start with intra-party 
competition and move to inter-party competition: to maintain stability but weed out 
corruption, all officials who wish to be put up for promotion would disclose their 
personal finances, while those who refuse financial disclosure could serve in their current 
positions until retirement, as a 2012 internal study conducted by the PLA suggested.23 
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The “Singapore Model” is most frequently cited as the ideal model for China’s future 
political reform. Under such a scenario, China would maintain single-party rule under the 
CCP but would also have rule of law, efficiency, a clean government, social justice, 
property rights, and human rights. However, PLA officers are open to supporting more 
drastic political reforms, including electoral democratic reform, as long as stability is 
maintained and the new political system is sustainable in the long run. The PLA officers I 
interviewed are well aware of the importance and urgency of launching political reform. 
However, they are equally aware of the danger of undermining CCP rule during this 
process. As one senior PLA officer said, “China will die if (political) reform fails to 
proceed; but (the supremacy of) the Party will die if (political) reform proceeds (bu gaige, 
wangguo; gaige, wangdang).”  
The tradeoff between preserving the CCP’s primacy or even survival and 
undertaking political reforms in order to bolster China’s fundamental stability is a 
profound dilemma the military has to face. However, it is clear that the PLA will side 
with the nation rather than the CCP if hard-pressed. As one senior PLA officer said, “the 
Party is so corrupt and the income gap in society is so large. Nine out of ten officials are 
corrupt. Almost all officials dredge for money wantonly. It is a matter of time until 
corruption kills the Party and the nation (if this is not stopped). By then, even the military 
cannot be kept from damage.”24 That said, it would be utterly wrong to conclude that the 
PLA is likely to initiate a coup or support a rebellion to overthrow the CCP, as that would 
fundamentally contradict the PLA’s nature, tradition, and professionalism. It is 
reasonable to infer that the PLA would prefer to support a moderate, reform-minded top 
leader. Such a leader would have a politically progressive reform agenda, and would also 
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have the capacity to carry out his agenda while simultaneously maintaining stability and 
increasing prosperity. The PLA is less inclined to support a radical or conservative top 
leader who tries to strengthen the Party’s control at all costs.   
The PLA’s political orientation of being progressive moderates in China’s 
domestic politics comes from both the PLA’s self-perceived image as “people’s children” 
or protectors of the state, as explained above, and from the elitism deeply buried in the 
PLA officer corps. An active-duty senior military officer articulated the PLA’s self-
perceived role as “grown-up children who safeguard their parents’ safety” as he said, 
“The PLA’s mission is to protect China’s security. China’s security includes both internal 
security and external security. Therefore, (safeguarding) China’s political stability and 
(ensuring) political system reform is part of the military’s mission.”25 
It is not rare for senior PLA officers to take a great interest in studying potential 
political reforms in China. General Liu Yazhou, Political Commissar of the PLA National 
Defense University, even quietly commissioned a study on the different possible paths of 
China’s political reform before Xi Jinping officially took power as China’s top leader. Xi 
favored such a study, expressed support for this task force, and encouraged it to present 
its findings to the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC).26 This unpublished study 
concluded that China should introduce intra-Party competition and gradually transition to 
inter-Party competition. This study also recommended innovative measures for advancing 
governance reform while minimizing political instability by advocating that: all officials 
should report their assets to the government and could choose to return illegal assets to 
the government without retributions; and those who accurately report their assets would 
be allowed to proceed along the promotion track while those who refuse to do so would 
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retire from their positions within a given period.27 General Liu Yuan, son of the former 
Chinese leader Liu Shaoqi, was also closely associated with progressive intellectuals such 
as Zhang Musheng, who supported China’s political reforms but insisted on conducting 
such reforms while protecting the CCP’s supremacy among all parties, as China officially 
has eight “democratic parties.”28 General Liu Yazhou and General Liu Yuan may 
disagree over how China should proceed along the path of political reform, but they have 
one conviction in common – China badly needs to push forward deep economic and 
political reforms.29 
Wang Yang, the former governor of Guangdong Province who became China’s 
Vice Premier in 2013, has also been identified as one of the reform-minded senior 
government officials who have kept a very close relationship with the officer corps.30 
More importantly, PLA officers recognized that the most serious security threat China 
faces is systematic corruption caused by the lack of progress in political reform, which 
many worry will eventually topple the CCP and cause irreparable damage to Chinese 
society.31 However, they are dissatisfied with political leaders’ inertia and inaction, 
growing interest groups that serve the privileged and the wealthy, rampant corruption, an 
increasingly wide income gap, and pervasive civil unrest. The PLA officer corps, 
however, does not favor radical destabilizing reforms such as those carried out by the 
Soviet Union under Gorbachev. 
The Tiananmen Incident marked a drastic inflection point for the PLA. Seven 
generals, all first-generation military leaders including a former Defense Minister and 
former Chief of the General Staff, explicitly wrote to Deng to express their opposition to 
sending troops to Beijing.32 Current-duty commanders such as Maj. Gen. Xu Qinxian, 
 76 
who led the renowned 38th Army, chose to defy direct orders and were eventually court-
martialed.33 Maj. Gen. Liu Liankun, the most senior PLA officer to defect to Taiwan and 
become an informant for Taiwanese intelligence, explained that one of his motives to 
defect was his disappointment with the fact that he could not help save Maj. Gen. Xu 
without sinking himself politically.  
The 138 interviews I conducted with PLA officers indicate that these PLA 
officers are not in the PLA’s minority. Rather, they represent the moderate and politically 
progressive majority of the PLA officer corps who could not and would not speak up on 
this topic but maintain a strong conviction on the necessity of reforming China’s political 
system. The vast majority of PLA officers are steadfast supporters of China’s gradual 
political reform, as they resist supporting abrupt and radical reforms, which they worry 
may destabilize China and ultimately work against the purpose of reform. Many of them 
believe a premature and ill-planned radical movement, such as the Tiananmen student 
demonstrations, though well-intentioned, would set back China’s political reform for 
decades. Nonetheless, it would be a step too far to conclude that the PLA would instigate 
a rebellion to push forward the reform agenda or even support an attempt to overthrow 
the CCP. This would go against the PLA officers’ professional instincts.  
Having established that the majority of PLA officers are “progressive moderates” 
with regard to China’s domestic politics, it is important to understand why this is so. First, 
the PLA’s “progressive moderate” tendencies result from its elitism. As Roman 
Kolkowicz concludes, “an elitist value system” is a universal characteristic of most 
military establishments.34 Elitism has been a trait of the PLA officer corps since 1949, 
despite the first-generation officers’ low level of education, and the PLA’s elitism 
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invariably increased with the specialization process. By 1949, most of the social and 
economic elites had fled to Taiwan with the KMT government. As a result, the most 
knowledgeable and competent personnel in the CCP, besides a small number of elites 
who remained after the KMT fled, were those who had been serving in the military and 
possessed managerial experience as a result of their fighting careers and interactions with 
peasants. 
A large segment of China’s elites joined the military and formed the core of the 
subsequent generations of the PLA officer corps, especially from the 1950s to the 
1970s.35 They were attracted to the PLA by the higher standard of living, higher social 
status and prestige and, most importantly, they wanted to avoid the hardships of the 
countryside and could be exempted from such hardships by joining the military. Because 
the military was one of the best-paid and most honorable vocations from the 1950s to the 
1970s, that generation’s elites joined the military.36  
Another important phenomenon in the 1950s-1970s was that children and 
grandchildren of the first generation of PLA officers typically wanted to join the military. 
Compared to those with a non-military background, these children and grandchildren of 
the first generation of the PLA officers were more easily recruited because of their 
parents’ connections. This segment of PLA officers was a much smaller slice of the 
officer corps but was often promoted much faster than those from other backgrounds, and 
often benefited from opportunities to pursue further education and training, and even the 
ability to study overseas. These people, who grew up in a socially secluded military 
family compound (jundui dayuan) and in a relatively well-off environment, often 
demonstrated strong personalities and tended to be more independent-thinking, outspoken, 
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rebellious, confident, and even arrogant. The PLA officers whose family members were 
also in the PLA, and who grew up in a military environment, also tended to be 
proponents of gradual political reforms because of a firmer sense of ownership of 
China.37 General Liu Yazhou wrote: “In China, the military is a force for reforms…The 
majority of the real elites and the real reformers are in the military.”38 
Additionally, PLA officers’ detachment from general society contributes to their 
realistic assessment of China’s development. PLA officers were often able to maintain a 
higher standard of living and greater social privileges than average civilians throughout 
the 1950s-1970s.39 That exclusivity and separation from society (military officers often 
lived apart from the general society and their living space and working space were 
guarded and therefore separated from civilian society) provided PLA officers with a 
relatively detached position to view China’s catastrophic radicalism under Mao from a 
more critical perspective.40 The protection ensured by physical separation and a 
privileged social status, paired with its mission of safeguarding the nation, possibly made 
PLA officers less “contaminated” by society’s radical shifts, thereby instilling a more 
moderate mentality.  
Finally, PLA officers, especially high-ranking ones, often have more access to 
information, which allows them to understand what is really going on in China. In China, 
access to information increases as one’s political standing rises. The PLA also has its 
own information collection and reporting channels. This access to information often 
made the military more aware of the severity of China’s problems.41 PLA officers in 
general, especially the first generation, mostly come from family backgrounds of 
peasants. Their children, who were much better educated than they were and enjoyed a 
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much more prestigious life in cities, tended to join the military in the 1950s-1970s. These 
third and fourth generations of PLA officers were still connected to peasants or the 
poorest segments of society through relatives and familial ties. When China’s countryside 
suffered through a massive famine and fits of radicalization in the 1950s-1960s, these 
officers knew from their families the plight of the peasants and poor Chinese citizens. 
Therefore, the PLA officers, though often relatively detached from society, understood 
China’s social problems, which made them more aware of threats to China as a nation.   
The PLA was not immune to the relentless political campaigns, the government’s 
struggles to govern, and the widespread persecution of innocent people that occurred 
during the Mao era. The radical elements in the military tortured, imprisoned, and 
persecuted numerous military officers, ranging from Marshals Peng Dehuai and He Long, 
to soldiers such as Guo Xingfu, who was a model of military professionalism in the 
1950s. In some provinces such as Guangxi and Yunnan, the military committed atrocities 
against Chinese civilians. This part of history has not been whitewashed, as “everyone 
coming out of it smells fishy” as one scholar put it.42 During the late 1970s, the PLA was 
derogatively called the “military faction,” which was indicative of people’s lost trust in 
the PLA. However, one has to make a value judgment by standing in the current of 
history rather than out of it when evaluating how the PLA acted in comparison with the 
general population. It is not a coincidence that despite internal divisions, factional 
struggles and certain radical elements, the majority of the PLA resisted those who 
attempted to seize power in the 1960s and firmly supported the Gang of Four’s arrest in 
the 1970s.43 The PLA firmly supported Deng’s policies of economic reform and opening 
in the 1980s, despite the fact that its own institutional interests were harmed as Deng put 
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military modernization on the backburner.44 The PLA’s past behavior was consistent with 
its progressive and moderate political orientation in domestic politics. 
PLA officers broadly recognized and understood China’s serious domestic 
challenges, and from this realization concluded that China needed gradual political 
reform. This conclusion might also come from the common characteristics the PLA 
shared with its Western counterparts of being cautious, pessimistic, and realistic.45 Unlike 
the powerful or rich who may have a lot to lose as a result of any meaningful reforms, the 
PLA’s relative detachment from China’s economic life has contributed to its officers’ 
more sober realization of the severity of problems China has been facing.46 The majority 
of the PLA officer corps has a strong sense of crisis not only in terms of military security 
but also in terms of China’s fundamental internal stability.47 As one active-duty PLA 
officer warned, “China’s prosperity would be like skyscrapers built on sand if gradual 
political reform is perpetually postponed.”48  
Thus, the majority of the PLA officer corps supports gradual but deep reforms to 
China’s political system in order to avoid a drastic and perhaps violent revolution. They 
do not reject the Western democratic model, but their vision of political reform is not 
constrained by an existing liberal democratic model. Their bottom line is that China 
needs to undertake political reforms that make the system fair and just, ensure that it is 
not flawed by design, and provide a sustainable basis from which the Chinese people’s 
needs for security and development can be met.  
As “progressive moderate” in China’s domestic politics, with a profound sense of 
crisis, the PLA is preoccupied with its internal mission. Political system reform many 
PLA officers privately advocated must simultaneously maintain internal stability. Some 
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officers believe that addressing external threats can wait until economic and political 
reforms are carried out successfully and that, for such a core mission of enacting 
fundamental system reforms that may harm the interests of the privileged and powerful 
and thus possibly bring great turmoil to society, the PLA is the force to stand firmly 
behind any such significant domestic reforms.49 Another former PLA officer who used to 
work in the Central Military Commission (CMC) office said,  
The crisis China is facing now is like trying to re-route an out-of-control train before it 
reaches The Cassandra Crossing [The Cassandra Crossing is a 1976 British 
disaster/thriller film in which a plague-carrying train had to be re-routed via the 
Cassandra Crossing, where it will plunge into oblivion]. I believe that the PLA should 
play the role of “political stabilizer,” ensuring that stability is maintained and that the 
rules of the game are enforced during China’s trial of democratization, which could start 
with experiments of democratic competition at the regional level and then expand to the 
national level. The PLA would take down whoever does not follow the rules (of allowing 
democratic competition). Internal security should be the most important task for the 
military. Other issues are all nonsense. China could make compromises with Russia, 
India, and those around the South China Sea because the biggest problem for China is 
internal stability.50 
 
The PLA’s current promotion mechanism favors inward-oriented officers, since 
foreign language proficiency and training in foreign military institutions do not 
significantly help officers’ evaluations during the promotion process.51 This was 
evidenced by the result of a three-year survey conducted by the PLA National Defense 
University of its prestigious commander class, composed of 254 division-level officers 
who enrolled from 2000 to 2002, which indicated that the majority of these officers 
cannot speak a foreign language.52 This parallels the pattern of official promotion in the 
government system. Officials who occupy the highest positions in the government and 
ultimately in the Party begin their careers as local officials who are solely focused on the 
growth of local GDP and what their next position will be. These officials often have 
neither interest nor experience in foreign affairs. Foreign policy is something that they 
learn after stepping into a high-level position where part of their portfolio includes 
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foreign affairs. China’s highest-ranking military leaders between 1978 and 2014 share a 
trait in common: they are neither interested nor experienced in foreign affairs. It is often 
those at the second-highest level of military leadership – those below the members of the 
CMC and at the level of deputy commander of a major military region (fuda junqu ji) – 
who have more knowledge of and interest in foreign affairs, or who have some kind of 
vision about where the PLA should head. The incumbent group of top military leaders, 
however, often view officers who possess such vision and knowledge and are senior 
enough to potentially advance onto the first tier of military leadership, as threats.53 
 
“Outward-oriented” PLA: Characteristics and Political Orientation 
A typical outward-oriented PLA officer believes that the military should focus on 
protecting China’s boundary of interests – China’s political and economic interests that 
extend well beyond its borders – rather than its territorial borders; he/she is motivated to 
act strongly depending on the scope of military threats posed by other militaries; he/she 
often sees the U.S. as a military threat but does not believe a war with the U.S. is 
inevitable since the U.S. may change its own thinking and calculations; he/she believes in 
concepts such as soft power and military diplomacy, and that cooperation and 
engagement with the U.S. and other militaries could benefit the PLA’s own development 
and China’s security environment; he/she admires a strong and professional military, but 
understands the weakness and constraints of the U.S. military under its own political 
system as well as the fears a rising China could arouse among its neighbors; he/she is 
more receptive to proposals for the PLA to take on burden-sharing and leadership 
responsibilities internationally; he/she is assertive in expanding China’s sphere of 
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influence and in gaining the same rights as those possessed by other militaries; and he/she 
often values foreign language skills, foreign travel, international conferences, and 
training opportunities, meets visiting foreign military officers in order to learn from and 
understand others, often thinks analytically, and could easily empathize with another 
person or country’s view. 
The PLA as a whole has become more outward-oriented since the early 1990s. In 
2013, the PLA conducted five joint exercises with the U.S., exceeding all previous joint 
exercises with the U.S. combined. As of April 2012, the PLA has sent 1,425 military 
observers to conflict zones, and 80 military observers are routinely stationed abroad. This 
is a marked increased since 1990, when China sent military observers abroad for the first 
time, sending five.54 In 2012, China sent a total of 2,000 Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
personnel abroad, making it the largest contributor of PKO personnel among the 
Permanent Five (P5) members of the United Nations. The PLA Navy (PLAN) has 
established a high-sea escort task force to protect Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kong 
merchant ships against piracy in the Gulf of Aden.  
Why has the PLA become increasingly outward-oriented since the 1990s? There 
is no single answer to this question. One of the reasons for this shift is the fact that PLA 
officers have been undergoing a generational shift. As more PLA officers born in the 
1940s, 1950s, and increasingly 1960s rise to the military leadership, their own 
experiences of witnessing China’s opening-up and subsequent economic development 
have undoubtedly shaped their worldviews. Such PLA officers display more openness 
and a more global perspective, as compared to the previous generations of officers who 
fought the Japanese and then the bloody civil war, and as a result had a deeper memory of 
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the humiliations foreign powers forced on China. Additionally, technologies such as the 
Internet, cell phones, Tencent qq,55 and Weibo56 have fundamentally changed Chinese 
society by connecting it more closely than ever to the outside world. Many of these 
officers’ children have been studying and living abroad since the 1990s, which forms a 
powerful personal link for these officers to the outside world. Increasingly outward-
looking and offense-oriented, these officers respond to strategies and doctrines that have 
such characteristics.  
The PLA’s military strategy in Mao’s era was focused on “People’s War,” in 
which the PLA was instructed to prepare to “fight an early, large, and nuclear war.”57 
Mao introduced the strategic guideline of “active defense and luring enemies in deep” in 
1965 and reinforced this operational doctrine in 1969.58 Under the “people’s war” 
concept, the PLA would actively abandon economic and industrial centers and instead 
retreat to China’s hinterland to defeat foreign invasions.  
General Su Yu first challenged the strategy of “people’s war” in 1979, coining the 
term “people’s war under modern conditions.”59 But the change in military doctrine was 
not fully launched until General Song Shilun in 1980, then the president of the Academy 
of Military Sciences, took it on with help from General Li Jijun. In a report entitled 
Advice on Strategic Guideline Issues that Deng endorsed in October 1980, they 
advocated dropping “enticing enemies to our hinterland” but keeping “active defense.”60 
China’s official military strategy did not change into “people’s war under modern 
conditions” until 1985. The change in the PLA’s military strategy in the mid-1980s 
essentially just updated instead of replaced the strategy of “people’s war” by prescribing 
solutions to challenges from mechanized (jixiehua) warfare. The concept of drawing 
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enemies deep into China, however, was fundamentally replaced by the strategy of 
intercepting and pushing the enemy’s aggression away from China’s territory or “frontier 
defense.”61 
In the 1990s, the PLA further transformed its military doctrine to “local wars 
under modern high-tech conditions,” devised by General Zhang Zhen, which was 
reworded during the Hu era to “local wars under informationized conditions.”62 The 
1990-91 Gulf War was an inflection point for the PLA, driving a drastic paradigm shift in 
its military strategy and doctrines. Since then, the Kosovo War, the Georgian war, and the 
Afghanistan war repeatedly forced the PLA to draw disturbing conclusions: without high-
tech weaponry, information-based command and control systems, and a military that 
could undertake joint operations, the PLA would face the risk of being quickly defeated 
by a technologically superior enemy during a short, local war. Precision guided missiles, 
“global hawks,” and other high-tech weaponry supported by satellites and information 
systems could allow enemies to penetrate China’s defenses without sending a large army 
to its border.63 Since then, active defense has still been still invoked to define the PLA’s 
operational military strategy, but in actuality its content has been revamped to include the 
thinking of defense through offense. Although the PLA is said to follow a national 
military strategy of “active defense,” the nominal defensive strategy does not exclude 
offensive tactics such as preemptions and other offensive operations.64 General Zhang 
Qinsheng, Former 1st Ranking Deputy Chief of General Staff, wrote:  
Being active refers to emphasis on war preparation and offensive operations in battles 
and war-fighting, and alternatively, to accomplish the goal of strategic defense through 
tactical offense. It has two most distinct characteristics: first, combine strategic defense 
with tactical and war-fighting offense organically, which means the general goal is for 
defense, but actual combat operations are not limited to defense but take form of active 
offensive operations in strategic defense; second, strategic defense in due time leads to 
strategic counterattacks and strategic offense, or in another word to fully take advantage 
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of beneficial situation created by strategic defense and launch strategic counterattack and 
change the defense into strategic offense till winning the war.65 
 
The PLAN’s strategic focus became the most forward- and outward-looking of all of 
China’s military services, shifting from the “near-coast defense” strategy adopted in the 
Mao era, to the “near-seas active defense” strategy in 1985, thanks to Admiral Liu 
Huaqing’s fierce lobbying, and then to the “far-seas operations” strategy by the mid-
2000s.66  
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) started the transition at a considerably slower pace 
than the PLAN. Prior to the 1980s, the PLAAF clearly adhered to a principle of “staying 
within Chinese territory and never going to air zones above the high seas.”67 In 1994, the 
PLAAF conducted the first-ever large-scale exercise of airborne offensive battles in 45 
years. In 2004, the CMC approved the PLAAF’s first-ever service-specific strategic 
concept, which clearly suggested a greater emphasis on offense: “Integrate air and space; 
be simultaneously prepared for offensive and defensive operations.”68 In 2008, the 
PLAAF made it official that it is transitioning from its traditional role as a supportive, 
localized and defensive force with a focus on homeland air defense toward a strategic air 
force with defensive/offensive missions.69 The PLAAF further set its eyes on space-based 
informationized systems to “enhance the capability to fight both in the air and in 
space.”70 In 2009, General Xu Qiliang, PLA Air Force Commander, claimed the PLAAF 
is pursuing an air-space, offense-defense strategy.71 More radical air force analysts like 
Dai Xu openly advocated for the PLAAF to pursue the capability to “defend against 
enemies 4,000 kilometers away” from Chinese territory and “once our enemies shoot the 
first bullet, we push the battleground back to its homeland.”72 Space, deep sea, and cyber 
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operations have also caught the PLA’s imagination and are increasingly treated as 
frontiers of China’s strategic interest. 
As examined above, China’s evolving strategies and doctrines kept pushing the 
PLA’s mission outward both in geography and in dimension. What lies at the heart of 
these transformations is the fundamental change in China’s national interests and 
priorities as well as its threat perception. During the Mao era, a purely defensive strategy 
that focused on winning wars by luring the enemy deep into China was only viable since 
China had little to lose inside its border. As China modernizes and develops its economy, 
allowing the destruction of its prosperous eastern coastal region would be similar to 
losing the engine of a running train, and as a result Mao’s strategy is no longer viable. As 
China globalizes, protecting sea lines of communication (SLOC) that its trade passes 
through and its citizens and businesses from wars and chaos have also become a vital 
interest. Zhang Wenmu, a Chinese geopolitical thinker, first raised the concept of 
“security boundary,” defined as a nation’s security concerns over all of its national 
interests, including those beyond its own borders. He argues that “China’s national 
interests – writ large – are especially relevant to the nation’s economic development, and 
may not only involve all the regions of the world but could even include outer space.”73  
This “extroverted,” outward-oriented tendency is in the PLA’s DNA due to 
China’s irreversible linkages with the rest of the world. The PLA’s logic is the same as 
Captain Alfred T. Mahan’s, as he explained how the changing globe justified the 
strengthening of American naval power in 1895, stating, “the world has grown smaller” 
and “positions formerly distant have become to us of vital importance from their 
nearness.”74 China’s core interest in continuing economic modernization, which relies on 
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global trade and securing SLOCs as strategic “lifelines,” as well as the RMA as a global 
military trend, have together forced the PLA to be more outward-looking. This has 
continuously transformed the PLA’s “personality” and its perception regarding its 
mission, and forced it to become more “outward-oriented” and focused on preparing 
militarily for deterring and countering external threats. This has also greatly incentivized 
the PLA to be more involved in foreign and security policy-making. 
As the PLA undergoes this generational shift, it is more likely that the inward-
oriented “personality,” strongly ingrained especially in the first and second generation of 
PLA officers, will be gradually superseded by an outward-oriented mentality. There is no 
consensus within the PLA as to whether internal or external threats should take priority. 
“Before 1990, the internal mission weighed a lot more than external threats. The 1990s, 
starting with the Gulf War in 1991, was a transitional period for the PLA. Now (2014), 
external threats weigh more on the PLA’s mind than the internal mission,” one senior 
PLA officer commented.75 However, will the “inward-oriented” personality of the PLA 
disappear in the long run? It is premature to conclude that the PLA will definitively 
become an outward-oriented military due to changes in its strategies, doctrines, and the 
country’s expressed needs. Perceptions, characteristics, traditions, culture, and values, 
encapsulated in the word “personality,” are sticky and have a time-lagging factor. Other 
reasons to be less certain about the PLA’s outward-oriented “personality” include: a large 
percentage of recruits are still from rural regions; and most PLA officers concentrate on 
training, exercises, and operational movements in their daily work, which leaves them 
little time and space and does not incentivize them to think about strategy and study other 
militaries.76 Also, the lack of engagement in wars or conflicts with foreign militaries 
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further contributed to the endurance of the PLA’s inward-oriented “personality.” This 
inward-oriented mentality, cultivated throughout the development of PLA officers’ 
careers, has been prevalent among senior officers.77 That said, while it may take a long 
time, the PLA will inevitably become more outward-looking.  
 
Dynamic Two: Professionalization vs. Politicization 
Professionalization 
Western analysts such as Ellis Joffe and Harlan W. Jencks have pointed out that 
the PLA has acquired the “basic features of professionalism.”78 Even during the Cultural 
Revolution, when the PLA was largely free of political controls, the PLA’s 
professionalism and its basic values, such as discipline, commitment to national unity, 
and “serving the people,” constituted a countervailing force against radicalization as well 
as the impulse to seize control of the state. Before the PLA officer corps, led by Marshal 
Ye Jianying, obtained the support of Hua Guofeng (Mao’s official successor after the 
Gang of Four’s arrest in 1976), General Li Jijun proposed the idea of “advising by use of 
force” (bingjian).79 According to this proposal, the PLA would have taken down the 
Gang of Four and forced Hua’s hand, in essence advocating a classic military coup. The 
PLA leaders themselves ruled out Li’s idea, on the grounds that such actions ran against 
the PLA’s nature.80 Deng, after becoming the paramount leader of China, relieved 
himself of military posts such as Chief of the General Staff and took on the position of 
Chairman of the CMC, a position meant to be occupied by a political leader. These 
instances of PLA officers demonstrating such self-restraint came from a deeply ingrained 
belief in generations of PLA officers, an indication of their professionalism, that they can 
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never become Yuan Shikai, a warlord who overthrew the Qing Dynasty’s last emperor 
but later appointed himself China’s new emperor. 
Since 1978, the PLA has become a professional army with some peculiar 
characteristics. The most noticeable change in the PLA since 1978 has been the emphasis 
on its professionalization, heralded by the rise of its basic education and professional 
military education (PME) level, the regularization of training and exercises, and the 
institutionalization of a method of promotion that favors expertise, experience, rotation, 
and younger age. 
Harlan W. Jencks believed that the nature of modern warfare raised the 
requirement for military professionalism in all countries.81 The PLA has been forced to 
adapt to the rapid development of RMA and promote a group of younger professional 
officers who understand modern warfare and can master relevant weaponry and 
command and control systems.82 Ellis Joffe believed that China’s post-Deng leaders no 
longer commanded the same political authority as Mao or Deng, which further reinforced 
the need to strengthen the PLA’s professionalism.83  
Samuel Huntington defined three characteristics for professional soldiers: 
expertise, corporate spirit, and responsibility.84 Although there has been an internal 
debate within China since 1949 about “red vs. expert,” or in other words politicization vs. 
professionalization, since 1985 a consensus has been established, and since 1993 
consolidated, that the PLA should move in the direction of military modernization, which 
inevitably requires professionalization of the PLA officer corps.85 Among the three 
characteristics Huntington mentioned, the PLA emphasized expertise the most, which it 
believes will only be mastered “through systematic and standardized military education 
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and training.”86 As You Ji points out, expertise and management skills have become 
important criteria for PLA officer promotion.87 PLA officers’ expertise is not only 
exemplified by advanced education and PME, but also by experience serving in combat 
and non-combat operations such as disaster relief, multilateral joint exercises, and anti-
piracy operations.88 
The most visible index of the PLA’s professionalization, though not necessarily 
the most indicative, is the education level of officers. In 1949, 68 percent of PLA officers 
did not have an elementary school-level education (Grade 6 in the U.S.).89 In 1980, 9 
percent of PLA officers had an educational level above college (three-year college) while 
56.9 percent had an education above professional schools (between high school and 
college) and 34.1 percent below Grade 12.90 In 2008, 85 percent of PLA officers had an 
education level above a three-year college, among whom 66 percent had a four-year 
university bachelor degree (though half of them achieved the bachelor degree through 
long-distance learning and night schools instead of enrollment in a university) and 10 










Table 2.1: PLA Officers’ Education Level (1949-2008) 
PLA Officers’ Education Level 1949 1953 1959 1980 2008 
Elementary School (Grade 1-3) 
and Below 
68% 25.71% 2.2% - - 
Elementary School (Grade 4-6)  32% 39.02% 32.7% - - 
Middle School (Grade 9)  - 25.71% 48.6% 56.9% - 
High School (Grade 12) - 7.92% 11.9% 34.1% 15% 
Professional School Education - - - 9% 20.4% 
University - 2.32% 4.6% - 56.1% 
Graduate School - - - - 8.5% 
Average Level of Education 
(years) 
5.28 - - 10.04 14.06 
Sources: Liu Yan, “Course of PLA Officers Improving Educational/Cultural Structure,” dangshi bolan, 
Issue 11 (2008); Wang Fa’an, Strategy of Strengthening the Military in China’s Peace and Development: 
Contemporary Military Affairs of China, Volume II (Beijing: zhong guo she hui ke xue chu ban she, 1989); 
Contemporary Political Affairs of China, Volume I (Beijing: dang dai zhong guo chu ban she, 1994).  
 
As a result, the average education PLA officers received in their lifetime was 5.28 years 
in 1949, 10.04 years in 1980 and 14.06 years in 2008. This means that the PLA took 30 
years to push its officers’ education level from grade six to grade ten and another 30 
years to push their education level from grade ten to that of a sophomore in college.92 
According to the “Regulation on Appointment and Relieving of Positions of Active-duty 
Officer” issued in 2002, all officers promoted above the level of regiment must have an 
education level of a three-year college or above.93 
PLA officers’ increased education level over the past 30 years is a notable 
achievement, but it should be treated with some skepticism. First, a large percentage of 
officers with college or university degrees obtained their degrees through a self-learning 
testing procedure, night schools, or long-distance education, which is qualitatively 
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different than someone who graduated after full participation in college life. A three-year 
survey conducted by the PLA National Defense University (NDU) concluded that 90 
percent of the 254 members of NDU’s division-level commander class from 2000 to 
2002 only had an education level of junior high school (Grade 8) or high school (Grade 
12) before joining the military, but obtained a college-level education through self-testing, 
long-distance learning, and in-service training.94 Among those surveyed, only 18 percent 
obtained a college-level education in science and technology.95 Second, a large 
percentage of officers obtained their degrees from professional military schools, which 
are substandard at best when compared to civilian colleges and universities at the same 
level.96 In other words, the requirements and rigor of PME schools are much lower than 
civilian universities.97 Third, teachers and instructors in military command academies 
rarely rotate back to combat roles. As a result, theories taught in command academies 
grow outdated and do not effectively improve officers’ knowledge and skills for training 
and warfare.98 Lastly, the fact that China has not fought a full-scale war in over three 
decades means that PLA officers lack combat experience and have not been able to apply 
theories they learned in the classroom to actual war-fighting. For example, under Hu 
Jintao the PLA formally shifted its strategy to winning local wars under informationized 
conditions. However, while the U.S. has fought multiple wars under such conditions, the 
PLA has yet to do so. 
In recent years, the PLA has started to recruit specially designated university 
students (by paying their tuition and recruiting among students with lower scores) in 
order to address the problem of the lower quality of PMEs.99 However, the problem with 
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this practice is that these university graduates often turn out to be inexperienced and 
incompetent command officers as soon as they graduate and are placed in platoons.100  
Age limits have been specified and strictly enforced in considering officers for 
promotions, which encourages younger officers to meet more professional requirements 
to move up the ladder. The oldest chief of general staff (CGS) after Yang Dezhi (Deng’s 
appointment) was Chen Bingde, who was 66 when stepping into his position; the 
youngest CGS was Chi Haotian (1987-92), who was 58 when obtaining this position. 
Since 1978, the CGS’s average tenure has been five years, with Yang, the oldest CGS, 
serving in this position from 1980 to 1987 until the age of 78.101 A strict age restriction of 
65 years old for CGS was one of the official reasons given for eliminating General Zhang 
Qinsheng from the race for CGS. For CMC members, in a time of team transition, those 
who are younger than 68 can stay, and those who are 68 years old and up must retire, 
according to a rule called “seven up and eight down” inherited by the military from the 
Party and government personnel practice.102 This means that those who are hoping to stay 
on the CMC for two terms have to be 62 or younger when chosen as a CMC member for 
the first time. The “seven up and eight down” rule is only applied to existing CMC 
members. PLA officers at the level of Military Region (MR) leaders, who are not CMC 
members, have to retire by 65; at the level of MR deputy leader, must retire by 63; at the 
level of corps leader but non-combat troops, must retire by 60; and at the level of corps 


































Platoon 30 30 4 5 3 N/A 
Principal 
of Division 
Company 35 35 4 5 3 N/A 
Battalion  40 40 4 5 3 N/A 
Principal 






Division 50+5 55 4 5 3 10 
Chairman 
of CMC 





63     10 
65 
Sources: “Regulations on the Appointment and Removal of the PLA Officers in Active Service” (2002); 
“Law on PLA Officers in Active Service” (revised), passed by the NPC Standing Committee in December 
2000. 
* CT=Combat Troops; NCT=Non-combat Troops; GD=General Departments 
** Each ranking level is divided into the levels of deputal and principal. 
***Limit for Officer Exchange means the maximum years served at one post by officer who is required to 
exchange or rotate as the next step;  
**** Max. Time for Stationing at One Post means the maximum years served at one particular post at one 
particular level and those who exceed this limit would be forced to retire. 
***** Deputy battalion commanders would be promoted by the Principal of the division-level unit; officers 
from the principal battalion to the deputy regiment level would be promoted by the Principal of the corps-
level unit. Officers from regiment level to deputy division level would be promoted by the Principal of 
military region. Officers from division level and above would be promoted by Chairman of the CMC, a 
particular article stipulated in the 2002 regulation and a revision of the previous regulation. In the previous 
regulation on officer promotion, the promotion of the officers at the principal division level and above was 
subject to the authority of the CMC Chairman. 
*****Principal of any military unit normally includes both the military commanders and political 
commissars except General Staff Department (without a political commissar) and General Poltics 
Department (without a military commander). 
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A less noticeable and more problematic index for PLA officer evaluation is that of 
rotations. Rotations among military regions and general departments are increasingly a 
crucial criterion for PLA officer promotion. Rotations between military regions are a 
crucial component of senior officer promotion. After Zhang Wannian became CGS in 
1992 (1992-95), all four CGS (including Zhang) had experience as commander of at least 
two military regions.104 This requirement was probably introduced because the CGS 
under Mao and Deng played the role of senior military advisor, but in the post-Deng era, 
the CGS has to directly devise and execute military operations on his own. Therefore, 
once the Party left military matters solely to the PLA, having experience as commander 
of several military regions generally became a necessary condition for being promoted to 
CGS.  
A new regulation was also enacted to force out any officer at the level of division, 
corps, or military region leader who stays in one position without being promoted for ten 
years, which is known as “death by ten years’ limit” (shinian daxian).105 However, the 
enforcement of this rotation requirement can be bypassed by almost nominal, box-
checking, short-term “embedding” (guazhi) with military regions, as long as the hopeful 
officers are pre-chosen by their “patrons.” This has led to a group of officers who rose to 
the top “by helicopter,” with flashy resumes filled with rotational experiences, but in 
reality, “they just passed the stages to get to the top as planned.”106  
In order to build a professional force, the PLA must restore the honorability of the 
military profession and make it materially highly attractive, while also implementing 
transparent, fair and just promotion procedures in order to attract high-quality talent to 
join and stay in the military. This means that the PLA must become a volunteer-based, 
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lean military, with standardized and transparent merit-based promotion procedures. Until 
this happens, the problem of disconnect between higher education and higher 
capability/expertise will continue to assert itself and impede the PLA’s 
professionalization process to a certain degree. 
The rise of the PLA’s professionalization has coincided with the decline of its 
politicization. The debate about whether the PLA is a Party army or a State army has 
persisted throughout the past nine decades since its founding in 1928, even though at 
times it was muted or disappeared in words only to be reborn in actions. From 1978 to 
2013, communism as an ideology receded gradually from mainstream military thinking 
and even officially became much less prominent. A glimpse of that trend could be seen in 
the series of changes to the oath each PLA soldier has to take.107 
The Soldier’s Oath has gone through four revisions since 1949, each of which requires 
obedience to orders. (See Appendix B: The Evolution of the PLA’s Soldier’s Oath). The 
last two iterations are more similar in spirit. The first version emphasized people 
(mentioned twice), Chairman Mao, and the motherland, but did not mention the Party. At 
this point, the Chinese military and political leadership heavily overlapped, and the 
PLA’s identity as a force whose victories relied on support from the masses dictated an 
emphasis on an army that was the “children of the people.” By 1984, when China was 
undergoing the transition of returning the PLA to its barracks, the second version of the 
Soldier’s Oath still kept the identity of “a revolutionary soldier” but emphasized “love” 
for the Party and “socialism,” the “socialist motherland,” and “socialist construction.” By 
1997, when ideology had clearly receded from Chinese society, the image of “a 
revolutionary soldier” and the requirement for “love for the Communist Party” were both 
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dropped. Instead, obedience to the Party’s leadership was required, and the requirement 
for “serving the people” returned to the oath. The current oath, the result of a 2010 
revision, didn’t deviate substantially from the 1997 version. 
Over the past three decades, the trend of professionalization has been the single 
most important factor that has been transforming the PLA. How does increasing 
professionalization affect the PLA’s foreign policy preferences? The answers are mixed. 
First, professionalization will certainly enhance the PLA’s competence with regards to 
the quality and appropriateness of the advice it gives when it is given an opportunity to 
express itself. Since foreign and security policy-making is a repeated game, credibility 
matters and the PLA can increase its credibility when its advice and recommendations are 
sound and appropriate. Second, professional soldiers are naturally realistic and cautious 
towards war, especially when they don’t have confidence in winning. Professionalization 
will make the PLA more aware of its weakness and thus more conscious about preparing 
for war than fighting it. Third, continuous professionalization further pushes the military 
to internalize the principle of “the military only managing military affairs” and therefore 
staying out of civilian politics.108  
Almost all military officers interviewed expressed their support for the concept of 
a “national army” and believed that such an evolution is “an inevitable social trend, a 
trend the rest of the world follows.”109 The PLA officer corps is aware that the PLA 
cannot escape this evolution, and supports it even though they understand that this reform 
will inevitably reduce the privilege and uniqueness of their social status compared to the 
government. Having internalized the previous indoctrination and increased 
professionalization after 1978, the PLA officer corps agrees on the principle of the 
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military’s voluntary subordination to the State, though it believes that China’s political 
leader, rather than the PLA, should decide when it is the right time for such a transition to 
occur. All of those officers who favored building a state army believed that doing so is an 
integral part of China’s democratization process and therefore the PLA should not “jump 
the gun” but instead wait until “the nation calls for it.”110 
The flip side of specializing in military affairs and further professionalization is 
the PLA’s increasing rejection of civilians “wantonly meddling with” what they see as 
professional military business. While ready to welcome changes in civil-military 
relationship brought by “a state army,” the PLA officers interviewed showed impatience 
with civilian officials who are inexperienced in military affairs giving orders to the 
military through unauthorized channels. They criticized Premier Wen Jiabao’s “arbitrary 
instructions” in the aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan Wenchuan earthquake ordering the 
PLA to march to the epicenter of the earthquake within a time limit.111  
The PLA’s further professionalization does not necessarily mean it will take a 
more restrained and pacifist position regarding foreign and security policies. 
Professionalization, which means military modernization and the training of a specialized 
force and other pure military affairs becoming the military’s full-time job and sole 
responsibility, makes budgetary politics more important to the military than ever.112 As 
the PLA continues to professionalize, it needs to justify its existence and prove to the 
political leadership and Chinese people why the defense budget needs to increase. The 
PLA’s awareness of budgetary politics became especially acute after it was divested from 
the marketplace in 1998 and systematic reforms were launched to separate the PLA from 
China’s defense industry. Prior to the 1999 defense industry and armament procurement 
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reforms, triggered by the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade earlier that year, 
the PLA didn’t have a say in the budget, either how much they got or how this would be 
allocated.113 In one interviewee’s words, the PLA never saw its money before 1999, as 
the budgeted allocation would have been directly channeled from the state coffer to the 
defense industry firms. Only after 1999 were the interests of the PLA and the defense 
industry significantly separated, making the PLA much more driven to receive a higher 
budget, gain more autonomy to allocate its resources, and use its money more efficiently. 
The economic reforms of the 1980s and Deng’s decision to urge the military to be 
patient and allow economic reform to take precedence taught the military a hard lesson. 
The PLA’s economic hardships not only demoralized the PLA and accelerated its brain 
drain, but also led to attempts at making money on the side and subsequent corruption. 
All of this, the PLA now realizes, threatens its vitality and stability as an institution. The 
PLA understands that more resources and officers’ personal welfare depend on attention 
from political leaders and the public’s respect. It also understands the need to prove its 
worth, especially since China has been at peace for so long. Failure to demonstrate its 
capabilities and political and public significance, the PLA now understands, will result in 
fewer resources, which the PLA needs in order to improve its own well-being, and its 
armament and capabilities. It is reasonable to speculate that a budget-conscious military 
may prefer low-intensity frictions or even an extremely limited war, as such conflict 
would justify a steady and growing defense budget.114 
Second, professionalization also makes the military “no-war anxious,” as officers 
worry that without real combat experience, the military, though better equipped and well-
trained, still does not know how to fight an actual war. Those who gained combat 
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experience during the Korean War, the 1962 Sino-Indian border clash, the Sino-Soviet 
standoff over Zhenbao Island in 1969, or the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, understood that 
real combat experience improves the military’s understanding of how to most effectively 
train itself and prepare for war during peacetime.  
Some officers worry about the PLA’s “peace disease” (heping jixi), a term used to 
describe how when peace seems a perpetual state for China, the PLA’s military 
effectiveness suffers from inertia, weakness, and a lack of discipline and combat 
consciousness. According to Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu, a PLA National Defense 
University professor, the PLA’s military exercises often turn into “acting,” for example 
as a squad with cooking duties, though already “killed” in action, still cooked meals, and 
a soldier could “destroy” dozens of heavily armed “enemy” tanks with shoulder-fired 
rockets without even moving.115 In a widely publicized incident, a PLA platoon fired all 
of its bullets after a planned military exercise, and became a sitting duck when it was 
“ambushed” unexpectedly on its way back to the barracks. Lieutenant General Wang 
Hongguang, Deputy Commander of the Nanjing Military Region, once openly criticized 
such a “peace disease” of the military, stating:  
The PLA’s field training looks more like a resident barrack. Instead of staying in field 
training tents, soldiers stay in barracks, walk on hardened surface. Tap water and electric 
lighting are introduced. Those field training camps for senior and mid-level officers are 
even installed with air-conditioning, telephone and Internet interface. In addition, the 
field vehicles and battle fields should have been strictly guarded, with no outsiders 
allowed to be around. However, hawkers followed the troops’ move, which not only 
compromised military secrecy but spoiled the soldiers.116  
 
The PLA’s “peace disease” is not only reflected in the PLA itself, but also in the society 
in which it lives. “More than 70 percent of the PLA force is the single child of their 
families. Could such a military force still be hardened enough to fight and win a real war? 
Could the current Chinese society still have the nerve to face massive casualties, 
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casualties of those single children in their families as well as remaining parents and 
grandparents of the war dead? That is a big question mark in everyone’s mind,” 
commented a PLA officer-turned historian.117 
The belief is gradually taking hold in the PLA that the best way to answer the 
above doubts about the military’s “peace disease” is to fight a real war that it has a high 
probability of winning.118 These doubts were highlighted by China’s catastrophic loss 
during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war. The Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012 
and the sending of the CNOOC 981 oil rig to a disputed section of the South China Sea in 
2014 could both have drawn the PLA close to the brink of war if the other side fired the 
first shot.119  
Lastly, professionalization also drove the PLA to be more “outward-oriented” and 
more focused on external threats. This will lead the PLA to expand its interests and 
capabilities in missions beyond China’s immediate periphery. 
 
Politicization: Counter-trend in Professionalization 
The PLA General Politics Department (GPD) and the system of political officers 
it represents is the largest single impediment to the PLA’s professionalization. GPD is an 
interest group under the large bureaucracy of the PLA, representing approximately 
100,000 political officers from platoons to the top military leadership. The impact of the 
GPD on China’s foreign and security policy-making is two-fold: though not the only 
opposition, the GPD’s strong resistance to and firm control of the internal debate 
surrounding “a state military” leads to an institutionalized disconnect between the 
military and the government in terms of foreign policy;120 and the GPD’s portfolio 
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includes control over military propaganda and the right to designate and authorize a few 
active-duty military officers to speak to the Chinese and foreign media. Not all of those 
favored by the GPD represent the thinking of the GSD and the individual PLA services. 
Two key points need to be highlighted. First, not all political officers are simple 
instruments of the Party whose actions are governed purely by ideology, propaganda, and 
indoctrination. Some, especially a few who proceeded to senior commissar positions such 
as General Liu Yazhou, have strategic vision. Second, as the military officers in the PLA 
have professionalized over the past three decades, political officers have professionalized 
in their own right as well. However, as an institutionalized system of planting political 
officers to control personnel evaluation and promotion, GPD’s departmental interest runs 
counter to the overall trend of the PLA’s de-politicization and professionalization. 
For the first generation of officer corps, the rotation between military and political 
officer tracks was relatively open and interchangeable given the shortage of capable 
military officers. Deng Xiaoping, Lin Biao, Chen Yi, and Peng Dehuai all had experience 
as political commissars. Nobody doubted their military expertise and accomplishments. 
However, as professionalization and the specialization of military duties has progressed, 
it has become increasingly difficult and almost impossible for political officers to move 
back to military tracks.121 
As political officers separate and specialize in personnel issues, providing 
evaluations, training/education opportunities, and recommendations for officer 
promotions and demotions, their interventions as a group are generally seen in a negative 
light by professional military officers.122 
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The PLA’s dual-leadership structure (shuang shouzhang zhi), in which political 
officers (commissars) achieve parallel hierarchical status with commanders at least in 
name, created internal frictions in the PLA, even though the practice is murkier than the 
regulation.123 (The debate on whether the PLA should be a “Party army” or a “State 
army” is discussed in Chapter 3) You Ji insightfully observed that the “CCP’s practice of 
appointing civilian commissars to the army…was as much motivated by factional 
consideration as by ideological worry” and “These commissars deeply worsened the 
army factional activities and further divided the military.”124 Each CCP main faction in 
Shanghai between 1927 and 1934 would dispatch its followers as commissars to the army 
for the sake of broadening its political influence, according to You.125 From 1930 
onwards, supremacy of the political commissar leadership, in the form of the political 
commissar responsibility system (zhengzhi weiyuan quanquan daibiaozhi), took such a 
strong hold in the army that even the Party committee system was abolished between 
1932 and 1936 to prevent the Party committee members, mainly commanders, from 
overpowering the outside commissars.126  
Political commissars no longer had the final say about military activities after the 
catastrophic Battle of Xue Cun (Snow Village) in 1942, in which the Japanese killed the 
Eighth District of Jizhong’s commander and political commissar. Such a catastrophic 
military failure was due to a serious disagreement on military operations between 
Commander Chang Deshan and Political Commissar Wang Yuanyin. Wang prevailed in 
the end, which led to the catastrophic military failure and deaths of both Chang and Wang. 
Although commanders or political commissars were occasionally killed, the simultaneous 
deaths of both the top-ranking commander and political commissar had never happened 
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before. To further humiliate the Red Army, the Japanese military cut off the head of 
Commander Chang and hung it in a birdcage on the city gate of Hejian for years. This 
incident led to the CCP’s 1942 decision to strip political commissars of the final decision-
making power in war-fighting.127  
The fallout from the Battle of Xue Cun led the CMC to rethink the political 
commissar responsibility system. The CMC decided on September 1, 1942 to shift the 
final decision-making power on military actions from political commissars to military 
commanders. According to this decision, ultimate command authority on military affairs 
during times of war, at the Regiment level (juntuan) and above, belongs to military 
commanders.128 Political commissars, though enjoying the same status as commanders, 
could only supervise commanders, and such a role could only be realized through the 
Party Committee. This means that unless military commanders are evidently making 
disastrous mistakes or directly violating military orders handed down from above, 
political commissars have no right to intervene in military decisions. In 1952-53, Marshal 
Peng Dehuai and a group of professionally-oriented officers planned to within ten years 
completely phase out the dual-leadership structure and establish the one-head command 
system, whereby military commanders would possess sole commanding authority.129 
Mao and Luo Ronghuan, however, objected to this proposal and due to their influence it 
was eventually overturned.130  
The principle of the “Party commands the gun” in practice has never meant that 
the political commissar is the first in command.131 In practice, it means that the PLA 
units have to obey the decisions of the Party Committee in the military at higher levels, 
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particularly one level above. The “Party commands the gun” does not mean commanders 
have to obey the commands of the political commissar at the same level. 
After the 1990s, in PLA units above the Field Army level, commanders supersede 
in ranking political commissars at the same level by half a step. For example, the Chiefs 
of two general departments, the General Logistics Department (GLD) and the General 
Armament Department (GAD), are half a step higher in rank than political commissars. 
The political commissars of GLD and GAD only have jurisdiction over their 
department’s executive offices (jiguan). They do not oversee the larger, massive GLD 
and GAD systems, which have corresponding local offices at various levels in services 
and all the military regions. The GSD is an exception, as it is not affiliated with any 
political commissar. Since the commanders of PLAN, PLAAF, and the Second Artillery 
became CMC members in 2004, with their administrative position moving up half a step, 
commanders have always superseded their political commissars in rank.132  
In units at and below the level of Field Army, commander and commissar are at 
the same level.133 When commanders and political commissars enjoy the same ranking, 
who is in charge of their unit depends on a few factors:  
First, whoever holds the position of Secretary of the Party Committee (dangwei 
shuji), whether it is the political commissar or the commander, often has more influence. 
This is because the Party Committee has a certain power over the recommendation of 
cadres/officers. Therefore, whoever holds the position of Secretary of the Party 
Committee may have more influence in agenda-setting and therefore decision-making on 
personnel issues. Political commissars are traditionally responsible for routine 
cadre/officer personnel management, such as annual evaluations, training opportunities, 
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and weighing in on officer promotions.134 Another prerogative political commissars have 
is agenda-setting for Party Committee meetings, as they can set the topic and tone of 
these meetings, though the Party Committee follows the mechanism of “one person one 
vote.” This means that political commissars, even those holding the position of Party 
Secretary, cannot necessarily override military commanders who hold the position of 
Deputy Party Secretary. Second, seniority matters. If a commander is new to the job, 
while the political commissar has been there for years, the political commissar will 
usually take charge, and vice versa. Third, personality matters. Occasionally, the 
commander or commissar has an overpowering and competitive personality and may 
break all of the above rules and prevail over his counterpart.135 
The dual-leadership structure with the political commissar enjoying the same rank 
as the commander, enforced at the Field Army level and below, has caused perpetual 
conflicts within the PLA. As one senior officer described the dynamics and tensions,  
If both the commander and commissar are very experienced leaders with strong 
personalities, they will keep fighting each other and the unit will not have peace. 
However, if both the commander and commissar are weak, nothing can be done. 
Therefore, a balance needs to be struck, with a weak political commissar sent to assist a 
strong commander or vice versa. Isn’t that creating headaches for oneself? Aren’t we (the 
PLA) inventing problems that we ourselves must solve?136  
 
The PLA’s politicization also takes time and detracts from the professional 
training it should receive. Military officers who specialize in training and exercises 
complain that meetings and study sessions initiated by political officers are so numerous 
that they directly interfere with their training and exercise programs.137 In peacetime, 
training has more impact than anything on enhancing troops’ readiness. Military officers 
have their own working meetings for planning, organization, and evaluation. When 
military officers have too many meetings, political officers’ meetings can never be 
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reduced and military officers have to either endure exhausting meeting schedules or cut 
their own needed working meetings. When Xi Jinping ordered the military to hold fewer 
meetings, the military in general held fewer meetings, but the military officers’ own 
meetings were cut while the political sessions stayed the same.138  
Politicization not only interfered with the PLA’s professional training, but also 
with its military education. An educator of a top-level military technology university 
concluded that military cadets in his school lost one-fourth of their science and 
technology instruction during their five-year enrollment due to mandatory political 
indoctrination.139 
Political officers also intervene in evaluations of military training in a way that 
distorts the incentives of military officers. One PLA officer who organized night 
exercises in the Shenyang Military Region complained that after several sleepless nights, 
the exercises were completed and regarded by military officers as a great success. The 
next morning, political officers came to him and claimed that the winning platoon’s 
shooting scores were fabricated, implying that he deliberately favored that platoon 
because the platoon leader was close to him. Although this accusation was baseless, 
according to this officer, political officers reported this assertion to the military region’s 
headquarters. During subsequent exercises, this officer fabricated the shooting results of 
platoons, balancing among each platoon and picking the one that had no close connection 
to either him or other power centers. “The whole experience was very frustrating. All I 
wanted to do was to do my job well and let the most competent platoon win the contest 
by itself. But in the end, I had to bend myself so political officers did not make such false 
accusations, which could have harmed my career,” said this PLA officer. 
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Political officers not only can disrupt military training but, more importantly, they 
also mostly control the evaluation of officers. According to the regulations, military 
officers above the regiment level are to be evaluated once every two to three years and 
officers below the battalion level are to be evaluated every year. A team headed by either 
the ranking commanding officer or the political officer, but composed mostly of political 
officers, lead the evaluation. The evaluation results play a critical role in determining 
whether officers should be kept on the promotion track as “reserve cadre candidates” 
(houbei ganbu renxuan) or whether they should receive various training opportunities.140 
One PLA officer explained his “happy” encounters with a political officer. When 
there was an opportunity to study abroad, the unit he worked in recommended three 
candidates. The most competent officer clashed with the political officer, so the political 
officer ruled him out on the grounds of “immaturity and a bad relationship with the 
masses as an officer.” The second officer was going through a divorce, so political 
officers were convinced there must be something wrong with him as well. The winning 
candidate, the one I interviewed, confessed that he was chosen because he kept a low 
profile and was always polite with political officers, even though in his heart he disliked 
them as well. As he explained, 
We, in the training department, were always working overtime on evenings and during 
weekends, while political officers would pat us on our shoulders to tell us to take it easy. 
They write laudatory summaries of themselves in their own work evaluation at the end of 
the year, such as incentivizing officers to work overtime. When I applied for fellowships 
overseas after they granted the opportunity to political officers, they did not help me with 
anything in the application but they would write in their own evaluation that they 
“worked so hard to find opportunities for excellent officers to study abroad in order to 
meet the challenge of winning local wars under high-tech conditions, and even managed 
to persuade them to come back as soon as their studies finished.”141 
 
Political officers band together with each other more closely than military officers 
do, as they are in their unit’s minority. Whereas military officers increasingly specialize 
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and cannot always be interchangeably transferred, political officers do not have that 
constraint. They have more incentive to use their personal networks for better placement. 
Political officers do not master skills that could be useful after their retirement, in 
contrast to military and technical officers. Nor do they control the budget or military 
decisions. The only important aspect political officers can exert control over is personnel 
evaluation, which is the basis for officer promotion. The prerogative they have is to send 
military officers into political study sessions or training that would take these officers 
away from their routine work. Any defiance would be punished with political labels such 
as “they don’t understand politics” or worse, “they are not loyal to the Party.” Therefore, 
political officers negatively impact the PLA’s overall efforts at professionalization by 
disrupting training routines and squeezing the time allotted for military work and 
sabotaging competent military officers’ promotions at their whim.  
The tenures of two GPD chiefs in particular, Yang Baibing and Xu Caihou, were 
characterized by their excessively combative styles in bureaucratic infighting. When 
Yang Baibing, Yang Shangkun’s half brother, assumed leadership of the GPD in 1987, 
the GPD’s bureaucratic power increased sharply. Yang Baibing was “presumptuous and 
domineering.”142 Using the pretense of strengthening the Party’s control over the military 
after the Tiananmen Incident, Yang offended much more senior military leaders such as 
General Zhang Zhen and went head-to-head with reform-minded generals, including then 
Deputy Secretary General of the CMC General Li Jijun.143 Under Yang’s leadership, the 
GPD became an arrogant and overbearing “mighty unit” (qiangshi danwei), which 
intervened much more assertively and aggressively in other military bureaucracies’ work. 
One general recalled that from 1989 to 1992 the GPD scrutinized and had to approve of 
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all of the National Defense University’s (NDU) activities, big and small. One senior PLA 
general recalled: 
Suddenly one day in October, then NDU President General Zhang Zhen disappeared for a 
day and nobody could reach him. Then on a program I sent to GPD for approval, GPD 
called me, which had not happened for years, since (if) you wanted to know the progress 
of their approval or wanted them to expedite the process, you (should) call GPD and pull 
favors from them to get things done. So I was very surprised to get the call from GPD, 
and I was very politely notified that this program had been approved and in the future 
such programs did not need to be sent to GPD for approval. Later that day, I heard that 
Yang Baibing was purged and General Zhang Zhen, who was then getting ready to retire, 
was promoted to CMC Vice Chairman. I realized then that the “center of the world” had 
shifted from GPD to NDU (General Zhang Zhen’s institution). What an unexpected twist 
of fate!144 
 
During CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou’s tenure, the political officer system was revived 
and strengthened, against the trend of strengthening professionalization that had taken 
hold since Yang Baibing’s downfall. Xu had an early foot in China’s high politics, 
starting in 1999, when he became member of the CMC at the position of Executive 
Deputy Director of the GPD.145 (Xu’s involvement in China’s high politics is detailed in 
Chapter Three.) Xu added positions for political officers throughout the system and 
emphasized their roles in the military in evaluating and recommending officers for 
promotion.  
As made clear earlier, the PLA’s continuous professionalization has had a mixed 
impact on its positioning in foreign and security policies. Continuous politicization has 
had a more definitively negative impact. The GPD as an organized interest group will 
certainly oppose any move away from the “Party army” towards a “national army,” 
because such a shift would inevitably lead to the PLA’s streamlining and call into 
question the reason for the GPD’s existence. This means that in reality the PLA and the 
government system are independent of each other, which leads to a lack of coordination 
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and even frictions between the two in China’s politics and foreign/security policies. 
(More details can be found in Chapters Five and Six.) 
The PLA’s own decision-making system is highly centralized under the GSD’s 
Operations Department, which could be compared to the PLA’s mind, while the GPD 
dominates the PLA’s propaganda operations, which could be thought of as the PLA’s 
mouth. The “mouth” (GPD) does not always speak what the “mind” thinks (GSD), as the 
mind does not dominate the mouth. 
 
Dynamic Three: Unity vs. The Rise of Inter-service Rivalry 
Inter-service rivalries have long existed in the PLA.146 However, as the four 
mighty general departments overshadowed the services, services had weak voices. The 
biggest problem could be more accurately defined as “stove-piping” – either the General 
Department-service barrier or the service barrier (junzhong de fanli).  
One example of the stove-piping and the disconnect between the services is that 
during peacetime military regions only have army troops under their authority, while air 
force and naval troops in these regions report to Air Force Headquarters and Navy 
Headquarters directly, thus bypassing the military regions.147 The problem of stove-
piping not only exists among services, but also between mighty general departments and 
services. For example, the war-fighting command departments, including the command 
divisions of services, do not have any cooperation mechanism with armament 
development and management agencies.148 The need for appropriate armaments to fight 
wars, therefore, cannot be transmitted through institutionalized channels to armament 
R&D managers. Such a missing link demonstrates the weakness of services as compared 
to general departments.  
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Inter-service rivalry (as defined in the West) has become more intense in China in 
recent years, as the services, especially new services such as the Navy and the Air Force, 
start to rise. For example, the PLAAF has long struggled with the PLAN in its effort to 
get an airfield on Hainan Island, as all military airfields on the island currently belong to 
the PLAN’s South China Sea Fleet. However, the PLAN’s naval aviation force continues 
to strongly resist the PLAAF’s attempt to build a foothold on Hainan, which has resulted 
in the PLAN’s refusal to give any of its airfields to the PLAAF.149  
Even though the chiefs of the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery became 
members of the CMC after 2004, as of 2013 this move is largely symbolic as service 
chiefs are not generally in the CMC’s decision-making chain.150 The relative junior status 
of service chiefs in the CMC is revealed by the fact that service chiefs are generally 
chosen from among the deputy chiefs of the general staff.151 It is hard to imagine that 
these service chiefs, though automatically CMC members, have equal status as the Chief 
of General Staff after just stepping up from the position of deputy chiefs of general staff. 
Most frictions between services occurred when there was a sharing of facilities and 
interests. However, differences in styles and focus are emerging, making inter-service 
rivalry potentially a factor that impacts the PLA’s behavior as a whole. 
Inter-service rivalry is starting to become intense, along with the rise of the PLAN 
and PLAAF, but has not yet become a major problem because of the enormous gap of 
power between the army and the rest of the services. The PLA land force has a long 
tradition and occupies a rarefied position due to its role in the revolution led by the CCP. 
The other, younger services – Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery – were all 
established much later and experienced more troubled times during Lin Biao’s tenure as 
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Defense Minister.152 In the PLA, the land army has traditionally occupied the leadership 
roles. A small but telling piece of evidence is Admiral Liu Huaqing’s symbolic gesture: 
upon leaving the post of Commander of the PLAN and taking the position of Deputy 
Secretary of the CMC in 1988, Admiral Liu changed from his naval uniform into the 
army’s green uniform, as he wrote in his memoir.153 In 1997, despite the small decline 
from a few years prior, over 75 percent of all PLA personnel belonged to the PLA 
army.154 
Inter-service rivalry could intensify because of the development of two trends that 
started in the early 1990s: first, the dawn of a RMA, which mandates that the PLA 
develop command, control, communications and computer-based intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies and conduct integrated joint 
operations; and second, contingencies and threats that have started to concentrate on 
China’s southern and eastern coastal regions. Both trends press for the acceleration of the 
Navy’s and Air Force’s modernization. This has led to a seismic shift in the defense 
budget towards allocating increased resources to building the PLAN and PLAAF in the 
2000s.155 According to a senior PLA army officer: 
In terms of defense budget allocation, different services have certainly spoken for their 
own interests. The Navy emphasizes the strategic importance of aircraft carriers and 
submarines; the Air Force the necessities of strategic bombers; and the Second Artillery 
on the expansion of the nuclear arsenal and increasing its survivability and penetration 
capability. However, the Second Artillery has a relatively weak influence. It is 
questionable how far the Air Force could fly. Therefore, the final winner (in the rising 
military budget) in the 1990s and onwards is the Navy, which in the end has to be a 
global navy and have the potential to engage in non-combat missions overseas to 
demonstrate China’s military deterrence and soft power.156 
 
China’s inter-service rivalry is also embodied in the rivalry among military 
regions. As Taiwan and the East and the South China Seas have become increasingly 
pressing security concerns since the 1990s, the military regions guarding these areas have 
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obtained greater attention from military and political leaders. This southern and eastern 
shift of geopolitical and strategic concerns has made inland military regions such as the 
Lanzhou Military Region, Shenyang Military Region, and Chengdu Military Region 
uneasy and disgruntled.157 According to one senior PLA officer, “These military regions 
in southwest and northwest China challenged the policy guidelines that military 
preparations targeting Taiwan shall be the ‘dragon head’ or the primary focus and highest 
priority of the PLA’s military modernization.”158 Jiang Zemin, in a 1999 speech in which 
he reviewed the CMC’s work from the previous year, said: 
…accelerating military preparation and realizing the motherland's complete reunification 
is the remaining wishes of Chairman Mao and Comrade Xiaoping...The fuller military 
preparation we make, the stronger we are militarily...the more likely we realize peaceful 
reunification (with Taiwan)...Military preparation is the most realistic and the most 
pressing task. If that is well managed, we are then focusing on the right place and we are 
then grasping the 'dragon head' of our military modernization.159 
 
However, many officers of the Lanzhou Military Region and the Chengdu Military 
Region contested Jiang’s proposition, since they believed that security tensions in 
Xinjiang and the Sino-Indian border region posed threats equally serious to those from 
Taiwan and should have been treated as strategic directions for the PLA’s war 
preparations. These officers bitterly refuted any suggestion that the PLA should orient its 
war preparations around the Taiwan contingency, since in their view a better national 
security strategy would take a comprehensive view rather than fixating on lopsided 
planning.160   
The presence of inter-service rivalries has a number of implications: First, 
different military regions have divergent views on what strategic priorities should receive 
military preparation and fund allocation. Those inland-based military regions in 
southwest and northwest China, with mostly a land army, push for different strategic 
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priorities than those coastal military regions such as the Nanjing Military Region and the 
Fuzhou Military Region (with a large Navy and Air Force), and the Jinan Military Region, 
which houses the second-tier reserve troops that would be used during a possible conflict 
over Taiwan. 
Second, if past successful experiences can be used as a barometer for future 
actions, the PLAN and PLAAF will strive to obtain more attention and greater funds by 
pursuing more outward-looking and expansive service strategies. As this competition 
between services unfolds, the services’ differing style or culture, which arises out of their 
parochial interests, may have an impact on PLA behavior as a whole. For example, the 
PLAAF is the least experienced and open of the service branches in terms of interactions 
and substantial dialogues with the outside world. Therefore, it tends to formulate 
strategies and policies in isolation and under secrecy, which therefore lack sophistication 
and more easily draw criticism from the outside world. The PLAAF was deliberating 
whether to change its strategy in 2010-11 to include an “all Chinese air territory 
concept,” in which the PLAAF strives to develop the capability to conduct air and space 
war-fighting over all Chinese air territory. The problem is that the PLAAF defined “all 
Chinese air territory” as encompassing the air and space above China’s territorial land, 
waters, and its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).161 Before its intended official publication 
of this strategic concept, the PLAAF presented its strategy in an internal meeting, which 
for the first time included analysts from other services. Only one senior officer, outside of 
the PLAAF, opposed this concept during the meeting, urging that the MFA and National 
People’s Congress be allowed to examine this concept. After further deliberation and 
consultation, the PLAAF dropped this “all Chinese air territory concept.” Although the 
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PLAAF still talked about developing the capability to conduct war-fighting over all 
Chinese territory, it chose not to openly define what geographic area it is referring to. 
Another example of the PLAN’s and PLAAF’s expanding influence is the 
development of the policy to declare and implement an Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) over the East China Sea, which the PLAAF and probably the PLAN had been 
deliberating for several years. However, Air Force officers in charge of the study had 
almost no interaction with countries that administered existing ADIZs. As a result, the 
PLAAF first got the concept wrong in the legal sense, designing it first for operations in 
the South China Sea, and in the end publicized a policy with little operational feasibility. 
The announcement and implementation of the policy also offended countries that would 
be affected by the ADIZ, including countries that are important to China such as South 
Korea, because they were not consulted prior to the announcement.162 The PLAN also 
has a more conservative culture than its Western counterparts. However, this 
conservatism is gradually changing, with the PLAN participating more in anti-piracy 
operations and sea-borne joint exercises with other navies. 
 
How Does the PLA Make Decisions on Foreign and Security Policies? 
Decision-making Chain for Contingencies Related to Foreign Countries 
The GSD functions as the lead agency in any international security crisis 
involving the PLA. The GSD’s Operations Division, or the 1st Division, undoubtedly 
undertakes the most important tasks in both planning and implementation. It has at least 
eight division-level (shiji) bureaus (including the Operation Planning Bureau, War 
Environment Bureau, Joint Operation Bureau, Operation Organization and Gaming 
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Bureau, Special Force Operation Bureau, Strategic Targeting Bureau, War Preparation 
Bureau, and Military Exercise Management Bureau) within which a wide array of 
functional issues are addressed.163 There are additional agencies below these division-
level bureaus that support their tasks. When Zhang Qinsheng headed the Operations 
Division, he added another string of new bureaus, including one intended to address non-
traditional security threats. There are five Deputy Chiefs of the Operations Department – 
all major-generals – including one from the PLAN and one from the PLAAF. All five 
deputy chiefs of the Operations Department report directly to the Chief of the General 
Staff.  
When any security crisis takes place, it is immediately handed to the relevant 
bureau(s) under the Operations Division for assessment, planning, and to propose 
solutions. The military intelligence apparatus (the 2nd and 3rd departments) would attend 
the preliminary assessment meetings (wu xu hui) and provide analysis on how this 
contingency and possible various solutions may affect other countries, and what reactions 
other relevant countries may have if the PLA takes certain measures. The bureau(s) 
subsequently will hold meetings of substance (wu shi hui) to decide what options are on 
the table and what they will suggest. Military intelligence does not attend this and 
subsequent stages. The bureau(s) will then recommend a set of options and measures. 
The bureau(s), with it/their respective expertise in issues it deals with, usually have a high 
level of autonomy in making suggestions on measures and countermeasures. The 
bureau’s chief will present its opinions to the head of the Operations Division, who in 
most cases simply passes it on to the First Executive Deputy Chief of the General Staff, 
who is in charge of the Operations Division. If he endorses the plan (fangan), he will first 
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brief the Chief of the General Staff and then present it to the CMC’s Vice Chairmen.164 
During a high-stakes contingency, or when war is a real possibility, the Chairman of the 
CMC, who is also typically the top leader of the Party, may circumvent the CMC Vice 
Chairmen and directly make a decision after receiving the report that lower-level officers 
at the Operations Department sent to the Chief of General Staff. However, such a 
sequence is rare and exceptional. 
The Operations system has a direct and relatively short chain of command to 
reach the top. The military intelligence, primarily the GSD’s Second and Third 
Departments, play a very important role, but in most cases only during the preliminary 
stage, and in general through their own routine reporting channels. The military 
intelligence’s influence is also reflected in its channels to reach and influence the PBSC’s 
members. It is capable of sending specific reports to selected PBSC members, whom it 
thinks would have an interest in a given issue and may be sympathetic to the PLA’s 
view.165 In cases containing very sensitive, top secret information, reports will be recalled 
once read by those PBSC members. The military intelligence has the prerogative to 
decide who has interests and stakes in its reports, and therefore who receives them. 
The PLA’s GPD is in charge of foreign propaganda, which means not only 
responsibility for the PLA’s image to the outside world, but also who in the PLA should 
speak to the domestic and foreign media. The Chiefs of the GPD and GSD are regarded 
as the CMC’s backbone, together with the two CMC Vice Chairmen, though their powers 
relative to each other fluctuate. Which bureaucracy inside the PLA is “the mighty unit,” 
(qiangshi danwei) or is more powerful than the others, depends largely on who heads this 
bureaucracy and who keeps that bureaucracy as his power base.166 GSD superseded GPD 
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in bureaucratic power particularly when it was headed by Luo Ruiqing, as well as during 
the Cultural Revolution, and for a majority of the time since 1978.167 The exceptions to 
this were during the periods when Yang Baibing and Xu Caihou were in power. Over the 
past twenty years, the chiefs of the General Logistics Department (GLD) and the General 
Armament Department (GAD) were routinely candidates to become Chief of GSD and 
GPD. Such was the case with Zhang Zhen, Chief of the GLD (1978-80), who later 
became DCGS (1980-5), and Fu Quanyou, Director of the GLD (1992-5) who later 
became CGS (1995-2002). Additionally, Chen Bingde, the third Chief of the GAD 
(2004-7), was later named CGS (2007-12), and Li Jinai, Chief of the GAD from 2002-4, 
then became Director of GPD (2004-12). This is evidence that GPD and GSD chiefs 
supersede GLD and GAD chiefs in seniority.168  
In May 2006, Hu Jintao instructed the PLA, in an internal report distributed by 
Xinhua News Agency, to study seriously questions on “how to establish the PLA’s image, 
how to use the weapon of public opinion, and how to strengthen the PLA’s soft 
power.”169 Hu’s instruction led to the issuance of a document in 2008 that established 
new guidelines for the PLA’s propaganda, which shifted the GPD from a passive posture 
to a more proactive and purposive campaign strategy, in order to improve the PLA’s 
image and soft power.170 These new guidelines also established the all-military foreign 
propaganda leading small group, which was led by Liu Yongzhi, GPD’s deputy chief, 
though this group’s executive branches include a newly established Foreign Propaganda 
Bureau of GPD and the News Affairs Bureau under GSD. Since the establishment of this 
group, the GPD has become increasingly open and transparent. However, opinions 
transmitted through GPD-supported channels do not always reflect the thinking of GSD 
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or the PLA services. Those who are not appointed by GPD as “propaganda experts” may 
still accept interviews from media without seeking GPD’s approval, but could be 
harassed by GPD.171 Those who give voice to the hawkish views inside the PLA, such as 
Luo Yuan (a well-publicized figure), are largely dismissed inside the PLA.172 Such 
figures are dubbed the “angry youth” of the PLA, and allegedly receive support from the 
GPD’s “angry youth” segment, “though not representative of the overall GPD’s 
opinion.”173 
Services including the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery often stand at the 
start and end of the decision chain. They do not have direct influence on the opinions 
shaped by the Operations Department, or decisions reached at the level of deputy chiefs 
and chief of GSD. However, they may alert and report on international security crises to 
GSD at the outset through each service headquarters. How they frame the situation and 
the problems, in addition to the other data and intelligence their own frontline troops 
provide, could have bearing on the GSD’s thinking and ultimate decisions. After the 
decision is made, orders go back through the decision chain in the reverse direction. GSD 
will then alert the relevant services to carry out the order. If services must consult or 
coordinate with one another, they would most likely go to GSD to express such a need. 
The different services rarely directly talk to each other when it concerns important 
operational issues.174 
Military regions have even less influence or an institutionalized presence in the 
decision-making chain. Occasionally, senior officers from military regions may speak up 
on a certain situation, yet they must do so with the knowledge that their opinions, if badly 
received, would negatively impact and could even end their careers. Therefore, senior 
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officers from military regions are more cautious in expressing their views during 
international security crises until they have some confidence in knowing the military 
leadership’s thinking. These officers mostly will choose information channels, such as 
personal connections, to transmit their opinions upward.175 
 
Advisory Agencies on Foreign and Security Policies 
Military Strategic Planning Committee and Military Strategic Planning Advisory 
Committee under the CMC 
Under the CMC, the Military Strategic Planning Committee (MSPC) and the 
Military Strategic Planning Advisory Committee (MSPAC) are the official entities that 
study and advise the military leadership on the PLA’s threat perception and how it should 
adjust its strategies, doctrine, and armament procurement in response. The MSPC is 
composed of the heads and decision-makers of departments who are relevant to the 
execution of any plan concerning the PLA’s strategic planning. MSPAC has dozens of 
members, including academics whose work concerns military affairs, and top scientists 
and researchers in military sciences, including those who focus on cyber, 
informationization, strategy, and tactics.176 Established around 2011, the two committees 
are headed by a deputy chief of general staff, first Qi Jianguo, and then his successor, 
Wang Guanzhong.  
The PLA used to have a Military Informationization Committee (MIC), however, 
after the MSPAC was established, most members of the MIC were transferred to MSPAC. 
The Department of Strategic Planning, a second-level department under GSD, is the 
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executive office of these two committees. It is tasked with organizing MSPAC’s 
meetings and work, and ensuring that MSPAC’s advice is implemented. 
MSPC has four main tasks: first, it conducts studies to “evaluate the home 
reserves” (mo jiadi) of the four general departments, pools all the findings together, and 
then advises on what to do; second, it studies the “dynamic integration” of the defense 
budget by examining how each year’s defense budget is spent and how the new defense 
budget should be allocated; third, it studies and plans the future path of the PLA’s 
development; lastly, it studies international affairs in order to advise on targets of and 
threats to the PLA.177 
 
Strategic Planning Department of the GSD  
The Strategic Planning Department (SPD), a second-level department under GSD 
directed by an officer with a grade equivalent to army corps rank, was formally 
established in 2010 and was up and running by 2011.178 It is an executive office of MSPC 
and MSPAC.  
The purpose of this functional department is to design and coordinate the general 
planning and decision-making of the military, balance and coordinate departmental 
interests of the four general departments, and organize and draft plans to reform and plan 
the organizational structure of the PLA and the corresponding allocation of budgetary and 
military resources.  
The real question is whether the PLA can manage to link strategic thinking with 
implementation. To meet the challenges of connecting armament development, the non-
material aspects of army construction, and planning and trends in military affairs, the 
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department will need a diverse mix of personnel from across the PLA to reach the Chief 
of the General Staff and even the CMC as well as other general departments and services. 
However, SPD is an office with only a few dozen official staff and other officers 
seconded from other institutions.  
First, the SPD, though having a seemingly broad strategic mandate with a grand 
vision, does not have the authority and structure to suit its intended purpose. The fact that 
it is a second-level department (er ji bu) under the GSD, which is one of the four general 
departments, makes it fated to be ineffective. The other three departments will not follow 
the instructions of a lower-level unit of the GSD, especially when those instructions touch 
on sensitive interests and resource allocation. As one senior researcher at the PLA’s 
Academy of Military Sciences remarked, “In reality, the fact that such a department is put 
under the GSD, one of the four general departments, won’t do the trick. Could a second-
level department under GSD dictate how other subsidiary agencies under three other 
general departments and services work and in which direction they head?”179  
Second, in addition to the SPD not having high enough reach, it also does not 
have lower-level organizational reach. There are no SPD offices at lower levels of the 
military such as Military Regions, services, or corps (jun). A major weakness resulting 
from this arrangement is that the lower-level PLA organizations simply ignore any SPD 
instructions that do not fit their interests. SPD has too broad a mandate, along with a 
small budget and very few employees. It therefore heavily borrows talent, often from 
lower-level organizations or specialized institutions and military universities. Those who 
are willing to serve in SPD without an official capacity are often officers who are not on 
the promotion track and therefore are willing to take “sabbaticals” and work for SPD. 
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That means these personnel are probably lower quality and are not valued highly by the 
GSD’s other departments or other general departments. This further adds to SPD’s low 
morale, and increased difficulty in gaining cooperation from other departments to 
implement its policies. As one senior SPD officer remarked,  
The SPD’s biggest flaw is its lack of top-to-bottom offices to execute decisions and plans 
it has made. In other words, SPD doesn’t have “legs.” It could issue orders to the lower-
level agencies of general departments or military regions. But it is a big question mark 
whether these agencies would listen to the SPD’s opinions and enforce its orders. My 
experience working in SPD showed me that I had to use my own network to get things 
done.180   
 
Third, the SPD is alleged to be much more closed and parochial than the Foreign 
Affairs Office (FAO) in interacting and consulting with non-military agencies and 
civilian experts, and having exposure to foreign militaries.181 SPD has difficulties 
recruiting either experts from other military agencies or civilian experts because: its 
official personnel quota is limited; it lacks the prerogative and resources to attract 
military strategists and experts as consultants, though it has the authority to invite junior 
officers to work in the office for months and even years; it lacks resources to pay civilian 
consultants with either adequate pay or by awarding them with any position or status in 
the military; and it worries that civilian consultants may not keep military secrets. SPD, 
therefore, has even more parochial worldviews and policy interests than the GSD’s 
FAO.182  
 
Military Intelligence  
The GSD’s 2nd and 3rd departments are responsible for collecting intelligence and 
advising and consulting the military and political leadership. The military intelligence 
department’s main task is to advise the top military chiefs in the CMC as well its 
Chairman, who is also general secretary of the Party. Depending on the content and 
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importance of the issue, the military intelligence department may directly advise the top 
political leader through his military secretary at his administrative office. The military 
intelligence department also has channels to send its reports to designated members of the 
PBSC whom the military believes are interested in these reports and powerful enough to 
influence the policy debate in a direction favorable to the intelligence department. 
Extremely sensitive policy reports may be sent to these selected members of the PBSC in 
a highly restricted manner and recalled after a limited time period.183   
 
Foreign Affairs Office of the GSD 
The GSD’s Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) has the reputation of being “barbarian 
handlers,” shouldering the responsibility of consulting the PLA’s various stake-holding 
agencies and advising the PLA leaders on foreign and security policies. In this respect, it 
is vastly different from its Western counterparts, especially its counterpart in the United 
States. The FAO is responsible for every aspect of military diplomacy, including 
approving and hosting any high-level military delegations to or from China. Additionally, 
it is often the lead agency to initiate, coordinate, and integrate various functional 
departments of the PLA and non-military government agencies concerned with PLA-
involved foreign and security policies.  
The FAO’s role in influencing the PLA’s foreign and security policy-making lies 
in its responsibility to provide strategic advisory to the PLA’s internal policy deliberation 
mechanism. In other words, FAO is responsible for initiating (qiantou), narrating, 
agenda-setting, organizing the input of functional departments, advising on solutions they 
desire (ding zhu diao), and integrating opinions of all sides. It cannot dictate policies.184 
 127 
However, FAO officers, when tasked with policy advisory roles, are required to analyze 
what the problem is, explain what options are available to decision-makers, and which 
approach has the best chance of success. In this way, FAO officers play the role of policy 
analysts and narrators for the military leadership by framing the debate and setting the 
bounds of permissible or feasible policies. FAO acts as the lead agency that consults 
relevant functional departments in the military, and as a bridge that reaches out to non-
military agencies. It also organizes inter-agency consultation and dialogues that involve 
various analysts pushing the consultation in a certain direction, and reaches a conclusion 
on whether and how the policy should be implemented. It has vast power to borrow talent 
from different units, including the National Defense University and the Academy of 
Military Sciences (AMS), as well as others inside the military, without worrying about 
adding personnel positions or finding the funds to pay for such personnel.185  
FAO’s civilian consultants are mainly from the Ministry of State Security (MSS). 
Compared to the military intelligence officers, who compete with the MSS, FAO has a 
free hand in inviting experts from the MSS system to provide their opinions and analyses 
through internal seminars. Such MSS experts are usually viewed as being knowledgeable 
about foreign affairs, having wide exposure to the outside world, and are believed to 
generally take a balanced and moderate view. In contrast, the FAO has increasing 
interaction, but a problematic relationship, with the MFA’s civilian experts. Very few 
experts and analysts from the MFA are invited to the military’s internal seminars. There 
are more known cases wherein the MFA invited military scholars to their closed-door 
meetings, though most of those officers who attended such meetings either spoke little or 
had contentious conversations with MFA officials.186 
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Military leaders cannot give direct orders based on their personal opinions. To 
turn their opinions into official PLA policy, as with the MFA, they have to follow strictly 
controlled procedures. However, this does not mean that military leaders, with strong 
personal preferences regarding certain policies and political clout, are unable to hijack the 
FAO in some cases, when they have strong personal preferences regarding certain 
policies. Such military leaders still have to go through the process of transforming their 
personal opinion into the opinion of the PLA. When FAO sends in reports seeking 
approval regarding policy recommendations that individual military leaders disagree on, 
these reports would be sent back to the FAO for revision. FAO would then analyze what 
this particular leader thinks and amend the report accordingly. Such reports, upon the 
CMC’s approval, then turn this particular military leader’s personal opinions into the 
PLA’s organizational opinion (jiguan yijian).187  
 
CMC General Office 
The CMC’s General Office plays a supporting, secretarial, and liaison role, 
ranging from speech-writing to administrative tasks of organizing meetings and 
transferring documents from General Departments to CMC leaders. It is the “nerve 
center” of the CMC, akin to the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, though 
the director of the CMC’s General Office has much more limited promotion potential 
compared to his counterpart in the Party system. One would imagine that the most 
convenient advice CMC leaders get should come from the CMC General Office. In 
reality, this is generally not the case. Li Jijun, Deputy Director of the CMC General 
Office in 1987, tried to make it an expanded entity with “more content” and “more 
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brain,” with the capacity to conduct research and advise other agencies. However, 
functional departments strongly resisted this reform, and therefore Li’s idea was never 
realized.188 The CMC General Office has an in-house research branch, but it is 
understaffed and is rarely consulted during international security crises. 
 
Personality Matters 
What is described above is the PLA’s standard policy-making procedure. 
However, exceptions do exist during different conditions and at different times. In any 
bureaucracy, “people” or “personality” counts a great deal. Interviewees who work or 
have worked inside China’s government and military system repeatedly confirmed this.  
For example, General Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of General Staff from 1996-
2006, who was in charge of foreign affairs and intelligence, significantly elevated the role 
of intelligence in the decision-making process both in the military and in influencing the 
then top leader’s thinking, due to his intimate personal relationship with Jiang Zemin. In 
June-July 2013, the responsibility for military intelligence and foreign affairs was broken 
up and divided into portfolios of two deputy chiefs of general staff, even though 
traditionally they were both in one Deputy Chief of General Staff’s portfolio. Coinciding 
with this major change, military intelligence was instructed to only present objective 
analysis of the situation and not provide any advice. It is still unclear at this point why 
this happened, but it is reasonable to speculate that this shift represented a push-back 
against the military intelligence apparatus after Xiong’s years. The splitting of the 
military intelligence and the military’s foreign affairs portfolios ended in mid-2015, as 
evidenced when Sun Jianguo, the DCGS in charge of military intelligence, attended the 
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2015 Shangri-La Dialogue, a foreign affairs occasion. Sun’s attendance signified the 
completion of the military intelligence system’s adjustment. 
General Ma Xiaotian, who oversaw foreign affairs and military intelligence after 
Xiong and Zhang Qinsheng, provides more evidence for the truism that “personality 
matters.” Ma Xiaotian, son of Senior Colonel Ma Zaiyao who served as the Provost of 
the PLA Political Academy, joined the Air Force cadets at age 16 and became the 
youngest Deputy Regiment Commander at age 25. His personality may reflect both his 
career as a pilot and his identity as a member of the so-called “second Red generation,” 
though his father was a mid-ranking officer. General Ma’s subordinates in FAO viewed 
Ma as “bright,” “confident and strong-minded,” “outspoken,” “having his own mind,” 
“sometimes seeing things in black and white,” and “a typical Air Force pilot.”189 He 
neither paid attention to briefings given by subordinates, nor carefully read reports and 
talking points, but almost always spoke well on subjects he chose to address.190 In 
comparison, General Qi Jianguo, a highly respected Army command officer who took 
over Ma’s seat as the Deputy Chief of General Staff overseeing foreign affairs, was said 
to be more attentive to subordinates, as well as expert advice and briefings. 
 
Circumstances When the PLA Will Not Consult the MFA 
The above sections of this chapter explain what motivates the PLA to intervene in 
certain policy areas. Putting aside whether and how the PLA would achieve the level of 
influence it desires, the subject of discussion in Chapters Three through Six, these 
behaviors by the PLA are deliberate and intentional. However, the PLA’s actions 
resulting from operational freedom and therefore military autonomy is arguably different 
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than “influence,” as influence has a deliberate purpose of making others do or refrain 
from doing certain things. The PLA’s action borne out of its operational procedure, 
however, is unintentional but nonetheless creates policy outcomes. Standard operational 
procedure is permitted based on what the military should do under certain circumstances 
out of military necessity and the civilian’s and military’s prior agreement concerning 
these type of actions. The following three areas are within the PLA’s military prerogative, 
in which the PLA would not consult with the MFA in principle: 
First, when an issue is a part of the PLA’s core responsibilities and is a military 
prerogative, such as; armament research and development, weapons development, testing, 
and deployment, protection of China’s territory or patrols within China’s territory 
(including disputed areas), and most aspects of mil-to-mil relationships.191 
Examples of the PLA exhibiting this behavior include China’s 2007 anti-satellite 
weapon (ASAT) test and the J-20 stealth fighter’s test flight during U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates’ visit to Beijing in 2011. The MFA was silent for 12 days 
following the PLA’s 2007 ASAT test, which made the outside world suspect that the 
MFA was kept in the dark before the test.192 The GAD conducted an in-house impact 
assessment before the test, but the assessment’s conclusion was redacted when the GAD 
sent the report to the CMC for approval. Hu Jintao, and possibly Wen Jiabao and a 
handful of non-military officials, were informed about the test in advance, without an 
explanation of what the GAD fully knew. A deputy chief of China’s Meteorological 
Administration was informed about technical aspects of the test and sought to provide 
technical assistance. However, the full picture of what this test was really intended for, 
and possible damage and international fallout, was not provided.193  
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The case of the J-20 test flight during Secretary Gates’ visit to China is more 
telling. From January 9-12, Gates visited China, marking the full restoration of U.S.-
China military-to-military ties. As Gates’ visit was used to demonstrate a thawed and 
improving Sino-U.S. military and political relationship before Hu Jintao’s visit to the U.S. 
in 2011, Beijing tried its best to make sure his visit was a success. Given that Hu’s 
previous visit to Washington was such a diplomatic disaster, and that Beijing abruptly 
cancelled Gates’ planned visit in 2010, every step by planners in Beijing was taken with 
much consideration. Gates was given head-of-state treatment throughout his visit, a 
treatment China has rarely given to a visiting U.S. defense secretary. However, on the 
same day of Gates’ planned meeting with Hu, a test flight of the J-20 stealth fighter was 
conducted. Even photos of the test flights appeared on Chinese Internet chat-rooms. 
Gates was furious about the test, interpreting it as a direct insult to himself and to the U.S. 
Gates even considered cancelling the rest of his visit to China.194 Upon considering U.S. 
Ambassador Jon Huntsman’s advice, Gates decided to proceed, but directly raised the 
issue with Hu during their January 11meeting. Hu “seemed surprised when Gates spoke 
of the matter and questioned his colleagues down the line.”195 Gates noticed that an army 
officer, Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie, explained to Hu that it was a 
coincidence.196 Gates concluded, “the Chinese civilians in the room had known nothing 
about the test.”197 Hu assured Gates later that the rollout had been a “previously 
scheduled scientific test.”198 A PLA officer who used to work for the GSD FAO 
confirmed Hu’s explanation, stating, 
The J-20 test flight was indeed scheduled before Gates’ visit was scheduled. As a routine 
practice of weaponry testing, this wouldn’t be communicated to the MFA. No one in the 
PLA FAO connected the dots either, as they were not on the line of communications on 
weaponry testing. The only peculiar part of this event was that most weaponry testing by 
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the defense industry would be classified and sealed from the outside world. But this is a 
rare case, as even photos leaked out.199  
 
Protection of China’s territory is a more thorny area, as it includes areas that 
China clearly claims, but other countries dispute. On January 10, 2013, the PLA sent 
military planes to the vicinity of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, though they did not enter 
the 12 nautical mile territorial waters of the Islands. Officials in the MFA complained 
that they were not informed in advance about the PLA’s actions.200 The PLA did indeed 
leave the MFA in the dark, but it justified this because it “considers the Diaoyu Islands as 
China’s own territory, so there is no need for it to consult with the MFA when flying 
planes above its territorial waters.”201 
Moreover, the PLA will not consult with the civilian foreign affairs system when 
it comes to operations following established routines in border patrols, military exercises, 
movements in China’s EEZ to resist foreign military surveillance ships/airplanes,202 anti-
surveillance maneuvers against foreign military ships, submarines and airplanes, and 
contingency-based border sealing and blockades.203  
Two examples illustrate this point. First, when the U.S. launched the Afghanistan 
War on October 8, 2001, the PLA ordered a massive border sealing operation along 
China’s thousands-of-kilometer-long western border centered in Xinjiang, in order to 
prevent Taliban members and other terrorist elements from crossing into China. This 
operation was conducted without consulting the MFA, as it was well within the PLA’s 
military mission. The troops conducting the operation were on first-degree alertness, 
while the Lanzhou Military Region and the Tibet Military Region were put on third-
degree alertness. It was the largest and longest military operation on China’s western 
border since the 1962 Sino-Indian border clash.204 
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Second, the PLA will not consult the MFA when it is implementing an existing 
policy, even when that policy constitutes a flashpoint with foreign countries. One 
constant friction between the PLA and the U.S. military has been close-in surveillance 
conducted by U.S. military ships, submarines or airplanes within China’s EEZ. The U.S. 
performs such exercises in order to collect data on the Chinese military’s capabilities, 
such as the frequency, intensity, technical characteristics, and technical parameters of the 
telecommunication and electronic equipment on Chinese warships and submarines, 
including radar or the balladromic course of some particular weapons system. As a 
routine military operation, the PLA will try to repel such surveillance activities, even 
though such military exercises are conducted beyond China’s 12 nautical miles of 
territorial waters and are thus allowed under UNCLOS. Such tensions almost boiled over 
as recently as December 2013, when a PLAN vessel nearly collided with the USS 
Cowpens as it was conducting surveillance.  
China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, was on its way to its first deployment 
for a military drill in the South China Sea. The USS Cowpens (CG-63), a Ticonderoga-
class guided missile cruiser, monitored the Liaoning’s deployment closely, though in 
international waters. On December 5, a PLAN ship made radio contact with the Cowpens, 
urging it to leave the area. When the Cowpens rejected the request, a PLAN amphibious 
dock ship suddenly crossed its bow at a distance of less than 500 meters and stopped in 
the water. The Cowpens was forced to take evasive action to avoid a collision.205 From 
the U.S. perspective, the incident took place in international waters and China’s actions 
posed a challenge to freedom of navigation.206 A visiting senior PLA officer accused the 
Cowpens of “tailing the Liaoning and collecting data of the PLA’s military drill at close 
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range,” saying “How could the PLA sit on its hands under this circumstance?! If this 
happens again, we will do the same.”207 
Third, the PLA will not consult with the civilian foreign affairs system when its 
local units believe they are being provoked by foreign opponents and launch a tit-for-tat 
response. The military’s tenet, under which “the authority of firing shots lies in the hands 
of the CMC, but the authority of firing shots back is in the hands of the Fleet,” as 
explained by a senior PLAN officer, is revealing about how this tit-for-tat operational 
procedure, which applies to every service, works in the PLA.208 The PLA border troops 
would conduct retaliatory patrols or proportional reactions if, for example, the Indian 
military takes provocative actions by patrolling one mile further into the disputed area.209 
Officers at the lowest level will follow this tactic without thinking about whether they 
need to get approval from supervising units or the MFA. It won’t matter to them whether 
China and the opponent are having a very tense relationship, or whether their actions will 
escalate such tensions.  
The 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff and the intensified Sino-Japanese dispute 
over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands after Japan’s nationalization of the island chain indicate 
a new line of thinking regarding escalatory punishment — if the opponent breaks the 
status quo first and moves one inch, we will not only retaliate, but will also respond by 
going an inch and a half. This new model of thinking has not been locked in as a 
replacement for the PLA’s tit-for-tat practice, but has garnered increasingly strong 
support.210   
In the above three scenarios, in cases when the MFA raises serious concerns to 
the top leader and disputes the PLA’s routine operations/patrols, the PLA won’t change 
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its practice unless all of the following conditions are met: the CMC explicitly accepts the 
MFA’s grievances, new and clear instructions are given, and these new instructions are 
uniformly understood and can be operationalized.211  
Although civilian actors can hardly alter the PLA’s behaviors within its 
operational freedom, which sets in motion like an automatic machine, such behaviors do 
not indicate that the PLA runs amok, as its operational freedom has limits that are set in 
within its operational procedure. Exceptions may occur, resulting from individual 
officers’ choices and actions, which are subject to penalty once detected and determined. 
However, exceptions should not prove the rule. The PLA is by and large a professionally-
trained military, in which military effectiveness is built on the foundation of obedience to 
rules and orders. For example, during the EP-3 incident in 2001, Zhao Yu, the other pilot 
in the air, requested to shoot down the EP-3 after Wang Wei’s fighter crashed, but was 
rejected by the command on the ground. Zhao requested again and the command rejected 
it again. Zhao finally followed orders and returned.212  
 
Conclusion 
The PLA is a professional military with some peculiar characteristics. It is also a 
military force in transition, with dynamics that could greatly impact the PLA’s likelihood 
to intervene in or refrain from China’s foreign and security policy-making process.  
The debate about whether the PLA should focus more on internal or external 
threats has not concluded in the PLA. The very subject could still arouse great differences 
and strong feelings in both camps. The trends nevertheless demonstrate that the PLA will 
become much more outward-oriented or outward-looking over the coming years, though 
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it is still largely an inward-oriented or inward-looking military focused on China’s 
internal challenges. An increasingly outward-oriented PLA is more likely to be open to 
military-to-military interactions, engage in burden-sharing, and take on non-combat 
responsibilities overseas. Though an increasingly outward-oriented PLA may be more 
pleasant to deal with on a daily basis, it could be a more lethal opponent under certain 
conditions.  
The PLA is surely undergoing professionalization, though the disruptive force of 
politicization will be present for a long time because the system of politicization is upheld 
not only by the Party, but also by organized interest groups headed by the GPD. 
Politicization will continuously weaken the PLA’s efforts at professionalization and 
create an institutionalized disconnect between the PLA and the government. 
Professionalization, the dominant side of this dynamic, is a double-edged sword as it 
elevates the principle of civilian centrality, but makes the PLA more budget-conscious, 
“no-war anxious” (anxious about military inertia and its potential lack of military 
effectiveness since it has not fought a war in over three decades), and possibly more 
welcoming to continuous frictions and even provoking a war in which there is a high 
probability of winning. 
The rise of inter-service rivalry, though it shouldn’t be exaggerated, is 
increasingly an important factor affecting the PLA’s behavior in foreign policy. Inter-
service rivalry over the past two decades was reflected more through the differences 
between inland-based and coastal-oriented military regions over the PLA’s core mission. 
On the policy side, the PLA is primarily concerned about two types of issues: 
those that pose existing and potential military threats, and territorial-based ones. The PLA 
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as a whole is a territorial animal that vigilantly guards what is happening within and 
immediately around China’s borders, as well as around its immediate periphery. As a 
secondary concern, the PLA also cares about strategic assets that could grant it a 
significant geopolitical advantage.213 In summary, the PLA is more strongly motivated by 
policies and actions of substantive military utility/threat than about issues that address 
hollow political values.    
Despite internal differences and debates, as a bureaucracy that has a shorter, less 
hierarchical decision-making chain than its flatter and more cumbersome civilian foreign 
affairs system, the PLA may reach a decision more quickly during crises. This may allow 
the military to gain an advantage in how an issue is initially framed, when the PLA 
deems it necessary to do so.   
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Given China’s Party-dominated political system, power in politics is still the main 
determinant of power over policies. Therefore, in examining the PLA’s influence in 
foreign and security policy-making, it is crucial to look at the Party-military relationship, 
which decides the scope of the military’s political autonomy in China’s power structure. 
The Party-military relationship here is defined as the dynamic of relations between the 
Party and the PLA, as determined by the top Party leader’s political reliance on the 
military, the top leader’s effective control over the military, and the PLA’s political 
participation in the Party.1  
In 1980, China installed a collective leadership system that the general secretary 
of the Party heads, which remains the structure for governing China.2 Despite the 
collective nature of the Party leadership in general decision-making, the top leader of the 
Party officially maintains an exclusive relationship with the PLA, as explained below. 
That said, the Party’s strength and coherence, or its weakness and fragmentation, do 
impact the top Party leader’s relations with the PLA. The strength, unity and coherence of 
the Party leadership would help reduce the top leader’s dependence on the PLA’s support, 
while the Party’s fragmentation would weaken the top leader’s authority and makes him 
more dependent on the PLA’s support. Therefore, the collective leadership of the Party 
plays a role mostly in the aspects of strengthening/weakening the top leader’s political 
reliance on the PLA. A decision regarding extremely crucial policies with direct 
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implications on war and peace would have to go through the collective leadership for 
responsibility-sharing purposes, but such a process is a bargaining game between the top 
leader and others in the Party leadership. Therefore, when the PLA’s influence on 
policies is examined through the framework of the Party-military relationship, it is 
critical to understand the PLA’s relationship with the top leader of the Party. 
The previous chapter explored what motivates the PLA to influence China’s 
foreign and security policy-making and found that the PLA has evolved into a 
professional army with unique characteristics, which precluded it from sliding into a 
pattern of political interference as a praetorian military. However, the PLA is strongly 
motivated to impact contingencies that combine core interests/territorial disputes with 
military threats, as well as those that they see as having a military prerogative.  
Chapters Three and Four examine how the Party-military relationship impacts the 
PLA’s ability to influence policies. This chapter builds a theoretical framework for 
assessing the Party-military relationship and provides a historical overview of this 
relationship. The next chapter explores empirical case studies of this relationship in the 
post-Mao era. Although the military’s political representation is a reflection of how 
important it is relative to the Party’s overall goals, the PLA’s political participation in the 
Party (explained in the Appendix to Chapter 3) has a more crucial impact on interactions 
between the PLA and the government. The PLA’s political participation is the 
mechanism through which it generates influence within the framework of the Party-
military relationship.  
The PLA’s influence over policies is a function of the Party-military relationship, 
as determined by the balance of the supply and demand of political support between the 
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top leadership and the military. The PLA’s categorical influence over policies and the 
policy-making process is determined by the degree of the Party leader’s political reliance 
on the military, and the leader’s effective control over the military. In order for the top 
leader to grant the military influence, he must be assured that during times of need he can 
rely on the military’s allegiance and political support. Political reliance – the top political 
leader’s reliance on the military’s support – determines whether the leader needs the 
military in the first place. If the Party leader does not need the military’s support and can 
control the military, the military’s influence in politics and policy-making will diminish. 
In other words, without the need to secure the military’s support, the Party leader exerts 
more control over the military, and thus the military has less influence over policies.  
On the other hand, without effective control over the military, the top leader 
would be hesitant to believe that he owns the military’s support and thus could rely on 
such support during times of turmoil or crucial moments in intra-Party politics. Under 
this circumstance, whereby the top political leader relies on the military but does not 
control it, the top political leader would seek to minimize the PLA’s influence in politics 
and policies. If the top leader both politically relies on and effectively controls the 
military, the military will become one of the leader’s strong power bases, and therefore 
the leader will naturally grant trust and access to the military, thus allowing it to exert 
influence over policies. In other words, when the top leadership politically relies upon 
and needs support from the PLA, the Party leader’s effective control over the military 
will translate into the military’s direct influence in policies that the top Party leader 
personally oversees. The Party-military influence is in this sense mutual. The Party-
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military relationship is dynamic and responsive to the movements of political events and 
the rise and fall of political power. 
Effective control that the top political leader establishes over the military 
leadership, and the top leader’s political reliance on the military, determine the 
parameters of the PLA’s influence in foreign and security policy-making. The concept of 
effective control refers to the PLA leadership’s subordination to the top political 
leadership’s authority concerning military personnel promotions, employment of the 
military for non-combat missions, and major political decisions, including key national 
policies that concern the country’s overall development and stability. Effective control 
concerns largely the military’s political autonomy rather than military autonomy, except 
with regard to appointing the senior officer corps (though political autonomy may impact 
military autonomy).3 The establishment of effective control could be facilitated by the 
military’s increased willingness to accept the top political leadership due to a variety of 
reasons, including convergence or similarity in identity, values, visions, or goals. 
Effective control is different than political control or Party control carried out through 
systematic political indoctrination or the political work system in order to maintain the 
military’s ideological loyalty to the Party. Political or Party control could be used to build 
effective control over the military, but they are not the same. The development of 
effective control undermines the military’s autonomy. 
This chapter consists of two parts: first, a definition of two concepts (political 
reliance and effective control) and a theoretical explanation of the PLA’s influence; and 
second, an assessment of the Party-military relationship by looking at the Mao period 
(1927-1976). 
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The result of the application of the reliance-control model can be summarized as 
follows:  
Table 3.1: Application of the Reliance-Control Model 
Reliance Control PLA Influence 
Low High Low 
High Low Low 
High High High 
 
Under the Party-military framework, when the top leader has low-level political 
reliance on the PLA, this would translate to the PLA having low-level influence. If, 
however, the top leader has a high-level of political reliance on the PLA, whether the top 
leader grants the PLA high-level influence depends on whether he can establish effective 
control over the PLA. 
 
Dynamics of the Party-Military Relationship 
Since China’s reorientation in 1978 toward a policy of economic reform and 
opening up, several important qualitative changes in Party-military relations emerged and 
later crystalized in the mid-1990s. The “interlocking directorate” and the traditional, 
symbiotic Party-military linkage were broken as a result of the generational shift from 
revolutionary leaders to those without military experience.4 Post-Deng senior political 
leaders generally have no prior military experience (with Xi Jinping standing as the 
exception, as he served in the PLA as Defense Minister Geng Biao’s secretary), and thus 
the PLA’s allegiance does not come naturally. Also, economic reform allowed for the 
accelerated development of the PLA’s separate corporate interest, a new budget 
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allocation system, and the PLA’s continuous professionalization.5 Finally, while Party 
ideology has lost its appeal amongst the PLA’s rank and file, the framework of the Party-
military relationship still applies because the Party continues to dominate China’s 
political system. Despite the fact that the Party’s ideological appeal may be greatly 
diminished, the Party-designed power structure remains intact. The Party-military 
relationship since the mid-1990s is increasingly one in which both sides jockey for 
control and influence. 
Some analysts equate the PLA’s influence with the PLA’s representation in 
China’s formal power structure.6 Indeed, to understand any specific area of policy-
making in China, one has to understand China’s political power structure. Its uniqueness 
lies in the Party’s preeminent status over the military, state, and society.7 In the almost 
four decades since China began to reform and modernize, the relationship between the 
Party and each subordinate unit in the system has changed drastically. One can even 
argue that the Party itself has fundamentally changed.8 However, since 1978 China’s 
formal power structure has remained largely unchanged.  
It is important to understand the formal political power structure embedded in the 
Party system, though this study shows that the PLA’s political representation has a 
negligible impact on its influence over policies. For example, under Mao, the PLA’s 
representation in the Party leadership was strongest, while its influence on foreign and 
security policy was probably weakest. A close examination of the PLA’s political 
representation, in the Appendix to this chapter, highlights the PLA’s importance in 
general, and these formal structures are an important factor in the PLA’s relationship with 
other policy actors, but they are not venues for the PLA to exercise its influence under the 
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framework of Party-military relations. Therefore, this will instead be discussed in a later 
chapter focusing on the relationship between the PLA and the civilian foreign affairs 
system, since the PLA’s political representation impacts its relationship with other 
bureaucracies. 
This chapter analyzes history’s impact in detail because history significantly 
shaped the outline of the current Party-military relationship and fundamentally 
determined the unique position of the military in China’s political system. An 
understanding of the Party-military relationship and the PLA’s influence in foreign and 
security policy-making lies primarily in the structural disconnect between the military 
and the government (State) due to historical Party-military arrangements. Without the 
nationalization of the military or subordination of the military to the State system, the 
military is organically separated from the government in foreign and security policy-
making. Also, because of the PLA’s history of acting as a caretaker, guarding the Party’s 
victory and survival, and supplanting the Party as the supreme governor during times of 
national chaos, soldiers enjoy a place in the Party-dominated power structure that 
diplomats simply cannot match. However, this does not mean that the military wins every 
policy battle, and in fact during some points in history diplomats did outflank the military 
during policy debates.9 Nonetheless, without understanding the history of the Party-
military relationship, one misses out on the origins of the intricate relationship that exists 
between the Party and the military in contemporary China. 
 
Party-Military Relationship as an Independent Variable: Dynamics 
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This section examines how the Party-military relationship has impacted the PLA’s 
influence over China’s foreign and security policy-making process since 1978.10 During 
this period, Deng’s era was the only time in which the top leader (Deng) was so strong 
that he did not rely on the PLA. Throughout almost the entire 1980s, Deng, with a 
singular focus on economic reform, had little need for the PLA to provide political 
support. The one exception to this was the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989. The PLA had 
minimal influence over foreign and security policies during Deng’s era.11 Deng’s 
successors have generally politically relied on the military. Therefore, the defining 
measure for the degree to which the military influences policies is the extent to which the 
top leader establishes effective control over the military. In the post-Deng era, the more 
control the top leader exerts over the PLA, the more confident he is in wielding the 
military’s influence when necessary to advance his political goals, the more trusting he is 
in the military, the more access the PLA gains to the top leader, and the more influence 
the PLA has in China’s overall policy-making process. 
The policies that the top Party leader directly oversees are the same issues that the 
PLA influences through the Party-military construct, namely those that cannot be settled 
at the level of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) and must instead go to 
the top leader for his guidance. These issues are those that have bearing on China’s core 
national interests and overall international well-being, namely Sino-U.S. relations and 
cross-Strait (Taiwan) relations, regional security issues that impact great power relations 
(South and East China Seas, North Korea), contingencies that have direct bearing on the 
imminent threat of wars (such as the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade 
in 1999), and major foreign policy issues where interagency (including the military) 
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differences exist and no consensus can be reached (such as the Sino-Philippine 
Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012). Even with the Party leader’s intervention, foreign 
and security policies issued by the leader are mostly guidelines rather than detailed 
policies.12  
 
Top Leader’s Political Reliance on the PLA 
Unlike Western democratic systems, in which a military has to keep political 
neutrality to be considered professional, in the Chinese system, officially, the military 
remains part of the Party and therefore its political participation is regarded as “an 
expression of Party loyalty, not a violation of military professionalism.”13 Therefore, the 
Party at some points legitimized and even required the PLA’s political participation, and 
in some extreme cases the PLA’s proactive intervention. In some instances, the PLA’s 
political intervention when implemented strayed out of the agreed upon and desired 
course the top leader set, as demonstrated by the PLA’s persistent frictions with radicals 
in the 1960s and early 1970s and its officers’ opposition to carrying out the Tiananmen 
crackdown. Yet such dissent was localized within small groups and limited in scale and 
degree, as compared to the overall course of action. The PLA’s past interventions in 
Chinese politics did not indicate a particular interest within the military to alter China’s 
political landscape, but rather reflected its compliance with political leaders’ orders. The 
PLA has internalized the norm of subordination to the Party to such a degree that the 
military’s compliance with the Party’s wishes is almost assumed. However, when the 
Party leader disagrees with the military’s policy positions the military is not immune 
from suffering similar political consequences as its civilian counterpart (MFA).  
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For example, even with the extreme case of the Gang of Four’s arrest in 1976, 
when it was a life-and-death struggle between radicals and moderates, one camp in the 
PLA’s senior echelon was advocating using a military coup (bingjian) to take down the 
Gang of Four and thereby force Hua Guofeng’s (Mao’s designated civilian successor) 
hand.14 The PLA leaders independently ruled out this idea, on the grounds that such 
actions “ran against the nature of the PLA.”15 The PLA leadership under Marshal Ye 
Jianying instead pursued and obtained Hua’s support, which legitimized the arrest. On the 
other hand, both civilian officials and military officers widely recognize that the PLA is 
an instrument of power “that is supposed to neither think nor act with political 
autonomy,” precisely because “compared with the other forms or sources of power, 
military power weighs the heaviest.”16 
The PLA’s allegiance, if obtainable, is one of the most formidable pieces of 
support for any Chinese leader in domestic politics. However, some leaders need such 
support more than others. Variables that affect the degree to which a leader needs the 
military’s backing include the stability, multiplicity, and authoritativeness of leaders’ 
own power bases, fragmentation of the political opposition, and crisis level (intense inter-
Party rivalries and rifts that may split the Party, leadership succession, prosecution of 
major political leaders, and events that threaten the country’s overall political stability). 
Deng Xiaoping certainly gained the officer corps’ nearly full and unconditional 
personal allegiance. First, the Party-military relationship was lopsided, with the military 
badly needing Deng’s leadership and authority to launch systematic reforms to reboot the 
military after decades of chaos. Deng resurrected the political careers of a large group of 
veteran cadres and cleared the names of those wrongly purged during Mao’s political 
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campaigns. These officials, in return, became part of Deng’s power base through the 
early 1980s. A younger generation of leading experts in education, science and 
technology, and economics were at the core of Deng’s power base throughout the 1980s. 
Therefore, Deng had little need to rely on the military politically in the 1980s, with the 
exception of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. Second, the military’s backing of Deng 
would change neither China’s domestic power structure nor the rules that governed 
political bargaining during most of the 1980s. For example, despite the opposition of 
Chen Yun’s camp to Deng’s policies of economic reform and political liberalization, it 
was unimaginable that Deng would take down Chen with military force, even though 
Deng had the PLA’s full allegiance. This is because there were other arbiters in the 
political system, such as the Party elders, and the military would not tip the balance of 
power either between Deng and Chen or between Deng and his deposed successors (Hu 
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang).17 Third, none of the crises except the Tiananmen Incident 
were grave enough to undermine the overall political stability of the Party and the nation.  
Even during the course of one leader’s rule, the importance of the military’s 
backing varied depending on the circumstances. For example, between 1989 and 1992 
Deng needed the military’s backing much more than he needed it from 1980-87. As both 
Yan Jiaqi and Ruan Ming, political insiders during the 1980s, have concluded, Deng’s 
political power was repeatedly weakened from 1987-89 in favor of the conservative camp 
led by Chen Yun due to the collapse of the Deng-Hu-Zhao mechanism,18 after he 
denounced Hu in 1987 and ordered the Tiananmen massacre in 1989.19  
As political power inevitably decentralized after strongmen faded away, the top 
leaders in the post-Deng era face more political constraints and challenges as the Party 
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continuously and inevitably fragments as it faces increasingly powerful interest groups, 
opposing political factions within and outside of the Party, strong bureaucracies with self-
interested agendas, and an increasingly empowered and vocal society. Meanwhile, the 
political system and leadership succession have become more institutionalized, 
predictable, and therefore stable. The occasions in which the top leadership needs the 
PLA’s political participation and support are rare and close to nonexistent during 
“normal” times, when there is not severe fragmentation within the Party and/or 
debilitating nationwide civil unrest. However, the military’s backing, or absence of 
support for the opposing political faction during serious crises or grave political 
turbulence, may tip the balance of power. Therefore, during the post-Deng era the 
military’s support has become even more crucial to the top leadership and is a potential 
game-changer. In other words, the PLA, as security provider-of-last-resort, is 
indispensible to the Party and the top leader in particular. This, in turn, also changes how 
the Party interacts with the military, which makes the top leader’s political reliance on the 
military for support in the post-Deng era such a critical variable. As the PLA’s allegiance 
and support becomes the “nuclear option” for the top leader and the Party, lacking such 
support could be a fatal political vulnerability for the Party’s top leader. At the same time, 
the military needs access to the leadership for resources. In the Chinese political system, 
the attention of and access to the top leader are the hard currency of political capital, 




Effective control refers to the senior military leadership’s subordination to the top 
political leader’s authority over primarily major political decisions (political 
compliance/autonomy) concerning personnel promotions, employment of the military for 
non-combat missions, and important non-military political decisions such as the arrest of 
Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang.20 In comparison, the PLA’s military autonomy concerns 
professional decisions such as budget allocation, systematic bureaucratic reforms, 
strategies and missions, and army building and training, all of which are not the targets of 
effective control. The political leader is primarily concerned with the military 
leadership’s political compliance. Effective control is a measure of relative power 
between the political and military leaders. Effective control, as employed here, is 
different from Party control or political control through ideological indoctrination, which 
is an institutional concept, though the two concepts sometimes overlap.  
The military leadership here refers to those senior military officers who are the 
primary decision-makers and first-tier implementers in military affairs, with 
administrative rank no lower than that of Military Region Deputy (fu da junqu jibie). This 
group of officers matters most in determining the top political leader’s effective control 
over the military, since each officer who attains such a position has accumulated 
substantial expertise and a power base within the military. Additionally, officers at the 
level of Military Region Deputy always become alternate members of the CCP Central 
Committee (CCPCC), the official collective leadership of the Party, and those with the 
rank of Military Region Principal always become full members of the CCPCC.21 These 
officers are “political appointees” in the military, meaning that their promotion to such 
positions entails political considerations and requires the support of some patron(s) in the 
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military or the Party. It also means that their positions start to have political implications 
for the collective Party leadership.   
The more effective control the top leader exerts over the PLA, the more confident 
the leader is in wielding the military’s influence when necessary to advance his political 
goals, the more trusting he is in the military, the more access the PLA gains to him, and 
the more influence the PLA has in China’s policy-making process. Conversely, the less 
effective control the top leader exerts over the PLA, the more distrustful he is of the 
military, the more distanced the relationship between the PLA and him is, the less access 
he is willing to give, and the less heard the military’s opinions become.  
The top political leaders in the post-Deng era do not have the same deep and 
organic bonds with the military that Mao or Deng had. As a result, these leaders face far 
more difficulties in establishing authority and effective control over the PLA. This tug of 
war for control and influence therefore comes as leaders seek to control soldiers in order 
to serve their political needs, while soldiers seek influence and resources by obtaining 
greater attention from leaders. 
 
Importance of Effective Control 
Among all the tools of power and control the top leader possesses, effective 
control over the military is the most important and necessary.22 Without firm control over 
the military, a top leader risks becoming ineffective, allowing instability to take root, and 
even countenancing the possible replacement of his rule. Examples of this can be found 
in the fates of Liu Shaoqi in 1968, Hua Guofeng in 1981, Hu Yaobang in 1987, and Zhao 
Ziyang in 1989. Jiang faced a similar risk in 1991-92 because he had major policy 
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disagreements with Deng, but saved himself politically after abandoning the conservative 
policies associated with Chen Yun and Li Peng and aligning with the more open and 
liberal economic policies that Deng supported.  
Although the military was never directly used to unseat these political leaders, all 
of the above Chinese leaders lacked effective control over the military during their 
downfall. In Jiang’s case, he faced a genuine risk of being purged. Although the system 
of collective political leadership has been further consolidated in the post-Deng era, and 
with regards to the process of political succession has been further institutionalized, 
control over the military is indispensible for any top leader who seeks ultimate political 
authority in China.23 This still holds true and will remain so for the foreseeable future, 
unless China’s political system is fundamentally altered by introducing either full 
democracy or meaningful intra-Party competition, and turning the PLA into a State army.  
In state affairs, the top leader is only the first among equals, while in military 
affairs he is, or is at least supposed to be, peerless. This distinction is less important 
during times of political stability, unity, and continuity. However, during serious political 
disagreements within the Party or in times of succession, the importance of consolidating 
political support and maintaining stability through the firm control of the military 
becomes critically important. A full-scale military coup is highly unlikely in today’s 
China, given the PLA officer corps’ level of professionalization. The military is even 
highly unlikely to contemplate the use of force domestically unless a political upheaval 
endangers the stability and unity of society as a whole.24 However, the military 
leadership’s public support and endorsement of the top leader would greatly help to 
consolidate the top leader’s political position during a delicate moment; meanwhile, the 
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revelation of fracture and even conflict between the military and the civilian government 
inevitably weakens the top leader’s position. As a result, the top leader in China will 
always seek to strengthen and ideally monopolize his control over the military. Even with 
the nominal and actual development of collective leadership in the post-Deng era, the 
CMC Chairman’s monopolistic control over the military is still justified as a tacit golden 
rule of Chinese politics. The decisions over critical security policies involving the 
military require the Politburo Standing Committee’s (PBSC) collective endorsement, but 
running day-to-day military affairs is still the exclusive realm of the CMC Chairman, and 
such policies are unaccountable to the PBSC’s other members.  
 
Division of Military and State Affairs  
The long-existing division of military and state affairs makes it possible for the 
top leader to exert exclusive control over the military. The Party leader’s self-interested 
calculation, rather than the interest of the Party at large, has kept military affairs as the 
top Party leader’s exclusive domain. Zhu De and Peng Dehuai, who were both 
professional soldiers, voiced their support for transforming the PLA into a State army.25 
However, there was collusion and a tacit understanding within the Party that the PLA 
should remain a Party army, even though the top Party leader clearly had a bigger stake 
in maintaining the status quo.  
The separation of the military and state realms has been a traditional political 
practice since Mao’s time, under the formula of “the Politburo’s realm is state affairs and 
the CMC’s is military affairs.”26 Mao believed “everything comes from gun barrels,”27 
and therefore he maintained strict control over building the army and deploying troops, 
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even when his designated successor, Lin Biao, was overseeing the PLA’s day-to-day 
operations. Deng Xiaoping maintained this division despite periodic and short-lived 
internal debates that Zhao Ziyang encouraged and backed that recommended separating 
the Party from military affairs. Deng was cautious about transferring control of military 
power to his designated successors, Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang, and it was taboo for 
either of them to step too far into the military realm before Deng made up his mind.28  
It has been a sacred principle that the Party commands the gun and the PLA must 
have absolute loyalty to the Party, and political leaders since Deng have followed this 
rule. Military affairs are kept highly separate from state affairs and even Party affairs, as 
evidenced by the fact that in the chain of command the PLA only answers to one civilian, 
the CMC Chairman.29 The PLA has not been subject to any external scrutiny such as the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) (the legislative body for the State), or the National 
Congress of the CCP (the legislative body for the Party). According to Article 94 of the 
1982 Constitution, the CMC Chairman “answers to” the NPC and its Standing 
Committee, but is not required to “report its work” to them, a requirement which the 
State Council – China’s central government – is subject to. The PLA leadership is neither 
required by the Constitution to report its work progress to the NPC, nor to address 
inquiries from the NPC.  
By having independent auditing, disciplining (anti-corruption), and judicial 
systems, the PLA has enjoyed a high level of autonomy. The military has its own 
farmland, issues its own vehicle license plates and driver’s licenses, and is in most 
respects not subject to civilian jurisdiction such as highway taxes, traffic fines, or 
criminal investigations. In this sense, “there are always two Chinas, a military China and 
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a non-military China,” with the CMC Chairman acting as the highest bridge.30 As a result, 
the traditional separation of military and state affairs has made it possible for the top 
political leader to exert exclusive control over the military. 
In the post-Deng era, the top leader no longer possesses near absolute authority in 
domestic politics, although Xi Jinping has emerged as a possible exception. Instead, 
collective political leadership, as exemplified by the PBSC, has taken hold. Leadership 
succession has become more institutionalized and predictable. Despite this trend, the top 
political leader’s relationship with the top layer of the military leadership, including the 
CMC vice chairmen and members selected from the officer corps, remains highly 
personalized and exclusive, in the sense that the top political leader rejects interference 
from any other non-military political leader.31  
 
Obstacles to Effective Control and the Issue of Political Interference  
Holding the CMC Chairmanship – the supreme military commander – is crucial to 
maintaining the authority to command the military. Because of the military’s unique 
nature in that it follows explicit orders through a fixed command-and-control procedure, 
official authority is even more important within the military’s structure. Even for 
paramount leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, holding the formal title of CMC 
Chairman was still important, despite the fact that both of them had the PLA officers’ 
almost absolute personal loyalty.  
The political battle for control over the military starts with leaders vying for the 
official title of Chairman of the CMC. For most of the PRC’s history, the CMC Chairman 
has also been the top Party and State leader. However, this is not always the case. For 
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example, Deng Xiaoping remained CMC Chairman from 1981 to 1989, even though Hu 
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were consecutively general secretarys of the CCPCC or the 
top Party leaders, while Li Xiannian and then Yang Shangkun served as President of the 
State. Deng gave up all of his political positions in 1987 except the CMC Chairmanship, 
which he transferred to Jiang Zemin two years later. Jiang manipulated this practice, 
pointing to this precedent in order to justify delaying the transfer of the CMC 
Chairmanship to Hu Jintao, the new General Secretary of the Party, from 2002 to 2004.32 
By tradition, the CMC chairman should concurrently be the Party’s top leader, the 
CCPCC chairman (otherwise known as the CCPCC general secretary). However, the 
authority, status, function, or composition of the CMC has never been clearly written in 
the nation’s constitutions, nor in the CCP’s constitution.33 After Hua Guofeng resigned as 
CCPCC Chairman and CCP CMC Chairman in June 1981, these two top positions were 
intentionally divided.34 Deng took over the CCP CMC Chairmanship, while Hu Yaobang 
became the CCPCC Chairman (renamed the “CCP general secretary” in 1982). The 
Party’s constitution was then altered to accommodate Deng’s wishes. The 1982 CCP 
Constitution stipulated that the CMC Chairman would be selected from among the CCP 
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) members, in order to accommodate the fact that 
Deng was not officially the top leader of the Party.35 The CCP constitution had to be 
revised again in 1987, which put Party membership as the only requirement for becoming 
CMC Chairman, in order to again accommodate Deng.36 By November 1987, Deng no 
longer held any position on the CCP Politburo or its Standing Committee. The only 
position Deng held onto from 1987 to 1989 was the CCP CMC Chairmanship.37  
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The official transfer of the CMC Chairmanship, however, does not guarantee the new 
chairman’s effective control over the military, as evidenced by Hua Guofeng from 1978-
81. Thus, the official title of CMC Chairman is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
exercising power over the military. This problem has only worsened in the post-Deng era, 
as the CMC Chairman, who generally lacked a military background and therefore the 
default loyalty of the military, only slowly gained the PLA’s allegiance after the transfer 
of formal power. For example, Jiang Zemin from 1989-93, and Hu Jintao arguably 
throughout his entire tenure, did not exert full control over the military. The example of 
Jiang during his transition to power is illustrative. In 1989, Deng appointed Admiral Liu 
Huaqing as CMC Vice Chairman, Yang Shangkun as President and CMC Vice Chairman, 
and Yang Baibing — Yang Shangkun’s half brother — as General Secretary of the 
CMC.38 Deng, at least formally, demanded that the CMC Vice Chairmen and General 
Secretary act as Jiang’s de facto “aides.”39 Jiang, now CMC Chairman, assigned Liu 
Huaqing to be in charge of hosting CMC Regular Work Meetings and required that major 
issues be brought to discussion at the PBSC, where Jiang was in attendance.40 However, 
Liu decided to first report to Yang Shangkun for instruction, and if the issue was 
important, he would then report to Jiang.41 The chain of command in the CMC from 
1989-92 was clear: Yang Shangkun was still the CMC’s real boss, despite the fact that he 
had the same (if not lower) position as Liu in the military, since both were CMC vice 
chairmen.42  
Top leaders in the post-Deng era have greater incentives to establish effective 
control over the PLA. If they cannot control the top soldiers – the CMC vice chairmen – 
they would then try to build direct links to the chief of general staff (CGS) and other 
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CMC members in order to build partial control. For example, Jiang won CGS Zhang 
Wannian’s allegiance by manipulating the corruption charge against Zhang, while 
maintaining a thorny relationship with Admiral Liu Huaqing.43 Whether the top leader 
can effectively control the PLA determines whether he can trust the military to serve his 
interests during times of need. Without effective control and therefore trust in the military, 
the top political leader would have more incentive to confine and shrink the role the 
military plays in China’s political process. This happened, for example, when Jiang took 
over the cross-Strait back channel from the PLA in 1992, and when Hu Jintao excluded 
Xu Caihou from the Secretariat in 2002-03 through procedural blockades. 
Why doesn’t the military leadership just give its allegiance to the new supreme 
leader, if that means greater access to the top political leader and therefore greater 
influence over the policy-making process? Wouldn’t it be rational for the military 
leadership to subordinate itself to the new top leader? Accepting a new political master 
could be obstructed by the PLA leadership’s conviction that the leader is not fit to 
manage military affairs, due to the leader’s lack of understanding or seniority. This was 
how the PLA viewed Hu Yaobang. In addition to the problem of acceptance on the 
PLA’s side, one of the biggest obstacles to the new civilian CMC chairman assuming 
effective control is political interference from the previous chairman and even chairmen. 
Deng from 1989-94 and Jiang from 2002-12 both obstructed their successor’s attempts to 
gain effective control.  
There is a prevailing recognition among PLA officers that “the PLA listens only 
to the CMC chairman” and “others cannot interfere in military affairs.”44 The CMC 
follows the “Chairmen Responsibility System,” which bestows upon the CMC chairman 
 173 
the highest authority over military affairs. This rule still holds true when referring to the 
ultimate military command authority regarding deployments. However, such exclusivity 
of allegiance to the CMC chairman should be compared with the rest of the existing 
collective political leadership, namely the other members of the PBSC.  
The previous CMC chairman’s political interference is facilitated by his influence 
over the appointment of the CMC members who will serve the new chairman during his 
first term. Although the PLA is by and large a professional military and its 
professionalization has accelerated in recent decades, the very top layer of military 
leaders has always been composed of political appointees. The CMC chairman has the 
authority, at least nominally, to nominate the vice chairmen and the members of the CMC, 
which include the chiefs of all general departments and, since 2004, chiefs of three 
services (Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery). However, such authority is often 
realized only in his second five-year term, if at all. The pool of qualified candidates for 
military leadership positions presented to the new CMC chairman is generally highly 
restricted, because the process of selecting officers follows explicit, written rules, and 
there are few candidates who have the requisite qualifications for the highest-level 
leadership positions. The new CMC chairman, for his first term, almost certainly inherits 
a CMC constructed by his predecessor. Thus, the new CMC chairman is most likely 
surrounded by a team with allegiance to the previous CMC chairman. In Hu Jintao’s case, 
this problem persisted into his second term.45 
To cultivate officers and bring them into the chairman’s own inner circle could 
take years, because such an effort has to begin during the early stages of such officers’ 
careers. This is due to a particularly pervasive culture among PLA officers known as 
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“loyalty to the king” (zhongjun). As one retired officer put it, “The thinking of zhongjun 
is a long-lasting tradition amongst PLA officers. Once they are promoted by someone, 
they regard themselves as ‘his man.’ Even if they don’t see it this way, others will still 
see them as such. This is the general rule, though of course the rule has exceptions.”46 
This line of thinking exists not only between military officers and political leaders, but 
also among military officers. “For example, Jiang tried to establish himself as the ‘core’ 
of the leadership, so he promoted a network of (PLA) officers, who in turn tried to 
establish themselves as the ‘little core’ of their universe, and so on and so forth from the 
top to the bottom,” explained a PLA officer.47  
There is a degree of “stickiness” in this network of loyalties and vested interests, 
which is difficult to break. The slate is hard to wipe clean, and individual officers are 
often stuck in a particular network. Therefore, the battle for control brought on by a 
change in leadership and even semi-political campaigns is inevitable for the new CMC 
chairman in the process of establishing control. That is also why the top leader can only 
slowly establish effective control over the military, even though it is critical to the overall 
success of his general political leadership. This also explains why each new CMC 
chairman will seek to replace as many officers as he can, in almost all key positions in the 
military.  
 
Measuring Influence, Political Reliance and Effective Control 
Influence is “causing decision makers to do something they probably would not 
have done otherwise.”48 Generating influence is realized through two approaches: direct 
influence, by encapsulating and explicitly expressing the formal institutional opinion 
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directly to the decision-making bodies or the top leader; and relative power, by shaping 
the opinion environment in the public domain or through military intelligence, which 
frames the question and the basis of the official decision-making. Alternatively, the 
military can generate relative power by deliberately or unintentionally stalling a policy’s 
implementation, or choosing the route of inaction by refusing to cooperate or consult with 
other policy actors, which results in a change of the facts on the ground and therefore the 
basis of decision-making.49 The PLA’s influence in foreign and security policy-making 
can be assessed by observing the difference between what the PLA advocates prior to a 
policy decision and the policy outcome. In certain instances, direct evidence of PLA 
preferences may not be readily apparent, in which case one must examine the options that 
fit the PLA’s interests. 
As abstract as the concept of the Party-military relationship are the two 
components of this concept: the Party leader’s political reliance on the military, and the 
leader’s effective control over the military. The problem for academic research is how to 
measure these abstract, nonmaterial and non-quantifiable concepts. Among the two 
concepts, reliance is even more elusive and subjective than control.  
There is no easy way to solve this measurement puzzle. When measuring political 
reliance, it is more manageable to examine the power landscape and rules of political 
bargaining in China’s top-level intra-Party politics. Therefore, variables that affect the 
degree to which a leader needs the PLA’s political support include: the stability, 
multiplicity, and authoritativeness of leaders’ own power bases; the coherence or 
fragmentation of the political opposition within and outside the Party; and the crisis level 
or stakes (intense inter-Party rivalries and rifts that may split the Party, leadership 
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succession, prosecution of major political leaders, and events that threaten the country’s 
overall national or political stability). These variables can be broken down into the 
following questions: How important is the PLA’s political support to the political/policy 
positioning in intra-Party politics at the leadership level? In other words, will the PLA’s 
political support tip the balance during the process of political bargaining? At the national 
level, is there a grave security threat that has made the use or threat of use of force 
necessary and imminent?  
The level of effective control the top leader has over the PLA can be determined 
by looking at four aspects, namely his ability to: streamline the PLA; effectively advance 
systematic reform in the PLA; remove or demote officers whom he distrusts; and change 
key leadership positions, including the CMC members, commanders, and political 
commissars of the seven military regions, especially the Beijing Military Region. 
The top leaders in the post-Deng era each faced a common political challenge: 
diversification of political power and intensified intra-Party competition have often made 
the top leader’s authority less absolute and more vulnerable to interference by outside 
actors. In addition to factions deeply rooted in history, new interest groups with 
increasingly coherent agendas, which often command a large amount of wealth and 
resources, further complicate the positioning for power inside the Party. The increased 
institutionalization and stability of political succession after 1989 was undermined by 
anti-corruption campaigns, which were tools of distinct political agendas. China’s 
economic modernization and social pluralization are also posing challenges to the Party’s 
legitimacy. Therefore, the PLA plays the crucial and irreplaceable role of political 
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“stabilizer,” which makes top political leaders in the post-Deng era more reliant on the 
PLA. 
If judged by the above criteria for measuring effective control, Jiang Zemin 
during his 15-year tenure as CMC Chairman gradually met each of these requirements for 
establishing effective control. Jiang reduced PLA personnel by 500,000 from 1997-99, 
and in 2003 announced a further reduction in personnel of 200,000. Additionally, Jiang 
implemented reforms in 1997-98 that forced the PLA to abandon its interests in the 
marketplace. Jiang also removed the Yang brothers in 1992 and blocked the majority of 
officers that the Yang brothers sought to promote. Finally, Jiang appointed Zhang 
Wannian as CMC Vice Chairman in 1995, in order to sideline Liu Huaqing and Zhang 
Zhen. In 1992, Gu Shanqing, who had a close relationship with Yu Yongbo and probably 
contributed to Xu Caihou’s rise, became Political Commissar of the Beijing Military 
Region, who was by association close to Jiang.50 
Compared to Jiang, Hu Jintao exerted much weaker control over the military. Hu 
never announced military personnel cuts. Hu tried to launch a military reform in 2006-07 
to streamline the military’s organizational structure and shorten the command-and-
control chain in order to better prepare the PLA for “information warfare” and enhance 
the “jointness” of services. This reform also called for replacing non-combat officers with 
the PLA’s civilian staff or civilian officers to improve the structure of the officer corps, 
better utilize the defense budget, and cut military personnel.51 However, the PLA 
leadership strongly resisted such a policy, and it was shelved following the 2008 
Wenchuan earthquake.52 The military reform Hu initiated progressed slowly over the 
following years and apparently went awry. By 2012, it was completely distorted and 
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manipulated to add positions for unworthy officers and insert more political officers 
throughout the military system, contrary to what Hu’s reform had intended.53 
Additionally, throughout his tenure Hu was unable to replace CMC Vice Chairmen Xu 
Caihou and Guo Boxiong, both of whom he inherited from Jiang. Finally, Hu was unable 
to promote his favored generals such as Zhang Qinsheng into the CMC. From 2002-12, 
Hu did not influence the promotion of most full generals, though he did build up control 
over promotion of commanders and political commissars of several military regions.54 
Most notably, Hu appointed General Fang Fenghui, an associate he trusted, as 
Commander of the Beijing Military Region in 2007. 
In analyzing the Party-military relationship, the measures delineated above 
provide a general set of guidelines for evaluating its two most important component parts, 
namely political reliance and effective control. These broad guidelines allow one to 












Table 3.1: Effective Control, Military Autonomy, and Influence Through the Lens of 
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Reliance, Control, Access, and Influence 
In the Party-military relationship, the top leadership’s political reliance on the 
PLA determines the PLA’s influence in politics as well as in the policy-making process. 
If the leadership does not need the military, it lacks the incentive to grant influence to 
soldiers. When such political reliance on the military exists, the top leadership will try to 
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establish effective control over the military. In other words, the top leadership’s political 
reliance on the PLA allows for the PLA to bargain for more influence.  
When previous and incumbent CMC chairmen vie for control and influence over 
the military, rivalries inevitably arise inside the military. Those who benefit from political 
favors tend to perpetuate the patronage system to cultivate their own supporters in the 
military, which raises the possibility of nepotism and corruption. With some officers fast-
tracked for promotion because they have political or military patrons, there are inevitably 
others who are better qualified but are nonetheless passed over. Such officers thus resent 
the current leadership and are therefore natural supporters of the new CMC chairman. 
The previous CMC chairman’s political interference, as well as fears of the incumbent 
CMC chairman, make the PLA officer corps’ loyalty and allegiance more personalized. 
Whether the top political leader can effectively control the PLA has a crucial impact on 
his trust and confidence in the military, which in turn determines his proclivity to give 
access to the military. With effective control established, and therefore trust in the 
military to serve his interests, the top leader would be more accessible to the military and 
more likely to actively consult with it. Therefore, the top political leader’s degree of 
effective control over the military is crucial to determining the PLA’s overall access to 
the top leader and the extent of the PLA’s influence in policy areas. Once effective 
control is established, the military becomes a strong power base for the leader and 
naturally gains trust, access, and influence. Conversely, when the top leader is unable to 
establish effective control, the military is treated as a force that can potentially threaten 
the political leader’s power. In such instances, the political leader will try to shrink the 
military’s influence as much as possible. While maintaining a distant relationship with 
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the top leader, in such circumstances the military leadership is most likely to respond by 
taking an indirect approach, primarily by attempting to mold public opinion, stalling the 
implementation of policies, and acting uncooperatively with other policy-making actors. 
The battle for effective control over the military has to contend with the 
increasingly institutionalized nature of the military leadership and the trend of 
professionalization. The PLA has formulated a comprehensive set of merit-based rules 
and requirements, and has also established strict age limits, for officer promotion. Despite 
the corruption in the military revealed from 2011-15, the trend of professionalization 
generally accelerated in the 1990s. The practice of networked loyalties, especially 
prevalent during Jiang’s era and manifested in senior officer promotions and the 
politicization of officer promotions, was widely abhorred by professional military 
officers. However, whether systematic checks and balances could be built in to reduce 
and prevent such a growth of networked loyalties is doubtful, given the importance of the 
top leader’s control over the military to his political power and the continued separation 
of military and state affairs. Moreover, promotion of the top layer of military leadership 
(CMC members) will always be political. Top military leadership must certainly be able 
to demonstrate performance as a professional PLA officer, but this has to be 
complemented by proven political loyalty. 
 
Understanding the Essence of the Party-military Relationship: History 
History shapes the PLA’s prestige and unique position in China’s Party-
dominated power structure, a structure that determines the organic segregation between 
the military and China’s civilian foreign affairs system. Thus, understanding the history 
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of the Party-military relationship is critical to comprehending the PLA’s influence in 
politics and policies in contemporary China. This section traces the historic symbiosis of 
the CCP and the PLA, and the historical debate on whether China should have a Party or 
State army. This discussion generates the following conclusions: 
1. Controlling the gun is a unique source of crucial political power. 
2. The gun alone will not control the Party; however, by controlling the gun, one has 
the greatest chance of establishing and then consolidating control in the Party.55 
3. The PLA is structurally separate from the State. 
 
To understand why the PLA has maintained such a uniquely important position in 
China’s political power structure and policy-making arena, one has to understand the 
shared, intertwined, and nonetheless conflicted past of the military and the Party. The 
PLA has been an inalienable part of the Party since the CCP’s inception in the early 
1920s. 
 
The History of Symbiosis of the Party and the Military 
When the CCP had just begun its uprising against the Nationalist (KMT) 
government, it had not yet established the system of having political commissars in the 
armed forces. Rather, a “Party representative” (dang daibiao) was initially designated for 
each level at or above that of regiment (dangbu shezai tuanli). After the 1927 Sanwan 
Reorganization, Mao Zedong established the principle of organizing Party branches by 
recruiting from among populations of troops. In effect, the Party branches were 
established at the level of “military companies” (zhibu shezai lianshang), and an 
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“instructor” (zhidaoyuan) was designated to companies, while political commissars were 
set up at the level of battalion and above. The institutionalization of pervasive Party 
control that Mao established transformed scattered and demoralized troops into a 
disciplined Red Army under constant ideological indoctrination.56 In this way, since 
many members of the army were both soldiers and party apparatchiks, the Party 
organization could ensure absolute control over the army.  
Since the birth of the Red Army in 1927 (later renamed the PLA in 1945), the 
army has been both a participant in and protector of the Party. The Party’s survival 
hinged on the army’s support and protection. In 1928, Mao established the principle of 
“the military helping the development of the local Party,” which, in reality, placed the 
military over the local Party.57 Thereafter, the Party and the military merged in Hunan 
and Jiangxi provinces, where Mao had unified control, with the Party embedded inside 
the military structure. As the Party faced constant threats to its survival during this early 
period of its existence, it blended with the military into a cohesive political-security 
apparatus.58 This formative experience established the tradition of an “Army-Party” 
(jundang) coalition — with the Army notably in the first position.  
Although the principle of the “Party commanding the gun” was established 
through the Gutian Resolution in 1929, this meeting did not settle the core issue of who 
represents the Party, which had been a subject of debate in 1928-29.59 The other side of 
the coin is that the political commissar system was firmly established within the Red 
Army, despite the professional soldiers’ initial pushback.60 The symbiosis and dualism 
(nizhong youwo, wozhong youni) of the Red Army and the CCP originated from Mao’s 
own method of seizing authority over the Party by first acquiring dominance over the 
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military. This habit matured through multiple reiterations as Mao learned this was the 
principle path to Party control, an approach he subsequently followed for the rest of his 
life. 
 
Mao’s Power Through the Gun Barrel 
Mao rose to power by first leveraging military success to assume leadership of the 
military. Mao then used this leadership to dominate the Party, which provided further 
evidence of a political truism summarized by historian Gao Hua: “the gun by itself will 
not control the Party; but by controlling the gun, one has the greatest advantage of 
establishing and then consolidating control in the Party.”61   
Although Mao was one of the primary founders of the Red Army, beginning in 
1932 his control over it was gradually undermined, as Russians commanded the 
Communist International (Comintern). The CCP during these early years faithfully and 
methodically followed the Comintern’s instructions. By 1933, the Internationalists – 
those CCP cadres who studied in Russia and followed the Comintern closely – such as 
Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian had substantial control within the CCP. Power struggles 
within the Party deprived Mao of any control over the military.62 Mao was effectively 
sidelined and was not even a member of the Chinese Revolutionary Military Committee, 
the CCP’s military decision-making command structure.  
Mao was only brought back into the military leadership after repeated, devastating 
military defeats that seriously threatened the survival of both the army and the CCP. Mao 
made his way back into the Party’s core leadership after the Zunyi Meeting of 1935, in 
which he was called on to reverse the fortunes of the Party and the military. Following 
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the Zunyi Meeting, Mao became one member of a three-person military commanding 
team, though Mao ranked lower than Zhou Enlai.63 Zhou represented the Party in military 
decision-making, and thus Mao was essentially designated to serve as Zhou’s assistant. 
As such, Mao was allowed to share the power of commanding the Red Army. However, 
Mao and Zhou reversed roles soon after Mao’s military strategy started to show success, 
with Zhou becoming Mao’s assistant.64  
In 1935-36, Mao’s military strategy of maintaining a high degree of tactical 
mobility achieved substantive success.65 The Party and the Red Army managed to resist 
the KMT’s onslaught. Mao’s military victories improved his reputation, which gave him 
the impetus to expand his influence and control from military affairs to Party and political 
affairs, including the direction of Party-military development.66 By August 1937, Mao 
was elected General Secretary of the Military Committee, which meant that he officially 
became the top Party representative in the Red Army. Without Mao’s military success 
and then dominance of the army, Mao would have been outmaneuvered by ideologues 
during factional struggles within the Party. Mao’s own ascension in the Party proved that 
controlling the gun is a unique source of crucial political power, a lesson that was 
repeatedly demonstrated in political power struggles during the following decades. 
More fundamentally, a closer examination of the CCP’s and the PLA’s history 
shows “the Party commands the gun” was not the hard and fast rule it is assumed to be.67 
When something is repeated with such conviction for so long, one tends to believe it has 
a high degree of historical accuracy. However, if one traces the actual circumstances of 
this slogan from its inception, one discovers that Mao combined it with a seemingly 
contradictory slogan: “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”68 In essence, 
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Mao was drawing attention to his own dual identity. In front of the army leaders, Mao 
acted as the leader of the Party and urged them to always follow the principle of being 
subordinate to the Party. Mao was signaling that the military should never question his 
authority and must obey him unconditionally. However, when addressing another 
audience, such as Bo Gu, Wang Ming, and other Internationalists who competed with 
Mao for power and control within the Party, Mao then put on his other hat as preeminent 
military leader. Mao would emphasize that “with guns, the Party could be made” or 
“political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”69 It was a strategy that worked well, 
since the Internationalists had neither fought in any battles, nor were rooted in a military 
tradition. In the 1930s and 1940s, the reality was that without military success, the Party 
could not have survived. The military was in cahoots with Mao over these struggles, 
since it suited the military’s interests to keep its indispensability at the forefront of the 
debate. This formed the basis of the military’s support for Mao, and, following the 
Yan’an Rectification Campaign, was exemplified by the Red Army senior commander 
Zhu De’s active support.70 
 
Structural Segregation Due to Party-military Arrangements, and the State Army Vs. 
Party Army Debate 
When examining China’s Party-military relationship, one must inevitably 
confront the paradox between the constitutionally-designated chain of command and the 
reality of who the PLA actually answers to. More precisely, should the PLA be built as a 
State or Party army? Public discussion of this question has been taboo since the 1989 
Tiananmen Incident. To even publicly raise the possibility of building the PLA as a State 
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army — a military that is subordinate to the government system — appears to be off 
limits.71 Yet this subject is a central feature of the current Chinese constitution. China’s 
first (1954) and current (1982) constitutions both maintain that the State (not the Party) 
Central Military Commission (CMC), a government branch, commands all of the armed 
forces and reports to the People’s Congress, and the People’s Congress elects or deposes 
the chairman of the State CMC.72  
The real military leadership, the Party or the CCP Central Military Commission 
(CMC), has no legal status under China’s first or current constitution, which are arguably 
China’s most important constitutions. The question of whether the PLA is a Party or State 
army is important because the answer to this question fundamentally alters the PLA’s 
status vis-a-vis the civilian foreign affairs system, which is itself a creature of the state. 
The fact that the PLA is a Party army, and thus not a part of the government’s decision-
making chain, leads to the institutionalized disconnect between the two, and systematizes 
a deficient coordination milieu between the military and the government in the arena of 
foreign and security policy-making.  
The PLA leadership structure is distinctly different from that of the United States 
and other Western militaries.73 The PLA’s status relative to and relationship with the 
government is unique and forms a principal cause of the disconnect and lack of 
coordination between the PLA and China’s foreign ministry (MFA). These differences 
derive from the particular nature of the relationship between the CCP and the PLA. Thus, 
to understand the PLA’s role in foreign policy-making since 1978, it is necessary to 
examine the historical context of the Party and the military. This is a complicated saga, 
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but one can begin by examining the debate over whether the PLA should be a State or 
Party military. 
The CCP first raised the question of nationalizing the Chinese military in 1945. 
This proposal was then codified in legal documents after the CCP won the civil war in 
1949, but was never operationalized or detailed on paper. In reality, the CCP retained 
ultimate control over the PLA. 
 
Zhou Enlai’s 1945 Proposal to Nationalize the Military 
Zhou Enlai proposed nationalizing the military following the end of the Sino-
Japanese war in 1945.74 During the ensuing negotiations between the CCP and the KMT 
in January 1946, Zhou pointed out that “China’s (current) military institution should 
follow the model of democratic countries, especially that of the United States…We 
agreed very much to separate the military from the party and that the military should 
belong to the state rather than the Party. We must clearly separate the military from the 
party.”75 Based on the CCP’s proposals, the KMT and the CCP reached an agreement on 
the nationalization of the military in 1946, embedded in the Double Ten Agreement. This 
agreement stipulated: “the military belongs to the state; the military’s responsibility is 
safeguarding the country and loving its people”; “the military is to be separated from any 
party”; “all parties are prohibited from conducting any open or secret activities inside the 
military”; and “any party or individual shall not use the military as the tool for political 
struggle.”76 
In June 1946, a civil war between the KMT and CCP broke out, effectively 
making the aforementioned agreement null and void. Mao and the CCP in the following 
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years still attempted to hold the moral high ground by insisting that the CCP’s goal was 
to build a democratic government. Moreover, all the publicized military orders had to be 
issued under the name of the “People’s Revolutionary Military Commission of China,” 
which was under the government, not the CCP. However, internal military documents, 
which were for military eyes only, continued to show that they were issued from the 
“CCP Central Military Commission,” thus indicating that in practice the CCP retained 
ultimate control over the army.77      
 
1949 Interim Constitution  
The Common Program, publicized as the interim Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, stipulated that the PRC armed forces were under the 
command of the “People’s Revolutionary Military Commission” (PRMC) of the 
government.78 Mao was elected the Chairman of the PRMC during its first meeting, on 
October 1, 1949. The PRMC contained both CCP and non-CCP members, including one 
KMT general who served as one of its vice chairmen. In the published memoirs of all the 
non-CCP members of the PRMC — all formerly KMT military officers who switched 
allegiance to the CCP — none described any details of their participation in PRMC 
work.79 In reality, the CCP Politburo and Secretariat – the Party leadership – was the 
ultimate decision-making authority regarding military affairs. For example, the decision 
to cut the PLA from 5.4 million soldiers to roughly 2.8 million was made during the 
Third Plenary Session of the CCP 7th Central Committee on June 6, 1950, not during a 
meeting of the PRMC. Also, the decision to enter the Korean War was made during the 
CCP Central Committee Secretariat’s meeting on October 2 and subsequent Politburo 
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meetings on October 4 and 5, 1950. On October 6, Zhou Enlai held a meeting of the 
PRMC, during which Zhou relayed the CCP Central Committee’s decision to enter the 




Eventually, even the PRMC’s official but essentially hollow control of the army 
was delicately removed. The PRC’s first Constitution, published in September 1954, 
abolished the PRMC and established the PRC Defense Commission (PRCDC) in its place. 
The PRCDC was composed of the CCP CMC, as well as non-CCP members who were 
KMT generals. It stipulated that the PRC’s armed forces “belong to the people” and are 
“commanded by the PRC chairman,” who would also be the chairman of the PRCDC. 
Four out of 15 vice chairmen and 26 out of 81 members of the PRCDC were former 
KMT generals. The 1954 Constitution did not explicitly state that the PRCDC was the 
leading agency commanding the PRC’s armed forces.  
According to the 1954 Constitution, the Ministry of National Defense (MND), 
which is under the State Council (a component of the State’s system), was established as 
the military arm of the government. Thus, the PLA was still designated a State army in 
the 1954 Constitution. Such a conception of the PLA was operationalized in the 
“Regulation on PLA Officer Service,” published in February 1955. According to this 
regulation, the prime minister of the State Council would determine promotions from 
senior colonel to full general, while the defense minister would oversee promotions from 
major to colonel.  
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While the State was granted some power over the military, in reality the CCP 
CMC was the main decision-maker with regard to military affairs. The schizophrenia 
about who had official power and control over the PLA began with the CCP’s promise, 
stipulated in the Double Ten Agreement, to grant the State ultimate control over the 
military, which was given in order to gain wider acceptance for the CCP’s legitimacy. 
Ultimately, the CCP was unwilling to honor its side of the bargain after winning the civil 
war. The charade of giving control over the PLA to the government while vesting the 
Party leadership with the real authority is the root of this confusion.  
 
Taking Back Leadership of the PLA in 1955 
Within one month of the 1954 Constitution being issued, the Politburo decided to 
reestablish the CCP CMC’s ultimate authority to “lead the overall military affairs.” In the 
“Regulation on PLA Military Officer Service” issued in February 1955, it was explicitly 
stipulated that the PLA was “the people’s army led by the CCP and Comrade Mao 
Zedong.” If establishing the PRMC was a way for the CCP to create the illusion that it 
was sharing the power of leading the PLA, done in order to placate the non-CCP people 
in the government in 1949, Mao and the CCP took back even nominal state leadership of 
the PLA in 1955. There are several possible explanations as to why Mao revised the goal 
of nationalizing the military at this time.  
First, it is possible that Mao and the CCP were never ready to share power and 
control over the PLA, and therefore nationalization of the military was never a sincere 
goal but only a smoke screen used to deceive others and obtain wider support from the 
non-CCP “democratic parties,” including some in the KMT.80 Second, the Soviet Union 
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could have exerted influence on and even intervened in the question of a “new 
democracy” revolution (xin minzhu zhuyi geming).81 Stalin and the Soviet Union never 
endorsed the concept of “new democracy,” which the CCP could not ignore since in the 
early 1950s the Soviet Union’s support for and aid to China was substantial.82 Therefore, 
after seeking Stalin’s advice, the CCP leadership could have decided to formally shift the 
CCP’s general line from pursuing “new democracy” to “transition to socialism.” By 
dropping this ideal, Mao abandoned nationalization of the military. A third possible 
explanation is that China’s self-perceived success in the Korean War greatly consolidated 
Mao’s domestic support. After the end of the Korean War, Mao’s confidence grew and he 
genuinely believed that China could in 10-15 years complete industrialization and 
achieve a socialist transformation — just one step before realizing Communism.83  
The second and third explanations more logically elucidate why nationalizing the 
PLA in the late 1950s was abandoned. China’s heavy reliance on Stalin and the Soviet 
Union in the early 1950s forced the CCP to follow his ideological advice, and Mao’s 
personal ambition and pride made him want to exert firmer control over the army. Thus, 
while Mao dropped the ideal of nationalizing the PLA by the mid-1950s, it was 
nonetheless written in China’s interim Constitution in 1949 and its first constitution, 
which resulted in protracted bureaucratic turf wars between the MND and the General 
Staff Department (GSD). 
 
Hollowing-Out the Ministry of National Defense 
As described above, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) was born under 
problematic circumstances. From the perspective of the constitution and national 
 193 
legislation, the PLA was a State army. As part of the PRC government and led by the 
State Council, the MND was subject to the leadership of the State Council and the 
supervision of the National People’s Congress, both of which had non-CCP personnel 
occupying high positions. So, by outward appearances, the PLA answered to the MND, 
and therefore the government system.  
In reality, the PLA only followed the orders of the CCP CMC, an organ of the 
Party. Therefore, after the MND was established in 1954, the PLA nominally answered to 
both State and Party organizations and had a dual identity. In this regard, the Chinese 
system fundamentally differed from that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet military’s 
structure placed the MND in a real position of leadership. If China had followed such a 
course, it would have run counter to the principle of “the Party commanding the gun.” 
From a strictly legal perspective, China’s constitution did not recognize the military’s 
true leadership, the CCP CMC, since its legal status was not addressed in the constitution. 
The disconnect delineated above between appearance and substance led to an 
operational problem: the issuance of CMC orders. Any orders between the CMC and the 
military that would not be publicized to the outside world would be issued in the CMC’s 
name. Any orders passed to the military by the CMC or Party system that were supposed 
to have a non-military audience would be transferred through the MND. The logic was 
that according to the 1954 Constitution, the MND, as the government’s military arm, 
should be the only entity issuing military orders known to the non-military world. 
Therefore, even though all military orders were given by the CMC, those released to the 
non-military world had to be transmitted as MND orders. As a result, there was constant 
confusion as to which channel the orders should be sent through. The GSD, which was 
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responsible for drafting CMC orders, was in constant conflict with the MND because of 
disagreements over which orders should be issued by the CMC directly and which by the 
MND.84  
The procedural problem of which entity should issue orders triggered a deeper rift 
between the GSD and the MND over the command and control structure. This friction 
was amplified by interpersonal competition such as that between Marshal Peng Dehuai 
and General Su Yu.85 Marshal Peng, who served as Vice Chairman of the CMC, 
dominated the routine work of military affairs from 1952-59 and was appointed the 
PRC’s first Defense Minister in 1954. But problems quickly arose as Marshal Peng, the 
most powerful officer in the PLA at the time, now headed the MND, an agency that was 
not a powerful institution. The contest for power between Marshal Peng and General Su, 
the Chief of the General Staff, was at its core a dispute over whether the constitution 
would determine the power structure. Was the MND, a branch of government, a real link 
in the PLA’s chain of command, or did it merely exist as a symbolic institution?  
According to the logic of the 1954 Constitution, the GSD should have reported to 
the MND. However, the principle of the “Party commanding the gun” dictated that the 
CMC, a Party institution, should be the top military leadership. Such logic would make 
the MND nothing but a hollow shell and establish the CMC as an institution with more 
power relative to the MND. Additionally, MND would not be an executive and 
enforcement branch of the CMC. All general departments, including the GSD, were not 
under the MND’s control, since the MND was by definition a department of the State, not 
the Party. If so, the GSD only answered to the CMC. In reality, the Party did command 
“the gun,” which meant that the reality fit more with General Su’s argument. 
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In March 1955, General Su proposed that the GSD draft regulations outlining the 
respective responsibilities of the MND and the GSD. After five draft copies, the turf 
battles were still unresolved. During the GSD’s planning meetings in January 1958, Su 
said, “we need to fight for power…not personal power, but demarcation of work 
responsibility.”86 Later in 1958, the struggle between the MND and GSD devolved into 
ad hominem attacks against Su through an enlarged meeting of the CMC, which 1,400 
PLA officers attended. During this meeting, Huang Kecheng, Su’s deputy and Peng 
Dehuai’s former subordinate, replaced Su as chief of general staff (CGS). Combined with 
interpersonal rivalries inside the PLA, the confusion caused by the Party-military 
arrangement not only led to Su’s purge, but also was the root cause of the perpetual 
distrust in the triangular relationship between the CGS, the military’s top leader (the 
CMC vice chairman or, less often, the defense minister), and the CMC chairman (the 
Party’s top leader).   
In 1959, Mao purged Peng Dehuai, who had become the all-powerful Defense 
Minister after General Su’s downfall. At the Lushan Conference, Marshal Peng directly 
disagreed with Mao regarding the policies of the Great Leap Forward, which called for 
crash industrialization. Marshal Peng’s stance resulted in the naming and shaming of 
Peng and Huang Kecheng as heads of an anti-CCP clique. Lin Biao succeeded Peng as 
both the Vice Chairman of the CMC and Defense Minister. Luo Ruiqing was named CGS. 
In reality, Lin Biao avoided most of the daily operations either because of his health 
problems or because of his fear of taking political risks. Luo was left to run the CMC and 
the GSD, and became the most powerful CGS in the PLA’s history.  
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After Peng’s downfall in 1959, the role of the GSD as the sole executive agency 
that carried out the CMC’s orders (rather than the MND) was played up on Luo’s watch. 
After December 1960, four out of five deputy chiefs of general staff had no other 
positions, indicating the professionalization of the GSD’s top positions. In comparison, 
during this time positions such as deputy defense minister were regarded as honorable 
positions left for those who could not work either because of health issues (such as Chen 
Geng) or due to Mao’s lack of trust in that individual (such as Su Yu), rather than 
positions with substantial power. The MND was in this sense completely gutted.  
Even though Lin Biao served as Defense Minister beginning in 1959, his political 
ambition far exceeded leading the MND or even the CMC. Luo Ruiqing, the all-powerful 
CGS, stepped into the same trap as Su Yu by having to be selective in terms of what 
would be reported to Defense Minister Lin Biao, then the PLA’s top leader, and what 
would be reported to Mao, the CMC Chairman and the Party’s top leader. Eventually, Lin 
believed Luo intentionally bypassed him on a few significant issues, which was one of 
the major reasons that Luo was purged.87 Therefore, the consequences of the conflict 
between the GSD and the MND, as evidenced by the cases of Su Yu, Peng Dehuai, Luo 
Ruiqing, and Lin Biao, were the ascendance of the Party-dominated command and 
control system, and a hollowing out of the MND under the State system. 
Moving ahead to the 1975 and 1978 constitutions, both explicitly stipulated, “the 
CCP Central Committee chairman commands all the armed forces.” However, the 1982 
Constitution, which remains in effect, reverted back to the position that the PRC Central 
Military Commission (CMC) commands all the armed forces and reports to the People’s 
Congress, and that the People’s Congress elects or deposes the chairman of the PRC 
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CMC. However, to prevent the “schizophrenia” problem of the 1950s that arose as a 
result of a dual leadership system, the PRC CMC’s membership and function exactly 
mirrors the CCP CMC’s. In other words, the PRC CMC presently exists on paper, but has 
the same personnel as the Party’s CMC. Since power on both Commissions derives from 
military rank and position – not from the State – the PRC CMC exists only as a symbolic 
institution.  
It is not a historic coincidence that soldiers and diplomats do not work well with 
each other in China. Rather, there is a fundamental reason for this: throughout the PRC’s 
history, they have not even sat in the same room together. The Party-military 
arrangement dictated that the Party, not the State, commands the PLA. This was not a 
significant problem prior to the 1980s, because Mao, Zhou, and even Deng from 1978-81 
personally oversaw both the military and foreign affairs. However, since the 1980s, the 
top leaders’ portfolios have shrunk, and they tend to oversee only the most sensitive and 
strategic foreign policy issues, while leaving the less pressing issues and most of the 
policy details to professional diplomats and soldiers. Therefore, the organic and 
systematic segregation between the military and China’s civilian foreign affairs system is 
a result of institutional design and the Party-military arrangement.  
Frictions between diplomats and soldiers are common in every country, regardless 
of their political systems. Officials’ difference of opinion regarding policies comes 
naturally from their different missions and roles – where they sit. In China, however, the 
divide between the civilian foreign affairs system and the military is much deeper and 
wider than it is in countries in which the military swears allegiance to the State. The 
organic, systematic divide has produced barriers to cooperation and coordination, and 
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sowed the seeds of competition and friction between these two large and powerful 
bureaucratic systems. In China, diplomats and soldiers are predisposed to be jealous of 
each other’s power. 
Since the late 1980s, the MND has truly become an arm of the State Council, with 
a mission of handling military diplomacy and coordinating military recruitment, defense 
mobilization, and disaster relief between the military and the government. The era of the 
MND acting as the “face” of the CMC to the outside world is long gone. The MND is by 
no means part of the chain of command and control in the PLA, but rather is an entity 
with an important-sounding name but no substantial power, that is not well-staffed, and 
does not have much reach into the military regions or services.88 The position of Defense 
Minister is an honorary position without substantial power, unless a CMC vice chairman 
concurrently holds this position.89  
The MND remains a hollowed out organization. It does not play a notable role in 
enhancing the military’s influence in foreign policy-making. Nor does the MND serve as 
an institutionalized channel to transmit the opinions of the civilian foreign affairs system 
into the military’s deliberations, when the PLA shapes its positions on foreign and 
security policies. Therefore, by design, the PLA and the government have no direct 
organic structural bonds in terms of foreign and security policy-making. Rather, the two 
bureaucracies meet at the level of the Party system, which then makes the Party-military 
relationship a more important factor when discussing the PLA’s influence in foreign and 
security policy-making. 
If the MND held real power within the PLA, the military and the civilian foreign 
affairs system would naturally be more integrated, and there would be an established 
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coordination platform. If this were the case, these bureaucracies would interact 
differently, thus altering how the PLA’s influence in foreign policy is effectuated. 
However, the reality is that the PLA and MFA remain in two different political spheres, 
independent of each other, and this separation raises coordination and communication 
problems.  
 
Who is the “Party”? The PLA’s Intervention in Politics 
 
The authority, status, function, or composition of the CCP Central Military 
Commission (CMC), an organ of the Party, has never been clearly written in the nation’s 
constitutions (xianfa). Neither has it been written in the CCP or the Party’s Constitution 
(dangzhang).90 From 1977 to 2012, the Party’s Constitution was revised eight times 
(1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012).91 As the last chapter indicates, 
the rules for promoting PLA officers in most positions have become more 
institutionalized and generally merit-based. However, rules about the appointment of the 
CMC chairman as well as the vice chairmen and other members of the CMC, the apex of 
the military leadership, are much more opaque and unpredictable. 
When considering the principle “the Party commands the gun,” who composes the 
Party? Deng’s case would indicate that “the Party” is its real decision-maker or the 
person who carries the most influence over decision-making. In some instances, the 
Party’s real decision-maker differs from the Party’s nominal top leader. Such was the 
case when Hua Guofeng was the nominal leader from the end of 1978 to 1980 and wore 
the three hats of supreme leadership: the State, the Party, and the PLA. However, during 
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this time period Deng had the final say. This scenario repeated itself when Hu Yaobang 
was the Party General Secretary from 1981-87 and Zhao Ziyang was the Party General 
Secretary from 1987-89. Deng gave up his seat on the CCP Central Committee and no 
longer had any formal position in the CCP after 1987, save the CMC chairmanship. Zhao 
Ziyang, then CCP Party Secretary and the top boss of the Party by design, held only the 
position of the 1st Executive Vice Chairman of CMC. Yet, until late-1989 Deng was still 
officially the ultimate decision-making authority of the PLA and, even without the CMC 
chairmanship, he maintained such authority till the mid-1990s. This happened as well in 
Jiang’s era – though in a more ambiguous way – during the leadership transition between 
Jiang and Hu Jintao. Hu took over the positions of CCP General Secretary and President 
from Jiang in 2002, but Jiang kept the CMC chairmanship from 2002-04. As a result, Hu 
was subordinate to Jiang in the CMC between 2002 and 2004, though Hu was the Party’s 
top leader. 
Whether the Party commands the military, and who in actuality represents the 
Party in terms of authority over the military, is at best an ambiguous issue. The emphasis 
each top political leader puts on his control over the PLA reflects the special relationship 
between the military and political powers in China. Those who control the military 
relentlessly pull the military into politics to support them. However, history shows that 
while the military’s loyalty has been rewarded through this arrangement, its participation 
in political struggles is often short-lived. In fact, the military has been penalized in the 
long run, since political leaders’ reliance on the military also creates a sense of 
vulnerability. The more reliant political leaders are on the military, the more vulnerable 
these leaders feel. Eventually, the leaders need to address this vulnerability and 
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consolidate their positions by circumscribing the power of military officers. Therefore, 
the military is ordered to obey the rule that “the Party commands the gun” after the 
question of “who the Party is” is settled. This cycle has repeatedly occurred throughout 
the PRC’s history.  
Four cases demonstrate this cycle and are worth further analysis: the purge of 
Marshal Peng Dehuai after he supported Mao in the decision to enter the Korean War; the 
demise of Lin Biao after the PLA was pulled in to support the leftist movement; the 
reduction of the military’s involvement in politics in the early 1980s after the meteoric 
rise and subsequent arrest of the Gang of Four; and the downfall of the Yang brothers 
after they explicitly supported Deng’s economic policies during his 1992 southern tour. 
Most military leaders — including Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, and Su Yu — were 
not supportive of entering the Korean War when the top leadership was debating this 
subject. However, Mao was determined to participate in this war, and when he faced 
resistance from the professional soldiers he called on Peng Dehuai to command the army 
into the war. In October 1950, Peng, then Chairman of the Politico-Military Commission 
of Northwest China, answered Mao’s call and returned to Beijing from Xi’an. Prior to 
1949, Peng and Mao had a tumultuous relationship. However, upon Peng’s decision to 
side with Mao on the issue of the Korean War, Peng was appointed Commander-in-Chief 
of the People's Volunteer Army in Korea.92 In 1954, Peng was awarded the positions of 
Minister of Defense and CMC Vice Chairman in charge of the CMC’s daily operations. 
But differences between Peng and Mao reemerged as he disagreed with Mao's economic 
policies during the Great Leap Forward. The rivalry between Peng and Mao culminated 
in Peng writing an open letter criticizing Mao at the 1959 Lushan Conference. Peng was 
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then labeled the leader of an anti-Party clique and purged, and later publicly humiliated 
during the Cultural Revolution. Peng was formally tried and sentenced to life in prison in 
1970 and died in prison in 1974. 
In 1959, following Peng Dehuai’s challenge to Mao at the Lushan Conference, 
Lin Biao came to Mao’s defense by launching fierce attacks against Peng, resulting in 
Lin’s ascendance in the PLA.93 There have been conflicting interpretations regarding 
Lin’s motivations. Many PLA officers accused him of failing to represent the PLA by 
promoting the policy of “support the left” and repeatedly purging the military through 
radical means.94 Some historians and Lin Biao’s former subordinates have called into 
question the assertion that Lin lusted for power, noting that Lin’s political power peaked 
in 1969 under Mao. Lin arguably had personal ambitions and publicly assisted Mao in 
taking down Liu Shaoqi, but it is likely that Lin realized the inherent risk of being Mao’s 
anointed successor after witnessing the fates of Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi.  
It is clear that Mao, politically weakened by the Great Leap Forward’s (1958-62) 
catastrophic failure, badly needed the PLA’s support.95 The Great Leap Forward, which 
some scholars estimate resulted in the deaths of approximately 30 million Chinese, 
significantly weakened Mao’s power in the Party. Mao became defensive and suspected 
that factions within the Party were trying to remove him from government. When 
Defense Minister Peng Dehuai sharply criticized Mao’s mistake in launching the Great 
Leap Forward in 1959, Mao replaced Peng with Lin Biao. Lin became Mao’s loyal ally 
and lieutenant. Luo Ruiqing, then Chief of General Staff, organized hundreds of Mao’s 
quotes into a book entitled Quotations from Chairman Mao, which became known as the 
“Little Red Book,” but Lin took the credit.96 In 1964, Lin required every PLA soldier to 
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read the book and emphasized adherence to the Party line and loyalty to Mao. Mao, in 
turn, praised the PLA as an example for the Chinese people. Mao and Lin reinforced each 
other’s status. Eventually, Mao’s image reached new heights and a personality cult 
formed around him, with a generation of radicalized youth following him, while the PLA 
transformed completely into “Mao’s army.”97  
The PLA stood on the frontlines in elevating Mao to that of a supreme authority 
and played a major role in carrying out the Cultural Revolution (CR). Mao relied on the 
PLA’s help to attack the first-line party leadership in late 1965.98 By August 1966, each 
of the PLA’s ten marshals had been promoted into the Politburo. Then, in 1966, the CR 
caused economic and political order to break down, and this mass movement Mao called 
for devolved into bitter divisions and lawless violence. As a result, Mao needed the 
military’s political support and operational assistance to stabilize the situation.99 After the 
11th Plenary Session of the 8th National Congress of the CCP in August 1966, Liu Shaoqi, 
Mao’s rival, was purged. Lin Biao was awarded and made the only Vice Chairman of the 
Party, Defense Minister, and thus heir apparent to Mao, with his ranking in the Party 
elevated from sixth to second.100 
While Lin Biao remained publicly supportive of Mao’s policies, including the 
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, – even personally verbally assaulting 
Liu Shaoqi – in private he had misgivings. As early as 1958, Lin wrote in his notes that 
the Great Leap Forward was a result of Mao “messing things up based on his fantasies” 
and commented in his personal notes that Mao “was someone who does one thing and 
says another.”101 In September 1966, Lin confessed to his daughter Lin Liheng, “this is 
not a Cultural Revolution, but a killing spree under the guise of a Cultural Revolution” 
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(zhe bushi wenhua dageming, ershi wenhua dayaoming).102 During his secretary’s private 
briefing on the Cultural Revolution’s progress, Lin Biao talked to himself, saying “it is 
not a Cultural Revolution, but an armed revolution” (zhebushi wenhua dageming, ershi 
wuhua dageming).103 In the spring of 1967, his daughter asked him whether it was right 
for Liu Shaoqi to be taken down. Lin replied, arguing that Liu did not do anything to 
deserve the attacks Mao launched against him.104  
By 1967, Mao became dissatisfied with Lin Biao when he found out that local 
PLA units either remained neutral or joined the civilian party leadership in opposing the 
radical leftists and their attempts to seize power. By 1970, Mao had decisively shifted to 
a position opposing Lin. Mao had never intended to truly transfer power to Lin. Rather, 
elevating Lin’s position to that of heir apparent was a temporary tactic used for the 
purpose of defeating Liu Shaoqi.105 But, unpredictably from Mao’s perspective, Lin was 
able to consolidate his political position after the 9th National Congress of the CCP (in 
1969) and thereafter became “a tail too big to wag.”106 In 1970-71, Mao tightened the 
screws on Lin Biao and, by purging Chen Boda, sent him the signal that he would be the 
next to be purged.107 This ultimately led to the 913 Incident in 1971, in which Lin, 
allegedly following a failed coup attempt, tried to defect in a plane but his plane crashed 
into the desert, killing him.108 
In 1976, the PLA chief, Marshal Ye Jianying, convinced Hua Guofeng, Mao’s 
designated successor, to agree to use a special PLA unit to take down the Gang of Four. 
A wider military operation was staged to occupy or temporarily control major Party and 
government institutions and news media offices.109 Geng Biao, a close associate of 
Marshal Ye, and Chi Haotian, then Vice Political Commissar of the Beijing Military 
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Region, were in charge of the operations.110 The PLA was instrumental in bringing down 
the Gang of Four and appeared to reap substantial benefits from it. However, the PLA’s 
sails were quickly trimmed in the early 1980s. Deng quickly decided to reduce the PLA’s 
representation throughout the Party’s power structure, and its membership in the CCPCC 
Politburo was decreased from ten in 1982 to three in 1985 (not including one alternate 
member). The proportion of uniformed military members on the 210-member Central 
Committee was 22 percent in 1987, roughly half of what it was at the height of the PLA’s 
political power in 1969-71 after the 9th CCP Congress.111 Deng personally decided to put 
limits on the number of uniformed military personnel in the Politburo.112  
The Yang brothers’ downfall in 1992, detailed in the next chapter, was the most 
recent case of China’s complicated Party-military relations. The above cases, while 
arguably the most prominent examples of the PLA’s intervention in China’s domestic 
politics, do not represent an exhaustive list of this pattern in China’s history. In all these 
cases, alternate causal explanations are possible. For instance, the PLA’s punishment can 
be seen as the price to pay for military leaders’ personal ambitions, or the result of Mao’s 
distrustful and erratic personality. Nonetheless, a consistent pattern emerges: the PLA is 
needed and pulled in, then is momentarily rewarded for its intervention in politics; after a 
brief period, the PLA’s newly acquired status presents a threat to political leaders, who 
check the military leaders, thus forcing them to return to their original subordinate 
position. In the end, the principle that “the Party commands the gun” is reestablished.  
 
The PLA’s Corporate Interest 
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Does the PLA have a separate corporate interest, analogous to that of Western 
militaries under democratic regimes? The PLA demonstrated in the 1950s and 1960s that 
it had disagreements with Mao and the Party on policies that were not security-related, 
from the Great Leap Forward to the Supporting the Left campaign. A majority of PLA 
officers were mostly silent and went along with Mao’s policies, despite privately holding 
grudges. The senior PLA officers, despite serious divisions and differences among 
themselves, had consensus on one policy position, which reflected a distinct corporate 
interest of the military – the political turbulence that at the time permeated the Party and 
Chinese society should not be brought into the military. When this goal could not be 
obtained, the PLA attempted to insulate the field armies from the chaos and violence, in 
order to keep a minimum of military effectiveness.  
Despite the PLA’s resistance, the radicalism and chaos of the Cultural Revolution 
that swept the whole country nonetheless seeped into the military. All of the PLA’s units 
were badly damaged, except for the field armies charged with the mission of standing on 
the frontlines during war. Although the PLA maintained its institutional integrity, it 
suffered from high-level politicization, which led to intensified factional struggles within 
the military and countless internal persecutions of innocent officers. The PLA was badly 
battered by the political campaigns it was deeply involved in, with the majority of routine 
military training suspended or disrupted. The military was ingloriously pulled into the 
civilian world and took the place of the dismembered civilian government to maintain 
some semblance of stability and governance. However, in some places, the military also 
committed unspeakable atrocities.113 It is difficult to differentiate the corporate interest of 
the PLA from the interest of the Party during this period. The 913 Incident caused the 
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military’s morale to reach a new low. This state of chaos was sustained until the Gang of 
Four’s arrest. The moderates of the Party and the PLA have since then reunited and 
formed an alliance to push the country forward to restoration and economic reform. 
In 1974, Deng Xiaoping launched a campaign to bring order and discipline back 
to the PLA. This effort was sidetracked when Mao purged Deng, but was then 
reintroduced in 1978, after Deng was rehabilitated. Under Deng’s program, officers who 
benefited from the Cultural Revolution’s radical politicization and were quickly 
promoted during that period were removed from their posts, while those who were 
wrongly persecuted were restored and their names cleared. When Deng’s reforms took 
hold in the early 1980s and he attempted to close the revolving door between the military 
and the government, the PLA’s corporate interest started to reemerge. The PLA was 
ordered to return to the barracks and withdraw completely from governance. The PLA, 
derogatively referred to as “the military faction,” had its reputation damaged due to its 
deep and controversial involvement in the extremely unpopular Cultural Revolution. 
With its reputation in shambles, the PLA itself suffered from extremely bitter 
internal division, as almost every officer who served through the Cultural Revolution was 
either a victim wrongly persecuted by others, one who wrongly persecuted others, or both. 
This problem was so severe that Deng decided to draw former PLA officers who served 
mostly in the civilian world, and therefore were not involved in the persecutions during 
the Cultural Revolution, back to the PLA to run the CMC. This group of officers included 
Geng Biao, who served most of his career as a diplomat and was called back to serve as 
the CMC’s Deputy General Secretary (1979-81) and then Defense Minister (1981-83), 
and Yang Shangkun, who had been a civilian administrator in elite politics for most of his 
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career and was asked by Deng to serve as General Secretary and then Vice Chairman of 
the CMC (1981-92). 
Compared to professional soldiers, those who ran the CMC in the late 1970s and 
throughout the 1980s, with mixed or mostly civilian experience and expertise, obstructed 
the expression and realization of the PLA’s separate corporate interest. The PLA endured 
a steep budget cut of almost one-fourth in 1981 in comparison with its 1979 budget, and 
was ordered by Deng to “be patient.” In the 1980s and 1990s, professional soldiers such 
as Zhang Aiping (Defense Minister) and Zhang Zhen (President of National Defense 
University) expressed their opposition to this policy quietly and behind closed doors.114 
However, most of the PLA’s rank and file unconditionally followed this policy guidance 
and suffered from the resulting hardship and erosion of military effectiveness. In order to 
partially compensate for the cut in the official defense budget, Yang Shangkun came up 
with the idea that the PLA should run independent businesses, which professional 
officers strongly but futilely opposed.115 
The 1989 Tiananmen Incident, in which the PLA was called upon to use force to 
clear out the protesters and restore order, despite commanding officers’ opposition and in 
some cases defiance, drew a clear line between the corporate interest of the PLA and the 
interest of the Party. PLA officers interviewed acknowledged that Tiananmen was widely 
viewed within the military as bringing dishonor to the PLA. At the same time, many 
blamed the reformers and student leaders for pushing reform “too rashly” and 
“prematurely,” which they argue instead stunted real reform by almost a decade. 
Following Lin Biao’s death, it was not until the Yang brothers’ downfall in 1992 
that the military leadership returned to the hands of professional soldiers. After Admiral 
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Liu Huaqing and General Zhang Zhen, both seasoned professional soldiers, took the 
CMC’s reins in 1992, the PLA started to express its corporate interest coherently. This 
was reflected first and foremost in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, which was the first 
“high-tech” war characterized by the massive employment of cutting-edge weapons 
systems, including long-range, precision-guided strike weapons. The Gulf War 
demonstrated to the PLA “the complete failure of the Soviet-style weapons systems and 
war-fighting theories.”116 The PLA subsequently repositioned itself to adjust to the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) by revamping the strategic thinking of “active 
defense,” which emphasizes powerful counterattacks and offense. The PLA also shifted 
its military preparations to focus on “winning a localized high-tech war,” a term coined 
by General Zhang Zhen.117 Additionally, Admiral Liu Huaqing drove the effort to 
develop and purchase high-tech armaments, which he built consensus around and became 
a focal point for building the PLA. Finally, the PLA’s budget started to consistently 
increase. 
The PLA’s professionalization has greatly accelerated since 1992, though the 
Party and its leadership still tried to maintain effective control over the military. The rules 
of the game have nonetheless changed in the Party-military relationship. The PLA, with a 
clearly and coherently expressed interest in professionalization, modernization, and 
military-building, could no longer return to its pre-1992 limbo. For the Party, the train 
has left the station. To maintain control over the military, the Party and its leadership not 
only have to accommodate the PLA’s parochial corporate interests such as an increased 
budget and heightened military modernization, but also must allow the PLA to provide 
input on which direction the country should go in and what the best policies are to take it 
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there. As political power increasingly fragments in the post-Deng era, the political 
leadership more than ever needs and competes for the military support.118 The Party-
military relationship has become a two-way street, with the leadership trying to establish 
control over the military and gain the military’s support, while the military in return vies 
for influence over the policy-making process.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter put forth the reliance-control model in order to explain the PLA’s 
political influence, generated through the Party-military framework. The reliance-control 
model posits, first, that the political and power relationship between the top leader and 
the PLA largely determines the level of policy influence the PLA can exert. Second, this 
relationship varies on the basis of the top leader’s political reliance on the PLA for 
political support and the top leader’s ability to establish effective control over the PLA.  
Under the reliance-control model, the top leader’s political reliance on the PLA 
serves as the basic condition for the level of the PLA’s influence in policies. In order for 
the top leader to grant the military influence, he must be assured that during times of need 
– intraparty struggles, political jockeying to consolidate and sustain his political power, 
and large-scale social upheavals – he can rely on the military’s allegiance and political 
support. Political reliance is the first and foremost necessary condition for such Party-
military bargaining to occur.  
The extent to which the top leader is able to establish effective control over the 
PLA during his tenure is the second condition that helps determine the access the top 
leader provides the PLA with, and hence the level of influence the PLA exerts in policies. 
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As the PLA and the State/government continue to “professionalize” and “specialize,” 
power will inevitably continue to decentralize, which will in turn lead to the Party’s 
further fragmentation. In the post-Deng era, the top leaders do not have the same deep 
and organic bonds with the PLA that Mao and Deng had. As a result, these leaders face 
far more difficulties establishing authority and effective control over the PLA.  
The top leader’s relationship with the PLA is exclusive relative to other political 
leaders. However, the political interference of previous CMC chairman (or chairmen), or 
from the former top leader(s), supported and sustained by tenacious groups within the 
PLA whose interests and privileges hinge on such lingering influence, created further 
difficulties for the new top leader to establish effective control. Unless the top leader 
establishes effective control, the PLA listens to other master(s), which in Chinese politics 
constitutes the most serious political danger to the top leader. Without effective control 
over the PLA, the Party would begin fragmenting, making the top leader vulnerable to a 
host of serious political challenges. Therefore, this tug of war for control and influence 
emerges as leaders seek to control soldiers in order to serve their political needs, while 
soldiers seek access and influence, as well as the realization of their institutional interests.  
This chapter then reviewed the historic relations between the PLA and the Party 
in order to explain the unique significance of the PLA to the CCP as well as the power 
arrangement in the trinity – the Party, the PLA, and the State (The Party’s formal power 
structure and the PLA’s political representation are explained in detail in Appendix A). 
The CCP has maintained the goal of essentially building a State army, as, according to 
China’s first and current constitutions the National People’s Congress (NPC) is endowed 
with ultimate authority over the PLA. In reality, however, since the founding of the PRC 
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in 1949 the idea of subjugating the PLA to the NPC and the government has remained the 
ideal but has not been achieved. As a result, the Ministry of Defense, the only organ 
under the State Council that links to the PLA, is not part of the command and control 
chain and remains a hollow shell.  
Thus, the PLA and the government have no meaningful direct links. Additionally, 
the PLA is not subordinate to the State, which is a deliberate institutional design that the 
Party engineered. The PLA and the government realize their interactions mostly through 
their participation in the Party’s power mechanism and platforms that the Party controls 
(traditionally, leading small groups or LSGs). The PLA has no real obligation to report to 
either the NPC or the government. This organic separation between the military and the 
government sets the stage for the difficulty of coordination and cooperation between the 
PLA and the civilian foreign affairs system on China’s foreign and security policy-
making process.  
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Shilun, President of the Academy of Military Sciences, in 1976. Some Chinese media reports attributed this 
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by Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili, Yan Mingfu, Rui Xingwen and Zhu Muzhi, heated up and led to a 
serious rift within the Party. This finally led to the collapse of the Deng-Hu-Zhao mechanism, as Hu 
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were ousted from the government. See Kou Chien-wen, The Evolution of 
Chinese Elite Politics: Institutionalization and Power Transition, 1978-2004, (Second Edition) (Taipei: 
Wunan, 2005), pp. 119-31. 
19 The weakening of Deng Xiaoping’s political power, especially after 1989, was evidenced both by the 
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author with a senior official from the Propaganda Department indicated that the top-level propaganda 
officials and in the military the top GPD officers sanction such public demonstrations of support and 
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the chiefs of these agencies have certain autonomy in whether and how they speak. For example, regarding 
Zhou Yongkang’s case, the PLA responded with firm support, first demonstrating the PLA’s and the 
People’s Armed Police’s support (PAP) through the PLA Daily’s weibo (Chinese equivalent of Twitter) 
account and then publishing an article, implying their support for the further and deeper implementation of 
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21 In the non-military world, only those officials at the administrative status of Vice Provincial Governor 
and above are eligible for alternate membership of the CCP Central Committee (CCPCC); In order to turn 
any proposal into a resolution, and therefore an official policy of the Party, it has to be passed by the 
CCPCC, which is on average composed of 200-300 members who serve a five-year term. The CCPCC 
members include the PBSC members, “three deputies and two supremes,” (or 两副一高, which means Vice 
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22 Michael D. Swaine concluded in his 1992 study on the military and political succession that in China’s 
political system, “a party leader's ultimate power relies to a great extent upon the strength and breadth of 
his personal links to the military, whereas a military leader's ultimate political leverage usually derives 
from his personal relationships with key party leaders.” See Swaine, Military and Political Succession in 
China, pp. 5-172. 
23 Since the 1980s, collective political leadership and decision-making based on consensus have been 
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follow. 
25 Zhu De proposed in 1949 to build the PLA into an Army of National Defense (guofangjun). The essence 
of the concept of building an Army of National Defense is to build a State army, thereby leaving the 
military in the hands of the government instead of the Party. In this sense, the CCP could still exert control 
through the CCP members and Party organs in the PLA, but could not enforce the decision-making and 
command-and-control by law. Zhu De was an enthusiastic supporter of the Common Program of the 1949 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which stipulated that the PLA receives command and 
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visits to military regions. Deng was serious about transferring control of the military to Zhao in 1987 and 
urged the military leadership to assist Zhao. That led to Zhao’s deeper involvement in military affairs in 
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officers who remained in the PLA continued to wear their military uniform and enjoy military status during 
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(1987-90), Wang Chengbin (1990-3), Li Laizhu (1993-7), Li Xinliang (1997-2002), Zhu Qi (2002-7), and 
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Chongbi (1982-5), Yang Baibing (1985-7), Liu Zhenhua (1987-90), Zhang Gong (1990-2), Gu Shanqing 
(1990-6), Du Tiehuan (1996-2003), Fu Tinggui (2003-9), and Liu Fulian (2009-). Among them, Qin Jiwei 
and Zhou Yibing were close to Deng Xiaoping. Qin became Defense Minister in 1987, while Zhou fought 
the Huaihai Campaign under Deng’s leadership and was Chief of Staff of the BMR, where he directed the 
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Gu Shanqing was close to Jiang Zemin through Yu Yongbo, and Zhu Qi was close to Hu. Hu served as 
governor first in Guizhou and then in Tibet from 1985 to 1992, which were both regions covered by the 
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this time as the “Workers’ and Peasants Red Army” or “Red Army,” in following the Soviet Red Army’s 
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Route Army. The Eighth Route Army was also known as the 18th Army Group of the National 
Revolutionary Army of the Republic of China. Two months later, those from the Red Army who engaged 
in guerrilla warfare in eight provinces against Japanese invasion troops were renamed the New Fourth 
Army of the National Revolutionary Army of the ROC. In October1945, the First Field Army of the 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was founded on the basis of the troops of the Shanxi-Chahaer-
Hebei Military Area Command of the Eighth Route Army. Since then, the PLA has been the formal name 
that the CCP uses for its military force. 
57 Gao Hua, How Did The Red Sun Rise, p. 82. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Although the Gutian Meeting established the principle of “the Party commanding the gun,” the dispute 
before this meeting was caused partly by Mao’s disobeying the Party Center’s order. The Gutian Meeting 
in 1919 was the result of a 20-month-long debate between Mao and Zhu De. The Fourth Red Army, led by 
Zhu and Mao, was mainly a combination of troops Zhu De led after the Nanchang Uprising (Regiment 28) 
and those Mao led after Autumn Harvest uprising (Regiment 31). Regiment 28 was composed mainly of 
officers who graduated from the Huangpu Military Academy and experienced soldiers of the so-called Iron 
Army who went through beifa. Regiment 31 was mainly composed of untrained soldiers who were peasants. 
Regiment 28 had a weak system of Party representatives, while Regiment 31 enforced political 
indoctrination and established Party representatives at the platoon level. Regiment 31 looked down upon 
Regiment 28 for its lack of official military training, while Mao disagreed with Zhu’s practice of overly 
democratic decision-making in the Fourth Red Army. The Fourth Red Army had three Party organizations: 
the Front Commission of Hunan, the Special Commission of Hunan and Jiangxi, and the Military 
Commission of the Fourth Red Army. The Party Center instructed in 1928 that the Military Commission 
should be established, with Zhu De as its Secretary. In February 1929, the Party Center (CCP Politburo), 
led by Zhou Enlai, wrote to the Fourth Red Army to instruct Mao and Zhu to leave the Army and come to 
work in Shanghai. In the same order, Zhu and Mao were asked to divide the Fourth Red Army. Mao wrote 
back and rejected this order. This intensified the frictions between Zhu and Mao. Meanwhile, the Party 
Center sent Liu Angong to inspect the Fourth Red Army and appointed him Secretary of Military 
Commission and Director of Political Work Department. Liu sided with Zhu in the dispute between Mao 
and Zhu. Liu criticized Mao’s violation of the Party Center’s direct orders and advocated that military 
officers should make decisions without an overpowering Party representative, i.e. Mao. Mao was then 
sidelined. At the following 7th Congress of the Fourth Red Army, Mao was stripped of his position as 
Secretary of the Front Commission through democratic elections, and Chen Yi was elected to replace Mao. 
Mao said, “my power came from the grassroots level. My power came from the people. My power came 
from soldiers, from below. However, this time I was unseated by the (soldiers) below.” Mao then left the 
Fourth Red Army. The Politburo made a decision to reinstate Mao and implement Mao’s ideas in 
September 1929. The 9th Congress of the Fourth Red Army, better known as the Gutian Meeting, was held 
in December 1929. In this meeting, the principle that decision-making power of the Red Army needs to be 
concentrated in the hands of political commissars at each level was established. The Gutian Meeting was a 
key step for the establishment of the Red Army’s political commissar system. After this meeting, political 
commissars have become the CCP’s open representatives in the Red Army, with the responsibility to 
supervise military commanders and troops, implement all orders of the superiors, and consolidate the 
Party’s control over the Red Army. Since then, all orders, instructions, and reports to superior officers by 
military commanders had to be co-signed or co-issued by political commissars. Otherwise, the superior 
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officers would not recognize such orders and the officers and soldiers at the lower level would not 
implement these orders. Dou Chunfang and Miao Tijun, “Differences of Mao Zedong and Zhu De Before 
Gutian Meeting,” hong guang jiao zazhi, reprinted by the CCP News Net, June 21, 2013, available at: 
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available at: http://www.aisixiang.com/data/72270-2.html; Gong Chu, Memoir of General Gong Chu (ming 
bao yue kan she, 1978); Xiao Ke, Memory about Zhu-Mao Red Army on the Sideline (Beijing: zhong gong 
zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1993). 
60 Disagreements regarding the Party’s dominance in the Red Army persisted through the 1920s and 1930s, 
encapsulated in the Zhu-Mao debate. Zhu De, the top professional soldier, headed the Military Committee 
of the Fourth Red Army, while Mao Zedong, then Party Representative, headed the so-called Frontline 
Committee (FC). Zhu and Mao had disputes over who should have the final say in military affairs between 
the 7th Congress in June 1929 and the 9th Congress of the Fourth Red Army, primarily because of the fight 
between the military officers and the imposed political officers who they believed messed up their military 
affairs. Mao was voted out as General Secretary of the FC. This dispute ended with the Gutian Meeting in 
December 1929, which firmly established Mao’s leadership of the Fourth Red Army. Guo Hongjun, 
Superstar Shining (Beijing: zhong yang wen xian chu ban she, 2008).   
61 Gao Hua, How Did The Red Sun Rise, p. 77. 
62 Ibid.  
63 This three-member leadership team differed significantly from previous ones, as the CCP’s supreme 
leader, Zhang Wentian, was not included. 
64 No historians seem to be able to explain this reversal of power between Zhou and Mao. But it is likely 
that Mao’s military strategy was working, which saved the Red Army at a crucial moment. Also, if put in 
the context of the longer history between Mao and Zhou, one could conclude that Mao was indeed a 
talented military strategist with stronger character who was good at manipulating people and political 
maneuvering. Zhou, in comparison, played an assistant role throughout his career, alongside Mao. 
65 After the Fifth Encirclement, led by Chiang Kai-shek with 500,000 troops in 1933-5, significantly 
weakened the Red Army, the Red Army finally adopted Mao’s highly flexible mobile war method in 1935, 
quickly moving among and between the Kuomintang’s stationary troops. The Red Army crossed the 
Chishui River four times and wiped out two divisions and eight detachments of the Kuomintang troops. It 
entered into Yunnan Province, crossed the Jinsha River, and skillfully intercepted a few hundred thousand 
Kuomintang troops. Many officers in the Red Army, including Lin Biao, questioned Mao’s strategy at the 
time. Mao’s strategy played a key role in the Red Army’s success. 
66 For example, after 1935, Mao’s people controlled all secret communications with Moscow. 
67 After the 1935 Zunyi Meeting, Mao Zedong was invited to return to the core military leadership, but at a 
position subordinate to Zhou Enlai, who then represented the Party in the military. As Mao’s military 
strategy achieved successes on the ground, Mao was elevated to the top position in the three-member 
military leadership, above Zhou Enlai. Zhou, still the official Party representative in the military, became 
subordinate to Mao. Ironically, after Mao finally became the Party’s designated top representative in the 
Red Army in 1937, Zhou Enlai, as well as Zhu De and Peng Dehuai, the latter two who were professional 
soldiers, started to contradict Mao in terms of the Red Army’s strategy for fighting the Japanese. Mao 
advocated using guerrilla warfare in mountainous regions and preserving and expanding the Red Army as 
much as possible, rather than striking the Japanese with frontal assaults. Mao emphasized preserving and 
strengthening the Red Army, rather than expending it on the struggle with the Japanese. The army led by 
Lin Biao ignored Mao’s instructions but achieved a great military success in the Pingxingguan Battle. 
Xiang Ying, head of then New Fourth Army and one of Mao’s rivals, chose to follow Wang Ming and 
Zhou Enlai. In the end, Mao’s approach proved to be the better one, and even the army ultimately followed 
Mao’s strategy. This instance in 1937, along with the events in 1935, demonstrated that the Party did not 
always command the gun, even under a figure as dominant as Mao. One could argue against the above 
analysis by asserting that what was disputed here was mostly military tactics and strategies, and that the 
disputes herein do not constitute a critical challenge to Mao and his political leadership. In other words, 
these instances do not constitute a breach of the maxim that the Party always controls the gun. It must be 
realized, however, that prior to 1949, the concerns of all involved, whether the CCP or the army, were 
almost exclusively with military tactics and strategy, how to survive physically, and how to fight against 
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the Nationalist government. Military matters were the central decisions to be made by the Party, and as 
such the struggle over strategic and tactical approaches was indeed every bit as political as it was military. 
Historian Gao Hua further elaborates on these points. See Gao Hua, How Did The Red Sun Rise: The Cause 
and Effect of the Rectification Movement in Yan'an, pp. 114 and 213. 
68 In November 1938, Mao Zedong wrote in On War and Strategy (zhanzheng he zhanlue wenti): “every 
communist member should understand this truism: political power comes out of gun barrels.” In the same 
article, Mao also wrote, “we could say that the whole world could only be transformed with gun barrels,” 
and “our principle is that the Party commands the guns and never allows guns to command the Party. 
However, with gun barrels, we could indeed produce a Party…Everything in Yan’an comes out of gun 
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China’s Party-military relationship is the primary reason why the PLA is 
organically separated from the government in foreign and security policy-making. In the 
previous chapter, I argued that the PLA’s influence on policies through the framework of 
the Party-military relationship from 1978-2012 hinges on two factors: first and foremost, 
the top leader’s political reliance on the PLA; and second, the top leader’s effective 
control over the PLA. Despite an institutionalized collective political/Party leadership, 
the relationship between the top leader and the military remains exclusive. Whether the 
top leader needs the military’s political support in politics or policies depends largely on: 
the stability, multiplicity, and authoritativeness of the leaders’ own power bases; the 
political opposition’s coherence and fragmentation within and outside the Party; and the 
crisis level or stakes. If the political leader is relatively strong, with a more coherent and 
empowered power base, or his political opposition is relatively weak and vulnerable, he 
would be in less need of the military’s support. The PLA’s allegiance, if obtainable, is 
one of the most formidable pieces of support that any Chinese leader can attain in 
domestic politics. 
The more effective control the top leader exerts over the PLA, the more confident 
the leader is in wielding the military’s influence when necessary to advance his political 
goals, the more trusting he is in the military, the more access the PLA gains to the top 
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leader, and the more influence the PLA has in China’s policy-making process. Effective 
control is established for multiple reasons: the PLA more readily identifies with the 
political leader because of his identity (military experience, seniority, and legitimacy) or 
because they share the same ideas and objectives. Once effective control is established, 
the military becomes a strong power base for the leader and naturally gains trust, access, 
and influence. The top leader tends to include his trusted generals in institutionalized 
policy-making mechanisms, consult them more closely on policy questions, and even 
takes on certain policy agendas that the PLA is motivated by. When the top leader fails to 
establish effective control at the top level of PLA leadership, he will try to shrink the 
PLA leadership’s space, and cultivate layers of officers below the senior leadership with 
the intention of replacing the generals he distrusts. 
Deng Xiaoping’s foundation of power rested primarily on Party cadres. Therefore, 
Deng did not rely on the PLA for political support throughout the entire 1980s, with the 
exception of 1989 (Tiananmen Incident). While Deng did not have absolute authority 
over the military, he was able to strongly control the PLA and the PLA did have near 
total allegiance to him. Deng was in firm control of the PLA’s policies and actions 
throughout the 1980s. Under Deng, the PLA’s influence in foreign and security policies 
was at a nadir. 
Jiang Zemin established effective control over the military much more firmly than 
Hu Jintao did. However, Jiang still had to overcome Deng’s political interference to 
achieve the military leadership’s allegiance. In the process, Jiang gave the military 
leadership more access and supported their cause – to adapt to the challenges presented 
by the Revolution in Military Affairs, shift the military’s strategy to “winning a limited 
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war under high-tech conditions,” and focus military preparations on reunifying Taiwan 
with the PRC.  
Hu had to contend with even greater political interference from Jiang, and by the 
end of his tenure had yet to establish effective control over the PLA. Given his distanced 
relationship with the top military leadership, Hu tried to shrink the PLA’s space in the 
policy-making process and limit the PLA leadership’s access. Concurrently, Hu tried to 
shift the emphasis of China’s policy toward Taiwan from one focused on military 
contingencies to one based on following a legalistic approach and offering economic 
incentives. The Party-military relationship under Hu was constantly strained, and as a 
result the PLA tried to push back and exert relative power. 
 
The PLA’s Minimal Influence under Deng1 
As David M. Lampton has pointed out, “Mao and Deng were each legitimated 
with a distinct mix of ‘traditional’ and ‘charismatic’ authority.”2 After 1980, Deng never 
accepted the formal supreme positions in the Party, and his ranking on the PBSC 
remained second or third.3 Neither did Deng possess the absolute authority that Mao once 
commanded, as he alone could not dictate major decisions.4 Rather, Deng had to consult 
with Party elders such as Marshal Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, and Bo Yibo, and make 
compromises with the Chen Yun Clique, which often disagreed with Deng on economic 
policies and decisions with ideological implications. Yet Deng, like Mao, was essentially 
a political strongman. Both were founders of the PRC who gained political legitimacy 
through decades of war and struggle on the battlefield, and who combined extensive 
military experience with an expertise in and vision for Party and government work.  
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Deng’s dominance in policy-making throughout the 1980s was second to none. 
Deng was clearly the deciding factor behind “most really major decisions” and all 
decisions “must be acceptable to him.”5 Deng’s singular dominance as supreme leader 
was reaffirmed in 1987 through the Party leadership’s announcement during the 1st 
Plenary of the 13th National Congress of the Party that major policies would be “reported 
to” and “decided” (paiban) by Deng, despite Deng’s partial official retirement and 
therefore his departure from the PBSC.6 This resolution was reinforced through an 
unpublicized resolution passed during the 5th plenary of the 13th National Congress in 
1989.7 
Their deep roots in the military and their bonds with their era’s military leaders 
also distinguished Deng and Mao’s relationship with the PLA. Decades of fighting on the 
battlefield and initiating political campaigns forged, tested, and consolidated such ties. 
This long process crystallized a mutual understanding between these two leaders and the 
PLA, and led to the PLA feeling personal loyalty to these leaders. As a result, the PLA 
leadership’s obedience to Deng’s strategic judgments was near absolute.  
 
Deng’s Political Reliance on the PLA as CMC Chairman (1981-89) 
When Deng took power, the PLA was a deeply demoralized and broken military, 
and thus it needed Deng's leadership to set it back on track much more than Deng needed 
the PLA. The PLA’s deep embroilment in the catastrophic Cultural Revolution sullied its 
reputation, undermined its effectiveness and readiness, and caused bloodshed in a few 
provinces.8 The 913 Incident further intensified the PLA’s negative image and weakened 
the PLA politically. Because of the military’s pervasive influence in society by the end of 
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the Cultural Revolution, and society’s aversion toward the military, the PLA was then 
derogatively called the “militarist faction,”9 and public opinion was overwhelmingly 
against the PLA.10 In the 1980s, it became a sensitive subject for the military to speak out 
independently on politics and foreign policy. The chaos of the 1960s and 1970s, which 
included the widespread persecution of innocent officers, deeply divided the PLA. By the 
late 1970s, the military was distracted, broken, and demoralized. It was only after Deng 
consolidated his political power that the military returned to the path of 
professionalization and modernization. In a sense, the military needed Deng’s leadership 
much more than Deng needed the military as a power base. Therefore, the military 
acquiesced to Deng’s wishes and receded from the political stage. Furthermore, the 
PLA’s opinions that stood in opposition to Deng’s policies were only voiced behind 
closed doors.  
Deng clearly resented the military’s intervention in politics during Mao’s era.11 
Following his political return, Deng unequivocally pushed the PLA to return to the 
barracks by reducing the political role of military leaders in elite politics and 
systematically pulling them out of local politics.12 Deng simultaneously strengthened the 
government’s institutionalization and ability to govern. During Deng’s era, the number of 
military officers on the Politburo and the proportion of uniformed members on the 
Central Committee were reduced. More importantly, the CMC was put into the hands of 
cadres with essentially civilian expertise. Geng Biao, who spent 15 years as an 
ambassador, was called back to run the CMC as Deputy Secretary General (1979-81), 
and briefly served as the Defense Minister (1981-83). Then, Deng assigned Yang 
Shangkun, who spent most of his career running the CCPCC General Office and was one 
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of Deng’s close allies, to run the CMC’s daily operations (1981-92), first as General 
Secretary and then as Vice Chairman. Geng and Yang both shielded Deng, allowing him 
to stand up to the professional soldiers’ pressure. For the PLA, which has a long tradition 
of revering seniority, running the military with essentially civilian officials violated the 
military’s autonomy. Yet the PLA again accepted these changes unconditionally.  
As CMC Chairman, Deng had absolute control over the military. With regard to 
the military, his first priority was downsizing its personnel and reforming its bloated 
structure. The PLA railway corps, in charge of building and repairing railways, tunnels, 
and bridges, in both war zones and for civilian use, was first cut in half, from 400,000 in 
1970 to 200,000 in 1980, and in 1982-83 its remaining officers were transferred into 
civilian positions.13 The majority of the engineering troops, which totaled 500,000 in 
1979, were transferred into civilian positions in 1982.14  
Since personnel cuts hurt the military’s vested interests, many in the military 
resisted Deng’s efforts.15 Therefore, from 1975-84 the military alternated between being 
streamlined and swelled.16 Deng’s ineffective efforts to streamline the military prior to 
1984 drove him to initiate a more drastic and systematic reform in 1985 to reduce 
personnel, with an emphasis on reducing non-combat cadres. As such, 11 military regions 
were reorganized and as a result the number of military regions was reduced to seven. 
Additionally, 31 army-level units and 4,054 division- and regiment-level units were 
eliminated, while 600,000 PLA cadres were placed outside the PLA’s control. By 1987, 
the PLA’s total personnel had been reduced from four million to three million. 
In addition to personnel cuts, Deng consistently reduced the PLA’s budget during 
the 1980s. As the table below shows, the PLA’s nominal budget fell by 14.95 percent 
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from 1979 to 1980. Although the PLA’s nominal budget crept back up during the 1980s, 
given China’s high inflation rate, during this period the defense budget actually fell 
substantially in real terms.17 For instance, the defense budget in real terms in 1986 was 
only half of what it was in the late 1970s.18 Chinese defense economists have pointed out 
that the most drastic decline in China’s defense budget occurred between 1984-88. If one 
indexes the real defense budget in 1978 to 100, the real defense budget for 1984-88 was 
91.5, 89.1, 88.1, 85.7 and 75.2, respectively.19 China’s nominal defense budget increased 
by 29.9 percent from 1980-89, but the inflation in China increased by 72.7 percent over 















































1978 167.84 167.84 12.75 4.60 0.7 100 14.96 
 
1979 223.00 218.84 30.39 5.49 2 101.9 17.40 
1980 193.84 177.02 -19.11 4.26 6 109.5 15.77 
 
1981 168.00 149.73 -15.42 3.43 2.4 112.2 14.76 
1982 176.00 153.85 2.75 3.31 1.9 114.4 14.31 
1983 177.00 151.67 -1.42 2.97 1.5 116.7 12.56 
1984 181.00 150.96 -0.47 2.51 2.8 119.9 10.64 
1985 191.53 146.09 -3.22 2.12 9.3 131.1 9.56 
 
1986 201.00 143.98 -1.44 1.96 6.5 139.6 9.12 
1987 218.00 145.53 1.08 1.74 7.3 149.8 9.64 
1988 251.00 141.09 -3.05 1.45 18.8 177.9 10.08 
1989 290.00 138.16 -2.08 1.48 18 209.9 10.27 
1990 330.31 152.50 10.38 1.56 3.1 216.4 9.41 
 
1991 377.86 168.84 10.71 1.52 3.4 223.8 9.75 
 
1992 425.80 178.83 5.92 1.40 6.4 238.1 10.10 
 
1993 550.71 201.65 12.76 1.21 14.7 273.1 9.17 
 
1994 636.72 187.82 -6.86 1.14 24.1 339.0 9.51 
 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook and China Finance Yearbook, 1991-1995; the 
author’s calculations based on the statistics listed in these yearbooks.  
 
The PLA’s Influence Under Deng Xiaoping: Case Studies 
The PLA’s influence in foreign and security policies was at a nadir under Deng 
Xiaoping. This was reflected not only in Deng’s strategic vision on issues of war and 
peace, but also in the most pointed and high-stakes issue of the time – the British transfer 
of Hong Kong.  
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During Deng’s era, the biggest difference between himself and senior PLA 
officers was regarding how to judge the threat level facing China, the perception of which 
was crucial to foreign policy and the PLA’s core interest of building the military. Deng 
posited that the 1980s would be a time of “peace and development.” In August 1982, 
Deng spoke of his hope for “no war for at least 20 years for China.”21 In March 1985, 
Deng expanded on this view, explaining, “although there is still the danger of war, the 
forces deterring it are growing” and “there are two great issues confronting the world 
today, issues of global strategic significance: peace and economic development.”22 In his 
speech at the enlarged conference of the CMC on June 4, 1985, Deng abandoned Mao’s 
conclusion that war was “inevitable and imminent.” By making such a pronouncement, 
Deng consolidated the ideological basis and justification for the major adjustment of 
national priorities, which prioritized economic development above all else.  
Deng’s defining the era as one of peace and development had two major 
implications for China’s foreign and security policies. First, limited national resources 
would primarily be devoted to economic modernization and the PLA would face major 
budget cuts.23 For example, the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) request to build aircraft carriers, 
which then PLAN Commander Admiral Liu Huaqing strongly supported, was repeatedly 
turned down on the grounds that China did not have sufficient resources to fund such a 
project.24 Second, Deng’s prioritizing economic development over security 
considerations impacted China’s foreign policy. He instituted an overriding principle of 
solving border disputes through peaceful means, and shelved issues of sovereignty in 
disputed areas. In 1984, Deng proposed shelving the territorial disputes over the Spratly 
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Islands in the South China Sea and the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands in the East China Sea, 
and instead prioritized focusing on joint development of the area’s natural resources.  
Deng’s privileging of economic development also drove the PLA into wide-
ranging commercial activities (aka PLA Inc.), ultimately a self-damaging path and a 
direction that General Zhang Aiping, the Minister of Defense at the time, and other 
professionally-minded senior officers strongly opposed but could do little about.25 Zhang 
once publicly commented at a CMC Working Conference: “allowing the military and the 
government to operate businesses will inevitably lead to official profiteering. Official 
profiteering will inevitably create corruption. Profiteering by those who wear uniforms is 
the disgrace of the military and woes of the nation.”26 In 1988, Yang Shangkun followed 
Deng’s lead and advanced a policy of “self-development, self-replenishment and self-
improvement,” which basically allowed the military to open factories and run businesses 
for profit.27  
Deng’s approach hinged on his assessment that for China the international 
environment was relatively benign, which senior PLA officers never openly challenged. 
Yet diverging opinions did occasionally surface in carefully-worded speeches. In a 
December 1986 enlarged meeting of the CMC, Zhang Aiping raised the idea that “a 
wealthy nation with a wealthy society is not equal to a strong nation” and that “while 
military building relies on strength in economic development, appropriate funding and 
personnel should also be allocated to military building…because it takes time, especially 
the development of high technology.”28 In 1987, Zhang again openly revealed that the 
PLA’s assessment was different than Deng’s, that the PLA believed “China’s 
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surrounding environment had various factors of instability,” and China’s “land territory 
and territorial sea are being threatened.”29  
Deng’s frail health in 1990 provided an opening for the PLA leadership to once 
again voice its disagreement regarding the threats that the nation faced. In 1992 and 1994, 
Liu Huaqing and Zhang Wannian discussed the threats China faced and warned of 
dangers surrounding the Taiwan issue, separatism in China’s border regions, and armed 
conflict along China’s perimeter.30 Memoirs of Liu Huaqing and Zhang Sheng (Zhang 
Aiping’s son) further show the senior officer corps’ differences with Deng on the larger 
strategic threat assessment.31  
Despite these disagreements, the PLA obeyed Deng unconditionally in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. A large number of PLA officers believe that the lack of attention to 
building and modernizing the military in the 1980s contributed to China’s weak response 
to a series of crises in the 1990s. They also believe, in retrospect, that corruption in the 
PLA started with Deng’s policy of tightening the defense budget and allowing the 
military to run independent businesses to support itself.32 
China’s policy toward Hong Kong from 1984 to 1997 illustrates the fact that the 
PLA had minimal influence over foreign policy under Deng. Deng played a crucial role 
in China’s tough stance toward Great Britain on two occasions during the long 
discussions over Hong Kong’s reversion: first, regarding the PLA garrison issue in 1984; 
and second, in 1992-93, when the Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong seemed to 
be at an impasse. 
In the early 1980s, China’s leadership had conflicting views regarding how to 
design Hong Kong’s future and there was even disagreement with Deng’s vision for 
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Hong Kong. At this time, some in the MFA argued that China should cut off Hong 
Kong’s water supply from the mainland in order to force Hong Kong’s return. However, 
in 1984 Deng ruled out this course.33 Rather, Deng proposed to use the formula of “one 
country, two systems,” in which Hong Kong would be returned to the mainland but be 
allowed autonomy in governance, with its capitalist system accommodated within a 
unified country under a socialist system for 50 years following its return. Deng’s 
reasoning was that it was in China’s interest to recover a prosperous and stable Hong 
Kong, rather than one that was impoverished and unstable.  
Conservative officials such as Li Xiannian, who then headed the Foreign Affairs 
Leading Small Group, continuously challenged Deng’s prescription for the Hong Kong 
issue. Such officials believed that “Deng was just too soft.”34 Li expressed his deep 
suspicions about Great Britain at the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Meeting in March 
1984, and suggested an early takeover of the territory.35 Compared to the civilian 
leadership, the PLA leadership was much quieter on this issue, especially following the 
Geng Biao Incident.36 
In January 1989, Liu Huaqing, then the CMC Deputy General Secretary, hosted a 
CMC meeting to discuss the stationing of PLA troops in Hong Kong.37 The main 
thinking of the PLA leadership on the Hong Kong issue in the 1980s was to pursue a 
peaceful transfer and transition. There were debates within the PLA about whether the 
PLA should have a garrison in Hong Kong at all and whether to take over all or partial 
British garrisons in Hong Kong. Therefore, the PLA initially did not make preparations 
for transfer by use of force or “starting all over again” (lingqi luzhao).38  
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Deng was dissatisfied with the PLA’s recommendations, criticizing the PLA for 
being indecisive and lacking focus and specifics. Deng pushed the military to take a 
tougher stance, acutely realizing the implications if the negotiations with Great Britain 
failed and Beijing “lost” Hong Kong.39 After Admiral Liu spoke in a 1992 meeting, 
indicating that Deng already gave “repeated, very strong and unequivocal instructions” 
that the PLA “should not be soft,” the CMC still did not hammer out specific contingency 
plans on Hong Kong.40 
After Chris Patten, Hong Kong’s last British Governor, announced proposals to 
bring increased democracy to Hong Kong in his October 1992 Legislative Council speech, 
despite Beijing’s warnings, Deng was incensed and urged, “on the issue of Hong Kong, 
in a nutshell, we cannot be soft at all.”41 Deng’s intended audience for this declaration 
was the PLA.42 At this time, the PLA’s new leadership had just been installed. To follow 
Deng’s exhortation, the CMC decided to speed up preparations to station PLA troops in 
Hong Kong and laid out limited countermeasures.43  
In Deng’s eyes, the PLA’s steps were still not enough. After reading the CMC’s 
report, Deng threw it back and complained that it was “too soft.”44 Deng told Liu 
Huaqing to “be ready for the best and the worst case scenarios.” At this point, the PLA 
drafted a contingency plan to take over Hong Kong by force, or in Liu’s words, solving 
the problem of Hong Kong “at a different time, through another (non-peaceful) means.” 
In other words, the PLA was prepared to use force to complete the transfer of Hong Kong 
to China and maintain stability during the post-transfer period in the event that Sino-
British negotiations broke down.45  
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Deng personally issued a warning to Great Britain in February 1993 that China 
might break its pledge ensuring Hong Kong’s peaceful transition if Governor Patten 
refused to withdraw his plan for reforms.46 Despite Deng’s warning, in March 1993, 
Governor Patten published the draft reform bill. The next day, the Politburo Standing 
Committee held an emergency meeting on Hong Kong. Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, 
and Liu Huaqing reported to Deng on developments in Hong Kong. The PLA General 
Staff Department, under chief of general staff (CGS) Zhang Wannian’s direct instruction, 
drafted a military contingency plan on Hong Kong, which the CMC passed unanimously 
and then sent on to Deng. Deng met with Jiang, CMC Vice Chairmen Liu Huaqing and 
Zhang Zhen, and Zhang Wannian at his home on November 3, while the military plan 
was again revised based on Deng’s suggestions.47 This contingency plan led to the PLA 
holding an intimidating military exercise in Hong Kong’s vicinity. The exercise triggered 
strong reactions from Hong Kong and Great Britain. However, according to Zhang 
Wannian, this step helped to resolve the dispute over Hong Kong.48 In June 1994, 
following 16 rounds of negotiations spanning seven years, China and Great Britain 
finally concluded their negotiations over Hong Kong.     
China’s policy toward Hong Kong from 1984 to 1997 reveals that the PLA 
repeatedly revised its policy positions to conform to Deng’s wishes. The accounts of 
Generals Liu Huaqing and Zhang Wannian, as well as others, reveal that Deng was in 
firm control of the PLA’s policies and actions throughout the 1980s in areas deemed to 
be part of China’s core interests — and at the time none was as important as the transfer 
of Hong Kong. One can see the PLA following Deng’s lead regarding the issue of 
establishing the Hong Kong garrison, as well as the drafting and revising of military 
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contingency plans for the takeover of Hong Kong once the British, in Deng’s view, 
undermined negotiations. Deng even pushed the PLA to conduct a military exercise near 
Hong Kong. Throughout the process, Deng was the real decision-maker behind China’s 
negotiations with Britain.   
Deng was very clear about what he wanted regarding Hong Kong and was 
determined to get what he desired. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the more hawkish 
voices on policy toward Hong Kong came from the civilian foreign affairs system, not 
the PLA.49 Both the MFA and the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group advocated using 
coercive means to force an early takeover of Hong Kong. Deng instead put forward the 
formula of “one country, two systems,” which was more tolerant and accommodating. On 
the other hand, Deng took a more hardline position than the military in policy options, 
pushing the PLA to be tougher.  
On crucial foreign and security policies, Deng micromanaged the PLA and the 
PLA faithfully obeyed him. This is an important example of the PLA’s generally minimal 
influence over foreign and security policies under Deng. However, it would be mistaken 
to interpret the case of Hong Kong as indicating that Deng micromanaged the PLA in all 
policy areas.  
 
The Military’s Approach to Exerting Influence under Deng 
Although the PLA generally did not have much influence during Deng’s era, there 
were some cases when the PLA did exert influence on policy issues. During one 
exceptional instance, such influence was generated through an unexpected conduit – a 
civilian leader with no prior military experience. The 314 Sino-Vietnamese Naval Clash 
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in 1988 took place because the PLA convinced Zhao Ziyang, who at this time Deng 
deeply trusted and who was preparing to take over Deng’s CMC chairmanship, to take a 
tougher stance in the South China Sea. This case demonstrates that the most effective 
way for the PLA to exert influence in policies is to forge an alliance with a motivated and 
powerful civilian leader.  
In 1987, Deng resigned all of his positions except that of CMC Chairman. Deng 
was in the process of transferring all of his powers to Zhao Ziyang, his designated 
successor, who was serving as the Secretary General of the Party and the CMC Vice 
Chairman. Deng held a CMC meeting in November, in which he announced that in the 
CMC, “routine policies need to be discussed between Zhao Ziyang and Yang Shangkun, 
but Zhao has the authority and the final say.”50  
In early 1988, officers in the Guangzhou Military Region briefed Zhao on 
Vietnam’s “aggressive acts” in the South China Sea while he was traveling through 
Guangzhou. The briefing shocked Zhao, who confessed “he had never been briefed by 
the MFA about how bad the South China Sea situation was.”51 Zhao took on the case and 
asked Admiral Liu Huaqing to brief him on the South China Sea. Admiral Liu presented 
the Navy’s proposals to build an ocean observatory on Fiery Cross Reef (which Yang 
Shangkun was slow to approve) as well as an airport on Woody Island (Yongxing Island 
in Chinese), and strengthen patrols in the South China Sea. After hearing Liu’s briefing, 
Zhao agreed with his recommendation that the military should strengthen its control over 
the Spratly Islands and increase its patrols and construction in the South China Sea.  
With Zhao’s blessing, Liu joined with Hong Xuezhi, the other Deputy Secretary 
General of the CMC, and Chi Haotian, Chief of the General Staff as well as the 
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Commander and Political Commissar of the PLAN, to draft a proposal on strengthening 
China’s military position in the South China Sea. The proposal also suggested that armed 
conflicts may be difficult to avoid and could be a good opportunity to train the PLAN.52 
This report was presented to Zhao Ziyang and Yang Shangkun in the name of the PLA 
chief of general staff, the two vice chairmen of the CMC, and Deng Xiaoping. On 
February 29, Deng approved of this memorandum, followed by the Politburo Standing 
Committee’s approval on March 10, which led to the 314 Naval Clash with Vietnam four 
days later.53  
Li Shuwen, then Chief of Staff of the PLAN’s South China Sea Fleet and one of 
the commanding officers during the 314 Naval Clash, recalled that he received two 
military orders: that the PLA should drive the Vietnamese military off the island, and that 
it should not fire the first shot. This meant that once the CMC decided on war, the time of 
execution was left to the local unit under the South China Sea Fleet.54 Once the political 
leadership gave the green light, the PLAN then made full preparations to execute the 
operation. The PLAN was only waiting for the right circumstances, namely for its 
adversary to fire the first shot. As frictions with Vietnam occurred frequently, the clash 
was inevitable.  
That said, the 314 Naval Clash occurred even though the PLA itself did not come 
to a consensus on whether this naval clash should be carried out, what constituted a 
pretext to launch this battle, and what the desired goals should be, which led to confusion 
and contradictory commands throughout the incident.55 The PLAN and the GSD 
disagreed on whether the clash was justified, i.e. whether the adversary did in fact fire the 
first shot, and how many islands the PLA should seize following the clash.56 The core of 
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the first dispute was that the PLA forcibly carried out the order of removing Vietnamese 
troops from the disputed island, which caused physical fights between the two sides and 
triggered one “accidental” shooting of Vietnamese soldiers.57 Chen Weiwen, the ranking 
officer on site during the clash, then launched the operation, which swiftly defeated the 
Vietnamese troops and sunk their ships. The second dispute resulted from some officers 
in the GSD Operations Department insisting on following the initial decision of the 
leader (presumably Zhao) to take back six islands. However, the PLAN in reality seized 
more than ten islands from Vietnamese control under Admiral Liu Huaqing’s direct 
orders.58 In the end, the PLA Navy kept control over six islands it seized during the 
conflict, but eventually gave up the rest of the islands.  
The 314 Naval Clash with Vietnam was an abnormal case during Deng’s era, 
which occurred after Admiral Liu, a visionary and strongly motivated naval strategist, 
allied with Zhao Ziyang, a top civilian leader who was driven to build his authority in the 
military and took the military’s case as his own priority. Admiral Liu attempted multiple 
times to push the Party leader to consider a more aggressive posture in the South China 
Sea as early as 1975, but Deng and others (such as Li Peng) did not follow his advice. 
Without Zhao’s support, the 1988 Naval Clash would have been another one of Admiral 
Liu’s proposals that went nowhere. The exceptional character of this successful case 
actually displays the PLA’s limitations in exerting influence on policies. It also reveals 
the crucial role that a powerful civilian alliance plays in helping the PLA get what it 




In the 1980s and 1990s, the reunification question – with Hong Kong and Taiwan 
– remained the Chinese leadership’s paramount foreign policy concern. Although both 
issues were and are regarded by China as domestic affairs, foreign influences played a 
significant if not dominant role. Of the two, the transfer of Hong Kong was a particularly 
existential challenge for the Chinese government. Any leader who mishandled this issue 
would suffer catastrophically in politics and such mismanagement could cause the 
Chinese public to turn against the Party. Deng Xiaoping clearly understood this issue’s 
crucial importance. The Hong Kong issue is an example of how Deng handled high-
stakes and sensitive issues by micro-managing them, from setting the bottom line to 
tending to tactical details. While Deng clearly dominated the negotiations on the British 
transfer of Hong Kong, other actors, including Li Xiannian, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and the PLA, all played major roles. Yet it is clear that Deng set the bottom line 
for the military on major foreign and security policy issues and that the military closely 
followed Deng’s instructions. 
With the exception of the Hong Kong issue, Deng was known to establish the 
bottom line but leave most of the tactical deliberation and implementation to the relevant 
bureaucratic agencies. This is where the traditional division of labor and the bureaucratic 
politics come in. In the foreign policy arena, the PLA had low-level influence with one 
exception – the Taiwan issue. Because of the PLA’s traditional expertise regarding the 
Taiwan issue, it was able to influence the decision-making process, particularly before 
1992, when Jiang Zemin established control over the cross-Straits back channel.  
The 314 Naval Clash in 1988, which occurred on Deng’s watch, was approved by 
Deng, but was initiated by a strongly motivated PLAN and a sympathetic civilian leader 
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– Zhao Ziyang. The exception proves the rule: if one looks closely into this case, it 
actually illustrates the main point of this section, namely that the PLA indeed had 
minimal influence under Deng. 
 
The PLA’s Influence under Jiang Zemin 
The Party-military relationship during Jiang Zemin’s era (1989-2002) is divided 
into two distinct periods: the transitional period (1989-94), when Jiang tried to overcome 
obstacles and political interference and had weak control over the military; and the 
consolidation and control period (1995-2002), when Jiang consolidated his power and 
established effective control over the military.59 By 1998, when Jiang launched the 
campaign to remove the PLA from the marketplace, he had firmly established effective 
control over the military.60  
When political reliance exists, whether the top leader can effectively control the 
PLA determines whether he can trust the military to serve his interests in a time of need. 
Jiang needed the military’s support throughout his tenure. During the transitional period, 
when he did not have effective control over the military and therefore did not trust the 
military to serve in his favor, Jiang attempted to confine and shrink the military’s role in 
China’s political process, including in policy-making. For example, in 1992 Jiang took 
over the cross-Straits secret envoy from the PLA, which at the time was managed directly 
by Maj. Gen. Yang Side and overseen by Yang Shangkun. The back channel was 
especially valuable to the Chinese leadership because they believed that through this 
platform they could hear the Taiwanese leader’s true agenda without it being 
“contaminated” by his worries about public opinion and potential backlash on the island. 
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Additionally, the Chinese leadership believed that the Taiwanese leader could be more 
flexible if any commitment he made would not be made public. 
Additionally, Jiang bucked the military and the advice of Admiral Liu Huaqing 
from 1991-99 when he decided against arming the PLAN to more aggressively assert its 
interests in the South China Sea. Once Jiang finally consolidated his power and control 
over the military, he relied more on advice from a small circle of trusted advisors, which 
included senior military officers. Jiang partially integrated and elevated the PLA’s 
interests in his policy priorities, which he seemingly did in order to appease and 
strengthen his power base.   
 
Transitional Period (1989-94) 
In 1989, Deng handed over the CMC chairmanship to Jiang Zemin. Many 
observers thought Jiang was just a transitional figure, given his lack of a power base in 
elite politics and the military.61 During this transitional period, Jiang recognized that he 
needed the military’s support in order to consolidate his political power, but he was slow 
to establish effective control over the military because of political interference by Deng 
and Deng’s appointees. Between 1989 and 1994, Jiang was first blocked by the Yang 
brothers and then impeded by Admiral Liu Huaqing and, to a lesser extent, General 
Zhang Zhen, who Deng appointed to “tutor” Jiang in military affairs. The transitional 
period of 1989-94 was one in which political succession and intensive power struggles in 
the Party led to the military leadership’s seemingly more active participation. As a result, 
Jiang cultivated support in the military by granting the PLA more professional autonomy, 
while shrinking the space for the military leadership’s influence in policy-making.   
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Deng Xiaoping’s Political Interference and its Aftermath 
A clear instance of the former CMC chairman heavy-handedly employing the 
PLA for political purposes can be seen between 1989 and 1992, when Deng’s dominance 
over the PLA was clearly demonstrated and Jiang’s control over the military was very 
weak. Deng was the last top political leader with war-fighting experience and, as a result, 
commanded the PLA’s deep loyalty. This special status with China’s military chiefs 
helped Deng push through his preferred national program in the early 1990s. Throughout 
1990, Deng met with Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, who at this time were the Party General 
Secretary and the Premier, respectively, about making Shanghai a special economic zone 
(SEZ), an idea that Chen Yun — leader of the arch-conservative camp and Chairman of 
the Central Advisory Commission — opposed.62 Jiang Zemin, then leaning more towards 
Chen Yun and Li Peng on economic policies, was initially non-committal to Deng’s 
efforts and turned a deaf ear to Deng’s advice.63 Chinese media did not address this 
debate until several months later, when officials in Shanghai, Zhu Rongji in particular, 
allowed Liberation Daily to “compile Deng’s earlier comments into a four-part series” 
without revealing the fact that Deng was behind this move.64 During this episode, the 
PLA leadership unequivocally sided with Deng.65 In October 1991, Yang Shangkun, the 
CMC Vice Chairman, publicly agreed with Deng and argued for bolder reform and wider 
economic liberalization.66  
Later, during his 1992 southern tour, Deng used his influence over the PLA to box 
in Jiang. The People’s Armed Police (PAP), under the PLA’s command, arranged Deng’s 
entire southern tour, in which he emphasized the need to continue on the path of 
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economic reform and launched attacks against the conservative camp.67 When Jiang did 
not respond to Deng’s actions, Deng turned up the heat when he visited the city of Zhuhai, 
one of the first SEZs.68 There, he ostensibly held a meeting on “military planning,” which 
Yang Shangkun, Admiral Liu Huaqing, and Yang Baibing attended. During this meeting, 
they all endorsed Deng’s veiled warning to Jiang that “whoever is opposed to reform 
must leave office.”69 The strong military representation at the Zhuhai meeting made it 
abundantly clear to Jiang that, if necessary, the high-level military brass was willing to 
turn against him and back a different future leader.70 The PLA General Politics 
Department (GPD), headed by Yang Baibing, organized three groups of senior officers to 
tour Shenzhen and Zhuhai, intended to demonstrate the military’s support for Deng’s 
position.71  
Then, during the March 1992 Politburo meeting, Yang Shangkun forcefully 
backed Deng’s ideas, while Jiang followed by expressing full support for Deng’s efforts 
and “admitting that he had been too lax in promoting reform.”72 In retrospect, it is clear 
that by March 1992 Deng had won this political battle and Jiang had gotten into line – 
both publicly and privately – with Deng’s policies.73 Despite Jiang’s acquiescence, Yang 
Baibing snubbed Jiang by instructing the PLA Daily to write an editorial entitled “(the 
PLA) acting as the protector for reform and opening up.” This editorial was intended to 
remind political insiders that the military, not Jiang, protected and supported Deng’s 
ideas.74 Over the following months, Yang Baibing continued to push the PLA to publicly 
support Deng’s policies.75 On August 1, all commanders and political commissars of the 
seven military regions wrote articles promising “protection” for economic reform and 
opening up.76 The explicit lack of respect and even disparaging attitude the Yang brothers 
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displayed toward Jiang was public knowledge among senior PLA officers. A military 
officer from the Guangzhou Military Region put it thus in an interview: 
Jiang was swaggering and conceited. But Yang Baibing simply told him to shove it. In 
1990, all the leaders of the Center enjoyed special military supplies (food and groceries 
from military-owned farms). Jiang’s family never received such benefits after moving to 
Beijing in 1989 and when they inquired why not, the CMC office replied that special 
military supplies are only provided for active-duty officers and that Zhao Ziyang did not 
get it either. That answer certainly did not go down well with Jiang.77  
 
During and immediately after Deng’s period as China’s preeminent leader, Yang 
Shangkun was “Deng’s man,” and his representative and liaison in the PLA. Yang was 
Secretary General and subsequently Vice Chairman of the CMC, and in those positions 
he was largely responsible for the CMC’s daily work. It is clear that the PLA’s ardent 
political support and participation in Deng’s southern tour initiative, which was intended 
to force Jiang’s hand, was instrumental to Deng’s political success, a fact that Deng also 
saw as a potential danger.78 A politically active PLA with its own agenda, with all the 
strength and resources it commands, could pose a formidable challenge to any political 
leader.  
One incident in particular seems to have accelerated Deng’s determination to 
remove the danger of an overly powerful PLA, which would have destabilized the new 
political leader, Jiang Zemin. In late August 1992, Yang Baibing summoned a meeting of 
those he considered trustworthy to discuss the PLA’s future personnel promotions. In this 
meeting, many attendees criticized Jiang’s lack of vision and his inability to direct 
military affairs. In short, they doubted his ability to assume the chairmanship of the CMC. 
The Yang brothers also drafted a list of around 100 PLA officers who they planned to 
promote, and did not consult Jiang during the drafting of this list. From September 7-10 
1992, the CMC held a meeting to discuss the PLA’s personnel issues in preparation for 
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the 14th Party Congress. Yang Baibing, concurrently Director of the GPD and thus 
overseeing personnel promotions, raised the list with Jiang after getting consent from Liu 
Huaqing and Yang Shangkun. Jiang went to Deng and presented this list as proof of the 
Yang brothers’ ever-growing power in the military and their attempt to replace those 
loyal to Deng.  
Yang Shangkun allegedly suggested to Deng that he should “retire while Yang 
Baibing moves to the top to enter the Politburo Standing Committee.”79 Yang Shangkun 
mistakenly believed that he had gained support from the PLA’s elderly patrons, but in 
actuality “old comrades such as (Generals) Zhang Aiping, Xiao Ke, and Yang Yong all 
opposed him!”80 Professional soldiers had long resented the fact that Yang Shangkun ran 
the PLA, as he lacked the seniority that the PLA treasured. Such professional soldiers 
believed Yang’s expertise and experience clearly did not match the high status he 
enjoyed. Professionally-oriented officers were depressed by the Yang brothers’ use of 
political maneuvering to sideline their opponents and expand their influence. This 
political battle was also fought along bureaucratic lines. Officers from the GSD and the 
GLD, long overpowered by the GPD, feared that Yang Baibing’s further ascendance to 
the top would mean the further decline of their agencies. These officers seized this 
opportunity to side with Jiang to take down the Yang brothers. General Zhang Aiping, the 
former Defense Minister, publicly opposed the concepts of an “Army of the Yang 
Family” and a family-governed monarchical country.81 Admiral Liu Huaqing, Deputy 
Secretary and then Vice Chairman of the CMC, who lived in the Yang brothers’ shadow, 
explicitly backed Jiang in the face of the Yang brothers’ accusations.82 
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The Party’s elders such as Peng Zhen, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian were also long 
dissatisfied by the Yang brothers’ expanding power, and opposed the Yang brothers for 
many of the same reasons as the professional soldiers.83 These elders believed that 
Yang’s power was so great that it could harm stability and harmony.84 Wang Ruilin, 
Deng’s long-time military secretary, understood the balance of power and realigned 
himself with Jiang against the Yang brothers during this political struggle. Therefore, the 
Yang brothers, with their power peaking in 1992, faced challenges from all sides, which 
to a large extent indicated the vulnerability of their power base in the military.85 Yang 
Shangkun found out the hard way that his true source of power was Deng Xiaoping. 
Those who granted power could take it away. 
The Yang brothers’ extensive political participation and their explicit scorn for 
Jiang could possibly have emanated from Deng himself. In 1990-91, Deng was extremely 
dissatisfied with Jiang and Li Peng. Deng could have (mis)led Yang Shangkun into 
thinking that he had made up his mind to replace Jiang and Li. During this period, Deng 
and Yang were so close that Yang was the only senior leader who stayed with Deng for 
the Spring Festival three years in a row (1989-91).86 Although it is still unclear why Deng 
ultimately decided to strip the Yang brothers of their power, it is clear that Deng 
understood Jiang had a very weak position vis-a-vis the PLA, and that without settling 
this issue Jiang would not survive long in power. Such a scenario could lead to chaos and 
instability within China’s top leadership and China more generally. Deng genuinely 
believed that soldiers should be kept from intervening too much in politics and that 
China’s political stability trumped all other matters. Deng had initiated the military’s 
involvement in politics and now it was his turn to end it before it spiraled out of control.87  
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Before the start of the 14th Party Congress, Deng wrote a letter to the Politburo 
that gave his opinion on how CMC personnel arrangements in the future should be made. 
According to Liu Huaqing’s recollection of this letter, Deng stated, “In the future, the 
routine work of (the) CMC should be directed mainly by two comrades, Liu Huaqing and 
Zhang Zhen, under the leadership of Comrade Jiang Zemin. As for the task of choosing 
(their) successors, the responsibility shall be left to those who are familiar with the 
military.”88 At the 14th Party Congress, the Yang brothers were removed from their 
formal positions in the military leadership, but were not purged from the Party. This came 
about through two maneuvers – both of which were schemes that had previously been 
used. The first entailed abolishing the positions of the CMC Secretary General and the 
Deputy Secretary General. The second was officially promoting Yang Baibing to the 
Politburo but in reality stripping him of all his power in the PLA. More importantly, after 
removing the Yang brothers themselves, almost all of those on Yang Baibing’s list for 
promotion were sidelined. Further, a large number of PLA officers previously sidelined 
by Yang Baibing were reinstated to positions that matched their experience and talent.89 
 
The PLA-dominated Back Channel with Taiwan 
As Jiang had weak control over the military in the transitional period of 1989-94, 
he tried to shrink the space that the PLA could exert influence over. One such area was 
Taiwan policy. During Mao’s era, the PLA had almost exclusive control over the study of 
the Taiwan problem, with military intelligence and counter-intelligence officers 
monitoring developments in Taiwan and making recommendations, as the Taiwan 
problem was characterized as “struggles with enemies” and the step yet to be taken to 
 252 
complete the victory of China’s revolution.90 Therefore, almost all of those involved in 
the Taiwan issue in the 1980s had a background in military intelligence, counter-
intelligence, united front work, and military propaganda.91 The PLA’s historical legacy of 
having a hand in Taiwan policy is evidenced by the fact that the Association for Relations 
Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), the semi-governmental organization that specializes 
in people-to-people exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, was founded in the PLA GSD’s 
compound in 1991.92 
Deng Xiaoping did not have any official position on the Taiwan Affairs Leading 
Small Group (TALSG), but he was the key person who pushed the focus of Taiwan 
policy away from war-fighting (“liberating Taiwan militarily”) and “struggles with 
enemies,” toward peaceful talks. Therefore, Taiwan policy during Deng’s era was much 
less militarized and less emotional than during Mao’s era. Deng later presented the vision 
of “one country, two systems” to solve the Taiwan problem, which was then applied to 
Hong Kong. In Deng’s era, the PLA still had notable influence over Taiwan policy, as 
evidenced by the prominent positions of Yang Shangkun, the CMC Vice Chairman who 
also headed the TALSG, Maj. Gen. Yang Side, who was the Director of the Taiwan 
Affairs Office (TAO), and to a lesser degree Ye Xuanning, who headed the PLA GPD 
Liaison Department. These PLA officials controlled the secret cross-Strait envoy 
communications, which were initiated in December 1990 at the Hong Kong residence of 
Nan Huai-chin, a well-respected Zen master.93  
The PLA’s active participation and even its leading role in these clandestine talks 
between Taipei and Beijing led to China’s relatively calm response to America’s 1992 
sale of 150 F-16 A/B fighter aircraft to Taiwan.94 The Taiwanese envoy informed the 
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PLA of the U.S. sales to Taiwan well in advance. When Tseng Yung-hsien, Taiwanese 
President Lee Teng-hui’s secret envoy, asked Yang Shangkun, then a CMC Vice 
Chairman, in their meeting how Beijing would respond to the upcoming fighter jet sales, 
Yang replied calmly, assuring Tseng that “due criticism (from our side) will surely 
come.”95 Yang essentially reassured Taiwan that despite the inevitable tough and vocal 
criticism that would publicly come from China, Beijing understood and accepted the 
Taiwanese leadership’s explanation and the sale would not fundamentally obstruct the 
development of cross-Strait relations. 
The sale of the F-16 fighters to Taiwan, which according to China’s official 
interpretation violated the three communiqués that China and the U.S. had reached, 
resulted in a tough diplomatic response, which included reprimanding U.S. Ambassador 
Stapleton Roy with the “strongest protest,” suspending China’s participation in UN arms 
control talks, and selling M-11 missiles to Pakistan in retaliation. However, all responses 
were directed at the U.S., not Taiwan. The PLA was notably silent throughout this 
incident, though America’s arms sales to Taiwan hurt the PLA the most. One can 
reasonably conclude that the PLA leadership was convinced that through the secret envoy 
communications, which it oversaw, the cross-Strait relationship was heading in the right 
direction, despite the arms deal. Thus, the PLA was willing to accept the arms deal as a 
means of preserving this back channel. 
The relative calm and tacit understanding between Beijing and Taipei ended after 
the Yang brothers’ downfall, though the change in the lead contacts for the secret envoy 
was just one of many reasons for the ensuing stormy cross-Strait relationship. Jiang 
Zemin took over the secret channel with Taiwan from the PLA in 1992 and rerouted it 
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through Singapore. Jiang also entrusted his close civilian advisors, Wang Daohan and 
Zeng Qinghong, with overseeing most engagements with Taiwan. As such, the PLA was 
left with a participatory and intelligence advisory role in the policy process. The PLA still 
played a significant role in forming China’s Taiwan policy in the latter half of the 1990s, 
but was not as dominant as it was prior to and during the 1980s.  
 
Jiang’s Rocky Relationship with Admiral Liu Huaqing 
After the Yang brothers’ downfall, Jiang had a rocky relationship with the 
military leadership, which was headed by two career soldiers, Admiral Liu Huaqing and 
General Zhang Zhen, both of whom Deng Xiaoping nominated. Both Admiral Liu and 
General Zhang sided with Jiang during the political battle against the Yang brothers in 
1992.96 Jiang and these professionally-inclined officers opposed the Yang brothers for 
different reasons – Jiang in order to increase his political power, and the professional 
officers in order to combat the further politicization of the military – but shared the same 
goal. Once the Yang brothers were out of power, however, this alliance crumbled. Liu 
and Zhang, the two elderly CMC vice chairmen, with prestige and experience, helped 
sustain Deng’s partial influence within the PLA and stalled Jiang’s efforts to establish 
control over the PLA. To signal his goodwill, Jiang initially took a more relaxed 
approach to the management of military affairs by giving Liu and Zhang “unprecedented 
autonomy in running the army.”97 Jiang agreed to leave the details of military affairs to 
professional soldiers on the CMC, and chose not to attend most CMC working meetings, 
which in his absence Admiral Liu led.  
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Jiang instead focused on cultivating his relationship with rising PLA officers.98 
Since 1993-94, Jiang had established a substantial network of trusted officers in the PLA, 
headed by General Zhang Wannian, Chief of General Staff and then CMC Vice 
Chairman, General Yu Yongbo, who played a significant role in determining officer 
promotions as Director of the GPD, and General Xiong Guangkai, who headed military 
intelligence as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Through these senior officers, Jiang 
“held a conclave of General Staff officers and regional commanders to plan defense 
strategies,” though “the deeper agenda was ensuring the army’s loyalty” to Jiang.99  
As Jiang started to consolidate his power in the military, his highly personalized 
style of management led to repeated clashes with Admiral Liu. Jiang preferred to call 
officers personally by phone, asking their opinions and then issuing instructions directly, 
rather than going through traditional channels.100 This led to clashes and a thorny 
relationship between Jiang and Admiral Liu, the military’s last representative on the 
PBSC.101 Admiral Liu insisted that military affairs be the purview of professional 
military officers, since they best understood such issues. Also, Liu frequently repeated 
Deng’s instruction that the CMC chairman should work through vice chairmen, who 
would assist in executing orders, to implicitly accuse Jiang of inappropriately intervening 
in military affairs. As one PLA officer said,  
Admiral Liu Huaqing’s relationship with Jiang Zemin then became almost as bad as 
(Jiang’s relationship) with Yang Baibing. Jiang was greedy for power and control. He 
liked to put fingers in every matter. Serious corruption in the military began when Jiang 
took control as CMC Chairman, principally because he focused on cultivating his own 
people. More than once, Admiral Liu slapped the table in front of Jiang to accuse him of 
unduly intervening in military affairs.102 
 
Because of the discord between Jiang and Admiral Liu, Jiang carefully confined 
the PLA’s influence in policy areas by: lowering the level of the PLA’s representation; 
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setting a pre-conceived goal or deadline; putting in place checks and supervisory 
measures from another government agency; and publishing detailed procedures. The 
level of the PLA’s representation on the TALSG was lowered after 1992. Yang Shangkun 
headed the TALSG prior to his retirement, after which Jiang took that position. Admiral 
Liu was in charge of the PLA’s professional development, including armament 
development, army training, and army-building. As the military’s highest-ranking officer, 
Liu would have been the person occupying the military’s seat on the PBSC as long as it 
had a seat. Instead of giving Liu a role in policy-making, Jiang excluded him from 
exerting influence through bodies such as the CCPCC Secretariat and the TALSG. Jiang 
clearly did not consult Liu on foreign and security policies. Even Admiral Liu’s influence 
in the PLA’s own armament development was constrained because of his poor 
relationship with Jiang.103 As such, Admiral Liu appears not to have played an important 
role in the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis.104 
The handling of the Yinhe Incident is also evidence of Admiral Liu’s lack of 
influence.105 China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in January 1993, 
and the Yinhe Incident took place in July of that year.106 Admiral Liu started to head 
China’s Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Negotiation Leading Group in 1992, 
which was in charge of China’s negotiating strategy on both the CTBT and the treaty to 
ban chemical weapons. Admiral Liu had been the real decision-maker behind the Arms 
Export Leading Small Group (AELSG) since it was established in 1989.107 Therefore, the 
handling of the Yinhe Incident rightly fell under Admiral Liu’s purview. U.S. intelligence 
had very specific information that the Chinese Yinhe container ship was shipping 
chemicals that could be used to make mustard and nerve gas. Robert Einhorn, Deputy 
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Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation, communicated to the MFA through 
Stapleton Roy, then U.S. Ambassador to China, a request to “see whether these goods 
were on board and detain them.” The MFA assured Ambassador Roy that the goods in 
question were not on board and stated, “we invite you to inspect the ship.”108 Jiang told 
Ambassador Roy and a congressional delegation headed by Senator Chuck Robb that 
there were no illegal chemicals aboard the ship.109 Roy concluded that the goods were not 
on board “since an inspection proving him (Jiang) wrong would be extremely damaging 
to (Jiang’s) reputation” and urged Washington to tone down the rhetoric.110 However, 
U.S. intelligence insisted that its information was credible. Therefore, Einhorn pressed 
the case for inspection and Secretary of State Warren Christopher concurred.111 After 
negotiations with the MFA, the Yinhe pulled into a Saudi port and unloaded its cargo to 
be inspected.112 However, no chemicals were found onboard. Admiral Liu later 
reminisced that the two incidents that “humiliated” and “angered” him most in his life 
were the Yinhe Incident and the sending of the two American aircraft carriers to the 
Taiwan Strait in 1996.113  
As he was handling the Yinhe Incident, Admiral Liu was most likely overruled by 
Jiang. Liu was evidently sympathetic to the PLA’s arms exporters, some of whom the 
U.S. accused of selling sensitive material and technology, thereby aiding proliferation. 
When China’s defense industry inquired as to the plausibility of exporting arms to a 
given country, Liu “always gave such a succinct answer – as long as someone asks for it, 
we will sell it,” according to the recollections of an official from China’s defense 
industry.114  
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Admiral Liu’s more encouraging attitude toward arms sales is consistent with the 
PLA’s bureaucratic interest. Arms exports produced revenue that was partly used to 
procure armaments for the PLA, which helped offset the challenges it faced due to a 
declining defense budget. From 1986 to 1990 alone, Poly Technologies Corporation 
(Poly Group Corporation), the PLA’s main arms trader, gave US$20 billion of its profits 
from exporting arms to the PLA, so that the PLAN and PLAAF could purchase badly-
needed armaments.115 China’s arms exports averaged US$100 million annually in the 
1990s.116 Poly Group, under the GSD, Kaili Group, under the GPD, Xinxing Group, 
under the GLD, and Xinshidai Group, under COSTIND (later the GAD), as well as 
businesses run by the different services and military regions, constituted a powerful 
interest group that strongly resisted China’s participation in the international non-
proliferation regime in the early 1990s. To these companies, the proliferation of sensitive 
material and technology was often an enticement they could offer their customers during 
negotiations for more lucrative conventional arms deals. More importantly, the children 
of former leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Wang Zhen have controlled or protected 
these arms-exporting companies.117 From decision-makers at the top level to enforcing 
agencies, it was tremendously challenging to put these companies under the MFA’s 
supervision, which understood the implications of proliferation of sensitive material and 
technology. Jiang personally intervened during the Yinhe Incident and was most likely 
backed by the MFA, based on how this incident played out. Jiang’s intervention, however, 
contravened Admiral Liu’s preference. Jiang’s eyes were set on a big political prize – his 
first meeting with President Clinton, which was being planned to occur during the APEC 
summit in November of that year.  
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The MFA was the lead agency diplomatically that dealt with the Yinhe Incident, 
and did so without the military’s full cooperation. In fact, the PLA was silent throughout 
the Yinhe Incident. Sha Zukang, the diplomat who negotiated and dealt with the U.S. 
throughout this crisis, confessed in a talk at Renmin University in 1994 that he had no 
clue whether or not the alleged chemicals were on the Chinese ship when he took over 
the negotiations.118 “Jiang was upset at the PLA over the Yinhe Incident,” said an insider 
who was close to both the PLA and the MFA.119 Jiang personally participated in the 
handling of the crisis.  
Admiral Liu later reminisced that the Yinhe Incident, in which China allowed the 
U.S. to inspect its own civilian ship on the high seas, was one of the two most humiliating 
and angering experiences in his life.120 Apparently Admiral Liu was either not consulted 
throughout the incident or, more likely, consulted but not listened to by Jiang. In 1997, 
China publicized the Arms Export Management Regulation and applied stricter licensing 
and regulating methods that barred China’s defense industries from engaging in 
proliferation activities without the prior approval of both the State Council and the CMC. 
This was in part a result of the Yinhe Incident and Admiral Liu’s retirement. 
During Jiang’s transitional period, the biggest price Liu Huaqing paid for his 
animosity toward Jiang was Jiang’s stifling Liu’s lifetime ambition of seeing China build 
its own aircraft carrier and his taking an alternative approach to the South China Sea.121 
Even though he was the CMC’s Vice Chairman in charge of defense science and 
technology, Liu could not realize his dream of building an aircraft carrier. His vision was 
for China to develop a medium-sized aircraft carrier fleet in order to strengthen its 
position in the South China Sea. The PLAN differed with the rest of the PLA regarding 
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the direction of the PLA’s force structure. Even the PLAN itself was split internally 
between investing in aircraft carriers or submarines.122 However, the real resistance came 
from the civilian leadership, especially Jiang. In spite of this resistance from the top 
leader, Admiral Liu tried hard to press his case within the PLA and took his case to the 
Politburo. He called on the CMC to host several special sessions on the aircraft carrier 
project during his decade-long work in the CMC (1988-97).123 Admiral Liu, when he was 
a member of the PBSC, also sent a proposal to the Politburo that called for the 
construction of three aircraft carriers by 2010. During internal debates, Jiang said that the 
aircraft carrier project should be suspended while continuing feasibility studies.124 
Admiral Liu acknowledged that his failure to establish the aircraft carrier project during 
his decade on the CMC was the biggest regret of his career.125 Jiang’s lack of support 
reinforced the opposition from other services and from the PLAN’s internal “submarine” 
faction to the aircraft carrier project126 This opposition also torpedoed the PLAN’s 
request to the PLAAF that it include several Su-27K, then the most advanced Russian-
made carrier-borne aircraft, in its Su-27 fighter procurement deal with Russia.127 
With this, not only did Jiang stymie Admiral Liu’s ambitious dream, but he also 
denied the followers of Liu’s vision in the PLA in even blunter terms. For instance, when 
a senior officer of the South China Sea Fleet in a meeting in December 1991 mentioned 
how important aircraft carriers were for the PLAN and China’s long-term national 
security, Jiang blasted the idea in front of everyone, saying: “Just days ago I greeted 
Vietnamese Party Secretary General Do Muoi and hugged him to end the decade-long 
conflict between China and Vietnam. China finally has peace on its border (with 
Vietnam). Now you dare to bring up this idea (of building aircraft carrier), which will 
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only make our Vietnamese friend think I am cheating them?”128 Soon after Jiang publicly 
humiliated this senior officer, the latter was forced out of the Fleet and put on a track to 
early retirement. From that moment on, nobody brought up the idea of building an 
aircraft carrier in front of Jiang.129 
Jiang’s policy differences with Admiral Liu were certainly not just a result of 
their political differences. Premier Li Peng, a strong political figure in Chinese politics130 
and foreign policy in the early 1990s,131 formed a consensus with Jiang over the “Good 
Neighbor Policy,”132 though Li had minimal influence in the PLA. Moreover, Jiang 
distanced himself from the more aggressive South China Sea policies that his disgraced 
predecessor Zhao Ziyang advocated, perhaps under Admiral Liu’s influence. Jiang 
Zemin’s hallmark foreign policy directive, a strategy of engaging with neighbors on 
China’s periphery while solving or shelving territorial disputes, was developed in parallel 
with his central focus on improving Sino-U.S. relations.133 Termed the “Good Neighbor 
Policy,” this became the guiding principle of China’s foreign policy beginning in March 
1991.134 In December 1992, Jiang emphasized that the military should “create a long-
term stable security environment for China’s reform and opening up alongside the goal of 
modernization.”135 In January 1993, Jiang also pointed out at a CMC meeting that 
“China’s surrounding security environment has been improving” and “China’s ‘Good 
Neighbor’ relationship with its surrounding countries is in the best period since 1949.”136 
However, in order to implement this strategy, China had to become more willing to 
compromise in negotiations over territorial disputes.  
The PLA held particularly strong feelings toward negotiations with two countries: 
Vietnam and Russia. Regarding the Vietnamese case, the PLA preferred to negotiate 
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land- and sea-based territorial disputes in tandem, as a packaged deal, rather than solving 
them separately.137 The PLA took this approach because it had a military advantage over 
Vietnam on land but was behind Vietnam on the seas. However, the PLA’s advantage on 
land outweighed its disadvantage on the seas. The PLA wanted to leverage the former to 
accomplish a favorable outcome on the latter, since the PLA’s line of control on the land 
borders far exceeded what China traditionally claimed with Vietnam.138 “The prevailing 
military opinion then was that land territorial disputes should be linked to the dispute on 
the seas and that we should maintain strong pressure against Vietnam on land as long as 
the Spratly dispute was not solved.”139 However, the MFA, with the State Council’s 
backing, overruled the PLA’s proposal.140 As for the Russian case, the PLA was largely 
sidelined and excluded from territorial negotiations. The MFA dominated the relevant 
surveying and mapping of territory, in which the PLA at best played a secondary role.  
The military’s ability to influence debates over policy is determined by whether 
the military can alter the outcomes of such discussions, which in turn is a measure of the 
PLA’s overall influence. In this case, Admiral Liu, who clearly prioritized the aircraft 
carrier program and the protection of China’s rights and interests in the South China Sea, 
could not mitigate Jiang’s opposition to the aircraft carrier program, or his general policy 
position on the South China Sea disputes. 
A military leadership that did not fully subordinate itself to Jiang’s control, as 
exemplified first by the Yang brothers and then by Admiral Liu Huaqing, characterized 
Jiang’s transitional period. Although Jiang was slow to establish control over the military 
and Deng still exerted significant influence when he chose to, Jiang tried to shrink the 
military’s space in policy-making when he was able to do so.  
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Jiang Consolidates His Power (1995-2002) 
In 1995-96, Jiang’s consolidation of power in the Party is marked by his taking 
down Chen Xitong, the former mayor of Beijing who was Jiang’s political rival and a 
Politburo member, on corruption charges, and arresting Zhou Beifang, a close friend of 
Deng’s family. The 4th Plenary Session of the 14th CCP Central Committee in September 
1995 signaled a significant win in personnel affairs, as Jiang managed to add a series of 
political allies onto the Politburo and its Standing Committee, as well as the Secretariat. 
Jiang was dedicated to pushing through the “rejuvenation” of cadres at the central as well 
as the local level, and in the military through the campaign of “cultivating talents well 
adapted to the 21st Century.” This was a glorified excuse to skillfully retire the elder 
generation who held powerful positions and were less likely to follow Jiang’s orders. In 
1992-93, the majority of senior PLA officers at the level of military region principal who 
reached or were over 65 years old had to retire. In 1994, You Xigui, who had been in 
charge of Jiang’s personal security detail since Jiang’s days in Shanghai, was put in 
charge of the Central Bodyguards Bureau (Unit 8341). Prior to this, Yang Dezhong, who 
Deng deeply trusted, held this position. In addition, Jia Ting’an, Jiang’s longtime 
personal assistant, was appointed Deputy Director of the CMC General Office in 1994, 
which manages the logistics of the CMC’s daily activities and facilitates its 
communications, meetings, and orders. 
Jiang further consolidated his power after Deng’s death in 1997, as signaled by 
his retiring of Qiao Shi, his biggest political rival.141 Jiang recorded a significant victory 
when he successfully terminated the military’s representation on the PBSC after Admiral 
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Liu retired.142 “Jiang used peaceful rise/development of China and the Party’s absolute 
control of the military as the reasons to keep the military out of the Standing Committee. 
In essence, Jiang was afraid of having to fight another Liu Huaqing or Yang Baibing for 
power and control over the PLA,” said a senior active-duty PLA officer.143 Since this 
move, the PLA has yet to regain its representation at the State principal level, and its 
representation at the State deputy level has been limited to two to three seats (the two 
CMC Vice Chairmen as Politburo members, and the Defense Minister as State 
Councilor). In 1998, Jiang launched a campaign of “emphasizing politics,” which he 
primarily used to consolidate his absolute authority over government and military 
systems. 
Jiang’s goal was to use these struggles with senior generals to more effectively 
subordinate them, and he succeeded in doing so using several approaches. First, Jiang 
cleaned house by turning over the PLA’s personnel three times from 1992-94, launching 
an anti-smuggling and anti-corruption campaign in 1997-98, and announcing PLA 
personnel cuts of half a million officers in 1997. Jiang sidelined the officers close to the 
Yang brothers and the majority of officers who appeared on Yang Baibing’s promotion 
list.144 In the interim, Jiang loosened the requirements for promotion to full general in 
order to allow his preferred candidates to enter the military leadership, and used the 
position of full general as a carrot to incentivize the officers he did not favor to 
voluntarily retire.145 Second, age limits were much more strictly enforced on PLA 
officers, especially senior officers, through the revision of the “Regulation on Active-
duty Officer Service” in May 1994, in order to push out a large number of senior officers 
loyal to the previous generation of PLA leaders.146 This helped to make room for younger 
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officers who were more adept at leveraging new technology. While those younger, 
second- or third-tier officers that the Yang brothers favored were sidelined, Jiang helped 
almost a whole generation of officers leapfrog over other officers and assume positions of 
leadership more quickly.147 Third, beginning in 1993 Jiang launched a campaign 
“stressing political awareness,” which in essence aimed at strengthening the traditional 
authority of the CMC chairman and more specifically following “Chairman Jiang” and 
safeguarding Jiang’s authority.148 Fourth, in early 1995, Jiang put in place a two-track 
system for managing PLA officers: strengthening political indoctrination and cracking 
down on corrupt PLA officers.149 The large-scale auditing and inspection process, 
combined with the anti-smuggling campaign headed by General Yu Yongbo, created a 
long list of military officers vulnerable to corruption charges and therefore opened up a 
window of opportunity for Jiang to maneuver.150 Fifth, and most importantly, between 
1997 and 1998, the PLA’s divestiture from its commercial interests, the anti-smuggling 
campaigns, personnel cuts, and organizational restructuring all combined to bring enough 
pressure on senior PLA officers to toe the line and build their personal loyalties toward 
Jiang. 
In the military, Jiang achieved considerable though not full control. Neither 
General Zhang Zhen nor Admiral Liu Huaqing retired in 1995, contrary to Jiang’s wishes. 
Zhang Wannian, who was close to Jiang, and Chi Haotian, who was close to Deng 
Xiaoping, were promoted to vice chairmen of the CMC. Wang Ruilin, Deng Xiaoping’s 
long-term secretary and former director of the CMC Chairman’s Office (1983-90), 
became a member of the CMC (1995-2002) but remained the Deputy Director of the 
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GPD, which was an unprecedented measure and clearly a political compromise between 
Jiang and Deng.151  
Jiang made less noticeable but nonetheless significant progress with regards to 
promotions of commanders and political commissars of military regions, as well as senior 
officers at the military region principal and deputy levels. The PLA officers Jiang 
promoted to consolidate his power base in the PLA included Li Xinliang, who was 
elevated to Commander of the Shenyang Military Region in 1995 and then Commander 
of the Beijing Military Region in 1997, Guo Boxiong, who was promoted to Commander 
of the Lanzhou Military Region in 1997, and Liao Xilong, who became Commander of 
the Chengdu Military Region. Jiang Zemin was particularly skilled at manipulating 
personnel affairs.152 
Jiang consolidated his control over the PLA not just through nepotism and 
coercion, but also by identifying with the PLA’s pursuit of professionalization, improving 
the PLA’s material well-being,153 and providing the military with access to himself.154 
Most importantly, by supporting the standardization of the PLA’s education155 and 
training programs, and backing the PLA’s modernization to adapt to the revolution in 
military affairs (RMA), Jiang resonated with the younger and more professionally-
minded PLA officers. Jiang raised army salaries to at least 20 percent above those of 
local officials of comparable rank in 1993-94.156 In 1995-96, Jiang led a series of military 
exercises in the Taiwan Strait intended to intimidate Taiwan by displaying the PLA’s 
capabilities. In 1996, the CMC clarified for the first time that the PLA needed to shift to 
military preparations for a localized war under high-tech conditions. Jiang ardently 
supported the shift of the PLA’s armament development toward high-tech weapons 
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systems that could penetrate the defense of a militarily superior opponent.157 Jiang’s 
technical background and interests fit well with the younger PLA officers’ need for a 
force structure transformation to meet the challenges that RMA presented.158 In July 
1997, Jiang promised that as China’s economy grew, so too would its defense budget, 
and that increases in defense expenditures would focus on building armaments.159 Such 
efforts helped Jiang establish effective control over the PLA by 1997, signaled by his 
announcement that he would cut half a million troops in September of that year. This was 
followed by Jiang’s efforts to remove the PLA from the marketplace in 1998, which 
helped him win the support of retired generals such as Zhang Aiping and professionally-
oriented officers.160 By this time, the PLA had become one of Jiang’s power bases. 
 
Jiang’s Trusted Generals 
With ineffective control over the military and therefore weak confidence in the 
military’s willingness to serve his interests, the top political leader would be more 
distanced from the military and seek to confine the military’s influence in the political 
process, including policy-making. This pattern is evidenced by Jiang’s conflictual 
relationship with Admiral Liu Huaqing during his transitional period. While 
consolidating his control in the Party and the military from 1995-97, Jiang not only 
applied coercive measures to replace those who worked against him, but also took 
measures to win support from important power bases within the PLA.  
Although foreign/security policies sometimes overlap heavily with the purely 
military side, which could then bring in various actors along the line (including, for 
example, GSD’s Operations Department), only a few senior PLA positions, according to 
their mandates and portfolios, are directly relevant to the formulation of military opinions 
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regarding foreign and security policies. The most relevant position was deputy chief of 
general staff at the military region deputy level, which oversaw military intelligence and 
military foreign affairs. Along these lines, the assistant chief of general staff assisted the 
above position and played a tactical role. The defense minister, who oversaw military 
diplomacy, in most cases enforced policy but did not act as the policy-maker. However, 
while the first-ranking deputy chief of general staff oversaw war-fighting, the chief of 
general staff and vice chairmen of the CMC possessed the real decision-making powers. 
Their opinions would supersede all the officials who held the above positions when 
disagreements occurred, as military diplomacy and military affairs overlap. However, 
who top leaders seek counsel from and how much counsel they seek from a particular 
officer depends largely on their relationship with that officer and, secondarily, what that 
officer’s portfolio and position is. Under Jiang, the PLA increased both its access to the 
top leader and its ability to influence core issues that it prioritized. Jiang’s close 
relationship with Xiong Guangkai, director of the Second Department of the GSD and 
then the Deputy Chief of Staff for intelligence and military diplomacy, had significant 
power in framing the issues for Jiang, as he controlled the intelligence that Jiang received 
from the PLA.161  
As part of his drive to consolidate power over the military, Jiang first visibly 
appointed senior officers he trusted to be part of existing policy consultation mechanisms 
within the Party’s domain. Therefore, the officers Jiang trusted could elevate their 
importance and play a more active role in policy-making. In September 1997, the CCP 
Central Committee added General Zhang Wannian to the Politburo.162 More importantly, 
General Zhang became Secretary of the Secretariat in 1997, which provided Zhang with 
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more channels to insert the military’s opinions on policies.163 In 2000, General Zhang 
became Deputy Director of the TALSG, while General Xiong Guangkai had already been 
a member of the TALSG since 1997.164 Jiang’s confidence in senior officers such as 
General Xiong is not easily quantified by looking at their official positions, and in fact 
Jiang relied on such officers for personal counsel frequently. By the time Jiang had 
transferred the positions of the presidency and CCP general secretary to Hu Jintao in 
2002, the PLA had become one of Jiang’s principal power bases. Jiang rewarded the 
PLA’s allegiance by becoming the PLA’s primary advocate on the need for military 
modernization and to a certain extent supporting its position on the Taiwan issue. Jiang’s 
relationship with the PLA was one of mutual influence and reinforcement. 
The circle of trusted PLA officers that Jiang cultivated beginning in the early 
1990s greatly expanded by 1997 as he consolidated his power over the military. Having 
said that, it was certainly a balancing game Jiang played to satisfy his own needs and 
those of other power bases in the PLA. Most of those who entered the CMC during 
Jiang’s first term had exceptional expertise and some, such as Zhang Wannian, were even 
recommended by Deng. Not all of those who made it onto the CMC were particularly 
close to Jiang, such as Chi Haotian, who was promoted based on merit and maintained 
close ties to Deng and Deng’s family.165  
Some with a solid power base and overlapping loyalties could survive with a new 
master and make peace on both ends, such as Wang Ruilin, Deng’s longtime secretary, 
who remained a member of the CMC until 2002. Wang Ke and Cao Gangchuan were not 
only close to elders such as Liu Huaqing and Deng, but also identified themselves with 
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the direction of the PLA’s modernization under Jiang. In the end, only a handful of 
people who Deng once favored or demonstrated strong potential made it onto the CMC. 
Not all of those who were close to Jiang were close to each other. For example, 
Liang Guanglie did not get along with Xu Caihou, though both were relatively close to 
Jiang.166 Because Jiang needed to balance his personal interest in establishing control 
over the military with that of satisfying existing powerbases within the PLA, four out of 
nine members of the CMC in 1999 were political officers.167  
Personal ties to Jiang were a necessary but not sufficient condition for officers to 
have the ability to influence Jiang with regards to foreign and security policies. General 
Yu Yongbo, Director of the GPD, was instrumental in pushing through the campaign of 
political indoctrination and the promotion of officers based on both professional 
credentials and loyalty to Jiang. General Guo Boxiong, who personally pledged 
allegiance to Jiang in the early 1990s, was fast-tracked for promotion and joined the 
CMC in 1999 as the 1st ranking Deputy Chief of General Staff, and in 2002 became a 
Vice Chairman.168 General Xu Caihou became a member of the CMC in 1999, serving as 
Executive Deputy Director of the GPD. Xu, who became Director of the GPD and 
Secretary of the CCPCC Secretariat in 2002, was one of Jiang’s favorites due to his 
attempts to promote Jiang’s voice in the military by pushing ideological education and 
knitting the network of officers who followed Jiang at various levels. However, it is 
doubtful that either General Yu or General Xu had much influence on Jiang in foreign 
and security policies, given their personal interest and expertise in either personnel and 
political work or the PLA’s parochial institution-building and management.169 For 
example, during Politburo meetings, Xu very rarely spoke up on topics related to any 
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foreign and security policies, and when Xu was instructed to speak on certain issues, he 
would consistently wander off topic.170 
Zhang Wannian, Vice Chairman of the CMC, stands out among Jiang’s trusted 
generals as one of the strongest supporters of Jiang’s foreign policy in the 1990s and one 
of the two generals who were most able to influence Jiang’s decision-making.171 Jiang’s 
manipulation initially brought Zhang into his camp. In addition, while serving as 
Commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, Zhang won Jiang’s trust by defying 
General Yang Baibing’s campaign to politically cleanse officers who voiced 
disagreement with the Tiananmen Square crackdown.172  
General Zhang was instrumental in influencing and hardening Jiang’s posture 
toward Taiwan. For instance, in the days following Lee Teng-hui’s July 9, 1999 public 
articulation of a “two-state theory” to solve the cross-Strait issue, with Jiang’s blessing, 
Zhang convened a special meeting of the CMC to study possible responses. The CMC 
concluded that the military should orient itself toward “fighting an early war and a real 
war on Taiwan, a war with the possibility of intervention by a strong enemy,” which 
Zhang repeated when visiting PLA troops a few months later.173 During the same 
meeting, the CMC decided to carry out a “997 Operation,” which was a large-scale 
military exercise in the area around Taiwan that used 100,000 troops.174 Following this, 
on July 14, Jiang hosted a Politburo meeting and Zhang briefed the participants about the 
ongoing “997 Operation.”  
Deng instructed the CMC in 1989 to “bring major issues to the Politburo Standing 
Committee for discussion.”175 In reality, there is no clear definition of what a “major 
issue” is, and therefore such instructions can be ignored. Thus, the CMC has the 
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prerogative, or as David M. Lampton puts it, “room to run,” to decide what a “major 
issue” is, and thus what needs to be reported to the PBSC.176 However, China’s response 
to Lee Teng-hui’s two-state concept illustrates that even during crucial moments in 
matters of strategic importance, the CMC has the sole purview over military affairs, 
provided the CMC chairman gives his consent. The CMC can make an independent 
assessment and draft plans prior to consulting with the Party leadership’s top decision-
making body. 
Perhaps the most representative of Jiang’s close ties to the PLA is his association 
with General Xiong Guangkai. Xiong was the first and only PLA officer with a 
background in military intelligence to attain the position of deputy chief of the general 
staff.177 Although in comparison with members of the CMC Xiong held a lower-level 
position, as overseer of the PLA’s intelligence apparatus for 17 years (1988-2005) who 
was also able to gain Jiang’s trust, Xiong held the most advantageous position to advise 
Jiang on foreign and security policies.178 Compared with Deng, Jiang’s disposition was to 
solicit and pay much more attention to intelligence and information. Jiang was anxious 
about ensuring full access to valuable intelligence and information on domestic and 
foreign affairs issues.179 Xiong had far more access to Jiang than his predecessor, Xu 
Xin.180 Between 1997 and 2005, Xiong represented the PLA during seven consultative 
defense dialogues with the U.S. Xiong also represented the PLA for nine strategic 
consultations that the GSD held with its Russian counterpart. Moreover, Xiong played a 
crucial role in several critical top-level decisions on foreign policy matters of great 
consequence, such as China’s response to America’s accidental bombing of China’s 
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embassy in Belgrade and its response to Lee Teng-hui’s moves toward establishing 
Taiwan’s de jure independence.181  
Xiong was instrumental in crafting China’s response to the May 8, 1999 NATO 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.182 In the emergency meeting held 
following the incident, General Xiong represented the PLA in briefing the PBSC.183 He 
provided the PBSC members with the GSD’s assessment that the incident was “a 
deliberate act by the U.S. government” but “it was not President Clinton’s policy to bomb 
the Chinese embassy.”184 General Xiong “advocated a tough response.”185 Later that day, 
General Zhang Wannian chaired an emergency meeting of the CMC, where the decision 
was made to put troops on alert status.186 Apparently, a military option – possibly 
retaliation by use of force – was on the table.187 The summary of the CMC meeting was 
sent to Jiang and prompted Jiang to write a response on the night of May 8. Without 
directly responding to the military option, Jiang initiated the designation of increased 
funds for the nation’s military modernization program.188  
Xiong was arguably persuaded that the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy 
was indeed an accident, which the U.S. side took great pains to explain.189 However, 
once the military adopted the stance that “the NATO bombing was intentional” as its 
official position and presented this view to the PBSC, Xiong could not retract it without 
damaging himself politically.190 “One of the three major interest groups in Chinese 
politics is the policy-maker Once the policy-maker decides upon a policy, he will defend 
his policy to the death even when he knows the policy is a mistake,” commented a senior 
PLA officer.191 Xiong paid a visit to the United States in January 2000, five months after 
the embassy bombing, to repair mil-to-mil relations. However, as of 2014, the conviction 
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that the 1999 bombing was not an accident still stands as the official conclusion among 
Chinese government officials and military officers.192 
Lee Teng-hui’s introduction of a “two-state theory” that challenged the status quo 
of cross-Strait relations, combined with the bombing of the Chinese embassy, drove Jiang 
to reconsider and then accept an initiative from Xiong Guangkai and Zhang Wannian that 
Zhang proposed as early as 1995: a shift in China’s national strategic focus from “one 
center” (economic development) to “two centers” (economic development and military 
preparation).193 Jiang therefore lent credibility to the proposal that China adopt a timeline 
for military preparations to liberate Taiwan by force.194 Neither of these critical changes 
in policy was announced publicly for fear of touching off a war of words with the U.S. 
and exacerbating the cries for action among the Chinese public. 
Xiong also played an important role in shaping China’s response before and 
during the 2000 Taiwan presidential election. Lien Chan’s proposed “win-win” strategy 
for cross-Strait relations was communicated to Beijing in 1999. Although many in the 
military intelligence community and those connected to the Taiwan Affairs Office 
believed in late 1999 that Lien would probably lose the election, Xiong kept assuring 
Jiang that Lien would win. Xiong knew that this assessment was pleasing to Jiang’s ears, 
and he did not give an objective account of the election’s outlook. This threw China off 
balance when Lien lost to the pro-independence Chen Shui-bian, as “there was no Plan 
B.”195 As a result, China again overreacted during its response to the election result.196 
Xiong dominated China’s approach to the Sino-U.S. mil-to-mil relationship from 
1992-2004. For instance, as a result of his personal assessment, the PLA did not send a 
high-level delegation to participate in the Shangri-La Dialogue, an Asian security summit 
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that the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think-tank convenes annually 
in Singapore. Xiong strongly resisted this forum, as he saw it as a channel the U.S. relies 
on to interact with Asian countries on broad regional security issues and gang up against 
China.197 This policy of resistance stood until Xiong’s successor, Zhang Qinsheng, took 
office and led a high-level delegation to this forum in 2007.198 
After Xiong’s retirement, the PLA leadership approved new regulations, which 
mandated that the intelligence department not submit policy suggestions as part of their 
reports. Further, the deputy chief of general staff (DCGS) in military intelligence and 
military diplomacy’s portfolio was split and given to two separate DCGS in 2012.199 
 
The PLA’s Influence under Hu Jintao 
Under Hu Jintao, the PLA had less direct influence in the policy-making process 
than it did under Jiang Zemin, due to Hu’s distanced relationship with and weaker control 
over the PLA. In 2002, Hu took over two of the three key leadership posts from Jiang 
Zemin, those of general secretary of the Party and president. However, Jiang remained 
the Chairman of the CMC until 2004. Hu was weak both in domestic politics and in 
military affairs. Under Hu, the PBSC’s voting mechanism was greatly strengthened, 
which implied the weakening of the power of the Party general secretary and a continued 
shift toward collective leadership and decision-making.  
Jiang continued to exert strong influence over the military during Hu’s tenure, 
especially when he was still the Chairman of the CMC. Even after Jiang handed the CMC 
chairmanship to Hu, Hu was not able to establish effective control over the military and 
his relationship with the military’s leadership was distanced. As a result, Hu tried to 
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shrink the space where the military leadership could exert influence. In response, the 
military’s leadership tried to strengthen the military’s relative power by using media 
outlets to publicly share their views and shape public opinion. Hu allegedly reprimanded 
some military officials for doing this, and attempted to stop the military from taking this 
approach. Under Hu, the military leadership in some instances stalled the enforcement of 
policies that Hu had decided upon. Finally, during Hu’s tenure, the divisions and frictions 
between the PLA and the civilian foreign affairs system greatly increased. There were 
several instances when the military went ahead without consulting the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), which indicated the PLA had “room to run.”200 
 
Jiang Zemin’s Political Interference 
Unlike Jiang, who was the CMC chairman for 15 years (1989-2004),201 Hu was 
the CMC chairman for only eight years (2004-12). In comparison, Xu Caihou and Guo 
Boxiong, the two CMC vice chairmen who served Hu, sat on the CMC for 13 years 
(1999-2012). Similar to the constraints that Jiang faced due to the interference of Deng 
Xiaoping and the Yang brothers during his transitional period (1989-92), Hu faced the 
problem of acquiring official political power without taking effective control over the 
military. In comparison to Jiang, who benefited tremendously from Deng’s relatively 
unselfish removal of the Yang brothers from the PLA in 1992, Hu faced a predecessor 
who was much more eager to hold onto power and would manipulate the military to 
achieve this goal.  
Between 2002 and 2004, Jiang controlled the PLA. Jiang sustained his influence 
over the PLA through a network of officers whose primary allegiance was to him, not Hu, 
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especially in the upper echelon of the PLA’s leadership. The contradiction of power and 
authority during this period further segregated the military from the government and 
created the problem of “two centers,” as Hu had ultimate power over governmental 
affairs, while the military had to listen to Jiang’s commands.202 As a result, the military 
became more entrenched in dealing with military affairs, while Hu distanced himself 
from the military and tried to exclude the military from government affairs as much as 
possible. Hu started to establish control over the military, but the military’s promotion 
procedures had been relatively standardized with built-in requirements, which meant that 
influence over the promotion of favored officers had to start early, and the pool of very 
top officers was “sticky” and slower to change. Therefore, by the end of Hu’s tenure, he 
had established a certain amount of control over the PLA by placing trusted officers at 
the level of military region principal and deputy. 
Jiang’s decision to retain the CMC chairmanship until 2004 violated the CCP 
Constitution, as he was no longer a CCP Central Committee member and therefore could 
not be the CMC chairman. Jiang justified his move to the domestic audience by stating 
that he was merely “copying Deng’s practice" (deng gui jiang sui) and following Deng’s 
example of “guiding the new leadership for a stretch of road who just got on the horse” 
(qi shang ma, song yi cheng).203 To a foreign audience, Jiang justified his decision by 
claiming, “all the people in the military wanted me to keep (the CMC chairmanship).”204 
Since Hu Jintao was the 1st Vice Chairman and Jiang Zemin was the Chairman of the 
CMC, Hu remained subordinate to Jiang in the military’s command-and-control structure 
from 2002-04.  
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Jiang took advantage of every opportunity to prove his ultimate leadership over 
the PLA. For example, in 2003 Jiang announced a reduction in PLA personnel of 200,000 
over the next two years.205 In 2003, when the PLA North China Sea Fleet’s submarine 
(Number 361) sank due to a “mechanical malfunction,” which killed all 70 crew 
members, Jiang immediately sent his condolences as the CMC Chairman, ahead of Hu.206 
During extensive news coverage of this accident, Jiang was consistently mentioned first 
and Hu second, a message meant to remind the PLA and CCP cadres that Jiang still held 
ultimate control over the military, despite the fact that Hu was the Party’s top leader and 
the President of China.207 When Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan’s speech to the 
astronauts before the launch of the Shenzhou 5 manned spaceship was broadcast live on 
October 15, 2003 and watched by hundreds of millions of Chinese, Cao claimed he was 
sending his congratulations on behalf of “the CCP center, the State Council, the CMC, 
and Chairman Jiang Zemin.” Hu Jintao’s name was not mentioned.208 
Such words and public gestures were just the tip of the iceberg, but signal the 
deeper and more entrenched power struggles between Jiang and Hu. By retaining the 
CMC chairmanship, Jiang was able to further entrench his power in the military by 
placing his own men in top PLA leadership seats from at least 2002-07, since the tenures 
of the CMC members and vice chairmen are renewed every five years under normal 
circumstances. In 2003, Jia Ting’an, Jiang’s secretary, became the Director of the PLA 
CMC office, which controlled the traffic of information to the CMC and communications 
among CMC members, and served as Deputy Director of the GPD from 2007-14.209 In 
June 2004, just before Jiang’s official retirement as CMC Chairman, he promoted 15 
officers, most of whom were primarily loyal to him, to the rank of full general.210 These 
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officers included Liu Zhengu, the former Commander of the Hong Kong Garrison and the 
Guangzhou Military Region, and You Xigui, Jiang’s longtime personal bodyguard and 
later his security chief, which violated the rules regarding promotion to full general.211 
In 2007, Hu accomplished less impressive but nevertheless important personnel 
moves in the PLA. Hu rotated the commanders and political commissars of five out of 
seven military regions.212 Hu managed to appoint his own choices to become the 
commander and political commissar of the strategically important Beijing Garrison, 
naming Li Shaojun and Liu Mingfu, respectively, to these positions.213 Hu also tapped 
Fang Fenghui to be commander of the Beijing Military Region (BMR), which made Feng 
the youngest of the seven military region’s commanders. In 2012, in an unprecedented 
move, Fang was promoted to chief of general staff (CGS), thereby becoming the first 
BMR Commander to be promoted to CGS in the PLA’s history.214 Zhang Qinsheng and 
Zhang Yang, both close to Hu, became Commander and Political Commissar of the 
Guangzhou Military Region, respectively. In 2007, Cao Qing, formerly Marshal Ye 
Jianying’s bodyguard, replaced You Xigui as the Director of the Central Bodyguards 
Bureau (Unit 8341). Jia Ting’an was relieved from his position as Director of the CMC 
General Office (Deputy Director in 1994-2003 and Director in 2003-2008), an army 
corps-level unit, and transferred to be deputy director of the GPD, a military region 
deputy position.215 Though it seemed to be a promotion, Jia’s power was significantly 
reduced at the new position. General Zhang Qinsheng, who was one of Hu Jintao’s most 
trusted generals, became the first-ranking Deputy Chief of General Staff in 2009.  
Hu’s overall control over the PLA, however, was still weak. Even in 2007, when 
Hu would have presumably had a free hand to pick his own CMC team, Guo Boxiong 
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and Xu Caihou stayed on as vice chairmen. Even after 2004, Jiang continued to intervene 
in senior officer promotions by preventing or slowing the promotion of officers known to 
be closer to Hu than to him.216 For example, Li Zuocheng, a highly decorated war hero 
who became the youngest corps commander in 1998, offended Jiang by changing the 
location of Jiang’s photo in the Chengdu Military Region’s headquarters to a less 
glamorous place in 2002.217 After serving four years as the army corps commander, Li, 
who by custom should have been promoted to the level of military region deputy, was 
transferred to be Deputy Chief of Staff in the Guangzhou Military Region and served 
another five years at this level.218 Having said this, after 2004, Jiang did not have decisive 
control over personnel matters in the military, and instead had to balance his preferences 
with Hu’s.219  
Additional examples of Hu’s inability to exert full control over the PLA and 
Jiang’s continued interference abound. Major General Yang Chunchang, former Deputy 
Director of the Department of Armed Forces Development Research, Academy of 
Military Sciences, publicly commented on Xu Caihou’s monopolizing power in the PLA 
and isolating the CMC’s top leader, i.e. Hu Jintao.220 In 2007, Hu authorized the CCPCC 
General Office to devise a plan for further military reform. One of the purposes of this 
reform was to reduce the bloated size of the officer corps and to streamline the 
procedures of command-and-control in order to facilitate the “jointness” of the services. 
The military reform plan encountered strong resistance in the PLA and could not be 
carried out. The 2008 Wenchuan earthquake became an excuse for the military to 
formally shelve the plan.221 In an extraordinary move, Jiang kept his office in the Bayi 
Building, the PLA’s official headquarters, changing its name from the Office of the CMC 
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Chairman to “Jiang Zemin’s Office.” This office served as a venue for Jiang to extend his 
influence in the PLA after his retirement as CMC Chairman in 2004.222 Hu, it should be 
noted, never moved into the Bayi Building.223 “Unless certain protocol absolutely 
required Hu to be present in the Bayi Building, Hu seemed reluctant to even step into it 
(throughout 2002-12). He was certainly not comfortable lingering in the building after the 
ceremonies he had to attend,” a senior PLA officer observed.224 Yang Hui, whom Hu 
distrusted since he was one of General Xiong Guangkai’s protégés, headed the GSD’s 
Second Department (military intelligence and foreign affairs) from 2007-11.225  
Hu’s personality and managerial style also contributed to his distanced 
relationship with and distrust of the PLA. A retired senior government official recounts 
his impressions of Hu’s approach as a leader:  
Hu only trusted his small circle of advisors, just like Obama. His closest advisor, Ling 
Jihua, was a local official who “ascended to heaven” by following Hu. Ling had neither 
vision nor expertise in foreign policy, but was nonetheless a gatekeeper for Hu. However, 
if you are not in his small circle, how could you influence Hu’s thinking in policies? Hu 
distanced himself from the military, since he did not have any roots in it. His personality 
was different from Jiang’s. When facing the same difficulties, such as the problem of 
having no roots in the military, Jiang would try every means to elbow his way in. Hu is 
different. Hu would circumvent the difficulty and go around it as far as he can.226  
 
Hu treaded carefully in order to avoid any thorny problems with the PLA. Both Liu Yuan, 
Liu Shaoqi’s son and the Political Commissar of the GLD, and Liao Xilong, Chief of the 
GLD, urged the CMC to prosecute Lieutenant General Gu Junshan, the Deputy Chief of 
the GLD, who was known to be deeply corrupt. But Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, both 
Vice Chairmen of the CMC, protected Gu.227 Gu confronted Liu Yuan, who was 
investigating Gu’s case, slapped Liu’s desk and asked, “who are you? How dare you 
touch me?”228 Liu was deeply insulted and took on the prosecution of Gu as a personal 
mission. Liu sought help from Xi Jinping, Hu’s anointed successor and the 1st Vice 
Chairman of the CMC, to persuade Hu to pursue this case. Xi loyally transmitted Liu’s 
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messages to Hu but Hu was hesitant. With Xi’s efforts, the CMC eventually sent out at 
least three ambiguous orders to seek investigations against Gu, but each order was 
painstakingly resisted.229 Liu Yuan co-wrote a strongly-worded letter with Liao Xilong, 
who as head of the GLD was Gu’s boss, which was sent to all active-duty and retired full 
generals and asked for their support in Gu’s prosecution. This letter resulted in the PLA 
senior officers reaching a consensus on this issue. Only then did Hu intervene and 
express his consent to have Gu fully investigated.230  
 
The Military and China’s Foreign and Security Policy under Hu 
Despite Hu Jintao’s incrementally increasing control over the military after 2007, 
especially at and below the level of commanders and political commissars of military 
regions, his relationship with most of his top generals in the CMC remained distant. Jiang 
maintained his strong influence over the PLA leadership, especially among the top layer 
of senior officers. Therefore, Hu tried to constrain the PLA’s influence regarding major 
foreign and security policy areas by removing or downgrading the PLA’s representation 
in policy-making mechanisms and by redirecting the military toward missions other than 
a war in the Taiwan Strait.231 Hu had supporters in the military that agreed with his 
policy of increasing engagement with foreign militaries and China’s contributions to 
disaster relief, which intentionally turned the PLA away from its fixation with a Taiwan 
contingency. Moreover, through this reorientation Hu and the PLA could have a mutually 
beneficial relationship: the PLA polishing its public image through disaster relief 
operations; and Hu enhancing his image by effectively solving crises that affect many 
people’s well-being. Thus, the overall picture of the PLA’s influence under Hu was 
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mixed, as the PLA and Hu cooperated on some issues, while on others the two sides did 
not see eye-to-eye. Hu’s weak control over the military translated into his failure to 
promote his loyal followers into the top military leadership, which in turn caused 
bitterness among his followers in the military. The PLA leadership in general had a low-
level of direct influence on Hu.  
This was also a period when the PLA, though politically weak at the top, was 
more of an independent actor on national policies, due to Hu’s weak control over the 
military and some military officers’ conflicting loyalties. For those who were granted less 
access to Hu, their natural response was to undermine the civilian foreign affairs system’s 
influence, a bureaucracy that was largely under Hu’s control. A political leader with 
weak control over the military meant greater difficulties for China’s civil-military 
relations. On the other hand, the PLA continued to professionalize and specialize, pulled 
by the development of the revolution in military affairs (RMA). Military affairs, in many 
officers’ opinion, had become too professionalized and too intricate for the outside world 
to understand, much less interfere with. This trend compounded and further worsened the 
existing segregation between the PLA and the civilian foreign affairs system. As a result, 
almost no civilians or their institutions, other than Hu or Jiang, could penetrate into the 
military’s realm.  
 
Revision of China’s Taiwan Policy and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) 
The first and most important policy revision that Hu managed to make once he 
was in power was regarding China’s Taiwan policy. Security contingencies, above all 
else, allow for and legitimatize the PLA’s influence, and no security contingency under 
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Hu was more dangerous than the Taiwan issue. Hu managed to change the orientation of 
China’s Taiwan policy by relying on mainly civilian advisory agencies and effectively 
crowding out the military by introducing more actors into the policy-making process. 
After Hu took control of the TALSG in 2002, he relied on civilian advisors and aides to 
help him formulate Taiwan policy.232 Institutionally, Hu encouraged the United Front 
Department and the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) to develop strong research and 
information-collection capabilities, and to craft accurate, realistic, and pointed 
assessments and policy recommendations for Taiwan that were devoid of ideology and 
ignored pre-existing policies.233 Hu regularly invited those who directly interacted with 
Taiwanese businessmen, local governors/mayors who had major interests in developing 
the cross-Strait relationship, and external experts to attend TALSG meetings. The PLA 
retained two seats on the TALSG due to its traditional influence over Taiwan policy. In 
short, under Hu there was a proliferation of participants in the deliberation and policy 
formulation process on Taiwan, which effectively diluted and weakened the PLA’s 
influence and voice (as well as Jiang’s) regarding Taiwan policy.  
Hu fundamentally disagreed with Jiang’s approach to the Taiwan issue, 
characterized in the 1990s as “offense by pen and intimidation by sword” (wengong 
wuhe), because this approach, though seemingly tough and threatening, was 
counterproductive and was backing Beijing into a corner. Rather, Hu believed that a 
conciliatory policy towards Taiwan that emphasized developing economic and cultural 
links and expanding ties with the DPP would have been more beneficial to easing the 
tensions across the Taiwan Strait. This new thinking on Taiwan, which later produced 
positive results both in developing cross-Strait relations and in earning applause from the 
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American government, served Hu well politically from 2002-04, when Jiang still held the 
PLA’s reins and, for a time, did not show any inclination toward retirement. In 2003 and 
2005, Beijing allowed direct flights between both sides of the Taiwan Strait during 
Spring Festival, which gradually increased in frequency. In 2009, direct flights across the 
Taiwan Strait were officially launched. Increased interactions through such initiatives 
effectively gained the Taiwanese public’s goodwill and improved the political 
environment. Hu initiated the 2005 Taiwan Pan-Blue visits, which facilitated 
groundbreaking visits by delegations of the Kuomintang (KMT), including the KMT’s 
Chairman, Lien Chan, and the Chairman of Taiwan’s People First Party (PFP), James 
Soong.234 
Hu tried to shrink the space in which the top military leadership could exert 
influence. Unlike during Jiang’s era, under Hu the PLA’s top leadership was rarely 
invited to present their views to the PBSC. During the process of devising the Anti-
Secession Law (ASL), Hu is known to have stated, “(on the issue of Taiwan) the PLA’s 
only job is war-fighting.”235 Hu was signaling that the PLA should not intervene in the 
decision-making process on whether a war should be fought, which represented a stern 
position for Hu to take.236 Hu rarely took into consideration the opinions of either 
Generals Guo Boxiong or Xu Caihou on foreign and security policy and “in the few cases 
he did consult them, they were not forthcoming for fear of offending Hu.”237  
In March 2005, the National People’s Congress passed the ASL, which 
demonstrated Hu Jintao’s control over Taiwan policy. Although the law is often 
interpreted in the West as a step backward for Beijing’s thinking on Taiwan, it was 
actually a giant step forward from Jiang’s policy following the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits 
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Crisis of political intimidation and military coercion. This law reveals the Chinese 
government’s new thinking on the Taiwan problem: as long as Taiwan does not step over 
a red line by proclaiming independence, China would not intervene in Taiwan’s internal 
affairs, despite the vaguer language in other clauses that mandates the use of force.238 
This law indicated a clear shift of emphasis from urging reunification under Jiang to 
opposing Taiwan independence under Hu. The law did so by implicitly acknowledging 
the reality of separate political entities across the Taiwan Strait and showing that China 
did not feel great urgency to force Taiwan to reunify with the PRC.  
Hu understood a shift in the military’s overall posture was needed to sustain this 
important policy change that carried with it far-reaching military implications. Therefore, 
Hu strongly supported the shift of the PLA’s focus to “military operations other than 
war” (MOOTW). In addition to the critical reason explained below, a convergence of 
several forces drove the significant shift toward MOOTW. From 2008-11, while the 
world was mired in the most serious recession since the Great Depression, China’s real 
GDP grew by an average of 9.6 percent. The PLA’s budget increased in line with and at 
some points outpaced China’s GDP growth. Yet as the PLA acquired more resources and 
capabilities, but did not use them to fight wars, it faced pressure to justify its increasing 
budget.239 A Chinese scholar succinctly summarized these public doubts as he stated, 
“We now need to tell the Chinese people why we have the PLA. We are no longer poor, 
but are we weak? If we don’t use it, why purchase it?”240  
Hu prescribed “new historic missions,” also known as the “three provides and one 
role” mantra, in which he essentially urged the PLA to focus more on MOOTW.241 
Though the PLA still maintained that its chief mission was to fight and win regional wars 
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under informationized conditions, Hu’s newly assigned “historic missions” pushed the 
military to think beyond Taiwan. MOOTW, neither a Chinese nor a new concept when 
Hu introduced it in 2008-09, gained new urgency and became a higher priority after the 
2008 Wenchuan earthquake. MOOTW focused on domestic disaster relief and 
safeguarding CCP rule, while pushing the military at the same time further out to engage 
in peace-keeping operations (PKO), military exercises with other militaries, and anti-
piracy operations to safeguard the international commons such as those in the Gulf of 
Aden.  
MOOTW served multiple purposes simultaneously. The shift to MOOTW 
answered public doubts as to why the PLA is needed and the increase of the defense 
budget is necessary. It also reoriented the PLA from its sole focus on intensive 
preparation for a war over Taiwan, and enabled the Chinese government to more swiftly 
respond to the public’s needs during emergencies, which would help it maintain 
legitimacy. Essentially, MOOTW describes military preparations away from war, a 
strategy tailored for a peacetime military. It is an attempt to justify the PLA’s increased 
budget without resorting to war to do so, which Hu strongly supported for political 
reasons. 
 
Hu’s Trusted General  
Some professionally-oriented officers took this opportunity of re-orientation 
through MOOTW to exponentially increase the PLA’s participation in military 
diplomacy and joint military exercises.242 Joint military exercises with foreign militaries 
have historically been a common practice for Western militaries. However, not until the 
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PLA delinked holding joint military exercises with its still active “non-military alignment 
policy” in 2004-05 did it become more “outward-oriented” and begin to pursue 
international military engagements.243 General Zhang Qinsheng was not the only officer 
who had been pushing the PLA in this direction, but he was the right person in the right 
place at the right time, making him the most important advocate of it. 
General Zhang Qinsheng, the first-ranking Deputy Chief of General Staff (2009-
13), was unique in that he had a far-sighted strategic vision. He had independent ideas, 
and was known to be extremely hard-working.244 Although a talented officer, he had two 
fatal flaws: his overly strong and defiant character, and his record of fast promotion. 
Zhang’s talent, which led to his fast promotion, sowed the seeds of his eventual (though 
honorable) demise.245 Because he was promoted relatively quickly, Zhang failed to 
cultivate a strong and diverse power base in the military. A PLA officer remarked that 
Zhang’s career path demonstrates, “getting up earlier doesn’t necessarily mean having 
good health.”246 In the PLA, whoever gets promoted quickly fails to build up a power 
base that is sustained by multiple sources of support, and ends up with sometimes fatal 
vulnerabilities during politicized battles. Rather, long-term service with combat troops at 
multiple military regions is necessary for sustaining the vitality of a PLA officer’s 
military career. Moreover, throughout its history all of the PLA’s top leaders have been to 
a certain degree parochial and inward-looking, as they oriented themselves toward 
building credentials and their networks, developing the units they stayed in, and doing 
“what their superior officers and potential patron desire.”247 As a senior PLA officer 
remarked when explaining General Zhang’s failure to advance to a top position in the 
CMC: 
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All PLA top leaders follow the same path of reaching the top positions and then begin to 
make up for lessons about the outside world. If everyone follows this path, they will feel 
intimidated by someone at similar levels who have knowledge, ideas and visions about 
the outside world and where China or the PLA should go. If such a senior officer, like 
Zhang Qinsheng, who has knowledge, vision, and is willing to work extremely hard 
advances to a senior position, how could other senior officers live (with it)? In other 
words, Zhang was a threat to his leaders and colleagues at the senior and top level in the 
military.248  
 
General Zhang’s approach of improving the PLA’s combat capabilities by 
engaging with foreign militaries came long before he was appointed Deputy Chief of 
General Staff. In 2001, he publicly advocated that the PLA needed to “integrate into the 
world to develop itself.”249 Zhang pushed the PLA to revise its previous stance of being 
an onlooker or a hesitant participant in multilateral military forums.250 Under Zhang, the 
PLA started to actively engage in joint military exercises and dialogues with foreign 
militaries. Before Zhang participated in and gave a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 
2007, no PLA representative had ever spoken at this forum except when attending panel 
discussions. In internal debates, Zhang was a staunch supporter of joint exercises with 
foreign militaries.251 He personally led an unprecedentedly large joint military exercise, 
the Sino-Russian Peace Mission 2005, as the Chinese side’s Chief of Staff. General 
Zhang also pushed through the establishment of a military hotline between the U.S. and 
China, despite strong resistance from within the PLA.252 In 2011-12, General Zhang 
played a leadership role in China’s efforts to strengthen maritime security, especially 
protection of its interests in the South China Sea. 
Hu admired and trusted Zhang Qinsheng. However, the intimate relationship 
between Hu and Zhang did not help Zhang’s career, but rather led to the stonewalling of 
Zhang by Chen Bingde, Chief of General Staff, and Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, the 
two CMC Vice Chairmen. “Who said the military doesn’t have talents? I think Comrade 
Zhang Qinsheng is a good talent,” Hu Jintao once remarked in front of Guo and Xu.253 
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This indelicate praise by Hu made others above Zhang resent Zhang even more. Due to 
Hu’s weak control over the military, Zhang failed to be promoted into the CMC and was 
forced to retire in 2013. 
By keeping a distanced relationship with the PLA leadership and not consulting 
the military on major foreign policy decisions, Hu was less often briefed on the details of 
the PLA’s own development. This led to the military’s varying levels of influence in 
different areas, spanning both foreign policy and the military’s mandate. While having 
less direct influence in foreign policy areas, the PLA had increased autonomy in areas 
traditionally regarded as its core mandate, such as weapons development, testing and 
deployment, operational procedures, and enforcing previously established principles 
(such as the need to counter foreign military vessels’ close-in surveillance). The PLA also 
relied on more indirect channels to influence the top leadership, such as influencing 
public opinion. On several occasions, the military was found to have stalled the 
implementation of policies Hu had devised and approved. 
 
The Military Living in its Own Realm 
Since the PLA leadership had a distant relationship with Hu Jintao, the military 
attempted to strengthen its influence by taking an indirect approach, primarily by trying 
to mold public opinion, stalling the implementation of policies, and acting 
uncooperatively with other policy-making actors. 
Under Hu, the military faced growing pressure to justify its increasing budget 
from a much more outspoken society that was empowered by the Internet.254 Netizens, 
though diverse and largely unorganized, have entered the discourse in China’s 
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increasingly diverse politics and have become important voices.255 China’s political 
leaders and policy-makers have become forced to pay attention to strong opinions 
expressed by Netizens, as their opinions are sometimes “actionable” and lead to 
destabilizing protests. Hu was particularly sensitive to public opinion and Netizens, as he 
attempted to project himself as being different than Jiang by putting the Chinese public’s 
interests first. This made Hu on some occasions even more sensitive to public pressure 
for the PLA to justify its budget than the PLA itself.  
As a result of being put on the backburner, and having its armament development 
neglected in the 1980s, many younger military officers, without any deep personal bond 
with Deng Xiaoping, have become more vocal about this past injustice. In 2006, the GPD 
established a Foreign Propaganda Department ostensibly to strengthen the PLA’s voice to 
the outside world,256 though in reality its target audience was domestic.257 The military 
news release mechanism and news spokesman system debuted during the Wenchuan 
earthquake disaster in 2008. By 2009, the PLA had established a group of 2,500 
commentators who specialize in strengthening the military’s voice in Internet forums and 
chat rooms.258 
It is nearly impossible to authoritatively connect the PLA’s organized efforts to 
influence the public media with its influence on the top leader regarding particular 
policies. However, one can look at certain instances and find an indirect link between the 
PLA officers’ voices in the public domain and the decision-making of top leaders. One 
example was the rejection of the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ visit in 2010. 
In January 2010, the Obama administration announced the sale of US$6 billion worth of 
Patriot anti-missile systems, helicopters, mine-sweeping ships, and communications 
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equipment to Taiwan. Public opinion in China strongly opposed these weapons sales, and 
military voices fanned these flames, intensifying such feelings.259 Rear Admiral Yang Yi, 
who had just stepped down from his position as Director of the Institute for Strategic 
Studies at China’s National Defense University, advocated “sanctioning American 
companies which benefit from the arms sales to Taiwan” and stated “it is time to 
discipline the Americans.”260 Dai Xu, a star military commentator, though often 
dismissed by mainstream PLA officers, also commented that the government should 
“support Netizens’ calls for sanctioning” American companies.261  
In actuality, the 2010 arms sales “constituted the second part of a package that 
was already announced at the end of the Bush administration.”262 Therefore, China had 
already punished the U.S. with various sanctions, including cutting off military-to-
military ties with the U.S. in 2001, when the announcement was first made. The GSD 
Foreign Affairs Office clearly understood that by punishing the U.S. for the 2010 arms 
sales to Taiwan, China would be punishing the same act twice.263 The MFA also 
understood this point, and therefore when the U.S. State Department inquired about 
Secretary Gates’ planned visit that year, the MFA insisted that everything would proceed 
as normal. That was also the MFA’s logic when it wrote President Hu’s talking points for 
the second round of the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) held in 
May 2010, in which the MFA briefed Hu that if U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
asked about Secretary Gates’ upcoming visit, Hu should agree to it. During the S&ED, 
Secretary Clinton did inquire about the visit and Hu did not respond. The MFA at this 
point understood Hu’s thinking and never extended the invitation to Secretary Gates, 
surprising the U.S. State Department.264  
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Not all public commentary provided by active-duty and retired military officers in 
the media has the PLA’s blessing. “Most of those military commentators, who frequently 
appear on public media, cater to public opinion and do not play a role in the decision-
making of the PLA,” according to an official from the GSD’s Foreign Liaison Office.265 
This comment may be too dismissive toward the influence of military voices in the public 
domain. Nonetheless, there is some truth to this assessment: those military officers who 
provide commentary in China’s public domain often do not represent mainstream 
military thinking. Moreover, military officers, once retired, do not have a seat at the table 
during the decision-making process and are rarely granted a chance to weigh in on 
policies internally. The dilemma is that the media likes role-playing – military officers 
are supposed to take a tough position on policies. According to a retired PLA officer, “If 
you speak with a gentle tone on policies, you will be soon forgotten by the public. Instead, 
if you speak toughly, you will be more easily remembered and applauded in the public 
media.”266 The influence of active-duty and retired PLA officers’ opinions voiced 
publicly is hard to quantify. However, it certainly mounted to a level that Hu personally 
reprimanded and sent warnings to several outspoken officers in 2012-13, instructing them 
not to speak publicly as this might hijack the government’s policy.267 
As Hu significantly reduced the military’s ability to directly advise him on 
policies and decreased the military’s representation on policy-making bodies, some 
military officers quietly complained about Hu’s insufficient consultation with the PLA. 
As a result, senior active-duty officers occasionally made comments that contradicted the 
government’s existing policy and caused foreign countries to worry. Two examples 
illustrate this pattern: General Xiong Guangkai’s public statements in 2007 on China’s 
 294 
Taiwan policy; and the PLA’s disagreement with the government on the threat presented 
by the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea in 2010.  
General Xiong Guangkai, who had retired from his position as Deputy Chief of 
General Staff but remained active by holding the Chairmanship of the China Association 
of International Strategy, made a comment on China’s Taiwan policy in 2007 that strayed 
from the government’s officially publicized policy. Xiong emphasized “the mainland has 
not given up the method of use of force” on Taiwan and “if Taiwan shows any sign of 
attempting to become independent, the Mainland has to use non-peaceful means to solve 
the problem” (emphasis author’s own).268 China’s bottom line as explained by Xiong was 
inconsistent with the ASL. According to Article Eight of the ASL, “in the event that the 
‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to 
cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” (emphasis author’s own) China will 
employ “non-peaceful means…to protect China’s (its) sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.”269 
Such inconsistency in public statements on policies was demonstrated again in 
2009-10, when disagreements on how to respond to U.S. military exercises in the Yellow 
Sea arose between the civilian foreign affairs system and the PLA. The positioning in 
official statements might be unnoticeable to casual observers, but the underlying civil-
military contradictions on this issue were clear. China’s civilian foreign affairs system 
used much calmer words, while the PLA took an unambiguously hardline and indignant 
stance toward the U.S. exercises. Dai Bingguo, State Councilor on foreign affairs, first in 
meetings in July 2009 and then in an article he published in 2010 entitled “Adhering to 
the Path of Peaceful Development,” clarified China’s three core interests: “China’s form 
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of government, political system and political stability; China’s sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and national unity; and basic guarantee for China’s sustainable economic and 
social development.”270 Dai emphasized, “the Taiwan question constitutes China’s core 
interest concerning its unification and territorial integrity” but omitted China’s interest in 
the Yellow Sea in his recitation of China’s core interests.271 This deliberate omission 
would later speak volumes during China’s strong reaction to the U.S. holding joint 
military exercises with South Korea in July 2010, which greatly antagonized the PLA.  
Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of General Staff, stated that China “very much 
opposed” such exercises. PLA officers’ unconstrained criticisms and protests in Chinese 
media were much louder and unequivocal than those of Ma.272 However, throughout the 
PLA’s harsh reaction toward the U.S.-South Korea joint exercises, the MFA never 
clarified specifically whether the Yellow Sea is one of China’s core interests.273 Although 
there were disagreements even within the PLA on the Yellow Sea question,274 the PLA in 
general agreed on lodging such strong protests against the U.S.-led exercises because of 
an internal consensus that the U.S. conclusion on the Cheonan Incident275 was 
questionable and therefore could not be used as the basis for the U.S.-South Korea 
military exercises.276 
Both General Xiong’s comments regarding China’s Taiwan policy and General 
Ma’s comment regarding the Yellow Sea influenced Chinese public opinion and created 
confusion about China’s foreign policy. On the one hand, such comments indicate a 
wider range of opinions inside the PLA, and that probably every policy position 
crystallizes as a result of internal debates and disagreements. On the other hand, the PLA 
is bolder in expressing its opinions, even though such opinions often contradict the 
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MFA’s. The PLA’s commentary has caused a surge of nationalism on some critical issues, 
and has also generated public support for the PLA’s position, which in some instances 
changed the foundation for decision-making.  
A third way that the PLA can exert relative power is to stall the implementation of 
an established policy, not consult with other bureaucratic actors, or omit important 
intelligence/information in order to exclude other policy actors when seeking approval 
for certain actions. For instance, David M. Lampton has quoted a senior member of the 
civilian foreign affairs system as remarking that during the EP-3 Incident the MFA was in 
the dark and had to get its information from the PLA. This put Hu Jintao, then Vice 
President and Jiang’s designated successor, and Vice Premier Qian Qichen in “difficult 
positions” and led to “mistakes.”277 
The failure to launch U.S.-China nuclear talks, despite Hu Jintao’s agreement 
with President Bush in 2006 to do so, was one example of the PLA’s stalling behavior. 
During Hu Jintao’s visit to the U.S. in April 2006, President Bush proposed nuclear talks 
between the two countries. In June, Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman 
discussed inviting Jing Zhiyuan, the Commander of the PLA Second Artillery Force, to 
the U.S., and in October General James Cartwright, Commander of the U.S. Strategic 
Forces, sent a formal invitation to General Jing to visit the U.S. Strategic Command 
headquarters. Despite Hu’s prior agreement to such nuclear talks, the PLA declined to set 
a date for a dialogue on nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine.278 Instead, General Jing 
went on an extensive trip of Latin America.279 Commander Jing failed to meet Hu’s 
commitment for a variety of reasons, but what is notable is that he got away with it 
without suffering any repercussions from Hu. 280    
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The 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test was an example of the PLA’s holding-back or 
omitting intelligence/information critical to decision-making under Hu. On January 11 
2007, the PLA used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its aging satellites 
orbiting in space.281 The GAD oversees China’s military space program,282 and as such it 
conducted a debris assessment before and after the test but chose not to report the results 
to the CMC or Hu.283 As the damage assessment prior to the ASAT test was unfavorable 
and could call into question the decision to conduct such a test or invite new policy actors 
into the decision-making process,284 officers who oversaw this task force withheld this 
assessment and it never reached Hu’s desk.285 China’s twelve-day silence immediately 
after the test caused extensive speculation about civil-military friction in China. The fact 
that Chen Bingde, who was then the Chief of the GAD (2005-September 2007), was not 
punished but was in fact promoted to Chief of General Staff (2007-13), is a telling 
example of such behavior going unpunished under Hu and how the PLA was able to 
increase its relative power by creating facts on the ground. 
The J-20 Incident has often been raised as another example of the PLA creating 
facts on the ground, though a closer look leads one to conclude that other actors, in this 
case a defense contractor, are also able to skillfully maneuver the PLA’s sheer strength to 
create facts on the ground. During U.S. Secretary of Defense Bob Gates’ visit to China in 
2011, China conducted a test flight of the J-20, China’s fifth-generation stealth fighter, 
just hours before Hu Jintao was to meet with Gates. Hu and other non-military officials 
were evidently unaware of this test flight when Gates directly raised a question about it 
during their meeting. Hu and his aides, most likely, approved the J-20 test flight but did 
not connect the dots.286 If one looks closely at this incident, two conclusions can be 
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drawn. First, weapon testing follows an approval procedure independent of that of 
military diplomacy. The date of the J-20 flight test was set before Secretary Gates’ visit, 
which was taken to mend frayed Sino-U.S. relations. The PLA did not intend to 
deliberately insult Gates.287 Second, the incident was created when, more likely, China’s 
defense industry, more specifically the Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute (Institute 611), 
publicized the test photos at a sensitive moment to create a sensational impact and secure 
its project. Chinese bloggers publicized news of the test flights, as well as photos that 
were probably shot by test flight technicians.288  
Given how quickly the J-20 test flights were publicized, it is reasonable to 
conclude that this was a planned roll-out by the developer of this stealth fighter, Institute 
611.289 Institute 611 won this highly prestigious project in a competitive bidding 
process.290 Institute 611’s motivation may have resulted from the decision of its main 
competitor, Institute 601, with a longer history in designing fighter jets, to continue 
developing a rival to the J-20 with its own funding after failing to secure the contract 
from the PLA. Institute 611, perhaps feeling insecure, may have been motivated to 
enhance its reputation by leaking the photos of the J-20 test flight in order to firm up the 
PLA’s order of J-20s.291 As China’s defense industry is no longer affiliated with the PLA 
in a strict sense, the J-20 Incident was, at best, an example of non-PLA actors creating 
facts on the ground to sway the PLA’s procurement decisions.292 
Under Hu, the PLA became much more insulated and uncooperative in its 
relationship with the MFA, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Suffice it to say 
that Hu’s weak control of the military exacerbated this tendency. As the PLA leadership 
had scarce opportunities to access Hu, Hu had little chance to directly address these inter-
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agency coordination issues. Therefore, many PLA officers in the internal decision-
making chain did their best to avoid having to consult with the MFA. As one senior 
PLAN officer stated, “If I ask for the MFA’s opinion and they say no to a certain action, I 
would have to consider their opinion and pay the price if I decide to carry on, especially 
if something goes wrong. Therefore, I’d better not ask what they think if I want to go 
ahead with some action.”293  
As a political leader with weak control over the military, Hu did not trust the PLA 
and tried to shrink the space in policy-making where the military leadership could exert 
influence, as those military officers who would voice their opinion during the policy-
making process would have been those who evidently failed to swear allegiance to Hu. 
By doing so, Hu became distanced from the PLA leadership. With its influence weakened, 
the PLA leadership tried other ways to influence foreign and security policies, by 
inserting its voice to influence public opinion, articulating its opinion even when it 
contradicted Hu’s policies, stalling in the implementation of policies Hu advocated, and 
shunning the MFA and moving alone on certain actions. In the end, this indirect approach 
did not allow the PLA to fundamentally influence or change any of the major policies 
during Hu’s era. Rather, the PLA created a countervailing force that made it more 
difficult for Hu to implement his policies. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the dynamics of Party-military relations and the military’s 
influence during the decision-making process. The PLA’s unique importance to the Party 
in the long history of the Party-military relationship created the organic separation 
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between the PLA and the government, one of the root causes of the unequal positions of 
the PLA and MFA and the inherent civilian-military divide on foreign and security 
policies.  
This chapter introduced two concepts in order to understand what impacts the 
PLA’s influence in policies through the Party-military framework: Political Reliance and 
Effective Control. Without the top Party leader’s political reliance on the PLA, the 
leader’s effective control over the military would translate to the PLA having a very 
minimal influence on politics and policies. However, if the top Party leader needs the 
PLA’s support (existence of political reliance) and intends to strengthen his effective 
control, he would be forced to allow the PLA to have more influence on policies. The top 
Party leader would be incentivized to plant PLA officers he trusts into the policy-making 
process in order to augment his overall control over policies. Whether these officers, 
empowered with access and influence, would help the top leader seize and consolidate 
control over the PLA would depend on their own strength and the strength of their 
opposition in the military. On the other hand, the top Party leader would have to share 
power with the PLA in order to garner and sustain its support.  
Deng’s period forms a strong contrast with the post-Deng era in terms of the Party 
leader’s political reliance on the military. The PLA, distracted and broken after decades 
of political campaigns, cruel infighting, and the 913 Incident, needed Deng to hold it 
together and direct it onto the path of fundamental reform. Deng was relentless in 
pushing the military back to the barracks and suppressing the PLA’s parochial interests 
such as an increased budget and heightened political representation. Deng also appointed 
non-military officials to run the military, who acted as a natural blockade against 
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resistance and the institutional interests of the PLA. Under Deng, the PLA’s autonomy 
and influence in policy-making were suppressed to a very low level, except on the 
Taiwan issue, which had been a part of the PLA’s domain and under its purview since 
1949. While a strongly motivated PLA officer advocated for the 1988 Naval Clash with 
Vietnam, it was initiated by the civilian leader whom Deng trusted and claimed to have 
transferred power to.  
After the end of Deng’s era, the Party leader in general had difficulty establishing 
effective control over the military. Obstacles came not only from the lack of natural 
understanding between political and military leaders, due to a lack of shared past and 
expertise, but also from the PLA’s deepening professionalization, which has made the 
military further set in its own ways. However, the top leader’s biggest obstacle in 
establishing effective control over the military was previous CMC chairmen’s lingering 
influence and continued political interference. As a result, the top leader’s control over 
the military, if ever established, is personalized despite the increasing institutionalization 
and collectiveness – consensus-building characteristics – of China’s top political 
leadership.  
Whether the Party’s top leader can effectively control the PLA significantly 
impacts his trust and confidence in the military. Without effective control over the 
military, the top leader would be incentivized to confine and shrink the military’s role in 
China’s political process, including its policy-making process. The degree to which the 
top leader exercises effective control is decisive in determining the PLA’s overall access 
to the top leader and the extent of the PLA’s influence in policy areas. This does not 
suggest that the PLA leadership is always driven to voice its preference, rather it only 
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means that the effective control the top leader exerts, and therefore the trust he builds in 
the PLA, determines the PLA’s access to the top leader, which is the only vehicle by 
which the PLA has the opportunity to voice its opinions directly to the top leader.  
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144 This list included senior officers such as He Qizong, Zong Shunliu, Zhou Wenyuan, Li Jijun and Liu 
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promoted in 1994 retired by July 1995. General Zhang Wannian, who was both close to General Zhang 
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in seniority. Chi Haotian was the Chief of General Staff (1987-92), ahead of Zhang Wannian. (1992-95). 
Chi became a full general in 1988 and Zhang became a full general in 1993. Chi was close to Deng 
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Carry Forward the Theme of the Time”, PLA Daily, March 5, 1996. According to a PLA officer, “Stressing 
political awareness was to stress the importance of following Chairman Jiang and safeguarding Jiang’s 
authority. In the military, when we did the study sessions, a point was repeatedly clarified that the military 
has to obey the Party and Chairman Jiang and that Jiang embodied the Party.” Interview with a senior 
active-duty PLA officer, August of 2014. 
149 The two-track management of PLA officers was put in place through the “one decision and four 
regulations,” Jiang ordered the CMC and three General Departments to publicize and implement. The 
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153 Dai Xu, a former PLA Air Force officer, disagreed on this view that Jiang helped improve the military’s 
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156 Kuhn, The Man Who Changed China, pp. 245-6. 
157 According to Jiang’s talk in a meeting on the Gulf War in June 1991, Jiang pointed out that China 
“needs ‘Assassin’s Mason’ in armament” development and that “possessing top-notch (hi-tech) weaponry 
as ‘Assassin’s Mason’”, “a few projects that was (militarily) determinant and meaningful” is of strategic 
significance to China’s national security and economic development”. Jiang Zemin Writings, vol 1 pp. 142 
and 146. 
158 Jiang had given repeated instructions on the development of “Assassin’s Mace” since 1991. In the CMC 
meeting on the study of the 1991 Gulf War, Jiang warned that China’s gap with the West in terms of 
electronic technology was not narrowing but enlarging. On 3 December 1992, Jiang wrote a letter to 
Admiral Liu Huaqing and General Zhang Zhen emphasized the importance of developing “Assassin’s 
Mace”, attached with a summary of Deng’s talk on 28 November, in which Deng emphasized the 
importance of armament development. See Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing's Memoir, pp. 608-09, 666. 
159 Wang Congbiao, “Implement The Strategy of Strengthening the Military with High Technology; 
Improve the PLA’s Modern Defense War-fighting Capability”, PLA Daily, February 13, 2001, 
202.84.17.73/mil/htm/20010213/358908.htm. 
160 Jiang’s efforts of divesting the PLA from the market place in 1998 was started with the cutting the tax 
privileges of PLA-run enterprises. The PLA-run enterprises had enjoyed a low tax rate of 9.9% till early 
1998 while non-military enterprises face an income tax of 33%. Then, anti-smuggling topped the list of 
economic work of the nation as the PLA was heavily involved in smuggling activities. Jing announced in 
July 1998 in the PLA’s anti-smuggling meeting to divest the PLA from the market place. Jiang said: “the 
military holds the gun barrels. If the military…participates in smuggling or escorts smuggling, the 
government will face a tough challenge. You have guns and cannons and holds the banner of the military, 
who dares to stop you? ” See Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, vol. 2. This article could also be found in the 
website of People’s Daily at: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64185/180138/10818639.html. 
161 Xiong Guangkai became the director of the 2nd Department (intelligence) of GSD in 1988. He became 
Assistant Chief of General Staff in 1992 and Deputy Chief of General Staff in 1996. After overstaying in 
his post for one year, Xiong retired in 2006. 
162 General Chi Haotian, whom many suspected put loyalty in Deng and Deng’s family, was added as 
Zhang Wannian joined the Politburo. In comparison, General Zhang Zhen, the previous CMC Vice 
Chairman, never became member of Politburo, though Liu Huaqing was the member of the PBSC. 
163 Hong Xiaohu, “China’s new mechanism of national security decision-making”, China Strategy, Issue 1, 
January 2004. 
164 According to an unconfirmed source, Xiong was already member of TALSG in 1993. 
165 Interview with a retired senior PLA officer, 2010. 
166 Interview with a senior PLA officer, 2013 and 2014. 
167 Four political officers were Yu Yongbo, Xu Caihou, Wang Ruilin and Chi Haotian. The other members 
of the CMC in 1999 were Zhang Wannian, Fu Quanyou, Wang Ke, Cao Gangchuan and Guo Boxiong. 
168 Multiple interviewees who were active-duty and retired PLA officers confirmed the widely publicized 
rumor that Guo Boxiong earned the trust from Jiang by standing outside Jiang’s room as a guard when 
Jiang was napping inside. This incident took place when Jiang was touring the Lanzhou Military Region 
and Guo was still chief of the 47st army corps.  
169 A senior PLA officer indicated that Yu Yongbo held a conservative and suspicious attitude towards the 
mil-to-mil relationship between China and the US after he received “humiliating” and “downgrading” 
receptions from the US side. Yu, then chief of PLA GPD and a close associate with Jiang, had no 
counterpart in the US military. Therefore, the US side arranged chaplain corps of the US Army, Navy and 
Air Force hosting and briefing Yu during his 2000 visit to the US. The powerful PLA leaders, when 
visiting the US, were always accompanied by a group rising stars or second-tier officers with great 
potential to elevate to the military leadership. The accompanying senior officers of Yu’s trip included Ma 
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Xiaotian, who later became the PLA’s Deputy Chief of General Staff and then Commander of the PLAAF. 
Ma was taken to visit the canteens of the US military. Neither Yu nor Ma has ever recovered from this 
experience and then held a particularly hard-lined position against real communication and cooperation 
with the US military. See reference 56. Therefore, Yu Yongbo was unlikely to intervene directly in the 
deliberation of the military position on issues involving the US simply because of his personal “bias” 
against the US. However, as a ranking member of the CMC, Yu must have attended the regular working 
meetings of the CMC and could lament on policies personally. More importantly, Yu could exert a great 
influence in the military’s propaganda and political work as chief of GPD. 
170 Interview with a senior civilian official with access to Politburo meetings. 
171 The other influential general was Xiong Guangkai. However, Zhang far outranked Xiong and therefore 
his words carried more authority and weight among professional soldiers in the PLA. Xiong, only holding 
the position of Deputy Chief of General Staff, was important because he maintained a very close 
relationship with Jiang and also because Xiong was the gatekeeper to Jiang on military intelligence . 
Zhang’s opinions may reflect more of voices of professionally-oriented PLA officers and the PLA’s 
institutional interests while Xiong aligned himself personally closer to Jiang. 
172 Interview with a retired PLA officer, Guangzhou, 2011.  
173 Zhang Wannian, Zhang Wannian's Biography, p. 267. 
174 Zhang Wannian, Zhang Wannian's Biography, pp. 259-68. 
175 Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing's Memoir, p. 579. 
176 The top leader is “in charge of general policy” as Jiang Zemin explained to David M. Lampton, “but not 
in charge of actual deployments.” Lampton also believed the lack of “anemic horizontal, cross-system 
intergrating structures” contributed the difficulty to the civilians’ monitoring of military behavior. See 
David M. Lampton, Following the Leader, pp. 185-9. 
177 General Xiong was one of very few officers from the list of people slated for promotion to survive the 
political fallout from the demise of the Yang brothers. Because of his close tie with Jiang, he managed to 
postpone his mandated retirement for more than one year, a rare exception to a hard and fast rule in the 
PLA. 
178 Xiong Guangkai became director of military intelligence in 1988. He was promoted to be Assistant 
Chief of General Staff overseeing military intelligence in 1992 and then Deputy Chief of General Staff in 
1996. 
179 Jiang expanded Ministry of State Security early in his tenure and placed it under his right-hand man 
Zhou Yongkang, whose wife is the cousin of Jiang’s wife. On foreign intelligence, Jiang was anxious about 
lack of full access. Chen Xiaogong, a senior military intelligence official at the Second Department of PLA 
GSD, offended Jiang in late 1990s by blocking the communication of a piece of untranslated English-
language raw intelligence to Jiang. Chen did not do it on purpose but worried that Jiang could not read 
English and would blame the Second Department for not doing the job right. Yang Hui, then a much more 
junior intelligence officer, reported it to Jiang. Jiang was furious about it and instructed to send Chen 
Xiaogong on missions that prevented him from serving in Beijing. Chen was assigned to overseas positions 
after that incident in 1999 and came back to Beijing in 2005, after Jiang retired as the CMC Chairman. 
Interview with a retired senior PLA officer, Beijing, summer of 2013. 
180 According to Bonnie Glaser, who wrote extensively about the PLA’s role in China’s foreign and 
security policies and national security crisis management based on her numerous interviews with highly-
placed PLA officers.  
181 General Xiong was able to influence Jiang, but it was another matter whether his advice was well-
informed and well-grounded. Xiong was manipulative, intrusive, and ruthless in taking out rivals. Xiong 
frequently bypassed senior-ranking officers by directly calling junior-level officers to get answers and give 
instructions, which led to animosity between him and some of his subordinates. Many believed that Xiong 
could have better served China’s leaders if he had held to the truth more, and was less sycophantic and 
more professional. Some, especially younger and junior officers in the PLA foreign affairs system who 
were not Xiong’s direct subordinates, were impressed by Xiong’s influence both as a military 
intelligence/foreign affairs officer within the PLA system and his influence over Jiang. Interviews with 
multiple PLA officers, 2011-2014. 
182 During a NATO bombing campaign, the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was hit by five laser-guided 
bombs dropped by U.S. planes on May 7, 1999. Three Embassy employees were killed and 27 were 
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wounded in this attack. See In "Oral Presentation to the Chinese Government Regarding the Accidental 
Bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade," June 17, 1999. 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/1999_eap_speeches.html. 
183 Bonnie Glaser pointed out that not all members of the Politburo Standing Committee attended. Officials 
from MFA and MSS also attended this meeting. Gen. Chi Haotian and Gen. Xiong Guangkai both attended 
the meeting. Chas Freeman believed that Gen. Xiong made the briefing at the meeting as Xiong talked to 
him afterwards and mentioned this occurrence of this briefing he made at the PBSC. 
184 Chas Freeman, then the assistant defense secretary, met with Xiong in Beijing to explain in private that 
the bombing indeed was a mistake but learned that Xiong had just briefed the PBSC. Interview with Chas 
Freeman, Washington DC, spring of 2014. Bonnie Glaser also confirmed it by citing a separate reliable 
source of the PLA. In order to answer the most central question “whether President Clinton had ordered the 
attack”, Bonnie Glaser explained that the PLA GSD “examined five possibilities: 1) President Clinton gave 
the order to bomb the Chinese embassy; 2) General Clark, the head of the NATO forces in Europe, issued 
the order; 3) A lower-level commander gave the order; 4) The incident was caused by a technical mistake; 
and 5) An individual who had a role in selecting the targets and was anti-China was responsible for the 
bombing.” Without sufficient information to make a definite assessment, the PLA GSD decided to rule out 
the first possibility and Xiong supported this conclusion, according to Bonnie Glaser.  
185 Interview with Bonnie Glaser, Washington DC, fall of 2013. 
186 Zhang Wannian, Zhang Wannian's Biography, pp. 416-17. 
187 This was confirmed in an interview with a retired senior PLA officer, Beijing, summer of 2012. None of 
the interviewees gave further specifics about the “military option”, though that was the exact wording they 
used.  
188 Interview with several PLA officers, 2012-14. 
189 Interview with Ambassador Chas Freeman, Washington DC, 2014.  
190 Ibid. Ambassador Freeman met General Xiong in 1999. Xiong probably recognized that Freeman’s 
explanation of the NATO bombing was accurate, but he expressed that he had nowhere to go on this 
question as he had already briefed the PBSC on the PLA’s assessment that the bombing was deliberate. 
191 A talk given by a senior PLA officer, Beijing, 2010. This officer made that comment in a general 
context without referring to any specific policy mistake or any policy-maker. He pointed out two other 
interest groups in Chinese politics are some State-owned enterprises and local governments. 
192 This came as reflections through interviews the author conducted with officials of MFA, Ministry of 
Public Security and several senior and junior PLA officers. Once the official conclusion was made and 
transmitted to different levels of governments, unless there was an official correction, this became an 
“official memory” of bureaucracies, despite the controversies and uncertainties during the deliberations and 
even after more credible information came in afterwards. 
193 This conclusion was based on extensive interview with multiple PLA officers, as well as western 
security experts including Chas Freeman, Richard Bush, and You Ji between 2011 and 2014. Chas Freeman 
also acknowledged that this 10-year count-down plan existed. You Ji wrote on this point as early as 2006. 
See You Ji (2006), “China's Anti-Secession Law and the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait,” Contemporary 
Security Policy, 27 (2), pp. 237–57. 
194 The interviews the author conducted showed different allegations on this point. One senior PLA officer 
pointed out that it was a five-year count-down plan starting from 1999. The other interviewee, a high-level 
retired American contact who had intensive contacts with the PLA in mid to late-1990s indicated that it was 
a 10-year countdown plan. Interviews with other PLA officers showed a countdown plan existed, which led 
to exponential increase of funds invested in armaments research and development. But these contacts did 
not give specifics on what time frame this countdown plan existed. 
195 Interview with a PLA officer directly involved in Sino-US mil-to-mil relations, Beijing, 2011. 
196 As one active-duty PLA officer interviewed by the author stated, “The trust Xiong had gained [from 
Jiang] made him stand in the best position to influence Jiang in foreign and security policies. Xiong did not 
use his great influence to the right end. The worst and most loathed quality of a PLA senior officer is not 
telling the truth. That was what Xiong did.” Interview with an active-duty PLA officer, January 2013. 
197 Interview with a PLA officer directly involved in Sino-US mil-to-mil relations, Beijing, 2011. 
198 After Xiong’s retirement, many in the GSD tried to erase his legacy. Yang Hui, Xiong’s protégé, 
remained one of the chiefs overseeing military intelligence until 2011. Yang Hui was then transferred to the 
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Nanjing Military Region. However, like Xiong, Yang maintained some control over the intelligence 
apparatus in the Second Department through his former subordinates, which in part aimed at sustaining 
Jiang Zemin’s influence. The Chief of the General Staff later intervened to terminate this practice. 
Interview with a senior PLA officer, 2014. 
199 “Xiong has no influence now. Neither does he have a legacy here,” an officer from GSD Foreign Affairs 
Office claimed in 2012. Xiong’s influence in military intelligence, extended through his protégé Yang Hui, 
was further cleansed in 2013 and 2014 under Xi. Interviews, 2013 and 2014. 
200 See David M. Lampton, Following the Leader, pp. 185-9. 
201 Deng handed the title of CMC Chairman to Jiang in 1989 while the session of the incumbent 
government headed by Secretary General Zhao Ziyang, Deng’s designated successor, should have lasted 
for five years (1987-92). However, the Tian’anmen Incident intensified the conflict between Zhao and 
Deng, resulting in Zhao’s downfall and house arrest for all his life. Jiang took over the seats of CCP 
Secretary General from the disgraced Zhao and then CMC Chairman from Deng in 1989. Jiang started his 
first term for five years in 1992 and then the second term in 1997. In 2002, Jiang handed to Hu all the titles 
except the CMC Chairman, citing the precedent and thus “the informal rule” Deng created when Deng kept 
the CMC Chairman for another two years (1987-89) after relieving himself of any Party and State position 
in 1987.  
202 The problem of “two centers”, as described by Lampton, to mean that “it may be unclear at times where 
(or who) the authoritative party center is”. See David M. Lampton, Following the Leader, pp. 172-4. 
203 Lu Keng (1919—2008), a prominent journalist in Hong Kong whose interview with Hu Yaobang in 
1985 angered Deng Xiaoping and directly led to Hu Yaobang’s downfall, made one of the earliest 
predictions that Jiang would not give up the CMC chairmanship, by following Deng’s practice. See Lu 
Qiang, "How the 4th Generation of the CCP Completes the Succession," lianhe zaobao, October 26, 2000, 
http://www.renminbao.com/rmb/articles/2000/10/26/5080.html. In an article published by China’s official 
media, the phrase of “guiding the new leadership for a stretch of road who just got on the horse” (qi shang 
ma, song yi cheng) was publicly used. See Li Nan, "Jiang Zemin's Three Characters Last for 15 Years," 
shidai renwu zhoubao, 09/27/2004,http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-09-27/15554438572.shtml. 
204 Jiang Zemin was directly quoted by Professor David Lampton during his meeting with an American 
delegation including Lampton in 22 November 2002 in Beijing. See David M. Lampton, Following the 
Leader, pp. 173-4. 
205 “Jiang Zemin Attended the 50th Anniversary of the establishment of the PLA NDUT and Announced the 
Personnel Cuts of 200,000 In Two Years,” Xinhua News Agency, September1, 2003, 
http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2003-09-01/146796.html.  
206 In April 2003, a diesel-powered, Ming-class submarine Number 361 had a “mechanical malfunction” 
during an exercise in the waters of the Yellow Sea, killing all 70 crew members. See “PLA Navy’s 
Submarine 361 Sinking Accident Drove China to Enter Martime Century,”May15/2003, zhongguo xinwen 
zhoukan, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-05-15/14101062948.shtml. 
207 “70 Died in the PLA Submarine Incident, Jiang Zemin Sent His Condolesence,” Xinhua News 
Agency,May 2,  2003, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2003-05/02/content_856682.htm; “Jiang Zemin, Hu 
Jintao Met with Relatives of the Victims of the 361 Submarine Sinking Accident,” Chinese Central TV, 
May 6, 2003, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-05-05/21321030987.shtml. Generally, in 2003-2004, Jiang 
consistently ranked ahead of Hu in 2003-2004 in all PLA-related activities including the meeting with PLA 
representatives at NPC while Hu ranked ahead of Jiang in all non-military activities including the 
celebration of China’s nuclear industry’s progress. In the webpage People’s Daily collected on Jiang 
Zemin’s activities in 2003 and 2004 (http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/2140/), in 8 of 15 
activities both Jiang and Hu both attended, Jiang was ranked ahead of Hu while Hu ranked ahead of Jiang 
in the rest of 7 activities. For example, “Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin Attended the Exhibition of the 50th 
Anniversary of China’s Nuclear Industry,” People’s Daily, August 30/2004, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/2752741.html; “Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao Meeting PLA 
Representatives Group at NPC,” People’s Daily, March 12, 2004.   
208 Jia Xiping, “Cao Gangchuan Had a Land-to-space Talk to Astronaut Yang Liwei,” October 15, 2003, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/keji/1056/2135751.html. 
209 Jia had been director of the CMC Chairman Office and deputy director of the CMC Office since 1994. 
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210 Jiang promoted 79 full generals, compared to 17 promoted by Deng and 45 by Hu (2004-2012). All the 
active-duty full generals (top military rank) and all military region level (top administrative rank of the 
PLA) by 2004, and arguably most of lieutenant generals and senior officers of deputy military region level 
were promoted on Jiang’s watch. In the first CMC team Hu chaired  throughout 2007-2012, four (Liang 
Guanglie, Chen Bingde, Li Jinai and Liao Xilong) out of eight CMC members as well as both Vice 
Chairmen were promoted to full generals by Jiang. The other four CMC members were all promoted to 
Lieutenant Generals under Jiang’s watch, Chang Wanquan in 2003, Wu Shengli in 2003, Jing Zhiyuan in 
2000 and Xu Qiliang in 1996. Arguably, Chang Wanquan and Wu Shengli, promoted at the end of Jiang’s 
tenure, may be closer to Hu, compared to Jing Zhiyuan. Xu Qiliang, who was promoted to lieutenant 
general in 1996 and took a long time to be promoted to a full general, probably proved his distance with 
Jiang. 
211 General requirements for full general promotions include: becoming an officer at the level of Military 
Region Principal for 1-2 years; becoming a lieutenant general for more than four years.  
212 Commanders of the two military regions untouched in 2007 were General Chang Wanquan (Shenyang 
MR) and General Fan Changlong (Jinan MR). They were generally regarded generally politically neutral 
and may be relatively closer to Hu. Both were admitted into the CMC after 2012. 
213 Beijing Military Region or Beijing Garrison shoulders the task of protecting the safety and stability of 
Beijing including the top leadership in the capital. Occasionally, the extremely high-value political 
prisoners are placed in the Beijing Garrison temporarily to ensure their safety. 
214 It is an unprecedented move to promote Fang, a former commander of Beijing Garrison, to be Chief of 
General Staff. The reason is that part of the mandate of Beijing Garrison to protect the security and stability 
of Beijing, including the CMC. Commander of Beijing Garrison always stands in an impossible position. 
The top political leader and the military leadership rely on him doing the job right for their safeties, 
therefore his position is extremely important. On the other hand, it is also an extremely sensitive position 
that easily invites suspicion because Commander of Beijing Garrison has more opportunities to launch a 
coup and because if he chooses not to fulfill his responsibility, the CMC could be wiped out. It is also a 
long-held belief both among PLA officers and Chinese politicians that one may easily cultivate his own 
power base in the area he commands. Examples could be found in Gao Gang, who was nicknamed as King 
of Northeast China, who many suspected was building an independent kingdom. Chen Xitong, a former 
Beijing mayor who was convicted for corruption during Jiang’s era, was another example of building his 
power in the capital so much that the top leader feels threatened. Therefore, it was a tacit but prevailing 
understanding in the PLA that the Commander of Beijing Garrison would have very little to no chance to 
become Chief of General Staff before Fang Fenghui made the history. See “BMR Commander Fang Fenhui 
Promoted to Be CGS”, Takungpao, October 25, 2012, http://www.takungpao.com/news/content/2012-
10/25/content_1290601.htm. 
215 Jia was already promoted to be lieutenant general in 2005 and transferred to GPD in 2008 while keeping 
the same rank. He was promoted to be a full general in 2011. Therefore, for Jia, the transfer from CMC GO 
to GPD did not result in personal promotion. His real power was actually reduced because as the director of 
the CMC GO, he could oversee the “nerve center” of the CMC. See “Resume of Jia Ting’an”, Database of 
Chinese Politicians, http://renwuku.news.ifeng.com/index/detail/379/jiatingan. 
216 Interview with a PLA officer, Changsha, summer of 2013. 
217 In the 1979 war with Vietnam, Li Zuocheng, then a platoon leader, persisted the war-fighting for 26 
days despite multiple injuries. His platoon killed 294 enemies and captured four as well as large amount of 
armament and war material. Li himself was awarded the title of “war hero” by the CMC. See 
“Compliments for Heros,” Political Department of Guangzhou Military Region, 1979.   
218 Interview with a retired senior officer at Chengdu Military Region, 2013. General Li Zuocheng was 
finally promoted to be Commander of Chengdu Military Region in 2014 after Xi Jinping dealt heavy 
strokes to Jiang’s supporters in the military. 
219 One example for this point is that Liu Zhenwu, the founding commander of the Hong Kong Garrison of 
the PLA and Commander of the PLA's Guangzhou Military Region, vowed allegiance for Jiang after it was 
made clear that Jiang was retiring in 2004. Liu, already over 60, was promoted by Jiang in June 2004 to be 
a full general, which prevented him from retirement. According to the PLA regulation, senior officers older 
than 60 have to retire unless receiving a promotion. In June 2007, Liu was inter-exchanged with Zhang 
Qinsheng, who was close to Hu. Liu was therefore transferred to be Deputy Chief of General Staff, with his 
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actual power taken away, while Hu ordered an investigation against Liu on charges of embezzlement, 
“supporting mistresses” and “leading a corrupted life”. Liu was forced to retire in 2009. 
220 "Major General: Xu Caihou Selling Military Positions, Monopolising Power and Isolating the CMC 
'Top Leader'", Wenweipo, March 19, 2015, http://news.wenweipo.com/2015/03/09/IN1503090051.htm. 
221 Interview with a retired PLA senior colonel, Beijing, summer of 2013. 
222 Jiang Zemin Office in Bayi building served as an information nexus for Jiang by requiring major orders 
of the CMC to be archived (bei an) in this office. “Office of the CPC Central Military Commission Jiang 
Zemin Revocated,” Sankei Shimbun, November 1,  2012. Interview with a retired senior PLA officer, 2014.  
223 Jiang’s office in the Bayi building was later renamed as “Jiang Zemin Office” instead of CMC 
Chairman Office. The two Vice Chairmen of the CMC also kept an office in the same building, which 
occupies one half of the floor each.  
224 Interview with a senior PLA officer, Beijing, 2012.  
225 Even after Yang Hui, head of the Second Department of the GSD under Jiang and Xiong’s protégé, was 
transferred to Nanjing Military Region on Xi Jinping’s order, his successor continued to brief Yang on 
military intelligence reports till Fang Fenghui, Chief of General Staff, intervened, according to an interview 
with a retired senior PLA officer in Beijing in 2013. 
226 Interview with a retired senior PLA officer, Beijing, summer of 2013. 
227 More details emerged in 2013 and 2014 about Gu Junshan’s bribery to both Xu Caihou and Guo 
Boxiong. When Xu was house (hospital) arrested in mid 2013, there was a temporary hesitation to move 
onto arrest Xu and start the investigation against Guo. Xu’s arrest was publicized because Xu’s further 
attempt to transfer funds in Hong Kong. When Xu’s arrest was publicized in 2014, the political leadership 
faced another dilemma whether Guo should be formally arrested, as a wide range of mid-level PLA officers 
criticized the inaction despite Guo took the same amount of bribery from Gu with Xu. Interviews with 
multiple senior PLA officers, 2013-2015. 
228 Interview with a senior PLA officer, Beijing, 2013. 
229 Written letters from Xi Jinping to urge the CMC to investigate Gu’s corruption amounted to a dozen. 
But none worked. Hu remained his silence in the process. Interview with senior PLA officers, 2014-2015. 
230 Gu Junshan’s corruption case was finally presented to military court in April 2014. A senior PLA officer 
commented on Hu’s indecisiveness and slow response to this case: “On Gu Junshan’s case, until Liu Yuan 
and Liao Xilong had ‘laid out the bed’ did Hu come to “lie down and sleep’.” Interview with multiple 
senior PLA officers, 2012-2015.   
231 Any contingency and militarized threat on Taiwan would automatically put the PLA right in the center 
of the policy process on Taiwan. Sustained militarized threats on Taiwan would have sustainably expanded 
the PLA’s influence in foreign and security policy-making system. 
232 Hu Jintao’s main advisors on Taiwan policy included: Liu Yandong, head of the Ministry of United 
Front, Wang Gang, Director of CCPCC General Office, Sun Yafu, Director of Research Bureau of Taiwan 
Affairs Office and Wang Zhaoguo, Vice-Chairman of standing committee of 10th National People's 
Congress. Interview with experts specialized in Taiwan affairs based in Beijing and Shanghai, 2013. Liu 
Yandong was a long-term ally of Hu Jintao, assisted by Hu Deping, son of Hu Yaobang who was Hu 
Jintao’s political mentor. See “Liu Yandong Advocated No Debates About Questions of ‘Original Sins' of 
Private Entrepreneurs and Seeking Answers with Practice," diyi caijing ribao, 12/28/2006, 
http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2006-12/28/content_7568474.htm. Wang Gang was secretary of Maj. 
Gen. Yang Side, who was long-term director of Taiwan Affairs Office in 1980s and early 1990s and held 
nine secret dialogues with Lee Teng-hui’s secret envoy. Before stepping into the position of Director of GO, 
Wang Gang spent his important part of career working under Yang Side. See Kuo Jui Hua, "A study on the 
Taiwan affairs mechanism of the CPC：“Process of Government” perspective," PhD dissertation from 
National Chengchi University, 2009, p. 77. Partial text of this dissertation could be found at 
http://dspace.lib.ntnu.edu.tw/bitstream/77345300/72560/3/n089210002803.pdf; Lin Liyun: Remembering 
the Days When the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots Was Established," tai sheng magazine, 
November13/2011. http://www.tailian.org.cn/n1080/n1125/n1060754/1061912.html. Sun Yafu mastered 
the research work of Taiwan Affairs Office and directly engaged in Taiwanese business circle and 
politicians. Wang Zhaoguo was instrumental in pushing through the Anti-Secession Law in the National 
People’s Congress. 
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233 Qian Qichen, former Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, and Jiang Zemin expressed their views via 
letters. Interviews with officials involved in Taiwan policy during Hu Jintao’s era, Beijing, 2013. 
234 Lien Chan’s landmark 2005 visit to Beijing was personally brokered by Chas Freeman. 
235 Interview with a PLA officer, Beijing, summer of 2011. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Liu Jiaquan, a mainland scholar on Taiwan affairs at the Institute of Taiwan Studies of Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, explained the meaning of the Anti-Secession Law. See, “Expert: Hu Jintao’s 
speech hits back on the four ridiculous arguments on the Anti-Secession Law”, China News Agency, 
March 5, 2005, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-03-05/10125273793s.shtml. 
239 The author’s calculation is based on the data of the IMF World Economic Outlook published on April 
2014. See knoema.com/tbocwag/gdp-by-country-1980-2013. 
240 Interview with Yan Xuetong, a professor at Tsinghua University, Beijing, summer of 2013. 
241 In the enlarged CMC meeting at the end of 2004, Hu presented his thinking on the direction of army 
building, which is a manifestation of his “scientific development” theory. New Historic Missions included: 
(1) to provide an important guarantee of strength for the CCP to consolidate its ruling position, (2) to 
provide a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of important strategic opportunity for 
national development, (3) to provide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests, and (4) 
to play an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development. Xu Guoping, 
“Hu Jintao’s important expositions on defense construction and army building in new ages”, website of 
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The last three chapters examined the PLA’s drivers (Chapter 2) and the Party-
military relationship (Chapter 3 and 4). The PLA is a military force in transition, with 
dynamics that could greatly impact the PLA’s likelihood to intervene in or refrain from 
China’s foreign and security policy-making process. The trends demonstrate that in the 
coming years the PLA will become increasingly outward-oriented, though it is still 
largely an inward-oriented military focused on China’s internal challenges. Politicization 
will continuously weaken the PLA’s efforts at professionalization and create an 
institutionalized disconnect between the PLA and the government. Professionalization, 
the dominant side of the politicization-professionalization dynamic, is a double-edged 
sword. While it elevates the principle of civilian centrality, at the same time it makes the 
PLA more budget-conscious, “no-war anxious,” (explained in Chapter 2), and possibly 
more welcoming to continuous friction and even provoking a limited war in which the 
PLA believes there is a high probability that it will prevail. Inter-service rivalry within 
the PLA is reflected more through the differences between inland-based and coastal-
oriented military regions, though the Navy and Air Force have expressed increased 
interests in more involvement in policies.  
Having examined the Party-military relationship, it is clear that the top 
leadership’s political reliance on the PLA’s support and its ability to establish effective 
control over the PLA are the basis of the PLA’s influence over policy-making. When the 
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top civilian leadership relies politically on the PLA, this provides an opening for the PLA 
to bargain for more influence. As a result, whether the top leadership can effectively 
control the PLA has a critical impact on its trust and confidence in the military, which 
impacts the extent to which the top leader gives access to the military. In other words, 
once effective control is established, the military becomes a strong power base for the 
leadership and naturally gains trust, access, and influence. When the civilian leadership is 
unable to establish effective control due to political interference, the military is treated 
not as a strong power base but rather as an impediment to the leader’s power. The 
political leadership will then try to shrink the military’s influence as much as possible. 
Therefore, once it is clear that the top leader relies on the military for political support, 
the degree of effective control is a key variable in determining the PLA’s overall access 
to the top leader and the extent of the PLA’s influence in policy areas. When the top 
leadership lacks effective control over the military, the military will indirectly resist the 
civilian leadership and hesitate to carry out the civilian leadership’s policies, such as 
stalling the implementation of a policy contrary to their desire, or choosing the route of 
inaction by refusing to cooperate or consult with other policy actors. 
The PLA’s influence on foreign and security policy-making through the lens of 
the Party-military relationship is largely constrained to policy areas in which the top 
leaders’ intervention is required. However, the top leader and his small circle of advisors 
do not weigh in on the majority of policy decisions.1 China has developed a set of 
sophisticated and inclusive foreign and security policy-making mechanisms and 
platforms that reflect the interests of “stake-holders” – government agencies and actors 
that have an interest in policies under consideration. Most decisions in foreign and 
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security affairs are reached through a process of consensus-building and bureaucratic 
bargaining. As a part of this process, the PLA interacts and jockeys for position with the 
civilian foreign affairs system. These next two chapters (Chapter 5 and 6) examine actors 
in the civilian foreign affairs system. These chapters seek to determine why those in the 
civilian foreign affairs system differ from their counterparts in the PLA with regards to 
policy positions, and how these two systems interact with each other. This chapter 
examines actors, as well as the differing cultures and bureaucratic power of the PLA and 
civilian foreign affairs system, and then explores what factors of the foreign and security 
policy-making process strengthen or weaken the PLA’s bargaining position. 
 
Actors in the Civilian Foreign Affairs System 
The State Council and the Central Foreign Affairs Office, strictly speaking, are 
both part of the foreign policy coordination mechanism and are actors that lean 
predominantly toward the civilian foreign affairs system. The civilian bureaucracies that 
participate in foreign and security policies include the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of 
Propaganda, and, on technical and functional matters, the Ministry of Transportation, 
State Oceanic Administration, United Front, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office and 
General Customs, as well as some local governments that have an interest in China’s 
relations with other countries and regions. However, for this analysis, the civilian foreign 
affairs system is composed of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the International 
Department (ID) of the CCP Central Committee (CCPCC), the Taiwan Affairs Office 
(TAO), the State Council and the Central Foreign Affairs Office (CFAO), and the second 
tier in terms of relevance to foreign policy which includes the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
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Office of the State Council and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State 
Council.2 Even though these individual organizations compete with each other for 
influence, their positions on foreign and security policies are much more similar to each 
other than to the PLA’s. Additionally, personnel rotations among these civilian 
organizations are common, whereas these civilian foreign affairs agencies and the PLA 
have almost no transfer of personnel.3  
The civilian foreign affairs system stands in contrast with military and 
paramilitary agencies, namely the PLA, Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and Ministry 
of State Security (MSS), in terms of systems (kous) and policy positions. MPS and MSS 
both belong to the political and legal affairs system and answer to the Political and Legal 
Commission. This system is separate from the PLA and has substantial manpower and a 
comparable or even bigger budget.4 These three agencies generally share common 
concerns regarding security-related policies, though with respect to many mundane issues 
they fiercely compete and fight with each other. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) remains China’s main government agency 
that oversees foreign affairs.5 As Lu Ning explains, MFA plays a leading role in the 
“tactical” aspects of policy-making through policy interpretation, policy control, and 
information provision.6 The top leadership formulates national strategic objectives, the 
guiding principles of foreign and security policy, as well as guidelines for handling 
critical “sensitive countries” or “sensitive” policy areas.7 While the top leadership 
ultimately decides China’s approach to major strategic issues, the MFA “controls” the 
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process. It is tasked with researching and analyzing major foreign affairs issues, 
providing advice and policy recommendations, and implementing the leadership’s 
decisions and policies. The MFA plays a “pivotal role” in China’s foreign and security 
policy-making process by being the first responder to any incident with international 
ramifications, taking the lead role in inter-agency consultation and coordination, writing 
the initial memo on issues in question (though narration written by the MFA has to 
include opinions of other stakeholders) and briefing the top leaders before their meetings 
with foreign officials or their public appearances on the international stage. 
 
MFA’s Professionalization 
The civilian foreign affairs system, as represented by the Foreign Minister or 
Deputy Premier or State Councilor overseeing foreign affairs, used to be headed by 
powerful heads, such as Zhou Enlai and Marshal Chen Yi in Mao’s era. The power of 
these strong heads, on one hand, is expressed through personalistic, tighter control over 
the MFA, and on the other hand, helps enhance the MFA’s authority of coordination and 
implementation as a bureaucracy. The civilian foreign affairs system in turn enjoys more 
authority in its interactions with strong policy actors such as the PLA.  
The first generation of Foreign Ministers – Premier Zhou Enlai and Marshal Chen 
Yi – bound the MFA to the military, as their own identities and positions were dualistic. 
Foreign Ministers during the 1970s, who were old comrades of Mao and Deng and 
seasoned revolutionary soldiers themselves, enjoyed prestige and influence because of 
their political standing in the Party. The MFA, under Huang Hua (1976-82) and Wu 
Xueqian (1982-88), enjoyed substantial influence in China’s foreign policy-making and 
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was a major player in policy coordination.8 During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
military, which was tarnished by Lin Biao’s death and was derisively called “the military 
faction” due to its controversial role throughout the Cultural Revolution, had a 
disadvantageous position in Chinese politics. Due to the way the Cultural Revolution 
tarnished the PLA’s image, the military’s leaders were (and) are wary of intervening in 
politics.9 However, civilian leaders discounted such sentiments due to the military 
leadership’s apparent political ambitions and past incidents.  
Deng’s policy of economic reform and opening up began the process by which 
the MFA has become a specialized and professionalized bureaucracy that has regularized 
the way it operates. By 1954, only nine countries outside the socialist bloc had forged 
diplomatic relations with China. However, China recalled almost all of its ambassadors in 
1967 with the start of the Cultural Revolution (CR), except Ambassador Huang Hua 
Egypt. In just the CR’s first three months, 30 out of 49 countries with full or partial 
diplomatic relations with China found themselves in diplomatic disputes with China.10 
China closed nine of its 14 embassies, while 24 out of 30 foreign embassies in China 
were closed.11 Because of Chinese diplomats’ increased fervor and radicalism, Tunisia 
and Kenya banished the Chinese ambassador or diplomatic representative.12 By 1967, all 
Chinese ambassadors or diplomatic representatives but one had been recalled back to 
China.13 When Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev phoned the line of CCP Party Center to 
seek a conversation with Mao Zedong at the height of the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clash 
at Zhenbaodao (Treasure Island), the Chinese operator hung up on Brezhnev after calling 
him a “revisionist”, which almost triggered a real war between China and the Soviet 
Union.14 China’s diplomatic paralysis ended with Mao’s death and the Gang of Four’s 
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arrest in the mid-1970s.  By 1978, when Deng announced the policy of reform and 
opening up, 112 countries had established diplomatic relations with China. By 2011, 
China had established diplomatic relations with 172 countries.15  
The division of labor and specialization of each branch of the MFA, as well as the 
standardization of operational procedures, have made the MFA a much more professional 
but at the same time a highly bureaucratic agency.  
First, as the MFA’s departments and divisions become increasingly specialized, 
existing departments and divisions continue the division of labor while multiple new 
divisions and departments have been added to take on specific functions. During the two 
reforms introduced in the 1980s to streamline bureaucracies under the State Council, the 
MFA did not streamline but rather increased its division-level organs (sijuji jigou) to 
37.16 New departments and divisions have been continuously added. For example, in 
1997, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament (DACD) was established after non-
proliferation became a focal point of frictions between China and the US. In 2004, the 
Department of Security Affairs (DSA) was established to respond to challenges of 
international terrorism. Its main responsibility is to deal with the diplomatic aspects of 
anti-separatism (Tibet and Xinjiang) and anti-terrorism both in China and abroad. As 
maritime and territorial disputes in the South China Sea intensified in 2008-2009 in 
Chinese perception,17 the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs (DBOA) was 
established in 2009 with two major responsibilities: border demarcation, joint inspection, 
stipulation of regulations on the border management system, and cooperative 
development in border regions; and the delimitation of China’s maritime territory and 
joint development of maritime resources.18 In October 2012, the Department of 
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International Economy (DIE) was established. This department primarily focuses on 
economic diplomacy, and is tasked with devising an economic cooperation strategy and 
solving disputes that arise in international platforms such as the G20, BRICS, and 
APEC.19 The increasing specializations of departments within MFA helps to improve the 
professionalism of diplomats in their designated areas. Yet increased number of agencies 
under MFA has inevitably complicated intra-ministry cooperation in decision-making. 
For example, if Chinese workers are killed in Afghanistan, the DSA, along with the 
Department of Asian Affairs, will have to coordinate to handle the aftermath.20 The 
Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs and the Department of Asian Affairs 
normally jointly handle any contingency related to the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Island dispute 
or South China Sea disputes.21 
The MFA’s preexisting departments have become increasingly segmented. For 
instance, the Department of North American and Oceanic Affairs (DNAOA) has at least 
three divisions focusing on the U.S. One division deals with the executive branch, one 
concentrates on Congress and U.S. non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the 
other focuses on multilateral affairs involving the U.S. such as nuclear disarmament 
negotiations. DNAOA also has its own research division, despite the existence of an 
MFA division that specializes in research.22  
Second, the MFA has also standardized its operational procedures, which has 
contributed to its professionalization. In the 1980s, then Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian 
established a regularized Morning Information Session or the “wind-blowing meeting” 
(chuifenghui) in order to make sure that heads of various MFA divisions were informed 
of domestic and foreign developments (dongtai) well enough to make decisive and timely 
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decisions during contingencies. Collective decision-making and specialization of 
responsibility (jiti juece, fengong fuze) has since become the MFA’s guiding principle. 
The MFA has continuously added new agencies to take on more specific professional 
responsibility in the areas of politics, economy, security, and culture, which has further 
bolstered its professionalization and specialization.23 
Pursuing professionalization, specialization, and the standardization of 
operational procedures, however, is expensive. In 2007, the MFA’s staff exceeded 4,800, 
which is almost double the size of its staff in 1988 (2,526).24 The MFA’s budget 
increased to RMB 8.710 billion in 2014, from RMB 6.995 billion in 2013 and RMB 
5.799 billion in 2012.25 Nonetheless, MFA is not a strong government agency in terms of 
budgetary allocation. In comparison, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) had a 
budget of RMB 25.758 billion in 2014, RMB 26.174 billion in 2013 and RMB 24.840 
billion in 2012.26 Moreover, China's budget for “public security” (stability maintenance) 
reached 701.8 billion yuan (actual expenditure reached 707.8 billion yuan) in 2012 and 
769.1 billion in 2013, while the defense budget totaled 670.3 billion yuan in 2012 and 
740.6 billion yuan in 2013.27 The MFA’s travel budget in 2015 was only 36 percent of 
the General Administration of Sport’s, and was also lower than that of the Academy of 
Sciences.28 The increasingly complicated organizational structure and standardization of 
procedures, notably briefings, reports, and memo writing -- lead to a vast amount of 
documentation, book logging, and memo writing on a regular basis.29 
 
How does the MFA work? 
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On foreign and security policies, the MFA follows one of two different reporting 
procedures, depending on the urgency and importance of the issue in question. Issues of 
great strategic importance and sensitivity that may lead to a major diplomatic crisis 
would follow the procedures outlined for contingency/crisis management. Such issues 
could be sent directly to the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) and even the 
top civilian leader, in order for the total decision cycle to end in a day or two.30 However, 
the majority of issues, which do not reach this threshold of importance, follow a 
circuitous reporting procedure:  
 
(possibly embassy --) division/department(s)-- Supervising Vice Foreign Minister -- 
Foreign Minister -- State Councilor on foreign affairs/Vice Premier with a portfolio of 
foreign affairs ---Premier -- Central Foreign Affairs Office/FALSG – (Politburo member 
whose portfolio has a stake in the issue) -- top leader. 
 
Chinese bureaucracies follow a system of “countersignature” or “joint signature” 
(huiqian). For example, according to the Regulation on Party and Government Agencies 
Document Processing Work, if a ministry submits a request to the State Council for 
approval, it must first initiate a full consultation with the State Council’s relevant 
departments, if the matter involves other ministries’/departments’ authority.31 The 
sponsoring ministry/department is responsible for consultation and getting jointly 
countersigned approval from the State Council’s relevant ministries/departments, if its 
proposal encounters opposition or disagreement. If the consultation cannot result in 
agreement, the sponsoring ministry/department is required to list the differing positions 
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and rationales of all relevant parties, put forward recommendations, and get 
countersignatures from relevant departments before submitting it to the State Council.32 
The MFA, as well as the PLA and other bureaucracies, follows the same procedure and 
regulation. 
Functional departments/divisions (such as departments of Boundary and Ocean 
Affairs, Treaty and Law, and Arms Control) and regional divisions (such as departments 
of North American and Oceanian Affairs, and Asian Affairs) handle the major policy 
work at MFA. The work at regional departments in MFA is mainly “case work” (ban’an) 
and “research” (diaoyan). Staff at each department spend most of their time drafting two 
kinds of documents: “action memos” (xingdong beiwanglu) and “case record memos” 
(fuo’an jilu). “Section Chiefs” (kezhang) draft action memos after consulting with 
“Division Chiefs” (chuzhang). The division with the highest stakes will often become the 
lead agency to handle the issue. However, when an issue touches on multiple 
departments/divisions, which each have a similar stake in the issue, there is some 
randomness as to which agency will take the lead. Within the MFA, divisions are 
normally reluctant to assert themselves in taking the lead. Inter-division consultation 
determines which division leads on a given issue. They may take turns leading, or one 
agency will pass on responsibility if it is bombarded with another crisis. If the officials 
drafting a memo need the help or opinions of other departments at MFA, they will call 
the relevant offices to get their input. If those called on believe that this issue is so 
important that they need approval from their own chiefs, or if they have disagreements 
about how things should be handled, then the relevant departments hold inter-department 
meetings to handle disagreements.33  
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When the department-level officials within the MFA can’t come to an agreement 
during coordination meetings, the lead department will summarize and present its own 
opinion as well as the dissenting opinion to the Deputy Foreign Minister who as part of 
his portfolio oversees this type of matter. However, in most instances 
departments/divisions do not need to take this step and are able to coordinate with each 
other and find a way to reach agreement based on compromise.34  
When consensus is established, section chiefs will draft the action memo on 
behalf of his/her department. Such a memo will first be signed by his/her Department 
Chief, and will then be sent to the chiefs of other relevant departments for their signatures. 
The document will then be sent back to the drafting department, after which it will be 
presented to supervising vice foreign ministers and then the Foreign Minister for their 
signatures. Most decisions at the MFA follow this procedure.35  
Coordination among agencies within the PLA follows a pattern similar to the 
MFA’s outlined above. It is very rare for an agency in its own system (both in the MFA 
and in the PLA) to just go ahead and force its opinion on others because “if it is taken 
that way, this agency could not expect others to cooperate in the implementation.”36 
Though all bureaucracies follow the above common rule, the MFA differs notably from 
the PLA in terms of its bureaucratic culture: the MFA places more emphasis on 
consensus-building and agencies within the ministry are less likely to hold onto their 
departmental opinions, which is determined by its “flatter” organizational structure; the 
PLA’s agencies at similar ranks are more separated from each other and are less likely to 
compromise their departmental opinions which mean the final decision normally has to 
be a “package deal”, reflecting what each agency wants most.  
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A diplomatic incident could bring various departments within the MFA together. 
For example, a simple incident in Thailand involving a Chinese student drowning was 
reported to the Chinese embassy in Thailand. After investigation, the Thai police 
informed the embassy that the student’s death was not a result of foul play, and therefore 
suggested to one Chinese consular official that the body should be cremated. For some 
reason, when the embassy attempted to relay this information to the MFA in Beijing and 
then the student’s family, the news failed to reach the student’s family in time. Therefore, 
by the time the student’s family was informed of the news, the student’s body had already 
been cremated. The student’s family then issued a strong complaint against that 
responsible consular official. In this scenario, a plethora of departments inside the MFA 
would be involved in handling this case: the General Office of the MFA, the Department 
of Personnel, the Department of Consular Affairs, and the Department of Asian Affairs. 
Because this particular consular official held a relatively high rank, those involved in 
handling this dispute couldn’t be below his rank, since otherwise it would have resulted 
in an awkward situation of having a junior official evaluating a senior official.37  
The specialization and division of responsibility of an increasingly 
professionalized MFA create issues of their own. The MFA’s staff is preoccupied with 
trivial details, procedures, and writing and revising reports. The MFA’s bureaucratic 
reporting and documentation work has become so burdensome that its staff has an 
aversion to new initiatives or deviations from its routine that may require more work, 
increased responsibility, and a heightened chance of failure.38 
Specialization doesn’t completely eliminate the issue of overlapping 
responsibilities. For instance, the Bureau of General Studies under the Policy Planning 
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Department investigates and surveys international situations of strategic importance. 
However, the division in charge of the U.S. has its own branch that carries out the same 
mission.39 The MFA, in the eyes of many outside actors, has become increasingly 
dogmatic, inefficient, and arrogant, and bureaucratic inertia has set in. The MFA is not 
viewed as an agency where strategic thinking takes place.40   
The MFA has institutionalized an inter-departmental coordination mechanism, 
which takes the form of mostly ad hoc, contingency-based task forces (yingji xiaozu). 
The primary function of these task forces is to devise work plans, establish liaison and 
communication procedures, open hotlines, collect information from all relevant entities, 
and coordinate with all relevant ministries/agencies.41 However, too many mechanisms 
have been created, while the MFA’s number of personnel has remained relatively fixed. 
In addition to his or her routine workload, almost every staff member has to sit on a few 
of these task forces. Therefore, although coordination mechanisms exist, they are 
ineffective and not useful in handling pressing problems as soon as the crisis stage has 
passed. A diplomat at China’s Embassy in Washington, D.C. described his average day 
as follows: 
It is probably hard to imagine how heavy the workload for average MFA staff from the 
outside. I have to attend the so-called wind-blowing routine meeting every morning 
around 8:00, work until 6:30, and then I go back home to have dinner and play with my 
child for an hour. By 8:30 PM, I am back at my office again until 12:00 AM at least, and 
regularly until 2:00 AM. Then the next day, I have to be in the office again at 8:00 AM. 
My schedule in the embassy is quite a big break already compared to my colleagues back 
in Beijing, as my American counterparts normally don’t work on (American) holidays or 
most weekends, unlike my Chinese colleagues back at home.  
 
The MFA is perpetually shorthanded and its staff is routinely overworked. Its senior 
staff’s workload is even worse. As one of MFA’s senior officials recounts:   
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Let me tell you a typical day when a crisis dawns on us in the MFA. We were having a 
late-night meeting to deal with a contingency in the East China Sea, attended by a few 
outside experts who specialize on Japan. Foreign Minister Wang Yi is a diligent man. 
The meeting, which started at 7:00 PM, dragged on until 11:30 PM. Then Wang Yi called 
a break. We were all relieved and ready to go. “Well, I need to have a quick jog to keep 
my mind clear. But don’t let me interrupt the discussion. Go on with the meeting!” Wang 
Yi said cheerfully. We all sighed and our hearts sunk. He went out of the meeting room 
to run for five minutes and the meeting continued. We left the building around 2:30 AM, 
knowing that we had to be back to our desk by 8:00 AM for the “wind-blowing meeting.”  
 
The MFA established a Foreign Policy Advisory Group (waijiao zhengce zixun 
weiyuanhui) in 2008 that is dedicated to providing consultation and advice on 
international situations and diplomatic work as well as public diplomacy.42 As of 2015, 
its 29 members included 23 retired ambassadors and six outside scholars.43 The MFA 
also invites mostly civilian experts and a few military analysts to regularly meet to 
provide their opinions on major foreign policies. Outside experts have some influence 
over issues such as China’s policy toward North Korea, especially when their opinions 
coincide with public opinion. However, interviews with a few outside experts as well as 
retired and active-duty officers, who attended such consultations at MFA, indicate that 
some of those who criticized and disagreed with the MFA’s policies were penalized and 
not invited back to subsequent meetings. A senior MFA official who once headed the 
Department of Policy Planning demonstrated a dismissive attitude toward these 
consultations with outside experts, stating, “We do invite outside experts to provide their 
opinions on certain issues, but in the end we expect the dialogues we set up influence 
their point of view much more than ours.”44 Thus, the MFA has maintained a relatively 
insular culture, primarily relying on its own staff and its embedded research “muscle” to 
shape its positions, while consultations with outside experts exist but play a marginal role 
in shaping the MFA’s policy positions. 
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International Department of the Central Committee of the CCP 
The International Department (ID) is one of several agencies that fall under the 
Party system.45 ID was established primarily to handle the Party’s relationship with other 
countries’ Communist parties. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
disintegration of the Communist bloc, ID has expanded its portfolio, building 
relationships with more than 600 political parties in 160 countries by 2012.46 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, China’s diplomatic relations were mostly with other 
Communist countries.47 During this period, the only Western countries that established 
diplomatic relations with China were France (1964) and Japan (1972). ID handled 
China’s relationship with Communist countries, while the MFA was mostly responsible 
for China’s relationship with non-Communist countries. Thus, given China’s dearth of 
diplomatic relationships, the MFA had little work. ID, dubbed the “Party’s Foreign 
Ministry” that dealt with relations with other Communist countries, was more important 
than the MFA. The ID maintained a seat as Secretary or Alternate Secretary of the 
Secretariat until the 1980s. From the 1970s to the1990s, high-ranking officials such as 
Geng Biao (1971-79), Ji Pengfei (1979-82), and Qiao Shi (1982-83) led the ID. Wu 
Xueqian, a Politburo member and Vice Premier in charge of foreign affairs in the late 
1980s, accumulated his foreign policy experience through a decade of work in the ID 
(1972-82). Qiao Shi, the former Minister of the ID, was elevated onto the PBSC in the 
1990s. Prior to 2000, four of the ID’s ministers and most of its vice ministers, including 
Wu Xueqian, Qiao Shi, and Qian Liren, were associated with the pre-1949 underground 
resistance movement in Shanghai. As a result, ID, despite the perception that it was a 
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“Party” organ closed to the outside world, maintained a down-to-earth, moderate and pro-
reform internal culture.48   
After President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, the MFA’s portfolio and 
importance started to increase rapidly. By comparison, the Soviet Union’s implosion and 
the collapse of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s drastically 
reduced the ID’s portfolio and its political importance declined in absolute terms in the 
1990s. In the two decades following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the ID has 
tried to reinvent itself to develop relations with different parties and 
parliaments/congresses of non-socialist countries.  
The ID’s political fortunes improved during Hu’s era. As Jiang’s heir apparent 
and the PBSC member with a portfolio that included managing the Party’s affairs, Hu 
began to build his influence in ID. Dai Bingguo, Hu’s close associate, became the ID’s 
head in August 1997.49 After Hu ascended to the position of General Secretary of the 
CCP in 2002, ID was treated as the better of the two “Foreign Ministries.” Hu allegedly 
distrusted Foreign Ministers Li Zhaoxing and Yang Jiechi, and thus preferred the cadres 
cultivated from ID to those from the MFA.50 In January 2003, North Korea withdrew 
from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which intensified its frictions with China, 
particularly with the MFA, as this agency was a strong advocate of non-proliferation and 
arms control. With regards to North Korea, the MFA and ID divide their portfolios based 
on international implications: MFA handles China’s relationship with South Korea, the 
Six-Party Talks, and all international consultations regarding the denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula, while ID handles China’s relationship with North Korea. North Korea 
has persistently held a grudge against MFA, and in 2003 refused to communicate with 
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China through the MFA,51 which North Korea perceived was twisting its arm during 
negotiations. 52 Dai, then head of the ID, was “airlifted” to the MFA by Hu, and named 
Executive Vice Foreign Minister (with all the privileges of a full Minister), later 
becoming Party Secretary of the MFA in May 2003. Dai was brought in to navigate this 
crisis and handle North Korea. Under Dai’s leadership, in 2003 China initiated the Six-
Party Talks, marking the first time that China deviated from its long-held principle of 
non-interference, and led and participated in major regional security talks as a way to 
dissipate international tensions. Dai was also the key person initiating, planning and 
executing the invitation of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s trip to China in 2006.53 
When Tang Jiaxuan retired, Dai was elevated to the position of State Councilor on 
Foreign Affairs (2008-13). Besides its prominent role in handling China’s bilateral 
relationship with North Korea, ID played a more active role than the MFA in 
coordinating Hu’s visit to North Korea and Vietnam in 2005 and promoting Hu’s July 1st 
speech to 158 diplomats in 2011.54 However, the promotion and transfer of ID cadres to 
MFA and other bureaucracies, rather than the expansion of ID’s portfolio, reflects its 
increased importance under Hu. 
ID’s recovery under Hu was mostly likely transient.55 In addition to unfavorable 
personnel moves, the ID, one of North Korea’s strongest advocates in Beijing, has been 
further weakened as China gradually takes a tougher stance in restraining North Korea’s 
nuclear program. Even with China’s shifting policy toward North Korea, its bilateral 
relationship with the country is the only area where the ID has retained its influence. The 
ID has hosted a majority of North Korea’s supreme leaders’ visits and remains the most 
crucial link between the two countries. On several occasions, North Korea snubbed or 
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expressed its distrust of MFA officials, who are indispensible representing China’s 
interests in six-party talks, to communicate its message to Chinese leaders, particularly 
with regards to the denuclearization negotiations.56 
ID normally occupies one seat on the FALSG, and with its chiefs and deputy 
chiefs rotating through the MFA and TAO, it still holds significant political power. 
However, since both MFA and TAO have been given wide-ranging portfolios that touch 
on strategic issues, whereas ID has not, in the long-run ID lacks the potential and 
capability to compete with either of these organizations.  
 
Central Foreign Affairs Office (CFAO) of the CCP Central Committee 
The Central Foreign Affairs Office of the CCP Central Committee (CFAO, 
zhongyang waishi bangongshi), is the executive office that serves three masters, the 
FALSG, the National Security Leading Small Group, and the Maritime Rights & Interests 
Leading Small Group. CFAO grew out of the State Council Foreign Affairs office, a 
government agency that was reinstated in 1981. CFAO plays the role of secretary, 
coordinator, researcher, and largely an agenda-setter.57 In administrative status, CFAO is 
treated as having the level of a full ministry, but in official administrative rank it is higher 
than any ministry under the State Council. 
The Director of CFAO’s power and mandate have fluctuated greatly since the 
organization’s establishment. Liu Huaqiu, the former Director of the State Council 
Central Foreign Affairs Office, was the first director of CFAO, serving between 1998 and 
2005. During his tenure as Director of CFAO, Liu was overshadowed by his long-term 
political rival, Vice Premier Qian Qichen, who was the Deputy Head of the FALSG. The 
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Director of CFAO’s power has increased exponentially since 2005, due to political 
jockeying between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.58 In 2003, Qian retired and was replaced 
by Zeng Qinghong, the Vice President and Jiang’s close advisor. To outmaneuver Jiang, 
Hu hollowed out the position of Deputy Director of FALSG and delegated its power to 
the Administrative Director of FALSG, i.e., Director of CFAO, which Dai, who was a 
key Hu ally, occupied since 2005.59 Director of the CFAO, which is the executive arm of 
the FALSG, thus held high confidence of the top leader, prestige and substantial power in 
foreign affairs in 2005-2012. 
Although traditionally directors and deputy directors of CFAO were chosen from 
among government officials, one exception was Chen Xiaogong, former Assistant Chief 
of General Staff of the PLA, who was made Deputy Director of CFAO. However, Chen’s 
selection was not due to an institutional arrangement. Rather, this was a one-time deal 
that was made because CFAO had a shortage of staff and Chen’s father (Chen Chu), the 
former Chinese Ambassador to Japan, used to head CFAO.60 The PLA’s autonomy, 
which ensures that CFAO has no opportunity to interfere with military affairs, accounts 
for the distinct personnel appointment between CFAO, under the Party system, and the 
PLA.61 
CFAO is an executive arm of the FALSG and handles the FALSG’s day-to-day 
work and logistics. CFAO was made a powerful organ under Ji Pengfei, the longest-
serving Vice Foreign Minister, who had a wide network of protégés in the MFA. His 
Deputy, Chen Chu, a former Ambassador to Japan and the UN, also helped extend 
CFAO’s power and influence. However, CFAO was seriously weakened after 1989, 
because its Director, Wu Xueqian, was a close associate of Hu Yaobang, and his son was 
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arrested for his involvement in the student movement. When Qian Qichen was in power, 
who for a time held the position of both Foreign Minister and Vice Premier overseeing 
foreign affairs, overshadowing Liu Huaqiu, CFAO’s role was largely diminished.62 This 
situation didn’t improve until Hu took power. Since Zeng Qinghong, Hu’s political rival, 
was deputy head of the FALSG (until 2007), Hu balanced the FALSG by elevating the 
role of CFAO and its director, who at that time was Dai Bingguo. Under Dai, CFAO’s 
influence in the foreign policy arena was restored, to a certain extent at the MFA’s 
expense. However, CFAO’s power did not reach its pre-1989 level, as Dai was never a 
Politburo member, since he lacked credentials in the Party and the governmental system, 
even after becoming a State Councilor on foreign affairs.63 Dai’s successor, Yang Jiechi, 
the former Foreign Minister, is also not a Politburo member, nor a Vice Premier. 
According to its official mandate, CFAO is not endowed with great influence in 
foreign and security policy-making. Yet in reality CFAO is important because it acts as a 
gatekeeper, regulating almost all non-military traffic and information that goes to top 
policymakers, including members of the Politburo, the PBSC, and the top political leader. 
CFAO commissions reports and studies to governmental research institutions, such as 
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a subsidiary research  
arm of the Ministry of State Security. CFAO is also important because of its close 
proximity to the top political leader. CFAO deals with all the approval procedures and 
sometimes schedules the agenda of foreign visits of those with the status of “Party and 
national leaders,” or all those with Politburo membership. Therefore, CFAO has the 
“ears” of the Politburo members, the most important of which is the top political leader. 
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Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of the State Council/CCP Central Committee  
The Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of the State Council is an administrative 
agency responsible for setting and implementing guidelines and policies related to 
Taiwan.64 As an agency under the State Council, TAO is also the executive arm of the 
Party’s Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG) which therefore subjects TAO to 
the CCP Central Committee. Therefore, TAO is an agency of “one organ, two 
signboards” (yige jigou, liangkuai paizi), an agency both under the State Council and 
under the Party.  
The reason of the TAO’s “dual-personality” comes from both the history and the 
function of this agency. Between 1949 and 1966, a Central Taiwan Affairs Leading Small 
Leading Group led Mainland’s policy towards Taiwan. During this period, the PLA had 
jurisdiction over the Taiwan policy because the cross-Strait relationship was 
characterized as “struggles with enemies,” the step yet to be taken to complete China’s 
revolution, and therefore “liberation” by use of force. Directly led by Zhou Enlai, this 
group included members from military operations (PLA GSD Operations Department), 
military intelligence (PLA GSD 2nd and 3rd Department), military political warfare (PLA 
GPD/Liaison Department), state intelligence and counterespionage (Department of 
Investigation which in 1990s transformed into Ministry of State Security), United Front 
Work Department (political warfare).65  This organization became dysfunctional due to 
the chaos created by the Cultural Revolution but was resumed in December 1979 under 
the leadership of Deng Yingchao, Zhou’s widow and Chairman of Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference. An executive arm, Taiwan Affairs Office under the 
Party, was established to serve this organization. With Taiwanese allowed to travel to 
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China to visit their families or as tourists beginning in November 1987, a new line of 
work was opened. A Party organization like TAO could not cope with the amount of 
work and the nature of people-to-people exchanges as well as relevant coordination with 
local government. In 1988, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of the State Council was 
established, headed by Ding Guangen.66 The organization set up corresponding offices at 
each level of the government, which were dedicated to improving people-to-people 
communications and trade/investment across the Taiwan Strait. In 1993, TAO of the 
CCPCC and TAO of the State Council were combined into one office, but kept separate 
names. Through this integration, Jiang Zemin in essence returned Taiwan policy-making 
to the Party system.67 
Because of the institutional history, TAO has staff from mainly three backgrounds: 
MFA, the PLA and local governments. From 1987 to 2000, PLA officers consistently had 
prominent positions on TAO, starting with Lieutenant General Yang Side, a highly 
decorated military intelligence officer who spent most of his career in the PLA GPD. 
Yang headed the newly-revived TAO of the CCPCC, serving from 1985 to 1987.68 Other 
notable PLA officers who served in TAO included Wang Zaixi, a senior military 
intelligence officer, who was deputy director of TAO from 2000-2006 and Li Qingzhou, 
TAO’s spokesman and Assistant to Director of TAO. In Hu’s era, the PLA officers, 
though still placed in TAO, occupied lower positions.69 TAO officials with MFA 
background such as Director Wang Yi and Deputy Directors Sun Xiaoyu and Tang 
Shubei. In terms of backgrounds, significant numbers of the TAO staff came from local 
provinces, such as Chen Yunlin, Li Bingcai and Zheng Lizhong, who had rich 
experiences and expertise facilitating Taiwanese investment at the provincial level.70 
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Because of historical legacy and overlapping personnel background, TAO has 
maintained close institutional relations with the PLA and MFA.71 Although TAO was 
established with a strong connection to the PLA, it has always maintained a cordial and 
productive working relationship with MFA. The Department of Macao, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan Affairs under the MFA supports TAO by executing the international dimension 
of the policies that TAO sets. TAO’s working style is very different from MFA’s. 
Whereas the MFA has a highly bureaucratic, insular and formally institutionalized culture, 
the TAO of the State Council operates very differently.72 When TAO of State Council 
was established in 1988, people-to-people communication across the Taiwan Strait had 
already been well-developed. Therefore, upon its establishment, TAO absorbed a large 
number of civilian scholars/practitioners from outside the system, and has always relied 
heavily on the opinions and advice of these scholars/practitioners.73  
In terms of political power, resources, and talent, TAO is a late-starter and a 
weaker player in Chinese bureaucratic politics. Although it has traditional ties to the PLA, 
TAO has kept a non-competitive attitude with the MFA. Officials also rotate frequently 
between MFA and TAO, in order to increase these officials’ expertise and bolster their 
resumes. This has contributed to the harmony between the two government agencies. 
 
State Council 
Both the MFA and the Ministry of Defense (MND) are housed within the 
government system led by the State Council. The State Council is a coordinating 
mechanism as well as an actor in foreign affairs in that it supervises the MFA’s work. 
The State Council, established in 1954,74 is bestowed with the power to “administer 
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foreign affairs and forge treaties and agreements with foreign countries,” according to 
China’s Constitution.75  
Throughout China’s history, officials have taken leadership positions concurrently 
in both the State Council and the MFA. Prior to 1978, high-profile leaders led the MFA, 
which lent authority to the organization. Zhou Enlai, the Premier who also headed the 
State Council, held the position of Foreign Minister concurrently with the Premiership 
(1949-58). Marshal Chen Yi, as Vice Premier, succeeded Zhou as the second Foreign 
Minister (1958-72). After Chen, four foreign ministers, Ji Pengfei (1972-74), Huang Hua 
(1976-82), Wu Xueqian (1982-88) and Qian Qichen (1988-98), were elevated to the 
positions of Vice Premier or State Counselor overseeing foreign affairs after their tenures 
as Foreign Minister.76 Only Wu Xueqian (1985-92) and Qian Qichen (1992-2002) moved 
on to become Politburo members.77  
The position of State Councilor was created in 1982 during an institutional reform. 
State councilors, according to the State Council Organizational Law, assist the premier by 
taking charge of “work of particular areas or significant specialized tasks.” State 
councilors enjoy an administrative status of Vice Premier, but their political ranking and 
prestige is always behind that of the Vice Premier. Wu Xueqian, who served as the 
Foreign Minister from 1982-88, was the first State Councilor on foreign affairs (1983-
88).78 In 1988, Wu became the Vice Premier overseeing foreign affairs (1988-93) and the 
Deputy Director of the FALSG and the TALSG.79 However, Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen (1988-98) played a more dominant role in foreign affairs and quickly rose to the 
Politburo in 1992.80 Qian, who then became Vice Premier in 1993, was an exceptional 
case.  
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After Qian was promoted to Vice Premier and therefore vacated his position as 
Foreign Minister in 1998, the Foreign Minister’s status in China’s foreign policy-making 
hierarchy has declined.81 China’s foreign ministers no longer hold the position of state 
councilor concurrently, and therefore are no longer officially included in the State 
Council’s important Regular Work Meetings. By comparison, all defense ministers, as 
state councilors, are automatically part of this important meeting mechanism. Following 
Qian’s retirement in 2002, diplomats no longer have any representative sitting on the 
Politburo, while the PLA has two. 
Since 2003, state councilors on foreign affairs have consistently ranked behind 
defense ministers and the Minister of Public Security, who are automatically slotted in as 
state councilors. For example, Tang Jiaxuan was the third-ranking State Councilor (2003-
08) behind Zhou Yongkang, then Minister of Public Security, and General Cao 
Gangchuan, the Defense Minister and member of the Politburo. Dai Bingguo was the 
fifth and the last-ranking state councilor (2008-12), while General Liang Guanglie, the 
Defense Minister and a State Councilor, ranked second among the five. Yang Jiechi, as a 
State Councilor on foreign affairs (2012-) ranked after Defense Minister Chang Wanquan. 
Since the state councilor on foreign affairs reports to the premier, as stipulated by 
the State Council’s administrative procedures, the premier is a natural link in the 
deliberation and formulation of major foreign policies, although his main responsibility is 
to focus on economic policies. Some premiers are more interested in foreign affairs than 
others. Zhao Ziyang (Premier, 1980-88), and Li Peng (Premier, 1988-98) were both 
heavily constrained by Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Yao Yilin in deciding economic 
policies. As premier, Zhao was even more constrained than Li in the foreign policy arena 
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because Li Xiannian, a conservative elder, was heading the FALSG (1981-88) and Deng 
was more hands-on in foreign policy in the 1980s than in the 1990s. Premier Li presided 
over the FALSG between 1988 and 1997, and therefore had more scope get involved in 
foreign affairs. Later, neither Premier Zhu Rongji (1998-2003) nor Premier Wen Jiabao 
(2003-13) was particularly attentive to foreign affairs, despite continuous efforts to 
increase research capabilities within the State Council system.82  
The State Council provides platforms for the civilian foreign affairs system and 
the military to coordinate on specific issues. As of 2014, a total of 29 inter-agency 
coordination mechanisms have been set up under its umbrella, which are called 
“Advisory and Coordinating Organs.” These Advisory and Coordinating Organs are 
created mainly under four circumstances: when there is an important issue that requires 
cross-region, cross-agency work and takes so much coordination that no agency can 
handle it alone (i.e. State Commission of Border and Coastal Defense); when an issue 
concerns civil-military cooperation (i.e. National Defense Mobilization Committee); 
when an issue involves long-term public contingencies and natural disasters (i.e. State 
Council Headquarters for Resisting Earthquakes and Providing Disaster Relief); and 
when an issue has important international ramifications or garners high public visibility 
(i.e. National Leading Group for Climate Change, Energy Conservation and Emissions 
Reduction). Among the 29 Advisory and Coordinating Organs, the PLA directly assumes 
the leading role of four of them: National Defense Mobilization Committee,83 State 
Commission of Border and Coastal Defense,84 Air Traffic Control Committee of the 
State Council85 and the Central Military Commission, and the Leading Group for the 
Development of Army-People Relations.86 The PLA also participates in 15 other 
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Advisory and Coordinating Organs, such as earthquake relief, informatization/cyber, 
flood control and drought relief, forestation, protection of disabled people, National 
Energy Commission, work safety, AIDS prevention, demobilization (veteran placement), 
drug prohibition, and prevention of forest fires. The only Advisory and Coordinating 
Organ where the MFA and PLA work closely together is the PLA-led State Commission 
of Border and Coastal Defense (CBCD), as indicated by an Assistant Foreign Minister-
level official’s participation. The executive office of CBCD is housed under the Division 
of Operations of the General Staff Department. 
Besides the long-term Advisory and Coordinating Organs, the State Council also 
has contingency-based, short-term coordinating mechanisms, which serve specific tasks 
and often disband after the mission is deemed to have been accomplished. Examples of 
such coordinating mechanisms include the minister-level Coordinating Task Force on 
Emergent Incidents and Contingency in Foreign Affairs (shewai jinji tufa shijian xietiao 
xiaozu) and the Inter-agency Joint Meetings for Protection of Chinese Citizens and 
Institutions Overseas (jingwai zhongguo gongmin he jigou anquan baohu gongzuo buji 
lianxi huiyi). These inter-agency coordination mechanisms played critical roles in 
China’s response to a series of foreign contingencies, including the evacuation of Chinese 
citizens from Libya in 2011. 
Even though both the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister serve under the 
State Council, it has failed to be an effective platform for the PLA and the civilian 
foreign affairs system to coordinate. China’s Defense Minister, unless he concurrently 
serves as CMC Vice Chairman, lacks substantial power in the military87 and is not part of 
the military’s chain of command. On the other hand, a Defense Minister who is 
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concurrently CMC Vice Chairman (and therefore a Politburo member), such as Cao 
Gangchuan, outranks all other state councilors and therefore in practice would not answer 
to coordination through the State Council. In other words, if a Defense Minister is weak, 
nobody in the military will listen to him; conversely, if a Defense Minister is very 
powerful, he wouldn’t want to use the State Council as a platform for coordination. 
Therefore, the State Council is unable to serve as an effective coordination mechanism 
between the military and the civilian foreign affairs system. 
 
Dynamics of the Rise and Fall of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Analysts have continually been perplexed as to why the MFA’s political standing 
in Chinese politics, defined by both its bureaucratic power and the political status of its 
leader, the Foreign Minister, has fallen continuously since 1978, even though China’s 
international prestige, overseas interests, and actual participation and engagement in 
international affairs have all grown exponentially. Such a decline has been even more 
apparent since 1998, when Qian Qichen was promoted to Vice Premier, and Tang 
Jiaxuan succeeded him as Foreign Minister. Beginning with Tang, successive Foreign 
Ministers have never concurrently been elevated to State Councilor.  
There are two ways to examine the Foreign Minister’s bureaucratic power and 
status in China’s domestic politics: administrative level, and ranking in the Party. The 
Foreign Minister’s bureaucratic rank equals that of a Minister or of a provincial 
governor-level official. There are a total of 55 ministry-level agencies directly under the 
State Council. China, on average, has between 195-400 minister-level officials, excluding 
those serving in the People’s Congress or the CPPCC.88 Thus, China’s Foreign Minister, 
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if he is not also a Politburo member or a State Councilor, is just one of hundreds of 
officials of the same rank. Seen another way, the Foreign Minister is only one of over 200 
Central Committee members in the Party. The Foreign Minister’s bureaucratic rank is 
roughly the same as an army-grade (junji) PLA officer, which falls two levels below that 
of the CMC Vice Chairman.89 The Deputy Chief of the General Staff in charge of 
military diplomacy, often the Foreign Minister’s interlocutor, typically holds a position of 
Military Region Deputy (fuda junqun ji), which is one rank above the army grade. 
Therefore, China’s Foreign Minister, strictly speaking, is one rank lower than his 
counterpart in the PLA. In terms of ranking in the Party, after Qian Qichen retired in 
2002, the top diplomat, the State Councilor on Foreign Affairs, has a lower political 
ranking than the top soldier(s), both CMC Vice Chairman, who are Politburo members. 
 
A few reasons can be offered to explain the MFA’s continual weakening: 
First, the diversification of control over foreign affairs expanded the MFA’s 
sphere of power but at the same time weakened the strength of its power. In the 1980s, 
Deng identified economic reform and opening-up as the country’s core mission, which 
enabled the MFA to play a supportive role in achieving this central strategic goal. In the 
1990s, China’s overseas interests vastly expanded as the country turned itself into the 
“workshop of the world.” As China modernized and embraced globalization, it 
increasingly engaged with foreign countries across all dimensions. The scope of China’s 
foreign affairs and interactions has grown to such a great volume, become so complex, 
and crossed into so many areas that the MFA could not keep up. Throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, as the MFA professionalized, it expanded. However, the expansion and 
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specification of the MFA’s responsibilities has been outpaced by the growth of branches 
and various ministries that dealt with foreign affairs. As David M. Lampton has 
concluded, decentralization constituted one of the most important trends of China’s 
foreign policy-making.90 The MFA’s monopoly over foreign affairs was quickly eaten up 
by other ministries, which, unlike the MFA, have the real power. 
China’s approach to climate change negotiations illustrates the MFA’s weakening 
position relative to other bureaucracies. Since 1998, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), an extremely powerful but domestically oriented 
bureaucracy, has led China’s participation in international climate change negotiations 
because China views climate change as fundamentally a development issue rather than 
one of international affairs, though China’s progress in climate change has significant 
international ramifications. Xie Zhenhua, Deputy Director of the NDRC, was China’s 
chief negotiator at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit and generally conducted 
China’s negotiations on climate change principally through the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The NDRC has been the most powerful 
bureaucracy under the State Council, as it is responsible for studying, developing, and 
setting strategic policies related to economic and social development, including China’s 
Five-Year Plans. Its power is also reflected in its authority in coordination and regulation 
of energy prices, a highly lucrative area that affects many large state-owned enterprises. 
Even with Premier Wen Jiabao’s attendance at the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, the 
differences between the NDRC and MFA, ranging from negotiation strategy to policy 
substance, were so stark that even Wen could not make the two reach a consensus. 
Throughout the negotiations in Copenhagen, the NDRC was the leading actor on the 
 355 
Chinese side, though the MFA “put on an uncompromising stern face” and was 
eventually the target of international and domestic criticism due to the summit’s failure.91 
In other words, the NDRC, neither experienced nor savvy in dealing with other countries 
and international organizations, controlled the substantive aspects of the negotiations, 
while the MFA handled its formalities.  
The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) has also undermined the MFA’s policies 
and encroached on its territory. The MPS is the principal police and security agency 
under the State Council, which is ultimately responsible for day-to-day law enforcement. 
The MPS’s mandate is expansive, covering everything from traffic control, firefighting 
and fire prevention inspection, residency identity card (hukou) management and crime 
investigations, to combating terrorism, fighting civil unrest and subversive activities, 
anti-smuggling, anti-drug trafficking, and filtering and monitoring the Internet. Though 
traditionally seen as an “inward-looking” bureaucracy, MPS has become another new 
actor in foreign affairs. Despite its overwhelming focus on protecting China’s social 
stability and its citizens’ safety, MPS’s mandate has started to expand to include 
operations overseas, primarily because more Chinese businesses and citizens are 
operating abroad. By the end of 2004, Chinese-funded enterprises that operate overseas 
totaled 8,000, while 1,900 Chinese organizations had established overseas branches, and 
the Chinese government had sent more than 130 foreign aid task forces on overseas 
missions.92 In 2004, over 600,000 Chinese citizens were working in nearly 200 countries 
on construction and reconstruction projects, medical assistance, and investment and 
contracting, while 40,000 Chinese citizens were engaged in offshore fishing. From 1949 
to 1979, only 280,000 Chinese went abroad. In 2014, the number of out- and in-bound 
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Chinese citizens reached 233 million, representing 18.7% increase over the previous 
period.93 As one senior MPS officer put it:  
MPS’s job is to protect Chinese citizens’ safety and the country’s economic interests. As 
far as our interests and our citizens go, as far as our protection would try to extend to. It is 
not hard to understand that a traditionally ‘inward-looking’ bureaucracy like MPS starts 
to venture outside China’s border. We indeed have many more citizens living overseas 
and a great number of enterprises go overseas to do business than 30 years ago. We train 
tens of senior foreign law-enforcement officers from countries such as Pakistan and 
Afghanistan each year in MPS. The purpose is simple. We need local police support 
when our citizens or businesses abroad are attacked. Now the next step is to raise a force 
to provide protection and safety for our citizens overseas, something like Blackwater of 
the U.S.94 
 
As of late 2011, MPS started to operate outside of China’s borders in order to protect 
Chinese citizens’ safety and China’s overseas interests. MPS launched joint patrols with 
Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar along the Mekong River in response to the highly-
publicized murder of 13 Chinese sailors on Thailand's portion of the river. Thus, MFA 
inevitably has to deal with MPS, given its continually increasing ambition and mandate to 
operate overseas. 
What the MPS lacks in experience with international cooperation, knowledge 
about and proficiency in how to operate under international law, and awareness of 
possible international implications of its actions, it makes up for with strong bureaucratic 
power that MFA lacks. The MPS’s position of strategic importance, as it is tasked with 
maintaining China’s domestic stability, endows the agency with vast bureaucratic power. 
As part of this mandate, the MPS oversees a nationwide, top-down network of Public 
Security Bureaus that employs 1.7 million police personnel.95 Additionally, the MPS can 
use coercion and force to impose its will, levy both physical and economic punishment, 
and penetrate into the daily lives of average people. MPS’s bureaucratic weight in 
domestic politics makes it an actor that non-security bureaucracies, such as the MFA, 
often choose to avoid or defer to during turf battles.  
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MPS caused a diplomatic dispute with multiple countries when it issued newly-
designed Chinese passports in 2012. These passports featured a Chinese map in its pages 
that included the Nine-Dashed Line as well as disputed areas on the China-India border.96 
The implication was that China was claiming sovereignty over disputed territorial 
features. Although this was believed to be an act initiated and carried out by low-level 
MPS officials, who were penalized afterwards, this incident indicated how little 
coordination there is between MPS and MFA, as well as other bureaucracies’ ability to 
undermine MFA’s diplomatic efforts.97  In comparison, China’s diplomatic passports do 
not feature the same map, indicating the discord between these two agencies.98 
Lu Ning, in his book, “The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in 
China,” correctly points out, “China’s reorientation of its focus on economic 
development” is a primary reason for the gradual erosion of the MFA’s predominant role 
in managing China’s foreign affairs.”99 This was especially important after the death of 
Zhou Enlai, who was MFA’s “chief patron.”100 MFA, though still first among equals, 
“has lost the exclusiveness of its access to the central leadership,” and “has to compete 
for their hearts and minds with an increasing number of bureaucracies with vested 
interests that have entered the field of foreign affairs.”101 Lu Ning also provides other 
reasonable explanations for the MFA’s erosion of influence, such as the growing 
complexity of China’s relations with the rest of the world, which overwhelmed the MFA 
and drove it to delegate some of its tasks to other bureaucracies.102 
Second, China is a country ultimately controlled by the Party, whose primary 
concern is to secure the stability of its rule. Due to the pressing need for economic 
development and social stability, which directly impacts the Party’s legitimacy and the 
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stability of its rule, foreign affairs were not a high priority for China’s top leaders during 
the 1980s and 1990s.103 Therefore, China’s leaders put much more emphasis on 
providing good governance and strong economic growth, as well as maintain social 
stability. As Jeffrey Bader, a former U.S. NSC official who dealt with China observed, to 
Chinese leaders “Foreign affairs by far are simply a nuisance.”104 Foreign affairs have 
declined significantly in the Party’s political considerations in terms of strategic 
importance since 1980s and more drastically since end of 1990s, which is then reflected 
in the Foreign Minister’s low political standing in the Party. MFA’s decline in authority 
is also revealed by the gradual encroachment of other bureaucracies into MFA’s 
mandates. For example, the Ministry of State Security had originally been banned by 
Deng Xiaoping from occupying cover posts in diplomatic missions,105 a taboo apparently 
broken in Jiang’s era. 
Third, in the process of decentralizing power in the policy-making arena, which as 
David M. Lampton has pointed out is an increasing trend,106 China’s bureaucracies 
gained actual power and benefits unevenly. Since China started the process of reform and 
opening up in the early 1980s, the government has devoted much of its attention and 
resources to economic development and modernization. Concurrently, domestic stability, 
still a top priority, has become more challenging to ensure because of broader internal 
migration and the development of anonymous communication methods for groups. 
Therefore, those holding the power of resource allocation (the People’s Bank of China 
and Ministry of Finance), granting access and approvals (NRDC), carrying out 
inspections and supervision (Ministry of Environmental Protection), enforcing laws and 
administrative control, or maintaining stability (Ministry of Public Security and the 
 359 
Ministry of Transportation) have real power (shiquan). These bureaucracies have become 
increasingly powerful in China’s political landscape and have gained more political 
advantages as China’s politics became more democratic and pluralized over the past three 
decades. The MFA is labeled one of the “disadvantaged groups” (ruoshi qunti) in 
Chinese domestic politics, according to a scholar affiliated with the CCP Central Party 
School.107 Therefore, despite its high visibility to the outside world, the MFA holds 
relatively weaker bargaining power once those domestically powerful bureaucracies find 
legitimacy and motivation to enter the policy process.  
Lastly, Foreign Ministers after Qian were politically much weaker because they 
either lacked political credentials or the top leader’s trust. Past foreign ministers who 
enjoyed a high political ranking had long and distinguished careers in the military, Party 
affairs, and especially in the pre-1949 revolutionary struggles, and thus forged strong 
relationships with a wide network of powerful cadres. Wu Xueqian, for example, worked 
as a leader of the student movement within the CCP underground resistance in Shanghai 
from 1939-49, where he forged a solid relationship with members of the China Youth 
League and ID such as Hu Yaobang and Qiao Shi, who would later become prominent 
political figures. Interview with a PLA officer, 2013.After Wu Xueqian, Qian Qichen 
dominated China’s civilian foreign affairs system under Jiang. Qian, a Foreign Minister 
(1988-98), member of the Politburo (1992-2002), and Vice Premier (1993-2003), was the 
rare example of a professional diplomat who was promoted onto the Politburo. Qian’s 
fast-track promotion was largely a result of his ability to break the comprehensive 
economic sanctions the West imposed on China following the Tiananmen Incident.  
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A weak foreign minister has consequences for the entire MFA in terms of weaker 
position in inter-agency coordination and weaker influence on top leadership. Tang 
Jiaxuan, Qian’s successor as Foreign Minister (1998-2003) and then State Councilor for 
foreign affairs (2003-2007), was overshadowed by his predecessor. Tang only had 
experience as a one-dimensional Japan specialist, and rose from humble beginnings as an 
interpreter at MFA. During his tenure, Hu had difficulties trusting his foreign ministers, 
such as Li Zhaoxing and Yang Jiechi. Li Zhaoxing, the Foreign Minister (2003-07) under 
Hu Jintao and Qian’s protégé, with high-profile family connections,108 was never trusted 
by Hu or included in Hu’s small circle of advisors. Hu relied on neither Li nor Tang in 
molding his own foreign policy thinking. In November 2003, Zheng Bijian, former Vice 
President of the Central Party School and Hu’s advisor, made a speech entitled “China’s 
New Path of Peaceful Rise and Asia’s Future” at the Boao Forum. A month later, Hu 
explicitly stated that China would stick to the development path of a “peaceful rise” in a 
speech commemorating the 110th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth. During the 10th 
study session of the Politburo in February 2004, Hu again emphasized the theme of a 
“peaceful rise” and China’s independent foreign policy of peace. “Peaceful rise” was 
actively advocated as China’s national development strategy from 2003 to 2005, but was 
replaced with “peaceful development” in 2006-07 due to criticism from inside the Party 
and from the PLA. Li Zhaoxing was one of the critical voices of Hu’s “peaceful rise” 
narrative.109 
Hu also resented Foreign Minister Li because Hu’s 2006 visit to the U.S. was 
filled with diplomatic mishaps, with Falungong member protesting during Hu’s press 
conference, and the U.S. government representative referring to the PRC as the ROC 
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(Taiwan). Hu also resented Li because the U.S. did not give him a state dinner during his 
visit. Li was abruptly removed from his position as Foreign Minister in 2007, before he 
finished serving his five-year term. Li failed to be promoted to Sate Councilor on foreign 
affairs as his predecessors. Dai Bingguo, a close associate of Hu Jintao, replaced Tang 
Jiaxuan in 2008.  
Yang Jiechi, previously an interpreter and a relatively one-dimensional 
professional diplomat with experiences concentrating on the U.S., ascended to the 
position of Foreign Minister after Li’s premature departure. In the MFA, which is 
increasingly defined by its rising professionalization, the common perception, right or 
wrong, is that a diplomat will be less respected if he/she only has expertise only in 
handling bilateral relations and has not served in the capacity of conducting multilateral 
negotiations or serving in international organizations.110  
Hu did not have sufficient trust in Yang Jiechi, because either Hu believed that 
Jiang Zemin lobbied for his nomination,111 or there was too much criticism of Yang 
domestically for lacking diplomatic vision and skill. Despite Hu’s reservations, he could 
not rule Yang out. Therefore, Hu took two measures: first, he reestablished the ID’s 
importance as the alternative voice in foreign affairs; second, he emphasized the State 
Councilor’s importance and encouraged the State Councilor’s active role on foreign 
affairs, which was the position that Dai occupied. Given Hu’s poor relationship with 
Yang, Dai was the real driver of China’s foreign policy from 2008-12.  
A senior former U.S. official observed that during top-level meetings Hu attended 
with other heads of state, “he was always seen to sit with Wang Huning on one hand and 
Ling Jihua on the other hand. Even Dai Bingguo sat far down the table. Yang’s seat was 
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even further.”112 Further evidence in support of this observation is that when Chinese 
news media reported on Hu’s visits to foreign countries, it more often introduced his 
delegation as, “also included in the visiting delegations are Ling Jihua, Wang Huning, 
Dai Bingguo and others.”113  Ling and Wang, Secretaries of the CCP Secretariat, were 
Hu’s two gatekeepers. Thus, their power came from their ability to control the access of 
people and information to Hu. Yang would still be the one to write memos and brief Hu 
on talking points before Hu’s meetings with any major foreign delegation. However, Hu 
relied much less on Yang than on Dai in terms of foreign policy-making. 
Xi has more power and control over the government than Hu had, and also takes a 
different approach to handling foreign affairs.114 Under Xi, Yang replaced Dai as State 
Councilor on foreign affairs. However, Yang has less power in this position than Dai had. 
One example of Yang’s lack of power as State Councilor relative to Dai’s can be found in 
that fact that Yang was neither given the position of Executive Director of the National 
Security Commission (NSC) nor has occupied an important seat at the NSC. Li Zhanshu, 
Director of General Office and Executive Director of NSC, instead of Yang Jiechi, the 
officially top diplomat, went to meet Russian President Putin on Xi’s behalf in March 
2015 to pave the road for Xi’s upcoming visit to Moscow in May 2015. This could be 
explained by a practice repeatedly used during the CCP’s power struggles, whereby 
someone is officially promoted to a higher status, but in reality is demoted and sidelined 
(gaogao juqi, qingqing fangxia) as his real power is stripped away.115  
 
Sources of Differences Between the Civilian Foreign Affairs System and the PLA 
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The civilian-military divide in policies are not just pertinent to China. Bismarck 
once observed that “many officers considered all things outside the army ‘as alien 
enemies.’”116 The differences in policy opinions and positions between the PLA and the 
civilian foreign affairs system primarily stem from three sources: differences in threat 
perceptions resulting from differences in their mandates; differences in bureaucratic 
interests, as the PLA priorities in gaining strategic advantages and security interests, 
while the MFA looks to prevent and solve, diplomatic “problems” as quickly as possible; 
and differences in cost/benefit calculations, stemming from differences in their expertise. 
Disagreements between the MFA and PLA on substantive policy issues largely 
result from their respective missions, which cause the organizations to notably diverge. 
The MFA serves to solve problems, disputes, and disagreements. The PLA is designed to 
prepare for worst-case scenarios and wars. Differences in mandates determine the 
differences in threat perceptions between the PLA and MFA. Each has a unique role to 
play. However, their differing bureaucratic missions and functions lead the MFA and 
PLA to clash on policy prescriptions. As one active-duty PLA officer asserts: 
MFA seeks to maintain stability and please all parties. It has a distinctive role of “putting 
out fire,” so its work has a short-term perspective. An analogy could be made like this: If 
China is surrounded by four people, MFA will seek to be good friends with them all. 
However, the military has to establish an imaginary enemy, so it has to decide which one 
it needs to target. Therefore, the military has to think with more long-term, strategic 
angles. China does not have a National Security Council like the U,S. to coordinate 
positions, unify things and delegate roles to different agencies. (Chinese) Leaders will 
listen to opinions expressed by MFA and the PLA separately. (Therefore, how much 
influence each one could have on the leaders) depends on personal relations rather than 
on an institutionalized decision-making procedure. That is why China’s security policy-
making suffers from “schizophrenia,” which means diplomats and soldiers disagree with 
each other and they carry on and implement what they believe.117 
Although China established a National Security Commission in 2013, a forum that 
probably allows soldiers and diplomats to present their thinking to the supreme leader at 
the same table, their differences in positions are unlikely to decrease. The PLA, like other 
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militaries, looks at any problem from the standpoint of whether this constitutes an 
existing or potential military threat to China. On the other hand, the MFA handles 
diplomatic relations with other countries, and in most cases wants to avoid confrontation 
and maintain positive relations. The PLA is more sensitive to capability, concrete gains, 
and strategic assets, and is less attuned than the MFA to rhetoric and ideology. Many in 
the PLA quietly disagreed with the MFA’s resistance to engaging in human rights 
dialogues that the U.S. and Europe initiated in the wake of Tiananmen. Those in the MFA 
objected on the grounds that the West’s intention was to undermine the Party’s power and 
bring about democratization or “peaceful evolution.” One senior PLA officer summed up 
the PLA’s dissent as follows: 
Doesn’t China have its own human rights problems? While being so defensive and arguing 
to whitewash its poor human rights record after 1989, MFA should have directed all of its 
efforts and political capital toward gaining some concrete benefits. The MFA failed to 
assert itself in areas crucial to China’s national interests, but overreacted when it should 
have been “softer” and more attentive to outside criticism.118  
 
The PLA has certainly different opinions about China’s human rights conditions. 
However, it has a broad consensus on focusing China’s diplomatic efforts on tangible 
gains to enhance China’s security and strategic positions rather than wasting international 
political capital on ideological fights. The PLA had long protested more strongly and 
more unanimously what it perceived to be the MFA’s “inactions” in protecting China’s 
maritime interests in the 1980s, as well as its proclivity to compromise in territorial 
negotiations with Vietnam. Many PLA officers’ disagreements with MFA’s post-1989 
diplomatic approach were never incorporated into the PLA’s official position. This is due 
to the fact that articulating this perspective would seem like a challenge to the Party. 
Additionally, at this time Yang Baibing was in the midst of carrying out a campaign to 
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ideologically cleanse the PLA, which put it under heightened scrutiny and caused it to be 
more reluctant to take a vocal stance on issues. 
The PLA’s disagreement with the MFA was more evident in China’s relations 
with Japan from 1993-96, when China and Japan quarreled over Japan’s revision of its 
history textbooks and Japan’s cabinet members’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. In 1994, 
Japan’s Justice Minister Shigeto Nagano made inflammatory statements, calling the 1937 
Rape of Nanking a fabrication and denying that Japan was guilty of aggression in World 
War II.119 However, while the average Chinese citizen was outraged by these Japanese 
officials’ comments and actions, the PLA viewed the Sino-Japanese disputes over history 
as primarily a political issue. Therefore, the PLA took a much more moderate position 
toward Japan in the 1990s in comparison to that of MFA, China’s media, and its public. 
As one PLA officer remarked:  
China’s biggest security threat right now and in the near future is the United States. The 
U.S. does not want to see Taiwan go back to China. So it could pull the part that hurts 
China most when needed. The only way that the U.S. could dominate Asia as a great 
power physically far away from Asia is by dividing Japan and China. A Chinese idiom 
says, “when the snipe and the clam grapple, it is the fisherman who profits.” If China and 
Japan keep a sore relationship, who wins? It is the United States. Even fools can see 
that.120 
 
This quote is illustrative of most senior PLA officers and strategists, who could be 
roughly characterized as “doves to Japan and hawks to the U.S.”121 Given this strategic 
perspective and evaluation of potential threats, the PLA was more inclined to take a 
moderate position toward Japan in 1990s, in order to counter how it believed the U.S. 
could leverage its relationship with Japan to dominate the Asia-Pacific region.122 
However, the MFA acted much tougher towards Japan because of disputes over history 
books and Japanese politicians’ visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine - where 14 
Class-A war criminals including Hideki Tojo are honored.123 
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The PLA’s position toward Japan gradually shifted after the revision of the “U.S.-
Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines” in 1997, which expanded the U.S.-Japan 
alliance’s scope to cover the Taiwan Strait and its vicinity. The PLA started to perceive 
that Japan posed a bigger threat to its interests. As one senior PLA officer pointed out, “to 
whom the (PLA’s) guns point depend where the perceived military threats are.”124 Such 
an accumulative threat perception led to the PLA officers’ increasingly tough stance 
toward Japan. In spite of all the political downturns and open quarrels between China and 
Japan, the PLA’s engagement with Japan’s Self-Defense Forces was still ahead of the 
two countries’ political relations in many aspects.125 
Once an issue does arise, the military will assess and handle the problem from the 
perspective of a potential or imminent threat, while diplomats instinctively put off the 
issue for as long as possible. Therefore, in diplomats’ eyes, the PLA often plays up a 
threat unnecessarily, while the PLA sees the MFA as locked in the habit of avoiding 
“troubles” due to its lack of a strategic vision. Although both the PLA and MFA 
genuinely believe they themselves, not the other agency, represent China’s true national 
interests, mandates and expertise orient the two bureaucracies differently when looking at 
the same threat.  
One example illustrates the diverging perspectives of the military and the civilian 
foreign affairs system: the disagreement between the two organizations on 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification. CTBT ratification, as well as arms 
control and disarmament issues more generally, constitutes an area in which the MFA 
and PLA have consistent and distinctive differences. When China was deliberating 
whether to ratify the CTBT in 2009-10, the MFA proposed that in order to occupy the 
 367 
moral high ground, China should ratify the CTBT regardless of whether the U.S. did so. 
At this point in time, China had been under severe pressure both domestically and 
internationally. A series of civil unrest incidents in 2008126 and the July Urumqi Riot in 
2009 reinforced China’s sense of vulnerability despite decades of economic prosperity.127 
China’s neighbors were anxious, as the 2008 global financial crisis hit the U.S. economy 
hard, while China’s economy was only slightly affected. The Sino-U.S. discord 
exacerbated the pressure on China, ranging from the 2010 U.S.-ROK joint naval 
exercises in the Yellow Sea, to the U.S.’s changing position on territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea.128 Consequentially, China felt other powers were ganging up against it 
and overreacted, which only made neighboring countries more worried about China’s 
assertiveness.129  
The MFA’s approach was to relieve the international pressure on China and 
demonstrate the goodwill of a stronger China by making concessions on arms control 
issues. Hu Jintao consulted Qian Shaojun, a first-generation nuclear scientist with the 
PLA General Armament Department and a core figure behind China’s nuclear posture 
until 2011. Qian eloquently articulated the PLA’s position that it did not oppose ratifying 
the CTBT, but advised that China hold off until the U.S. ratified it. Qian explained, “to 
better protect its national security interests, China should not spin a cocoon around itself 
(getting enmeshed in a trap of its own devising), as the U.S. may ratify the CTBT with 
conditions and may even restart its nuclear tests after China’s ratification of CTBT.”130 
 
In the end, the military’s cautious, “wait and see” approach toward the CTBT prevailed. 
When facing the “Global Zero” nuclear-free world initiative that the U.S. and Russia 
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pushed in 2009-10, the PLA once again disagreed with the MFA on whether China 
should start to participate in the nuclear disarmament negotiations. There are still deep 
divisions inside the PLA on how to react to such efforts that seek to achieve complete 
nuclear disarmament. The more progressive side believes that China should actively 
participate in any forum that advocates nuclear disarmament such as “Global Zero,” in 
order to proactively explain China’s nuclear policy and shape the international debate. At 
the same time, this side cautions restraint, asserting that China should not participate in 
official disarmament negotiations until the U.S. and Russia reduce their nuclear arsenals 
significantly. The more conservative side asserts that “no response” is a better response, 
and that the PLA should accelerate its efforts to expand China’s nuclear stockpile, and 
strengthen its nuclear survivability and penetration capability. Yet the conservative side 
recognizes that nuclear disarmament negotiations are probably inevitable and may benefit 
China’s own security interests. Their logic is that if the U.S. and Russia cut their nuclear 
stockpiles at a pace much faster than China does, and if the progress of the U.S. missile 
defense system can be capped through the same negotiations, then China’s nuclear 
deterrent will be strengthened.131 
The MFA is not the only civilian agency that the PLA has disagreements with. 
When the MFA forms alliances with other agencies, its opposition within the government 
often vocalizes its opposition more loudly and attempts to constrain the PLA. After 
Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008, many Chinese civilian experts 
and officials close to TAO made strong calls to freeze and reduce China’s deployment of 
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) in the coastal area of Fujian Province, which lies 
directly opposite Taiwan and threatens it. Despite the Second Artillery’s (responsible for 
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deploying these missiles) instinctive resistance to this proposal, the PLA in fact agreed to 
this proposal and halted any new orders of these missiles. However, those missiles 
already purchased by the PLA were on track to be deployed as planned. “The revision of 
the deployment of these already purchased missiles was extremely difficult, literally 
impossible,” said a senior PLA officer.132 However, the PLA refused to publicly 
announce its decision to forego any further purchases of missiles to be deployed against 
Taiwan, due to “operational procedure.”133 Therefore, outsiders believed that the PLA 
was unresponsive to the détente between the mainland and Taiwan. In reality, the PLA is 
a huge machine that takes longer to shift gears, especially when there are divisions inside 
the PLA.  
Budgetary considerations are argued by many PLA officers as a “secondary” 
source for the differences in policy positions between the PLA and MFA. It is in the 
military’s institutional interest to strive for a bigger budget and be better equipped and 
prepared militarily. The PLA’s budgetary concern is exacerbated by the increasingly 
intense competition for resources between the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force as the PLA 
Navy emphasizes the importance of aircraft carriers and submarines, while the PLA Air 
Force advocates the “absolute necessity” of deploying strategic bombers for China’s 
security.134 
From 1978 to 1996, the PLA’s budget was essentially stagnant. During the 1980s, 
Deng invested limited economic resources into the economy and told the military to bear 
hardships and wait their turn. In the early 1990s, the military felt neglected and lobbied 
for a higher budget. The PLA budget began to rise under Jiang, but real improvements in 
officer’s salaries and the military’s welfare did not come until Hu’s era. As Senior 
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Colonel Dai Xu, a PLA Air Force analyst well-known to the outside world for his 
hardline views toward the U.S. said, “PLA officers’ salaries did not improve significantly 
until Hu was in power. My salary as a regiment-level officer did not rise to 1,700 Yuan 
by 2009.135 Now (in the summer of 2011136) I am earning 6,000 Yuan after a sweeping 
raise of salaries for officers.”137 Monthly salaries of major generals and rear admirals rose 
to 10,000 Yuan in 2011, slightly higher than civil servants of a similar administrative 
level.138 
Several retired and active-duty PLA officers pointed to the 2000s as the most 
favorable environment for the PLA’s development, as “the military always wishes for a 
certain level of tensions short of opening fires so it can draw more attention from the 
Party leaders and the public.” Yet this period might be coming to an end. The PLA’s 
budget is likely to face more downward pressure as the Chinese economy begins to slow 
down. PLA officers also realize that during peaceful times it is more difficult to convince 
the public of its need for continuing budget increases. Very few PLA officers interviewed 
by the author acknowledged this problem and expressed their worries about the Chinese 
media’s “pre-WWII war-mongering fascist” mentality of pushing China into wars, which 
pressured PLA officers take a more hard-lined position.139 “It is as if a PLA officer isn’t a 
qualified officer (in the eyes of Chinese media) if he (she) does not talk about going into 
wars when talking about frictions with other countries. This public sentiment is in some 
degree radicalizing some PLA officers, or at least their public positions. That is a deadly 
trend” (hen yao ming de qu shi), commented one PLA officer.140 One plausible scenario 
is that the PLA’s bureaucratic interests will be met as long as China goes to war, even if 
it loses that war. If the PLA wins the war, it gains both military victory and high acclaim 
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from the Chinese public. If it loses a war, Chinese leaders will rush to give the PLA more 
money, in order to strengthen the military’s capability and ensure that it wins any future 
war. Therefore, the PLA as an institution can’t lose if the leader chooses to go to war.141 
Most PLA officers dismiss the view that budget considerations dictate the PLA’s 
policy positions.142 Rather, these officers insist that threat perception has a much stronger 
influence over the PLA’s policy positions. When issues pose an imminent military threat 
to China or contradict the PLA’s existing principles, the PLA is driven to take action, and 
the budget is a much lower concern. Additionally, to support the above argument, the 
budget for purchases of big-ticket weapons systems and ships from foreign countries 
“does not come from the official defense budget but from discretionary funding earned 
through penalties by the (Administration of General) Customs and their seizure of 
smuggling worth hundreds of billions.”143  
The last source of differences between soldiers and diplomats is regarding the 
different calculus they use in evaluating situations. The military evaluates values and 
risks in a distinctly different way than do civilians. Therefore, they bargain harder for 
assets that potentially give them great military advantages, while bending over and 
compromising with greater ease on issues they believe have little military utility. 
Diplomats tend to base their assessment on a broader range of issues, such as regional 
stability, the nation’s reputation and ideology, and the impact that a policy will have on 
counties that are strategically important to China. The military values long-term strategic 
victories, even if this means short-term tactical losses. In contrast, diplomats tend to focus 
on short-term wins and deliverables, and solving issues that reach their desks. The 
military may see opportunities from a crisis, while diplomats see more crises arising from 
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a given crisis. As one PLA analyst who had a long career serving in the Shenyang 
Military Region (opposite North Korea) remarked, “A grave crisis on the Korean 
Peninsular might not be the worst scenario (for the PLA). If great instability is caused by 
external forces or regime collapse appears in North Korea, it is most likely that the PLA 
will enter North Korea to first secure the nuclear stockpiles. Many of us believe that it 
won’t stop there but seize the port at the narrowest ‘waist’ of North Korea144 that will 
open the PLA Navy to the Japan Sea.”145  
This particular PLA officer’s view may not be representative of the PLA in 
general. He may not even be representative of those in the Shenyang Military Region. 
But his approach of analysis was distinctly different from that of analysts from MFA or 
other civilian agencies, who tend to emphasize regional stability and the goal of 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. A MFA’s analyst typically emphasizes how a 
destabilized North Korea would have disastrous consequences, including Japan’s 
rearmament, the increased deployment of the U.S. military in Northeast Asia, and the 
fallout of the Sino-U.S. relationship as both sides lose a major point of cooperation. ID 
analysts worry more about the survival of North Korea’s regime and the potential blow to 
the Communist movement and the ID’s own survival as an agency if its Communist 
regime falls.  
It would be wrong to view the PLA as a player always advocating for war and 
confrontation, and the MFA as consistently pushing for peace and compromise. The 
Chinese public in general mistakenly views the MFA as “weak” and “prone to 
surrendering to the West.” The MFA’s core interest is in maintaining stability and solving 
problems to the best of its ability. For example, the establishment of Sansha City in 
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Hainan Province, a provocative move in the eyes of the Philippines, was a result of the 
MFA’s long-existing, pre-set plan (yu’an). The PLA Navy has shown restraint in cases 
such as the Sino-Philippine standoff over Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal), in 
which the PLA believes they have a clear military advantage. In cases such as the East 
China Sea dispute, in which the PLA does not have a clear military advantage, the PLA 
followed an even more cautious route. For example, the PLA senior commanders 
expressed extreme caution towards sending military planes or ships into the 12 nautical 
mile territorial waters surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, though it supports the 
activities undertaken by the paramilitary forces under the State Oceanic Administration to 
push the envelope.146  
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This and the previous chapter explain the dynamics of interactions between the 
PLA and the civilian foreign affairs system. While the previous chapter focused on 
bureaucratic culture and relative bureaucratic power, this chapter looks at the 
mechanisms for and rules that govern interaction. More specifically, this chapter first 
discusses the mechanism or platform through which the PLA interacts with the MFA and 
other civilian foreign affairs bureaucracies, and then explores what factors of the foreign 
and security policy-making process strengthen or weaken the PLA’s bargaining position. 
Since 2013, the dominance of Leading Small Groups as the mechanism the Party 
utilized for policy deliberation, consensus-building, and coordination among various 
stakeholders has been seriously challenged with the establishment of new institutions 
under Xi Jinping. In 2013, the National Security Commission (NSC) was introduced, as 
part of Xi Jinping’s attempt to hollow out existing policy mechanisms (i.e., leading small 
groups) and reroute power into a new organization that he could lead. While leading 
small groups and their executive offices are still standing, as of early 2015,1 the NSC, 
with an unprecedentedly broad mandate, has become the new nexus in foreign and 
security policy-making. Leading Small Groups’ primary purpose is to deliberate, build 
consensus, and coordinate various stakeholders within the government, the military, and 
the Party. These “cross-system integrators,” as David M. Lampton has termed them, 
serve not only as a connecting point for various agencies within the government system, 
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but also as the bridge to solve disagreements among the government bureaucracies and 
the military. Although some Leading Small Groups have existed for a long time and play 
a crucial role in policy-making, they are in essence a provisional structure, not an 
“embedded” part of the Party. 
 
Genesis of Leading Small Groups  
The mechanism of leading small groups (LSG) came out of Mao’s distrust of 
Zhou Enlai.2 In 1953, Mao was already greatly displeased with Zhou because Zhou did 
not consult him on the revision of the taxation system and instructed the Party Center, i.e., 
the Central Committee of the CCP (CCPCC) to strengthen its leadership over government 
agencies. Zhou drafted the resolution, which required that all major issues have to be 
reported to the CCPCC first, and all Party Committees in the central government are 
directly answerable to the CCPCC. In February 1958, Mao proposed the principle of “big 
power monopolized in one individual, small power decentralized, Party Committees 
make decisions, and various parties (in government) implement decisions.”3 In order for 
leading bureaucrats to better serve the Party, the government’s work was divided into 
“kou,” or areas of planning, finance and economy, politics and law, foreign affairs, 
communication, agriculture and forestry, labor, culture, and education. Officials were 
then put in charge of these larger areas or “kou.”4 This was the genesis of leading small 
groups.5  
Five LSGs – finance and economy, politics and law, foreign affairs, science, and 
culture and education – were subsequently established in June 1958. These LSGs were 
put directly under the leadership of the Politburo and the Secretariat. The LSGs were 
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initially able to formulate their own policy proposals and held immense power over 
coordinating and supervising agreed upon policies, arranging personnel appointments, 
and even influencing the policy-making process.6 However, during this period, the LSGs’ 
mandate focused more on coordination than policy-making.7 Judiciary and government 
agencies, which by constitutional design originally reported to the National People’s 
Congress, started to report to the LSGs in their “kou” or area, making the Party Center the 
actual supreme power. LSGs functioned until the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, 
which paralyzed the majority of Party and government agencies, including the LSGs. 
A turning point for LSGs occurred in 1980, when Deng Xiaoping launched 
political system reforms, which centered on separating the Party from the State, 
strengthening government institutions, and withdrawing the Party from governance. In a 
speech on reforming the Party and the state’s leading institutions in an extended meeting 
of the Politburo, Deng proposed to solve the problems of “no differentiation between the 
Party and the government” and “replacing the government with the Party leadership.”8 
With Deng’s proposal, LSGs’ status and importance ascended. Since 1987, LSGs have 
been directly under the Politburo and PBSC. LSGs enjoy the same status as the 
Secretariat, and have more power in the policy-making process.9 Arguably, LSGs’ 
ascension was relative, because the Secretariat’s power and status has sharply declined 
since the late 1980s.10 Nonetheless, following this change LSGs have more room to 
maneuver. 
 
Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) 
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The Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) is one of several channels for 
the civilian foreign affairs system to coordinate with the PLA. In June 1958, China 
institutionalized the foreign affairs management system11 and established the FALSG, an 
organ listed under the Party that directly reports to the Secretariat. This hierarchy 
established that government agencies had an advisory role, but the Party Center, 
Politburo and PBSC had the final say.12 The first FALSG was composed of six people 
and headed by Marshal Chen Yi, the then Foreign Minister. Its other members were 
Wang Jiaxiang (Secretary General of the Secretariat), Zhang Wentian, Liu Ningyi, Liao 
Chengzhi, and Ye Jizhuang, all of whom were Central Committee members.13 
The FALSG became dysfunctional during the Cultural Revolution, along with the 
paralysis of the rest of the Party and government system. It wasn’t resumed until 1981.  
The FALSG is not a permanently established institution,14 but rather is an ad-hoc 
mechanism to debate, discuss, and coordinate foreign affairs-related issues.15 Its 
functions were defined as decision-making consultation and coordination: first, it 
“discusses guidelines and major policies in foreign affairs but leaves details to various 
agencies”; second, it coordinates among relevant agencies.16 More specifically, it is 
charged with hosting inter-system, inter-agency meetings composed of representatives of 
all member agencies17 and working meetings18; enforcing decisions reached in such 
meetings; conducting investigations and research; and providing advice on major foreign 
policy issues and international affairs. FALSG, therefore, functions as a study, 
consultation, deliberation, coordination, advisory, and implementation body that serves 
the Politburo and the PBSC.  
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From 1981-87, Li Xiannian headed the FALSG, who was assisted by former 
Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei, the Director of CFAO (then under the State Council, not the 
Party). Under Li, the FALSG convened weekly.19 Li, with a conservative worldview, was 
a weak leader in foreign affairs, who was overshadowed by Deng. Therefore, the FALSG 
provided advice on strategic guidelines such as opposing the hegemony of both the 
Soviet Union and the U.S. However, the FALSG did not have significant influence on 
foreign and security policy-making until Li Peng, then Premier, took the FALSG’s helm 
in 1988.20 Vice Premier Wu Xueqian, a seasoned bureaucrat and an expert in foreign 
affairs, assisted Li in his capacity as the deputy head of FALSG.21 Since 1988, 
bureaucratic representation has dictated the FALSG’s composition.22 FALSG started to 
reach the peak of its power after Jiang Zemin became the FALSG’s head in 1996-97, 
triggered by the diplomatic crises caused by Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the U.S.23 Various 
agencies’ representation on the FALSG has changed over time, reflecting both the 
complicated and varying needs of the time and the pluralization of stakeholders in foreign 
affairs. The PLA’s representation in FALSG started in early 1980s and regularized in 
1990s.24  
Officially, member agencies in the FALSG carry the real power in decision-
making, while the executive office (Central Foreign Affairs Office), plays the role of 
“secretary,” tasked with organizing meetings, taking notes, and supervising the 
implementation of the decisions made at FALSG meetings. Since Dai Bingguo, a trusted 
advisor by Hu Jintao, became CFAO’s Director in 2005 (explained in this chapter at page 
10), CFAO has weighed in more in the FALSG’s decision-making process and engaged 
in agenda-setting, framing the policy in question, and recommending options.25 
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Depending on the importance, urgency, and relevance of issues at hand, the FALSG will 
hold small working meetings with only selected member agencies. Member agencies are 
called upon to send in their representatives at corresponding ranks, which varies based on 
how senior and authoritative such officials need to be to present their agency’s opinion. 
For example, if the issue in question is relatively tactical and narrow, representatives who 
are sent from member agencies could be low-level officials, as long as attending officials 
all have the same rank. Therefore, in most cases, the heads of member agencies do not 
attend the meetings. Rather, their representatives attend such meetings, though the lowest 
ranking representative would not be lower than that of Deputy Chief of a department or 
division (fu sizhang jibie).26  
The FALSG holds regular meetings and sometimes invites outside experts to give 
briefings. When contingencies of strategic importance take place, the FALSG can initiate 
emergency meetings. Almost all FALSG meetings are held in physical face-to-face 
settings, instead of over teleconference, for security reasons. FALSG meetings resolve 
matters mostly through consensus-building, and when in stalemate, the top political 
leader’s opinion is the deciding factor.27 That said, the top political leader regularly 
places initiatives onto the policy agenda and in these cases, the FALSG works toward the 
top leader and acts more like a policy implementation organ.  
For example, when China and the Soviet Union started to normalize their 
diplomatic relationship in 1988, Deng initiated the policy of “no embrace, only hands-
shaking,” which dictated how senior Chinese officials should greet their Soviet 
counterparts.28  According to the minutes of Premier Li Peng’s secretary, the secretary of 
Deng Xiaoping’s Office called on October 28, 1988, and passed on Deng’s message: 
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“Tell Comrades Qian Qichen and Li Peng and hold a FALSG meeting to discuss the 
diplomatic protocol of senior officials’ meetings and even summits of China and the 
Soviet Union. A tone and parameter shall be set for how close we should be, such as 
whether we should embrace each other (physically)…Embracing (of Chinese and 
Russians) will shake the world.” On the same day that Deng’s Office placed the phone 
call, Li instructed: “(Vice Premier Wu) Xueqian (whose portfolio includes foreign affairs) 
and Comrade (Qian) Qichen, please hold a working meeting (small circle) and deliberate 
on protocol (with Russians). Together with the decision of the last FALSG, report to 
Comrade Xiaoping and the Center. I will attend the meeting myself.”29 On November 3, 
a FALSG meeting was held among Premier Li Peng, Vice Premier Wu Xueqian, Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen, Zhu Liang (head of the International Department), with non-
voting delegates including Vice Foreign Ministers Tian Zengpei and Liu Huaqiu. Article 
IV of that FALSG meeting stipulated that when (Chinese and Soviet) leaders meet, they 
shall only shake hands and shall not embrace each other. Thus, the FALSG translated 
Deng’s stance and instructions into official policy.30 
 
National Security Leading Small Group 
In 2000, the National Security Leading Small Group (NSLSG) was established, in 
response to the shockwaves caused by the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 
Belgrade in 1999. In the wake of this incident, both civilian and military analysts such as 
Zhang Tuosheng, Maj. Gen. Yao Yunzhu, Men Honghua, and many others independently 
advocated for establishing a National Security Council (NSC). Additionally, a group of 
PLA analysts recommended to the top leadership that it establish a NSC.31 That specific 
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proposal was not followed, but as a compromise, the NSLSG was established. The 
NSLSG was originally intended to play a leading role in advising the top leadership and 
coordinating a response during national security contingencies, with an emphasis on 
addressing issues that affected the Sino-U.S. relationship.  
The NSLSG initially carried a prominent figure such as Zhang Wannian, Vice 
Chairman of the CMC and Politburo member, who was named as the deputy head of this 
organization. The other deputy chiefs were Hu Jintao, Jiang’s designated successor and 
then Vice President of China, and Qian Qichen, Vice Premier in charge of foreign affairs 
and Politburo member. Liu Huaqiu, the Director of Central Foreign Affairs Office, was 
the Secretary-General of the NSLSG. Other members of the NSLSG included Tang 
Jiaxuan, then Foreign Minister, Chen Yunlin, Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the 
State Council, Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of General Staff in charge of foreign 
affairs and intelligence, Xu Yongyue, Minister of State Security, and Jia Chunwang, 
Minister of Public Security.  
Those who initially conceptualized the NSLSG envisioned an organization in 
which those with strategic vision and the ability to coordinate stakeholders could handle 
national security crises in a timely fashion. The PLA clearly stood behind this concept, 
hoping to leverage this body to play a more effective role in issues in which it possessed 
greater knowledge and expertise. However, that goal was never realized. The NSLSG 
eventually became redundant and was a mere duplication of the FALSG. The NSLSG did 
not work for two reasons: first, it lacked an independent and authoritative executive arm, 
which hindered its ability to enforce its decisions and policies; second, it had only begun 
to fully operate for one to two years before the next leadership succession took place, 
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which caused political infighting and turmoil. Jiang insisted on keeping the CMC 
Chairmanship, while Hu assumed the positions of General Secretary of the Party and 
President. This exacerbated the conflicts and coordination problems between the military, 
under Jiang, and government and Party agencies, under Hu. Therefore, coordination 
mechanisms such as the NSLSG, which emphasized the bigger role of the PLA, were 
quietly sabotaged due to struggles over personnel, resources, and policy 
implementation.32 
 
Leading Small Group on the Protection of Maritime Interests (Central Maritime Interests 
Protection Office or CMIPO)33 
The Leading Small Group on the Protection of Maritime Interests, also called the 
Central Maritime Interests Protection Office, was established in September/October 2012. 
Xi Jinping heads the Leading Small Group on the Protection of Maritime Interests, which 
is a Party organ that specializes in handling contingencies related to maritime disputes. 
This organization was created in order to strengthen coordination among China’s various 
maritime agencies, and help develop and implement a more coherent maritime policy. Its 
conceptual prototype was the Office of Maritime Interests Protection in South China Sea 
under the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), which loosely connected the SOA, MFA, 
the PLA GSD, PLA Navy, Ministry of Agriculture, General Administration of Customs, 
and Ministry of Public Security, based on personal initiatives and networks.34 In March 
2013, the State Maritime Commission was established under the State Council and is 
headed by Premier Li Keqiang. It is a government agency that specializes in China’s 
domestic maritime development strategy. The State Maritime Commission’s portfolio 
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includes maritime economy, coastal development, maritime science and technology, and 
maritime ecological and environmental protection. 
 
Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG)  
The Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG) of the CCP was established 
in July 1954, and was initially composed primarily of officials who specialized in 
military intelligence and united front work, such as Li Kenong, Luo Ruiqing, Liao 
Chengzhi, and Xu Bing. While the TALSG was disbanded during the Cultural Revolution, 
it resumed its work in December 1979 under the leadership of Deng Yingchao, Premier 
Zhou Enlai’s widow. Yang Shangkun, then CMC Secretary General and later CMC Vice 
Chairman, took over the TALSG from Deng Yingchao most likely in 1988. Jiang Zemin 
officially took the TALSG’s helm in 1993, but in reality he had already begun to control 
this group in October 1992. Since Jiang, China’s top political leader has headed the 
TALSG. On June 24, 1993, the TALSG was put under the direct leadership of the PBSC. 
After Jiang Zemin took over Taiwan policy in 1992-93, the TALSG decreased its 
seats to six, with Qian Qichen, then Foreign Minister, Wang Daohan, and Wang Zhaoguo 
playing bigger roles. Gen. Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of General Staff in charge of 
military intelligence and military diplomacy, also sat on the TALSG. In 2000, Zhang 
Wannian, then CMC Vice Chairman, was given a seat on the TALSG, because of the 
crisis caused by Lee Teng-hui’s articulation of a Two-State Theory in 1999 and Taiwan’s 
2000 presidential election, in which the pro-independence DPP party won the presidency.  
 
National Security Commission under Xi Jinping 
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This dissertation examines the period of 1978 to 2012 and therefore omits 
changes initiated by Xi Jinping beginning in 2013. However, due to the fact that in 2013 
Xi initiated a drastic reform of foreign policy-making mechanisms, which has possibly 
made all of the aforementioned Leading Small Groups obsolete, this section examines 
these recent reforms. Following the November 2013 Third Plenum of the 18th Party 
Congress, the text of a 60-point CCP Central Committee “Decision” adopted at the 
Plenum was released, which outlined approximately 300 reform measures across the 
entire policy arena. This indicated “the most significant reform decision by any party 
leadership since Deng Xiaoping at the watershed 1978 Third Plenum of the 11th Central 
Committee.”35 As part of this reform package, a National Security Commission (NSC) 
was established, together with two other super groups, the Central Leading Group for the 
Comprehensive Deepening of Reform36 and the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity 
and Informatization.  
The NSC, headed by Xi, with Premier Li Keqiang and top legislator Zhang 
Dejiang serving as his deputies, is an “institutional innovation” that attempts to 
redistribute the division of power in the Party-State relationship.37 The NSC has a 
mandate of “decision-making, deliberation and coordination on national security 
affairs.”38 In other words, the NSC is the “devisor, choice-maker and implementer” of 
national security plans.39 There was speculation initially that the NSC would be a 
completely inward-looking entity focused on domestic security. However, there is a 
growing consensus that this entity covers both internal and external security challenges, 
and attempts to integrate the civilian foreign affairs system, the PLA, public security, and 
intelligence agencies.40 This formed a stark contrast with previous leading small groups, 
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as the NSC’s primary function is to make decisions, while leading small groups primarily 
play a coordination and advisory role. Although previous leading small groups 
occasionally weigh in during the decision-making process, they mostly shape the decision 
by setting the agenda and providing the options. If leading small groups reach a decision, 
without the top political leader directly involving himself or providing his opinion, such a 
decision usually has to be seconded by either Politburo or State Council executive 
meetings. In other words, leading small groups’ role in decision-making is path-restricted. 
In contrast, decisions could be made directly at the NSC, without having to go through 
any other channel. The NSC’s mandate also clearly includes devising and implementing 
national security strategy, promoting legislation and rule-making concerning national 
security, devising national security guidelines, and studying and resolving significant 
issues in China’s national security affairs. 
The unprecedented reform of China’s foreign and security policy mechanisms that 
Xi introduced, though still untested by actual emergencies, begs the question: why in the 
past did China consider the U.S.-type of National Security Council, but never implement 
it? By answering this question, one can more clearly see the challenges China’s new NSC 
will face.  
The idea of establishing a National Security Council, based on the U.S. model, 
was proposed multiple times throughout the 1990s. It was seriously studied in 1996-97, 
1999, 2001, and 2002.41 Jiang Zemin laid out the proposal for establishing a NSC in 
1997.42 These efforts partially succeeded with the establishment of a National Security 
Leading Small Group (NSLSG) in 2000, which was intended to grow into a mechanism 
akin to the U.S. NSC. However, the NSLSG never evolved in such a way. When Hu 
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Jintao took power in 2002, he had a team of experts study this idea again and make 
recommendations. However, this team was not granted a chance to even brief the PBSC 
on its findings and recommendations, much less put the plan to a vote among PBSC 
members.43  
The idea of forming an NSC was continuously brought up not only because of the 
pressing need for China to integrate and better coordinate its foreign policy-making 
actors, but also due to the time pressure of high-stake contingencies that China 
increasingly encountered beginning in the 1990s. Policy circles of the U.S. and other 
countries often brought up this idea to their Chinese counterparts because they were 
concerned by the lack of transparency in China’s foreign policy-making system, which 
caused it to be unpredictable and led to confusion. However, even though most 
interviewees, from both the military and civilian world, acknowledged that establishing a 
mechanism like the NSC is a good idea, they all expressed significant reservations and 
doubts about how to operationalize this idea. Two sets of relationships formed significant 
obstacles in any attempt to build a NSC: the conflict that would arise between a 
hypothetical NSC and the PBSC, and how the NSC would tilt the balance of civil-
military relations and domestic-foreign security coordination.  
The first hurdle is that a foreign and security policy-making mechanism such as 
the NSC would conflict with the PBSC’s authority and role, and would fundamentally 
rewrite the rules of the PBSC. This returns to a recurring theme – that of the Party’s role 
in decision-making and its relationship with both military and government agencies. 
Unlike the U.S. system, in which the President makes the final decision on issues of 
strategic significance, China’s system is designed so that the PBSC approves critical 
 397 
national security decisions by consensus. Having a NSC make decisions on many 
occasions will in essence make the PBSC redundant or obsolete. Given the PBSC’s focus 
on decision-making by consensus, it is difficult for the top leader to monopolize policies 
that cross into the purview of other PBSC members. Rather, the top leader needs to 
consult his colleagues who have a significant stake and interest in policies in question. 
The top leader in general could weigh in more heavily in the decision-making process, 
but whether other PBSC members agree with his policy recommendations largely 
depends on his political authority and power. With the establishment of a NSC, the top 
leader is the Chairman, who supersedes his deputies and other members of the NSC. A 
truly effective NSC could possibly undermine and at least dilute the PBSC’s ultimate 
authority.  
Second, the establishment of a true NSC in China would inevitably touch on the 
other set of important relationships, that of civil-military relations. For instance, who has 
seats on the NSC and who has a final say on policies are two practical issues. The PLA 
has enjoyed a unique status in China’s political system, with two seats on the Party’s 
Politburo, where the real political power has resided since 1992. By contrast, since 2002, 
the top diplomat, the State Councilor on Foreign Affairs, has not had a seat on the 
Politburo, much less the Foreign Minister, who is subordinate to the State Councilor on 
foreign affairs. Another way to see this problem is that the Vice Chairman of the CMC, 
who is always a full general, enjoys the same status as the first-ranking Vice Prime 
Minister, while the Foreign Minister has an administrative status equal to that of a 
provincial governor or the Chief of a Division in the PLA. Thus, the top PLA soldiers – 
the two CMC Vice Chairmen – outrank not only the Foreign Minister and State 
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Councilors, but also all other ministers such as ministers of finance), commerce, CIA 
state security), and public security.44 This huge gap that exists between the political 
ranking of the military and the civilian foreign affairs system makes it difficult for their 
representatives to sit at the same table on equal footing. However, if China borrows the 
U.S. experience, where ranking is determined by the relevance of missions and mandates 
as well as expertise, the MFA would be the first among equals in providing policy 
recommendations. This would tip the scales of the civil-military balance, unless some 
modifications could be made to the bureaucratic cultures of both the MFA and the PLA. 
The NSC also faces potential opposition and obstruction from ministries, weak or 
strong. Ministries with strong bureaucratic powers such as Ministry of Public Security 
(MPS) would seethe NSC as a powerful challenger that infringes on the MPS’s primacy 
in areas it specializes in. For weaker bureaucracies such as MFA, NSC represents another 
“mother-in-law” and adds another layer of supervision, which risks weakening MFA 
even further.45   
This leads to the question of why Xi insisted on building such a super agency as 
soon as he took power. David M. Lampton argued that constructing “new institutional 
pathways” is a method Xi used to “shape policy and bring in new people not so beholden 
to the previous constellation of interests.”46 Additionally, “Xi Jinping is…using the 
creation of the NSC to seek to consolidate his personal sway in the domestic security, 
foreign policy, and military realms. In short, Xi is both driving to achieve better policy 
coordination and greater personal control in the system.”47 
Despite all the hurdles mentioned above, Xi managed to accomplish the task of 
establishing a NSC due to his rapid consolidation of power, respectable family 
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background, solid support from the PLA, and sweeping anti-corruption campaign, which 
removed potential opposition. The NSC’s membership remains a tightly-held secret. 
Based on the interviews with officials of pertinent agencies, it includes members from the 
MFA, the international propaganda/communication apparatus (waixuan), Ministry of 
Public Security, the judicial system, Ministry of State Security, military intelligence (the 
PLA GSD 2nd and 3rd Departments), political warfare (the PLA GPD Liaison 
Department), the People’s Armed Police, and possibly the State Oceanic 
Administration.48  
While establishing the NSC was in and of itself a major accomplishment, 
challenges to the new NSC are enormous due to the hurdles explained above. It is 
apparent that tension over the NSC’s establishment remains, as evidenced by the slow 
process and opaque nature of the NSC in terms of deciding upon the leadership and their 
respective roles, the personnel make-up,49 and its decision-making procedures.50  
One can expect Xi’s opponents to push back and attempt to sabotage the NSC, 
which may either undermine its authority or disrupt its ability to function. Xi managed to 
announce the establishment of the NSC in November 2013 during the Third Plenum of 
the Chinese Communist Party's 18th Congress in the form of a resolution of the 
CCPCC.51 However, the Politburo meeting in January 2014 passed a resolution to change 
the name of the NSC to the Central National Security Commission. This name change, 
according to China’s political practice, equates to asserting that this organization is a part 
of the Party system, which then mandates its subordination to the CCPCC Politburo and 
the PBSC.52 Based on the Party Constitution passed by the 18th Party Congress, the 
CCPCC has the authority to implement the Party Congress’s resolutions and lead the 
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Party’s work, while the Politburo has the authority to implement and even refine but not 
change the CCPCC’s resolutions.53 
Xi is heading China’s inaugural NSC, assisted by Premier Li Keqiang and Zhang 
Dejiang, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, who are the top three 
members of the PBSC. Among the four PBSC members who are not sitting on the NSC, 
Wang Qishan and Yu Zhengsheng are known to be Xi’s political allies. Therefore, in the 
NSC’s establishment the real losers are Liu Yunshan and Zhang Gaoli. Liu Yunshan, the 
ideology and propaganda Tsar,54 has been cracking down on liberal voices. Liu truncated 
Southern Weekend’s 2013 New Year editorial, which originally advocated rule by 
Constitution.55 The power struggle between Xi and Liu led to a public warning by Xi in a 
Politburo meeting on 22-25 June 2013 that “comrades of the Politburo shall be a good 
model and voluntarily protect the Party leadership’s authority.”56 Zhang Gaoli, the first 
ranking Vice Premier overseeing finance, climate change and the environment, has been 
sidelined and remained in a much weaker position to challenge Xi.57   
Although Zhang Dejiang obtained a seat on the NSC, his loss of power on the 
PBSC probably outweighed his gains on the NSC, which explains why Zhang has tried to 
torpedo the NSC.58 Zhang clashed with Xi over the abolishment of forced labor camps 
(laogai), an institution Xi personally abhorred,59 and how to deal with Hong Kong’s 
future.60  
According to China’s legal doctrine, only the NPC could abolish the laogai 
institution. The CCPCC passed a resolution in November 2012 announcing the abolition 
of laogai. After Meng Jianzhu, Secretary of the Political and Legal Commission, 
announced in January 2013 the plan to end and abolish the Laogai institution within a 
 401 
year,61 the national congress of the NPC held in March failed to release any draft on 
laogai reform. Premier Li Keqiang, at the press conference of this congress, promised to 
“revise” this institution by the end of 2013. The NPC, headed by Zhang Dejiang, strongly 
resisted Xi and Li’s efforts. When the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Party Congress 
was held in November 2013, the NPC blocked any move on revising or abolishing laogai, 
which drove Premier Li to announce that the State Council first initiated Laogai and 
therefore it could abolish Laogai without notifying the NPC. On December 28 2013, the 
Standing Committee of the NPC passed a resolution ending all relevant laws and 
regulations of the “re-education through labor” system, i.e., laogai. As a compromise, a 
new system called “illegal activities correction,” or weijiao, was introduced.  
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC), headed by 
Zhang Dejiang, issued a controversial “decision” on proposed reforms to the Hong Kong 
electoral system on August 31 2014, which triggered massive “Occupy Central” protests 
in Hong Kong.62 Xi allegedly disagreed with Zhang’s position and subsequent tough 
approach, despite the fact that Hong Kong affairs is part of Zhang’s mandate, who heads 
the Central Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Coordination Group. When meeting with 
Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying in November 2014, Xi broke precedent by not 
expressing his approval publicly about Leung63 and did not openly support the “831 
Decision.” Zhang was conspicuously absent from this meeting, which is highly unusual 
for a PBSC member in charge of this line of work.  
As of early 2015, the establishment of NSC clearly served the dual purpose: 
dissolving the power of Central Political and Legal Commission, by including the 
domestic stability and security as one of its missions; and foreign and security policy-
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making. There is not enough evidence to determine whether and how China’s new NSC 
works. The long-delayed announcement of its leading personnel as well as the lack of 
transparency both in its other designated officials how it works indicate that turf wars are 
still ongoing. The awkward and unexplained coexistence of leading small groups with the 
NSC further reveals that turf wars between Xi and other PBSC members are unresolved. 
 
Interactions: PLA Versus MFA 
The following section examines how the MFA and PLA coordinate with each 
other through both formal and informal channels, by explaining the coordinating 
mechanisms on paper and evaluating the actual effectiveness of their interactions. By 
introducing four rules that govern their interactions, one can see in cases when the PLA 
and MFA disagree with each other which side is most likely to win and how that side 
wins. 
When Zhou Enlai oversaw China’s foreign affairs, the MFA had a natural bond 
with the military. In the 1950s, most of the diplomats, especially Foreign Ministers Ji 
Pengfei, Wu Xueqian, and Qian Qichen, either had a background in combat or experience 
in underground resistance and military intelligence.64 Those who composed the military 
leadership were comrades of and subordinate to Zhou and Marshal Chen Yi, who served 
as Foreign Minister after Zhou. While Chen was Foreign Minister, he also served as Vice 
Chairman of the CMC. The Central Committee and the Central Military Committee once 
issued the order to “select one officer at the division level and two officers at the 
regiment level from each corps with a minimum of middle-school education.”65 The 
MFA “borrowed” a total of 20 military officers to be ambassadors, six of whom became 
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Vice Foreign Ministers, including Ji Pengfei, Yuan Zhongxian, Geng Biao, Huang Zhen 
(father-in-law of Dai Bingguo), Wang Youping, and Han Nianlong. These “General 
Ambassadors” were allowed to maintain their military IDs while serving as diplomats. 
Among the twenty “General Ambassadors” was Geng Biao, who after serving as an 
ambassador from 1950-71returned to the military to serve as Defense Minister (1981-83). 
The last of the “General Ambassadors” was Ding Guoyu, who finished his term as 
Ambassador in 1984.66  
Coordination between the civilian foreign affairs system and the military before 
the mid-1980s was seamless, in the sense that both were tightly controlled by a handful of 
people who formed China’s first generation of leadership, and that they knew each other 
so well at the personal level. Such smooth coordination was also made possible because 
China’s relationship with the outside world was fairly limited, and therefore personal 
knowledge, experiences, and convictions normally did not diverge from one another. 
However, Deng’s campaign in the 1980s to send the military back to the barracks cut off 
the one-way rotation from the PLA to the MFA. Additionally, the MFA’s new retirement 
system replaced the old generation of diplomats with “technocrats and professionals.” 
These two policies catalyzed the revolution of professionalization that swept the MFA.67 
Meanwhile, the two bureaucracies, the MFA and the military, started to separate, 
specialize, and grow apart. As the personal bonds between diplomats and soldiers 
weakened, formal institutionalized coordination mechanisms became important.  
 
Inter-agency Cooperation (or lack thereof) Between the MFA and PLA  
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In addition to mechanisms such as leading small groups and the newly-established 
National Security Commission, the PLA and MFA have established four forms of direct 
interagency coordination that are tasked with solving policy differences: direct 
division/department channels, contingency-based task forces, permanent multi-agency 
coordination mechanisms, and informal engagements. 
1. Direct division/department channels: 
The MFA and PLA use formal direct channels to communicate with each other 
only when handling an actual issue or situation that requires the other side’s cooperation 
for implementation. The most common contacts are initiated through 
division/department-level channels between the MFA and PLA, though these contacts are 
made on behalf of minister-level authorities (buji mingyi). Both the MFA and PLA have 
to decide who will be its lead contact (qiantou bumen). The divisions/departments 
assuming the roles of lead contact will draft a document that is signed by all relevant 
divisions/departments within either the MFA or PLA. Most disagreements are resolved at 
the level of departments/divisions (siji bumen). These departments will contact and 
communicate with each other by phone. If the issue is highly sensitive, these discussions 
will be conducted over “red phones” or special hotlines (baomi dianhua or jiyao dianhua). 
If such consultations and discussions are unable to resolve these disagreements, 
departments/divisions will hold coordination meetings. They can also attach their own 
opinions to the original document and ask for high-level intervention. For the MFA, in 
most situations, documents are transported through the Confidential Traffic Division 
(jiyao jiaotongchu) under its General Office. During emergencies, lower-level staffers 
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need to run to other ministries with the documents that need signatures and bring them 
back to MFA, a practice known as “running signature” (paoqian).68 
For the MFA, which agency will serve as its point of contact depends on the 
nature and significance of the issue in question. Its lead agency on an issue could be a 
functional departments/division like the Department of Arms Control, or it could be a 
regional division such as the Department of Asian Affairs. Issues often touch on multiple 
departments within the MFA, in which case the department closest to the issue and with 
greatest expertise is often designated as the lead agency. If the department that would 
typically handle an issue happens to be busy dealing with a major contingency, the 
leading role could be handed to another relevant department within the MFA. The 
department tasked with representing the MFA on a certain issue then coordinates with the 
other relevant departments within the MFA and deals with the PLA and other external 
policy actors.  
Personalities and the history of bureaucratic relationships are important factors 
that influence the effectiveness of inter-agency coordination. An officer of the GSD FAO 
indicated that his organization, in general, has difficulty coordinating with the MFA, 
though his office has relationships of varying strength depending on which department 
within the MFA it is dealing with. “We have very tense relationships with some 
departments of MFA but have slightly better communications with others,” said this PLA 
officer. “GSD has explicit and serious disagreements with MFA. Our differences are deep 
and wide. When it comes to any issue relevant to (China’s) security interests, MFA must 
consult with the PLA.”69 MFA officials complain that their PLA interlocutors are often 
uncooperative and even arrogant in their communications with the MFA. “On several 
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major issues, (the PLA interlocutors) started the conversations by asking, ‘do you want us 
to open fires or not? If you do, we will go ahead. If you don’t, say whatever you like to 
and it is none of our business,’” said a mid-level MFA official.70 
2. Issue-based and contingency-based task forces:  
Issue-based task forces are narrowly focused on building interagency cooperation 
for one issue, while temporary, contingency-based interagency task forces are established 
to respond to a short-term crisis. Among all the mechanisms, these issue- and 
contingency-based meetings are still the most frequently used channel of interaction 
between the PLA and the MFA.71 For example, the Mechanism for Consultation and 
Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, established in 2011-12, belongs to the 
category of issue-based task forces. A task force was set up to prepare for potential 
contingencies during the Beijing Olympic Games, which put agencies such as the MFA, 
PLA, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of State Security together. A Diaoyu 
Island (Dispute) Contingency Task Force, headed by Xi Jinping, was established in 2013, 
which is composed of agencies including the MFA, PLA, intelligence community, and 
oceanic paramilitary forces. More low-level inter-agency task forces were set up to deal 
with contingencies such as the evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya in 2011.72 
When crises threaten the lives and well-being of a large number of Chinese 
citizens, such as emergent public security threats, natural disasters, catastrophic terrorist 
attacks, or civil unrest, the crisis response mechanism within the Chinese civilian system 
would be triggered. The most urgent crisis response, known as a “level-one crisis 
response,” (yiji xiangying) would lead to the swift establishment of a Headquarters of 
International Contingency and Crisis Response (shewai tufa shijian yingji zongzhihuibu) 
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within the State Council. At this crisis level the PLA would automatically be part of this 
mechanism, participating through its Office of Emergency Command in Handling 
Contingencies (jundui chuzhi tufa shijian lingdao xiaozu bangongshi), which is a part of 
the PLA General Staff. This office, established in 2005, shares contingency information 
and intelligence with 20 civilian entities.73 A “level-two crisis response” (erji xiangying) 
would lead, upon the State Council’s approval, to the establishment of an Interagency 
Joint Meeting (buji lianxi huiyi). The PLA, however, is not a default member of this Joint 
Meeting mechanism. For instance, during the 2014 crisis management effort that was 
initiated after Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 (MH370) went missing, the Joint Meeting, 
led by the MFA, included more than 12 ministries and agencies, but the PLA was initially 
not included. The PLA General Staff, and the PLA Navy and Air Force were part of a 
search and rescue interagency meeting led by the Ministry of Transportation, which was 
also joined by China’s Coast Guard, Aviation Administration, and General Customs. The 
PLA was not included in the Joint Meeting until its second meeting.74 
Depending on the nature and relevance of the issue at hand, either the MFA or the 
PLA could initiate the contact. Points of contact on both sides have to hold similar 
bureaucratic rank. On the PLA side, the GSD/MND Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) is the 
MFA’s main point of contact when it comes to diplomatic issues, while the PLA GSD 
Operations Department and its relevant bureaus is the primary avenue for coordination on 
substantive policy issues. The MFA communicates and coordinates with both the PLA 
General Politics Department and the PLA General Logistics Department, but much less 
so compared with the GSD Operations Department and the GSD FAO.  
 408 
Issue-based task forces work on mandates established through international 
agreements and are therefore obliged to maintain their operations indefinitely. 
Contingency-based task forces are normally terminated soon after the crisis passes. 
However, these contingency-based task forces, which during long-lasting crises also 
continue to operate for a long period of time, are mostly ineffective over the long run 
unless they receive high-level attention from top leaders. This ineffectiveness is due to 
the MFA’s division-level agencies are constantly short-staffed and overstretched. As a 
result, in some instances one staff member will be assigned to shoulder the responsibility 
of several inter-agency coordination task forces. In reality, he or she does not adequately 
contribute to any of these task forces. 
3. Permanent interagency coordination mechanisms: 
When contingencies reoccur and become a repeating pattern, the contingency-
based Joint Meeting mechanism, though designed to be temporary, could eventually 
become a permanent mechanism, such as the Joint Meeting on Overseas Chinese 
Protection. This mechanism played an effective role in the highly publicized incidents 
such as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami75, the Kyrgyzstan riot of 2010, 76  and the Libyan 
war in 2011, in responding to the crisis and planning the evacuation of Chinese citizens.  
Some permanent interagency coordination mechanisms are foisted on China from 
the outside. These coordination mechanisms are created out of some bilateral or 
international consensus and therefore feel the need to outline and successfully achieve 
deliverables. However, these mechanisms can evaporate if the consensus that formed 
them breaks. For example, based on the Sino-U.S. agreement in April 2013, the office of 
the Cyber Working Group was established in June of that year under MFA to coordinate 
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Sino-U.S. dialogues and cooperation on cyber security.77 However, this mechanism was 
disbanded in mid-2014 following the U.S.’s indictment of five PLA officers that it 
accused of cyber theft. 
Coordination mechanisms with international participation may alter the dynamics 
of these mechanisms’ operations. The U.S. pushed for a Strategic Security Dialogue 
(SSD) to be added to the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), which 
has become the only bilateral platform for Chinese and American civilian and military 
officials to discuss sensitive security issues in the same room.78 Many in the PLA 
mistakenly perceived the SSD as an “innovation” of Assistant Secretary of State Kurt 
Campbell, who was disliked by many military analysts, despite the fact that the SSD was 
actually the “brainchild of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg.79 The PLA 
fundamentally disliked the idea of the SSD, in which the PLA took the lead, being 
integrated as a “component” of another forum that the MFA would lead.  
Rear Admiral Guan Youfei, the Deputy Chief of the PLA GSD Foreign Affairs 
Office and a relatively low-ranking PLA officer, attended the 2008 U.S.-China SSD 
Working Lunch. For the first reintegrated S&ED in 2009, the U.S. sent military 
representatives such as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy and 
PACOM Commander Admiral Timothy Keating. Yet the PLA still sent out Rear Admiral 
Guan as its counterpart for a separate session of military dialogues. This probably 
prompted President Obama to stress during the S&ED that increased ties between the two 
countries’ militaries could “diminish causes for disputes while providing a framework for 
cooperation.” 
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The second SE&D was held in Beijing in May 2010. Even though the PLA 
suspended some mil-to-mil exchanges with the U.S. to protest U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, 
the U.S. still sent high-level military representatives to the meeting, including PACOM 
Commander Admiral Robert Willard and Assistant Secretary of Defense Wallace 
Gregson. The U.S. representatives met separately with Air Force General Ma Xiaotian, 
Deputy Chief of General Staff, and Rear Admiral Guan, for contentious meetings.  
The PLA snubbed both the MFA and the U.S. in order to indicate its displeasure 
with being relegated to a platform in which it had to follow the MFA’s lead in front of a 
foreign audience. For the inaugural round of the SSD in Washington in May 2011, which 
took place during the 3rd round of the S&ED, the U.S. side again sent high-level military 
representatives such as Under Secretary Flournoy, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff General James Cartwright, and Admiral Willard. However, on the Chinese side, 
only General Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of General Staff, attended the dialogue.80 
General Chen Bingde, Chief of General Staff, chose to visit the U.S. (May 15-22) less 
than a week after the SSD had concluded (May 9-10).81 The fifth SE&D was held on 3-4 
May 2012 in Beijing while Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie visited Washington 
on 4-10 May and therefore dodged the SSD dialogue. As one senior PLA officer 
remarked, “The PLA values the symbolic meaning of holding a seat at FALSG. But in 
terms of substance, we have better and more direct channels to influence the boss (lao da). 
The PLA resents platforms of dialogues in which the PLA does not play a lead role, such 
as the SSD. When Ma Xiaotian was in position and had to attend a mechanism which is 
not led by the PLA, he dealt with it half-heartedly.” As another senior PLA officer 
explained, “Ma Xiaotian made it a mere formality (at SSD). Liang’s visit expressed the 
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PLA’s point abundantly clear: the PLA likes to talk to the U.S. military, but not through 
SSD, a dialogue essentially chaired and controlled by the MFA.”82  
China’s civil-military relationship has its own dynamic. The American proposal 
for a civilian-led platform joined by soldiers in front of outside players was well-
intentioned, but in reality any initiative that would fundamental change the relationship 
between the PLA and the MFA has to come from within China’s own political power 
arrangements and these bureaucracies themselves. 
4. Informal engagements:  
The PLA and MFA have low-level avenues for communication and coordination, 
which are mostly initiated as a result of projects individuals under either the PLA or 
MFA took on that require inter-agency coordination. For example, a PLA GSD Foreign 
Affairs Office staffer always has a counterpart in the MFA’s Department of Arms 
Control, whom he/she is supposed to contact regularly. Contact could be initiated by 
either side, for instance if one party needs to write a report on a certain issue that requires 
understanding the other agency’s point of view. These personal contacts, if handled well, 
could contribute to enhanced communication between the two bureaucracies.  
MFA needs these channels for informal communication as well to handle its 
“guanxi” or relationship with the PLA for when its needs the PLA’s consent on certain 
policy proposals. The MFA initiated an informal engagement when it sought the PLA’s 
approval for the 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). 
The PLA internally criticized and resisted the DOC, which was a non-binding political 
statement that committed the parties involved to certain rules of the road in the South 
China Sea. MFA officials in turn launched a charm offensive and used informal 
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engagements to try to reduce the military’s resistance.83 In the end, the PLA reluctantly 
agreed to support the DOC and China and ASEAN member states signed the document. 
Other informal channels that the MFA and PLA utilize to engage each other 
include the CCP Central Party School’s high-level training programs. The Central Party 
School regularly holds classes (xuexi ban) for senior Party officials in government and 
the military. The classes’ teachers and speakers are sometimes brought in from 
institutions outside the Central Party School. These classes and programs have been one 
of the major informal channels for senior officials to socialize and network with their 
counterparts from other state bureaucracies, the Party, and the military.  
The PLA also seeks to communicate with outside experts, including experts from 
the MFA, by holding seminars and conferences through its own universities and 
academies. However, the PLA General Staff Department Foreign Affairs Office, when 
holding policy consultations, almost never invites MFA officials or experts from 
institutions affiliated with the MFA.84   
 
Bureaucratic Hurdles for Inter-agency Coordination 
Direct inter-agency coordination between the PLA and the MFA faces 
bureaucratic hurdles due to: a disparity in the political ranking of their respective 
leadership; differences in bureaucratic culture; and a gap of knowledge in personnel.  
First, differences in policy positions are exacerbated by the PLA’s elevated status 
in Chinese politics relative to the MFA. As a hierarchical organization, the PLA 
fundamentally values official ranks. The military’s top leaders, the Vice Chairmen of the 
CMC, are both Politburo members, holding a rank equivalent to that of the Vice Premier 
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of the State Council, at State Deputy level (fuguoji). Both Vice Chairmen are included in 
the category of “Party and National (State) leaders.” Their prestige and ranking not only 
far exceeds the Foreign Minister’s, but also surpasses that of State Counselor on foreign 
affairs, neither of which is considered a “Party and State leader.”  
Second, the MFA and PLA have distinctively different bureaucratic cultures, 
which could become hurdles during inter-agency coordination. MFA has a relatively flat 
organizational structure, and formulates policy positions mostly through consensus-
building. Therefore, the MFA’s divisions and departments cooperate with each other 
more easily and more readily than other bureaucracies. The horizontal transfer of chiefs 
and deputy chiefs of various divisions and departments is fairly common and 
institutionalized, which helps reduce parochialism and departmental/divisional interests. 
For the MFA’s bureaucrats, there is no point in feuding with another division, since one 
could find oneself transferred to that division in the future. Such a bureaucratic culture 
leads to policy assessments and prescriptions reflecting broad consensus, but often 
lacking creativity or ingenuity.85  
The PLA’s component pieces are much more hierarchical than those of the MFA 
(explained in greater detail in Chapter 2), although its structure follows the standard 
practice of “countersignature” or “joint signature (huiqian), like all of China’s other 
bureaucracies. The chains of the PLA’s decision-making are relatively shorter than the 
MFA’s. The transfer of personnel back and forth from one agency to another, at the same 
pay grade, is much less common in the PLA than in the MFA. For example, the personnel 
of the Operations Department (also called the 1st Department) of the PLA General Staff 
and the Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) of the PLA GSD, or the personnel of the 1st 
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Department and 2nd Department (intelligence) of the General Staff, very rarely rotate with 
each other. Therefore, the divisional interests in the PLA are more clearly delineated. 
Additionally, the boundaries of interests are more respected for fear that during the 
enforcement stage the aggrieved department will sabotage or resist the department that 
crossed the line. Therefore, the PLA’s assessment of issues and policy recommendations 
for addressing them are more pointed or sharper than the MFA’s.86  
Another aspect of the difference in bureaucratic culture of the two is the level of 
rigidity in changing its position. The PLA has often been found to be slower to get off its 
hardline position, as evidenced by its reluctance to restart the mil-to-mil relationship with 
the U.S. after U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. However, compared to the MFA, the PLA, 
especially those in mid-level functional positions, was less willing to suspend the mil-to-
mil relationship for selling arms to Taiwan in the first place.87 In the end, the PLA has 
more to lose than the MFA when Sino-U.S. military contacts are suspended.88 The PLA’s 
preferred policy position is to persuade the U.S. that if “you give Taiwan something, then 
give us something too.”89 However, the MFA typically shifts more quickly to a softer 
approach to the U.S., as long as it sees the potential benefits of such an approach in other 
areas. Meanwhile, the PLA finds it more difficult to adjust its position unless it sees 
tangible compromises from the U.S. that benefit the PLA.  
Finally, the PLA and MFA’s personnel have contrasting areas and levels of 
knowledge, experience, and expertise. The MFA’s staff rotates between posts in 
embassies and their division/department or among departments/divisions much more 
frequently, on a three- or four-year basis, in order to stay on the promotion track. MFA 
staff can also more easily than their PLA counterparts get overseas training opportunities 
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or even leave the MFA to pursue advanced education and training inside or outside of 
China. Therefore, the PLA’s staff involved in policy-making areas stays on average much 
longer in one position than the MFA’s staff. The PLA’s staff is likely to be more 
seasoned and experienced in the areas they work on than their interlocutors in the MFA. 
The knowledge gap between the lower-ranking staff members of the PLA and MFA is 
revealed during direct interactions between the two agencies, creating a certain amount of 
arrogance in the PLA when dealing with the MFA.90 In recent years, the PLA has 
gradually lowered the rank of military officers who regularly communicate and 
coordinate with the MFA. As of 2013, the military rank of such officers is that of Field 
Officer (xiaoguan), while the MFA interlocutor’s corresponding rank is that of Deputy 
Chief or Chief of Division.91 
While bureaucratic hurdles exist in inter-agency coordination between the PLA 
and the MFA, the PLA is incentivized to cooperate with the MFA on a narrow range of 
issues. As the PLA has not changed its long-standing policy of not seeking overseas 
military bases, it relies on the MFA and its embassies to help negotiate deals with littoral 
countries to supply and provide docking for its military ships and airplanes. As the PLA 
Navy aspires to become a blue-water force and operate in distant seas, the PLA will 
increasingly need the MFA to strike diplomatic deals. This was evidenced during the case 
of the 2011 evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya, in which the PLA sent out 12 
military airplanes and one frigate to evacuate Chinese citizens but had to rely on the 
MFA to negotiate the logistics and supplies.92 
 
Rules of the Game: Who Wins and under what Conditions 
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The following section outlines important “rules” that determine whether the PLA 
wins or loses policy battles. Such rules are: advantage of early entry during times of 
overwhelming external threats; advantage of strong allies/weak opponents (disadvantage 
of strong opponents); advantage of strong motivations; and advantage of public opinion. 
Substantial empirical evidence of results – policies made or un-made – support these 
rules, though only a few illustrative cases are discussed in this section.  
Some rules combine with others, compounding and magnifying the PLA’s impact 
on events. For example, a persistent overwhelming external threat may make the PLA 
highly motivated, silence opponents, and stir up public opinion. In other instances, 
different rules indicate divergent directions, potentially offsetting one another. What is 
the outcome when the PLA is highly motivated, but its opponents are powerful and 
equally motivated? In such a scenario, the policy-making process and debate will mostly 
likely hit an impasse, which means the PLA is not likely to get its way, while its 
opponents may not realize their goals completely. Then, each bureaucracy will undertake 
actions consistent with its own beliefs and understanding, until this impasse is broken 
either by a powerful leader’s intervention, or when the situation evolves to clearly justify 
one solution over another. Bureaucracies will try to avoid an impasse by choosing the 
second-best option, which is to negotiate a package deal whereby each gets something it 
wants.  
 
Advantage of Exclusive Access or Expertise 
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The PLA generally gains an upper hand in influencing the final policy decision 
when the issues at hand are convincingly defined as unequivocally concerning China’s 
territorial integrity or national security. The reason is that the PLA has irreplaceable and 
exclusive expertise in war and defense issues. As one senior PLA officer stated:  
The more military pressure a security crisis creates, the more needed the military is to 
speak. The more pressing the crisis or contingency is, the more China’s top leader needs 
to hear from the military what military options are. A militarized crisis, if prolonged, will 
inevitably enhance the military’s voice and influence on the final decision. When 
prolonged security tensions with an overwhelming threat of war exist, the PLA is almost 
guaranteed to have a seat at the table and be consulted.93  
 
American analysts have observed that in the American context, “defense issues are 
simply more politically compelling than foreign policy issues for elected officials.”94 
This conclusion is even truer in the Chinese context, given the Chinese leadership’s 
constant worry about China’s survival and the Party’s stability and legitimacy. Threats 
resonate more easily than opportunities with Chinese officials and citizens.  
In his seminal book analyzing the development of military doctrines during the 
interwar period, Barry R. Posen found that when there was a looming threat of war, 
balance of power theory tended to explain the policy outcome best.95 Under this 
circumstance, the decision-making process is explained in terms of the government as a 
rational actor that tries to “maximize strategic goals and objectives.”96 Therefore, in times 
of an overwhelming external threat, bureaucratic infighting and bargaining become less 
intense, while different bureaucracies are forced to make a more concerted effort to 
coordinate their actions. As Posen elaborates, “In times of relative international calm, 
when statesmen and soldiers perceive the probability of war as remote, the organizational 
dynamics…tend to operate. When threats appear greater, or war appears more probable, 
balancing behavior occurs. A key element of that behavior is greater civilian attention to 
matters military.”97 
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Despite the fact that the above conclusions on decision-making were made in the 
context of examining democratic regimes, they can explain the interactions of the 
Chinese military and foreign ministry. Additional reasons for the PLA’s more prominent 
position can be found in the Chinese policy context: 
When a significant external threat looms, two things will happen: first, the top 
leader will serve as the ultimate decision-maker and arbiter, and therefore the MFA will 
be demoted to a lower link in the decision-making chain; second, the decision-making 
will naturally require military expertise, and therefore the PLA will inevitably be 
consulted. As the overwhelming external threat persists, the chances are that the PLA will 
have increased opportunities to talk to the top leader directly, through the CMC and in 
person.98 However, this does not guarantee that the top leader will take the military’s 
advice once he hears it. Nonetheless, the military will have a greater opportunity than the 
MFA to frame the issue and provide its intelligence and assessment. The MFA, however, 
is not completely powerless during times of grave external threat. If the issue requires the 
decision between peace and war, it will be a matter for discussion at the Politburo, in 
order to share responsibility or blame with the top leader, which is a venue where the 
MFA can constrain the top leader and the military if it disagrees with the decision. 
Compromises that the PLA made can be found in instances where there was an 
imminent threat of war. For example, in 1987 China and India stood at the brink of war. 
However, China chose to deescalate precisely because of military considerations. In early 
1987, PLA border troops encountered Indian troops during what the PLA asserted was a 
“routine border patrol” and shot and captured more than 16 Indian soldiers after, 
according to China, the Indian army opened fire. The two militaries stood at a standoff 
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for over two months and came very close to war.99 The two countries’ diplomats 
successfully negotiated a simultaneous withdrawal from the disputed region and the PLA 
agreed to this proposal primarily because of military calculations –  it wanted to avoid a 
two-front war, as its war with Vietnam had not completely ended. During both phases – 
saber rattling and backing off – the PLA critically influenced China’s decision-making.100 
The PLA, like all other militaries, monopolizes the use of force or violence. 
Because the PLA understands the advantage that exclusive expertise grants it during the 
policy process, it tries to monopolize all aspects of military affairs, such as mil-to-mil 
contacts, and deliberation and establishment of military confidence-building measures. 
For example, as the mainland and Taiwan began to improve their relationship after 
President Ma took power in 2008, Shanghai-based scholars and government-dominated 
NGOs that already developed great knowledge and an extensive network in Taiwan were 
active in moving beyond economic and cultural exchanges and searching for ways to 
enhance mil-to-mil trust between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Even without the 
military expertise that the PLA has, these non-military scholars and organizations have 
one thing the PLA lacks in this area — their network of contacts in Taiwan, knowledge 
and history of interacting with Taiwanese, and more freedom and less reluctance to reach 
out to Taiwan’s retired military officers. Also, the Chinese government has been 
interested in generating momentum and building military CBMs with Taiwan. However, 
the PLA was displeased with this development and tried to exclude other actors from 
prying into areas in which it so far has displayed the most expertise. The PLA opposition 
frustrated the Central Affairs Office’s (CAO, under the Foreign Affairs Leading Small 
Group) efforts to fund this project. “The CAO does not say no, but it does not say yes 
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either. It just drags its feet until we no longer pursue and we understand why,” said a 
Shanghai-based scholar.101 
 
Advantage of Strong Allies / Disadvantage of Strong Opponents 
When the PLA disagrees with the MFA on certain policies, support from 
politically powerful allies can greatly strengthen the military’s voice. For the PLA, any 
powerful political actor, which is not solely limited to bureaucracies,102 could become its 
ally or opponent. Who become the PLA’s allies depends mostly on the issue at hand, 
historic relations between the two actors, and the sense of a shared common concern. A 
long history of cooperation and shared principles could bond the PLA with a particular 
agency more easily on policy issues. Such a relationship can be found between the PLA 
and the State Oceanic Administration/Coastal Surveillance, and the PLA and the 
Administration of General Customs.  
Common concerns and priorities regarding security issues could align the PLA 
with two other security-focused agencies, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS). However, MSS and MPS in particular could become 
either powerful allies or strong opponents of the PLA, depending on the particular policy 
issue. Each of the three security-focused bureaucracies independently operates 
intelligence collection and analysis channels, which are rarely shared with other agencies. 
Erecting bureaucracies with overlapping functions was probably intended to make it 
difficult for each bureaucracy with sensitive and important information, such as the 
failure of an operation, to conceal it from the top leader. Having powerful allies on board 
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often strengthens the PLA’s case; however, having strong opponents often leads to delays, 
stalemates, and indecision.  
In 2008-09, both Afghanistan and the U.S. requested that Xinjiang's Wakhan 
Corridor be opened to NATO troops, with the goal of opening a new supply line for its 
forces in Afghanistan. President Karzai in August 2008, and his Vice President 
Mohammad Karim Khalili in October 2009, requested that Beijing consider building road 
links between Badakhshan Province in Afghanistan and Xinjiang Province in China by 
developing the Wakhan Corridor.103 In the U.S.-China Joint Statement issued at the 
conclusion of President Obama’s visit to China in November 2009, China promised to 
“support” the “efforts of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight terrorism, maintain domestic 
stability and to achieve sustainable economic and social development.” In January 2010, 
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown also urged China to consider sending troops to 
Afghanistan, which would make China’s opening of the Wakhan Corridor inevitable. 
China did not explicitly oppose this proposal and agreed to consider it. By mid-2010, it 
was clear that China had ruled it out, primarily because of opposition from the military. 
The PLA CMC decided against this proposal based on multiple considerations:104 
First, the PLA was worried that opening the Wakhan Corridor to help the U.S. 
military would upset the Taliban to such a degree that the Taliban would launch 
retaliatory terrorist attacks against China and strengthen its support of the Uighur 
separatists in Xinjiang.105 This would undermine China’s efforts to stabilize Xinjiang. In 
the PLA’s opinion, Americans will “leave eventually after the war but China will be the 
perpetual neighbor of Afghanistan. If China arouses resentment from the Islamic world, it 
may drag China down strategically.”106  
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Second, the PLA decided against this proposal because it did not fully support the 
U.S. war in Afghanistan. In the PLA’s opinion, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) did not authorize the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan (Operation 
Enduring Freedom).  
Third, the PLA worried that approving such a project would not just entail having 
American supplies passing through the Wakhan Corridor. Rather, the PLA was 
concerned that this would have driven the U.S. military and its intelligence services to 
expand their footprints in the supply line’s vicinity to protect it. 107 The PLA believed that 
this would have spillover effects, increasing the international publicity of this trouble-
prone region, encouraging Uighur separatism, and changing the dynamics of the local 
separatist movement.108  
Finally, The PLA has confidence in its ability to guard the border between China 
and Afghanistan from the Taliban and other hostile forces through patrols, heavy militia 
involvement, and border checks.109 Therefore, the utility of supporting the war in 
Afghanistan to solve China’s own problem in Xinjiang does not outweigh the risk of 
embroiling China in a U.S.-led war against Islamic radicalism. Whether China could 
“stabilize Xinjiang eventually depends mainly on China’s capability of handling its own 
problems,” said Wang Baofu, Deputy Director of Institute of Strategic Studies of the 
PLA National Defense University.110  
The MPS and MSS, which have tremendous influence on matters related to 
Xinjiang and counter-terrorism, both supported the PLA’s approach. MPS has been 
China’s lead agency in directing counter-terrorism efforts. The Minister of Public 
Security has been heading the State Counter-terrorism Affairs Coordination Small Group, 
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which was established in 2001 and elevated in 2013 to the State Counter-terrorism 
Leading Small Group.111 The State Counter-terrorism Bureau, established in 2002, is 
housed within MPS and guides, plans, coordinates, and supervises the implementation of 
counter-terrorism measures through top-down agencies at each level of local government. 
MPS ardently opposes any measure that could potentially complicate its mission by 
adding external actors, and worsening its cooperation with the police forces of Pakistan 
and Afghanistan.112 
All three of these organizations (PLA, MPS, MSS) stood against the MFA and 
Xinjiang’s local government. MFA supported this deal because the U.S. had just elected a 
new president (Obama), and this would be a strong deliverable on the Chinese side to 
strengthen Sino-U.S. relations and boost mutual trust between the two countries. MFA 
also advocated for this proposal because by providing help to American and NATO 
forces, China could use this as a bargaining chip to persuade the EU to lift its arms 
embargo levied against China. Xinjiang’s local government favored such a deal because 
it welcomed the potential economic benefits. In the end, the PLA’s view prevailed, 
though it with a total victory for the PLA. China never publicly opposed the deal, but it 
did not progress, indicating the impasse that this policy proposal caused. 
Organizations can simultaneously partner with the PLA in one area and oppose it 
in another. One major difference between the PLA and MPS is their position regarding 
China’s policy toward Burma and its Kokang region. Kokang (guogan), a self-
administrative region of Burma’s Shan State, is populated by mostly ethnic Han Chinese 
and historically has deep ties to China.113 Peng Jiasheng (also known as Phon Kya Shin) 
has led the Kokang rebel force since 1989. Bai Suocheng, Peng’s deputy, had been the 
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point of contact to assist China’s Ministry of Public Security in its efforts to fight 
prostitution, gambling, and the illegal drug trade along the Sino-Burmese border. Having 
won the MPS’s trust, Bai supplied it with false intelligence,114 which led to a joint assault 
by the Burmese military and Chinese MPS officers against Peng in August 2009. This 
assault occurred despite a two-decade-long ceasefire between Peng and the Burmese 
military.115 Therefore, MPS was tricked and unwittingly helped the Burmese military 
strike a pro-China force in Burma. Following this incident, the differences the PLA has 
with other bureaucratic agencies on the Kokang issue widened. The PLA had internal 
debates on the Kokang issue, but most strategists believed they should keep the pro-
China Kokang force alive for either historic or humanitarian reasons.116 Only the MSS 
joined the PLA as an ally, as MSS and MPA have a highly competitive and antagonistic 
relationship with each other.117 Having taken an irreversible step, the MPS was more 
fixated than ever on cracking down on drug trafficking and other illegal activities in the 
border region. The MFA’s approach is to “maintain stability” (weiwen) and “stay away 
from troubles” (buzhao mafan), so it supports the policy of cutting off support to the 
Kokang forces and helping the Burmese military take down the rebels.118 The local 
government in Yunnan wants to open its border with Burma to increase border trade and 
promote Yunnan’s regional economy, so its primary concern is to maintain stability along 
the Sino-Burmese border. “That is why butts of MPS, MFA and Yunnan local 
government are sitting together (against the PLA),” said a PLA officer.119  
The major differences the PLA has with MPS, MFA, and the Yunnan provincial 
government over the Kokang issue have led to a policy impasse, which has resulted in 
confusion and conflicting signals about China’s attitude toward this issue.120 On the one 
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hand, the MFA still enforces the policy of “four nos” with regard Kokang – no political 
recognition, no exchanges between (Sino-Kokang) governments/administrations, no 
military support, and no economic assistance.121 Thus, the PLA was not allowed to 
implement its proposal for “a sustainable resolution on Kokang,” which implies more 
active and comprehensive engagements and even some form of assistance to the Kokang 
rebel force. On the other hand, after the PLA bitterly complained that “local interests 
overwhelmed national interests,” the Central Government reclaimed control of China’s 
Burma policy-making process and, after the Kokang incident, took the leading 
coordination power away from the Yunnan provincial government.122   
When the three security-focused bureaucracies (PLA, MPS and MSS) speak with 
one voice on certain issues, it is rare for any opposing bureaucracy to continue to stand in 
their way. However, there is a constant element of competition in the relationship 
between these three bureaucracies, which contend for turf, resources, and attention from 
the top leaders. MPS has much more manpower, capability and resources than MSS, has 
a greater ability to enforce its preferences at each level, and has a much bigger budget 
and a higher political status.123 This has led to an unbalanced distribution of power 
among the three, with the PLA and MSS finding most likely to form an alliance.  
The antagonistic relationship between the PLA and MPS was evidenced in the 
handling of a tragic incident on the Mekong River, where in October 2011 13 crew 
members of a Chinese boat were found brutally tortured and killed. The Thai police’s 
investigation was stalled because the alleged culprits were Thai soldiers. In late October, 
China’s Defense Minister, General Liang Guanglie, in an interview to the Hong Kong-
based Phoenix Satellite TV, expressed his impatience with the slow investigation and 
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stated that the military “could provide assistance” if needed, even though “the MPS is in 
charge of detailed actions.”124 Liang’s statement was a rare public nudge, as well as an 
expression of the military’s interest in intervening in the MPS’s business. The MPS 
reacted by taking the unprecedented step of initiating and enforcing a joint regional patrol 
mechanism with Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos on the Mekong River, which represented 
the traditionally parochial MPS’s first step beyond China’s border. 
 
Advantage of Strong Motivations 
When the PLA and MFA have differences in policy positions they do not always 
cooperate, as they each have a separate mandate and responsibilities, and therefore 
inevitably have differences in interests and priorities. Bargaining between the PLA and 
other bureaucracies is best conceptualized as a repeated game, in the sense that there are 
separate negotiations on various issues but bargaining as a whole persists endlessly and 
takes into account previous iterations. Robert Axelrod writes, “What makes it possible for 
cooperation to emerge is the possibility that the players will meet again…Once the (two 
players) know that they will be dealing with each other indefinitely, the necessary 
preconditions for cooperation will exist… The foundation of cooperation is not really 
trust, but the durability of the relationship. ”125 The PLA and MFA have coexisted for 
more than six decades and there is every reason to believe that their coexistence will 
continue indefinitely. Despite differences in policy positions and bureaucratic hurdles, the 
two have reasons to yield on issues they know the other actor feels particularly strong 
about.  Not every policy matter has the same implications for the two. In other words, 
they often place a different priority on the same issue. When one bureaucracy feels 
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particularly strong about a given issue, the other is likely to withhold its opposition if it 
does not see that particular issue as being a core value or high priority.  
China’s response to the U.S.-ROK joint military exercise in the Yellow Sea is one 
example of the MFA changing its stance and yielding to the PLA’s position.126 The MFA 
made the first statement on the joint exercise on June 8, 2010, urging “calmness and 
restraint from all parties concerned to avoid further escalation of tension,” followed by a 
second, similar statement on June 22 calling on relevant parties to “stay calm.”127 
However, the PLA’s strong opposition to this exercise drove the MFA to shift its position. 
The MFA’s initial position was based on the conclusion that part of the Yellow Sea is 
regarded as the high seas, and therefore the exercise was taking place in international 
waters. On July 1, Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff, told journalists 
that the PLA was “extremely opposed” to the U.S.-ROK naval exercises because they 
were “very close to Chinese territorial waters.”128 On July 6, when MFA spokesman Qin 
Gang was asked whether Ma’s comments represented China’s official position or his 
personal view, Qin didn’t answer but said the MFA is “concerned,” “has expressed its 
grave concern to relevant parties,” and “will follow closely” the situation.129 Two days 
later, Qin repeated Ma’s firm opposition toward foreign military vessels or airplanes 
conducting activities in the Yellow Sea or seas close to China that impact China’s 
security interests, thus signaling a revision of the MFA’s position.130  
Ma Xiaotian’s hardline comments on July 1 expressed the PLA’s strong 
motivation to push its agenda.131 A senior PLA officer explained the reason why the PLA 
had such a particularly strong response to the joint military exercise: First, the PLA did 
not agree with the American and South Korean assessment regarding the Cheonan 
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incident. While a number of people believed that North Korea perpetrated the attack, 
others asserted that it was nearly impossible for North Korea to sink the Cheonan and get 
away with it, given that North Korea had noisy submarines that would easily be detected. 
Some in the PLA adopted a conspiracy theory: the U.S. full-scale intervention in Vietnam 
started after it asserted that North Vietnam sank an American warship, which was 
exposed decades later to be a gimmick done by Americans themselves.132 The PLA also 
found it suspicious that those who died on the Cheonan were soldiers, not officers. 
Therefore, this group believed it was possible that the U.S. or South Korea was behind 
the Cheonan Incident. Another group within the PLA believed that a low-ranking North 
Korean officer sank the Cheonan to retaliate against previous failures of North Korean 
operations, but the top leadership in Pyongyang did not approve this particular operation. 
One PLA officer summarized the PLA opposition to the U.S-South Korea joint exercise:  
We didn’t see convincing evidence so we demanded a full investigation. Russia 
conducted an independent investigation but South Korea refused to cooperate and 
disallowed the surviving officers on Cheonan to meet Russian investigators. Therefore, 
the PLA concluded that it was very likely done by North Korea, but the evidence was 
insufficient. With this conclusion on Cheonan Incident in the first place, the PLA could 
not accept a strong response from the U.S. and South Korea with military exercises, 
which they believed to blow out of proportion and would not help to ease the tension 
anyway. Moreover, the U.S. and South Korean militaries conducted their exercises too 
close to China’s strategic heart, with Beijing within their shooting range. This made the 
military very nervous and resulted in their loud and strong oppositions.133 
 
By having Ma Xiaotian and a few other retired PLA officers argue publicly for the PLA’s 
position, the PLA successfully influenced Chinese public opinion, which created pressure 
on the MFA. The MFA revised its initial position from one of emphasizing stability to 
one of opposing the exercise outright. A diplomat explained the revision of the MFA’s 
position as its recognition of and desire to yield to the PLA’s hardline position: “The 
PLA has stuck its head out and held such a (strong) position. If things escalate and 
problems arise, it is all on the head of the PLA, not us. That is why MFA did not go 
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against the PLA this time and revised its position.”134 Civilian analysts acknowledged 
that the PLA’s strong opposition to the joint military exercises was problematic and 
wrong.135   
 
Advantage of Strong Netizen Opinions 
Though cyber nationalism started to emerge in China as early as 1997 and became 
noticeable in 2003, netizens, or internet activists, have become the “most dynamic” new 
actor in China’s foreign policy-making, as Linda Jakobson concluded.136 Individuals and 
groups with dedicated goals for social action create the majority of China’s nationalistic 
websites. Netizens have a distinctive purpose and the ability to harness the Internet to 
mobilize and organize large segments of Chinese society instantly and across multiple 
regions into social movements or protests. This is the main reason why netizens have 
become a new actor in China’s policy-making process. Netizens’ voices on China’s 
foreign policy receive disproportionate attention from the government because 
frustrations of large groups of netizens could be redirected to challenge the government 
and the Party’s legitimacy.137 In other words, the Chinese government values and fears 
netizens’ opinions because their voices are “actionable.”138 Although analysts differ over 
netizens’ level of influence, almost all agree that netizens constitute a new pressure group 
that the government can no longer ignore, especially when they form a near-unanimous 
opinion on a certain issue.139  
By 2008, China had overtaken the U.S. as the country with the largest number of 
Internet users. China’s Internet users reached 618 million in 2013, or roughly half of 
China’s population. The rise of the Internet in China has opened up public space, allowed 
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for anonymous political participation and a certain degree of free speech, spread 
knowledge and information, and has broken the monopoly of the government and elites 
in agenda-setting. This has significantly changed the way Chinese citizens interact with 
and exert pressure on policy-makers.140 The anticipated response of netizens and their 
potential cyber-activism has increasingly become a factor that the Chinese government 
needs to take into account when deliberating various policies. Netizens have played a 
positive role in China’s domestic politics and governance in the sense that they have 
created a public sphere and brought attention to the problem of corruption. Netizens’ 
exposure of evidence of corruption on the Internet has opened cases that the formal 
disciplining and anti-corruption bureaucracies are either unwilling or unable to expose. 
However, the Internet’s role in China’s foreign policy-making is more dubious 
and in general more negative, as it magnifies virulent nationalism, which puts pressure on 
the government and narrows its options. As Wang Xiaodong, one of the contributors to 
nationalist bestsellers China Can Say No and Unhappy China, correctly asserted, the 
“Internet is a powerful ally to China’s nationalism.”141 Netizens are generally more likely 
male,142 much younger,143 less educated,144 and more likely to be outside the labor 
market than the Chinese population as a whole.145 As a result, the average Chinese 
netizen is attentive to politics, but also more prone to being irrational, radical, and 
nationalistic.146 They are also likely to have more grievances and frustrations toward the 
government and have less to lose when involved in protests. Even with strict censorship 
and an effective firewall, the government cannot eliminate this threat and therefore tries 
to guide and channel it, and find an outlet for it. The government finds foreign policy a 
more conducive forum than domestic politics for releasing the netizens’ pressure, since 
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the latter touches on issues that represent a greater threat to the Party’s rule and 
legitimacy. Yet even on foreign and security policy, the government is reluctant to take 
into account the netizens’ nationalistic viewpoints, since such strong sentiments, even in 
the form of patriotism, could be transformed into more fundamental and silent criticism 
toward the Party’s governance.147  
The government disproportionately notices the netizens’ voices because the 
government still places heavy constraints on public opinion polls on sensitive topics such 
as foreign and security policy and public confidence in the top leader. Moreover, 
netizens’ voices, which are typically radical, spontaneous and instant, have a spillover 
effect on the media and public opinion in general. All Chinese media outlets are still 
regulated by the government and more or less adhere to the government’s censorship. In 
comparison, netizens, with anonymity, can more freely speak their minds. Some 
publicize information that traditional media outlets do not want to publish because they 
fear political reprisals. Some netizens even become self-made freelancers on foreign 
affairs, whom even the traditional media follows to a certain extent. This has made 
information found on the Internet a more trusted news source in China than in the West. 
The civilian foreign affairs system has adapted to the fact that netizens, whether 
one likes it or not, have become a new actor in China’s foreign and security policy-
making. Within its news office, the MFA established a public diplomacy section in 2004, 
which “downloads and collects public opinions online to brief MFA officials.” Senior 
MFA officials, including Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, regularly attended live Internet 
chat room discussions to explain the MFA’s policies. As Shen Guofang, then Assistant 
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Foreign Minister, acknowledged, “MFA would consider voices and views from the 
public when devising foreign policies or studying approaches to handle problems.”148  
It is hard to measure the overall magnitude and direction of influence netizens 
exert on China’s foreign and security policy-making, though in the past netizens have 
focused on Chinese citizens’ security. With regards to international disputes involving 
China, particularly Sino-Japanese disputes, their attitudes have tended to be 
“confrontational,” “radicalized,” “xenophobic,” and “war-mongering.”149150 In contrast, 
during international incidents where China is not a main actor, such as the Iraq War, 
netizens tend to be self-interested and even isolationists.151 As a result of netizens’ 
concerns, the MFA has had to adjust its overseas functions to put a much bigger emphasis 
on protecting and aiding Chinese citizens abroad. Public pressure modifies the MFA’s 
policies and behavior in other areas to a certain extent. Cases of netizens interacting with 
the MFA demonstrate the following three characteristics: 
First, MFA responds more effectively to netizens’ grievances when netizens reach 
and ignite a broader audience; MFA chooses inaction when netizens’ voices are confined 
to the cyber sphere and haven’t influenced the mainstream media and non-netizen 
population. In July 2004, Zhao Yan, a businesswoman from Tianjin, was brutally beaten 
by Officer Robert Rhodes, a U.S. border guard. Photos of Zhao Yan’s badly beaten face 
went viral on the Internet and aroused such public anger in China that Foreign Minister 
Li Zhaoxing, in a rare move, called U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to express his 
concern. The media and public approved of the MFA’s response.152 This contrasts with 
the case of Zhai Tiantian, a Chinese student studying in New Jersey, who was arrested in 
May 2010 on terrorism charges for threatening his professor and the school he 
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attended.153 The MFA initially thought this case would be as inflammatory as Zhao Yan’s 
and was ready to intervene. However, it didn’t take any action, as this case did not arouse 
great attention from Chinese netizens. As a Washington-based Chinese diplomat 
explained: “When this student was arrested, we (in the Chinese Embassy) all got nervous 
and thought it would be another Zhao Yan Incident. We scrambled to lay out measures 
we could take. We were ready to intervene and exert diplomatic pressure. However, this 
incident never caused great attentions in the Internet as we first thought. It bubbled up for 
a few days and quieted down. So we decided not to act on it.”154   
Second, the netizens’ influence on China’s foreign policy is unbalanced. Netizens 
are more influential in some policy areas than others, depending on how sustained 
netizens’ attention is and how strongly they react. For example, in March 2004, when 16 
Chinese reached the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands and seven of them were detained by 
Japanese police, the MFA initially kept a low profile and took a moderate position, which 
caused netizens to strongly criticize the MFA for its weakness. After two days, the MFA 
turned to a much more hardline position and urged Japan to release the Chinese detainees 
right away and unconditionally. Because of netizens’ and the general public’s sustained 
and strong resentment towards Japan, it has been difficult for the MFA to make major 
policy revisions on Japan, and some officials working on this area felt their policy had 
been “hijacked” by netizens.155 The sustained pressure that netizens applied forced the 
MFA to address netizens’ concerns and modify its proposed policies accordingly. 
Therefore, even though China did not alter its policies notably toward Japan after 2010, 
this does not mean that MFA felt less pressure from netizens.  
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Third, netizens’ influence on the MFA is also reflected in the MFA’s increasing 
self-censorship, which constrains its ability to promote its public diplomacy efforts. For 
example, the MFA published a statement on its website in November 2011 on China’s 
donation of 23 school buses to Macedonia, which caused netizens to rebuke the MFA 
publicly. Before this donation, China had several high-publicity fatal school bus 
accidents. Public attention was aroused after a school bus crashed in Gansu Province, 
killing 22 (19 children), and a similar school bus accident in Jiangsu killed 15 children in 
2011. In response to public outrage, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao publicized a regulation 
on school bus security management in 2012, promising to help local governments 
purchase secure school buses. The MFA’s public diplomacy efforts clearly target an 
international audience, and are intended to express China’s goodwill by providing foreign 
aid. However, a message intended for a foreign audience inevitably rebounds and reaches 
a domestic audience, as the Internet has no national boundaries. Once MFA’s school bus 
donation was publicized on its website, Chinese netizens instantly posted virulent, 
politically charged critical comments such as: “why is the Chinese government always 
doing things that contradict the will of the Chinese people? In essence, it is because the 
Chinese people cannot be the master of their own nation!”; “If it is an indisputable 
historic fact that Chinese people’s feelings are often hurt by western powers, this time the 
way those fools in the MFA hurt Chinese people’s feelings is no less than the harms done 
by western powers.”; “Is this treason?!”; “Since the Chinese government fulfills its 
responsibilities overseas, let the American hegemon take over the domestic governance 
of China!” The MFA soon deleted its statement on the school bus donation from its 
website.  
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Along the same lines, the PLA has increasingly felt pressured by netizens and 
conflicted by the conundrum that messages intended for a foreign audience cannot in 
practice be differentiated from messages intended for a domestic audience. Lieutenant 
General Qi Jianguo, Deputy Chief of General Staff, a well-respected combat-oriented 
senior PLA officer, delivered a moderate and level-headed speech at the IISS Shangri-La 
Dialogue in 2013, which was positively received by the largely Western audience.156 Qi 
went to great lengths during his speech to assuage the “China Threat Theory” and provide 
answers to the six challenging questions.157 However, Qi’s moderate stance and 
reassuring message, which was intended for a foreign audience, triggered a strong 
backlash from netizens. Qi’s comment on leaving the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Island dispute 
for future generations to solve (in fact reiterating Deng Xiaoping’s formula) was fodder 
for netizens, who commented, “Why do we need the PLA now if the dispute is to be left 
for future generations?” Some netizens even labeled Qi’s comment as the words of “a 
traitor” and some asserted that he was “mentally-retarded.”158 Qi was extremely 
frustrated by this experience. At the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue, his successor, Wang 
Guanzhong, took Qi’s lesson to heart. Wang, despite military analysts’ advice, delivered 
a particularly aggressive speech that he wrote himself, which is highly unusual in such 
circumstances.159 Even more troubling, the GSD’s leadership complimented Wang on his 
speech due to Chinese netizens’ approval of Wang’s performance. Senior PLA officers 
have adjusted to this new reality by displaying an increased reluctance to attend on-the-
record bilateral meetings and multilateral conferences, which is a worrying trend for 
China’s military diplomacy. “We are treading on thin ice, as it is impossible to please two 
masters with opposing viewpoints at the same time,” a senior PLA FAO officer 
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complained.160 If a PLA officer tries to assure foreign countries and the international 
community, he will be chastised by Chinese netizens, which may even hurt his career; if 
a PLA officer tries to cater to Chinese netizens, his positions will only add fuel to the fire 
and strain the PLA’s relations with other countries.  
The MFA and the PLA are not the only actors sensitive to netizens’ opinions. Top 
leaders can be influenced by the netizens’ positions as well. After the Obama 
administration approved an arms sale package to Taiwan worth more than $6 billion in 
2010, which included 114 Patriot missiles, 60 Black Hawk helicopters, and 
communications equipment for Taiwan’s F-16 fleet, China reacted by cutting off military 
ties with the U.S. and launching a new initiative of imposing sanctions on U.S. 
companies that sell weapons to Taiwan. Five months later, Hu Jintao met with U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner, 
following the conclusion of the second round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue (S&ED). The MFA had been assuring the State Department that despite 
China’s strong reaction toward the U.S. arms sales, U.S. Secretary of Defense Bob Gates 
would still be invited to visit China as planned. When he received previous reports, Hu 
had never expressed any support or opposition to Gates’ planned visit. Therefore, MFA 
wrote in the talking points prepared for Hu that he should invite Gates to visit China 
when meeting with Clinton. However, Hu did not raise the issue at all. The MFA then 
understood that the public’s strong reaction to the arms sales bolstered the PLA’s 
hardline position and influenced Hu’s thinking. The MFA did not pursue this issue 
further.161 
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When the military and MFA stand on opposing sides of an issue, the military’s 
hardline position could be more compelling when strong netizen support is foreseen or 
present, as exemplified by China’s response to the U.S.-ROK joint naval exercise in 2010 
discussed above. In such cases, the MFA is at a strong disadvantage because it suffers 
from an image problem in that netizens view it was being “weak” and “defeatists.” By 
contrast, given the PLA’s reputation for being tough and defending China’s national 
interests, it has more room to negotiate and has the ability to make concessions. However, 
when the two switch sides, with the MFA taking the hardline position and the PLA being 
more cautious and restrained, the PLA will be under less pressure from netizens and have 
more room to maneuver. Thus, when the military takes a moderate position and the MFA 
takes a more hardline stance, the military could be less susceptible to the netizens’ 
pressure than if it takes a hardline position and the MFA takes a moderate one.  
As an example of the above point, Chinese media started to float the argument in 
early 2013 that Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands-Okinawa is disputable. 
Some in the MFA supported the spread of this argument, as it believed that Japan was 
stubbornly refusing to negotiate over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. This position was first 
articulated in a highly publicized article in People’s Daily written by two academics that 
questioned Japan’s ownership of the Ryukyu Islands, and then in MFA spokeswoman 
Hua Chunying’s sympathetic comment.162 Global Times then advocated launching a 
“three-step campaign” to “reignite the debate about Ryukyu Islands’ ownership” and 
reverse China’s past diplomatic stance on the Ryukyu-Okinawa issue.163  As a result, in 
May 2012 People’s Daily, Global Times, CCTV, World Affairs (one of the MFA’s 
publications), and Hong Kong-based but pro-China Wenweipo published a series of 
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articles advancing the argument that Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands-
Okinawa was disputable.164 Netizens soon picked up this argument, which first emerged 
in 2005,165 and endorsed it through Internet chat rooms such as Xici hutong, Xinhua 
fazhan luntan (Xinhua Development Forum), zhonghua luntan (China Forum), and 
renmin luntan (People’s Forum). 166 Despite retired Major General Luo Yuan strongly 
lobbying for the PLA to adopt this position, the PLA167 as an institution resisted this 
argument on two grounds. First, as the U.S. has a large military base located on Okinawa, 
raising this idea would certainly bring the U.S. deeper into the East China Sea dispute, 
which the PLA was trying to avoid. Second, the PLA does not yet have the means to 
mount any military operation over this area. In June 2012, Qi Jianguo, Deputy Chief of 
General Staff, clarified in Chinese media that the status of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is 
“essentially different” from that of Okinawa, which showed the PLA’s realism and its 
ability to resist the netizens’ pressure.168 
It would be a mistake to believe that netizens currently make China’s foreign and 
security policy. Many Chinese scholars agree with the conclusion of Wang Yizhou, a 
professor at Peking University, that “China’s foreign policy-making is strictly controlled 
by political procedures,” and “the society could at best play a marginal role.”169 However, 
there is also a consensus among Chinese analysts that the government and top leaders 
self-censor and modify their policies to some extent based on an assessment of the 
netizens’ predicted response and any demonstrated netizen response.170 The Chinese 
government invariably pays great attention to its domestic audience, especially those who 
are vocal and can act on their views, precisely because as a non-democratic polity it has 
less legitimacy.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter examined how the PLA interacts with the civilian foreign affairs 
system, namely the MFA, a main if not the leading actor in China’s foreign and security 
policy process. During a state of normalcy, in which routine and non-contingency 
procedures dominate, the civilian foreign policy establishment follows a consensus-based 
decision-making model, as well as a bureaucratic and cumbersome reporting procedure. 
Since the 1990s, the MFA’s political standing relative to the PLA has been in continual 
decline. The PLA’s political space declined in the early 1980s, as explained by the 
previous chapter. The decline of the MFA’s political standing over the past two decades, 
however, is much starker than that of the PLA in the early 1980s. This dynamic has 
changed how the PLA and MFA interact in the policy process, which is critical given that 
the policy priorities and positions of these organizations have diverged significantly since 
the time before Deng’s reign. The PLA and MFA have numerous formal platforms to 
interact with each other, yet in practice the PLA and MFA are less connected than ever 
before. A new National Security Commission was created in late 2013, partly to 
strengthen the coordination of bureaucracies, though it will take years to establish the 
effectiveness of this organization. The way that the MFA and PLA interact is similar to 
how the State Department and Department of Defense interact in the U.S. In both China 
and the U.S., the military has an edge over the civilian foreign affairs system during a 
pressing security threat, and powerful allies help one’s case while potent enemies 
undermine one’s case. Other rules may be unique to China: a bureaucracy with 
particularly strong motivation can thwart other bureaucracies, which can change the 
policy outcome. Additionally, strong netizens’ opinions, though not necessarily 
 440 
representative of public opinion more generally, undermine the MFA more than the PLA, 
though both are influenced to some extent by strong netizen opinions.    
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Chapter Seven: China’s 1979 Border War with Vietnam: Decision to Fight 
 
 
Historians and scholars continue to debate why China chose to fight a war with 
Vietnam two months after it announced a drastic shift in the nation’s course from “class 
struggle” to economic reform and opening-up. Deng Xiaoping recognized that to achieve 
his goal of economic reform China needed a calm, peaceful external environment, yet 
under his leadership China deliberately provoked a war with Vietnam, seemingly 
undermining this new strategy.1  
The reasons for choosing China’s decision to go to war with Vietnam as a case 
study are as follows:  
First, the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War – known in China as the “1979 Self-
defense Counterattack against Vietnam” – is the last large-scale armed conflict in which 
the PLA fought.2  This was not only the PLA’s last war, but was also its last low-tech war, 
which shaped the PLA’s modernization path for decades to come. The PLA’s experience 
during this war has also arguably increased its cautiousness to go to war, especially when 
it is not fully ready. 
Second, this war was fought on Deng’s watch, and thus the debate on whether to 
go to war provides insights into his decision-making style and his relationship with the 
PLA more broadly. 
Third, this war impacted China psychologically much in the same way that the 
Korean War (1950-53) impacted the United States. The 1979 war was a forgotten war, a 
war that the PLA will not eulogize as much as the “unparalleled fortitude and courage” 
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the PLA displayed in the Korean War when it recounts its “glorious” history.3 It was a 
war that China won militarily, but a failure in terms of casualties, the unspeakable trauma 
that it inflicted on the PLA, and a failure in both the strategic military goal of inducing 
Vietnam to end its operations against Cambodia4 and the rhetorical goal of “teaching 
Vietnam a lesson”.5 During the Sino-Vietnamese War, the PLA was militarily superior 
and commanded more trained soldiers on the battlefield.6 Nevertheless, the Vietnamese 
side “outperformed” the PLA on the battlefield.7 A victory at such a high cost in terms of 
casualties was humiliating because China viewed it as a war between “teachers” and 
“students” – Vietnam had been the recipient of Chinese military aid for decades, and its 
best officers were often trained in China. 
Fourth, it was a war that both China and Vietnam until recently refused to discuss, 
since Deng’s instructions to “let the past pass” effectively sealed the military archives 
and prohibited military historians from studying this part of history.8 A policy issued by 
the central propaganda authority in 1992 explicitly prohibits “the publishing of any article, 
book and media product on the (1979) Self-defense Counterattack against Vietnam.”9 It 
is curious how Deng himself reflected on this war. As one active-duty military historian 
noted, “He (Deng) just did not expect the PLA would win such a ‘tragic victory’ in the 
war with Vietnam,” by which this historian meant that China would achieve military 
victory, but at a much higher cost than it anticipated.10  
Finally, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship has yet to completely recover from the 
war’s aftereffects, with new sources of tension and disputes that constantly invoke past 
rancor and the indelible trauma left by the 1979 war. 
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Nature of the 1979 War 
The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War was Deng’s war, as it was his deliberate choice 
and determination that led to China’s attack on Vietnam. China justified this war along 
history and geopolitical lines. For instance, Deng expressed to Lee Kuan Yew that 
through this war it aimed at curbing Vietnam’s expansionist ambition in Indochina.11 
China hoped that it could secure material support from and a stronger strategic 
partnership with the United States by fighting this war. Deng’s motivations, however, 
went beyond the reasons given above. Deng believed he could use the war to gain the 
upper hand in Party leadership struggles, and cleanse and reunify the PLA under his 
leadership. This chapter explores how the PLA’s motivation, the Party-military 
relationship, and the civilian foreign affairs system impacted Deng’s decision to go to 
war. 
The senior leadership in Beijing and Hanoi have both tried to erase the 1979 Sino-
Vietnam war from history, and in both societies speaking or writing about the war is 
largely taboo. Extensive interviews with retired senior diplomats, civilian and military 
historians, as well as military officers who served during this period, indicated that 
Deng’s military comrades opposed this war. Professional military officers and leaders 
had serious reservations about the necessity of and justification for the war, and also 
questioned the PLA’s military readiness to fight this war. In fact, the war was postponed 
after General Zhang Zhen inspected the frontlines and strongly opposed the original 
date.12 In retrospect, the military’s reservations were well-founded. However, the 
military’s opposition stayed within the military circle, as the officers did not want to 
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undermine Deng’s delicate political position in the Party. Deng was unwavering in front 
of resistance and opposition from his professional military officers.  
Prior to the war, in 1978, Deng faced a delicate power struggle in the Party. In 
1976, Deng was relieved of all positions and put under house arrest by Mao. Hua 
Guofeng, Mao’s official successor, was the official top leader of the Party and the 
military. In mid-1977, due to the lobbying efforts of Marshal Ye Jianying and Deng’s 
loyalists, Hua reluctantly reinstated Deng and named him Chief of General Staff and Vice 
Premier, but politically Deng remained sidelined. Deng recognized that he had one clear 
advantage over Hua – he was a decorated commander and a veteran of the Long March, 
with extensive combat and military experience. Deng looked to exploit this advantage to 
build political support. Deng needed a rallying cry that he could build support around, 
preferably one that would play up his strongest advantage over Hua – fighting a war.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) supported Deng’s decision to go to war. 
MFA lent credibility to Deng’s decision by providing analysis concluding that the war, if 
launched, could be kept limited, and that given the Soviet Union’s international strategy 
and posture there was a minimal risk of Soviet military intervention.13 The MFA also 
predicted that the U.S. would support China’s move to strike Vietnam, not only because 
Vietnam was the Soviet Union’s ally in Southeast Asia and shared the Soviet’s goal of 
expansionism, but also because the U.S. had lost a war with Vietnam not too long ago. 
Furthermore, MFA indicated that China could build stronger relations with Southeast 
Asian nations, especially Thailand, after such a war. Li Xiannian, who oversaw foreign 
policy at the MFA at this time, supported this war and was instrumental in providing 
Deng backing and convincing the Party leadership that war was the proper route.  
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This chapter begins by looking at the historic context of the 1979 Border War. The 
chapter then examines the role of the military’s mindset, the Party-military relationship, 
and the civilian foreign affairs system in influencing this policy decision. Finally, the 
chapter links this case study to hypotheses developed in previous chapters. 
 
Context: History, Territorial Disputes, Geostrategic Considerations 
The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War was not premised on one justification, but 
rather reflected a congruence of reasons: the historical antagonism between China and 
Vietnam, territorial disputes between the two countries, geopolitical considerations, and 
Deng’s domestic political calculations. 
 
Seeds of War 
The modern antagonism between China and Vietnam that was exploited in 1979 
has its antecedents in millennia-old conflicts between the two countries.14 Chinese have 
an unequivocal affinity for Vietnam, viewing it as a needy tributary and an offshoot of 
Chinese civilization. Chinese also slight Vietnam by paying insufficient attention to its 
will, while showering it with generous help. Vietnam, on the other hand, emphasized 
Chinese invasions and Vietnamese rebellions against Chinese power, even while it was a 
recipient of Chinese help. China conquered the area around the Red River Delta and Zhao 
Tuo (also Zhao To), a Chinese general who strayed from his allegiance to the Qin 
Dynasty’s Emperor, established a Vietnamese kingdom named Nam Viet or Nan Yue 
(South Vietnam).15 In 111 BCE, under the Han Dynasty, China annexed Nam Viet and 
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incorporated it as a province, which it remained until CE 939. For over a thousand years, 
the northern part of what is now Vietnam was under Chinese rule. Therefore, China 
historically treated Nam Viet as a local regime affiliated with China, and spread Chinese 
culture, Chinese-style bureaucracies, and even a particular type of rice cultivation to Nam 
Viet.16 The independent Vietnamese kingdom, Dai Viet, was founded and then forged a 
tributary relationship with China in CE 972. Under Dai Viet, Vietnam led incursions into 
China as the weak Song Dynasty was being battered by northern Qidan (Khitan) and 
Jurchen minority rivals.17 China under the Song Dynasty and the Mongols during the 
Yuan Dynasty tried to retake Vietnam with little success. China under the Ming Dynasty 
and the Manchus during the Qing Dynasty sent troops to Vietnam when Vietnamese 
rulers appealed to Chinese emperors for help crushing its domestic challengers.18 This 
tributary relationship ended after France colonized Vietnam in the early 19th century. 
Clearly, China and Vietnam have a close but often fraught history. 
The communist parties of Vietnam and China were “comrades plus brothers” 
(tongzhi jia xiongdi).19 This shared ideology formed a bond between the countries that 
endured as Vietnam struggled against France and then the United States to gain its 
independence and autonomy. The Sino-Vietnamese border became Ho Chi Minh’s 
“reliable rear area” and the only reliable source of military supplies when he was fighting 
the French.20 Mao promised and delivered numerous and much-needed armaments and 
munitions to Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). In 1950, General Chen Geng and 
Wei Guoqing were stationed in Vietnam to directly draft war plans.21 By 1952, about 
7,000 Chinese military advisors and troops were stationed in Vietnam.22  
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While the CCP helped and supported Vietnam, the seeds of hostility were sowed 
when Premier Zhou Enlai pressured Ho Chi Minh to accept the Geneva Accords in 1954. 
This agreement extended Vietnam’s separation until 1975, which many Vietnamese 
found unacceptable and believed was due to China’s self-interest and Zhou’s faulty 
judgment. The Geneva Conference was held after the DRV had routed the French at Dien 
Bien Phu, with the help of Chinese military advisors.23 The first half of the Conference 
focused on negotiating a settlement for the Korean War, while the second half turned to 
deciding Vietnam’s fate. China believed that Korea’s fate was of much greater strategic 
significance to it than Vietnam’s, and thus prioritized negotiations over Korea. Once 
China and the other participants reached an armistice to end the Korean War, which 
China’s military was heavily involved in, it was eager to show some goodwill to 
convince the West that its idea of “peaceful coexistence” was a genuine one.24 Premier 
Zhou’s primary goal in Geneva was to achieve some deliverables to demonstrate China’s 
desire for peace. However, the DRV did not share this goal. Ho Chi Minh and the rest of 
the DRV’s leadership wanted to decisively win the war, unify the country under Ho’s 
rule, and invade Cambodia and Laos.25 
During the second part of the Geneva Conference, Zhou Enlai flew back to 
Liuzhou of Guangxi Province and held eight meetings with Ho Chi Minh over the course 
of three days.26 By threatening to cut China’s enormous aid to the DRV, Zhou 
successfully persuaded Ho to compromise with the French and accept the partition of 
Vietnam.27 This required the DRV to withdraw from certain territories it had just seized. 
Furthermore, Zhou articulated China’s position that Laos and Cambodia should remain 
independent countries.28 At this point, most soldiers fighting in Laos and Cambodia were 
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Vietnamese, and it was not difficult to imagine a unified Vietnam absorbing Laos and 
Cambodia, both of which the French colonialists considered to be parts of a greater 
“Indochina.” China’s position violated its previous understanding with the DRV on how 
to promote the international Communist movement by spreading Communism through 
victories in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. 
North Vietnam’s first generation of leaders resented China’s efforts to prevent 
them from defeating South Vietnam and the French and unifying their country, but 
nonetheless compromised and agreed to withdraw North Vietnam’s forces to the 17th 
parallel. Due to China’s strong opposition, Ho also shelved his plan to unify Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia under his leadership.29 Ho’s compromise did not prevent the U.S. 
from intervening militarily, and as a result North Vietnam came to resent this bargain 
even more and viewed China with increasing suspicion. The sacrifice of Vietnam’s 
interests in 1954, complained by Vietnamese leaders such as Le Duan, secretary general 
of the Vietnamese Communist Party (1960-86), simply prolonged Vietnam’s civil war 
and made it much more costly in blood and treasure to unify the country.30  China’s 
actions during the Geneva negotiations partly explain Vietnam’s later “ungratefulness,” 
despite receiving generous aid and assistance from Chinese for decades, and contributed 
to the context that led to the outbreak of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War.31 
The rapprochement between China and the United States, which began in 1971-72, 
further accelerated the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese cooperation, as Vietnam viewed 
this development as China stabbing it in the back. After Kissinger’s visit, North Vietnam 
issued an internal report using an analogy of one brother fighting with an enemy, while 
the other brother chooses to shake hands with that enemy, to describe its displeasure with 
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developments in the Sino-U.S. relationship. Nobody from Vietnam’s government 
attended the celebration of Chinese Spring Festival held by China’s embassy in Vietnam 
in 1972, which was held on the same day that President Nixon shook hands with Mao in 
Beijing.32 Between Kissinger’s and Nixon’s visits, Premier Zhou flew to Hanoi twice to 




As North Vietnam relied on Chinese aid during its wars against France and then 
the United States, it made territorial concessions to China, which it then rescinded as it 
came closer to prevailing in its civil war. That had clearly caused endless disputes 
between Vietnam and China ever since North Vietnam won. This was a classic instance 
of ideology being unable to replace or overtake sovereignty and a country’s national 
interest, a bitter lesson that China itself learned from its relations with the Soviet Union. 
China and DRV maintained a cordial relationship in terms of territorial disputes 
through secret negotiations, peaceful territorial transfer and informal commitments. In 
1957, China transferred the White Dragon Tail Island in the Tonkin Gulf to DRV, which 
may be swapped for the Paracels and Spratlys, which DRV recognized China’s claims in 
1958, though no documentary evidence could be found to support this notion.33 On 
September 4, 1958, China issued a declaration that clarified what it considered to be its 
territorial sea, in which it claimed sovereignty over the Dongsha Islands, Xisha (Paracel) 
Islands, Zhongsha Islands, and Nansha (Spratly) Islands, which were then contested by 
South Vietnam.34 Ten days later, North Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Van Dong sent a 
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diplomatic note to his Chinese counterpart, Premier Zhou Enlai, explicitly articulating 
Vietnam’s support for China’s claims.35 Since China sided with the U.S. side at Geneva 
in 1954, Vietnam had protested China’s actions, which would not have gone unnoticed in 
Beijing. A unified and stronger Vietnam did not bode well for the territorial arrangements 
previously agreed to by North Vietnam and China. Taylor Fravel’s theory on territorial 
windows of vulnerability, in which he posits that the state that is “losing” in the territorial 
dispute is more likely to use force to prevent or forestall its decline as the opponent 
strengthens its position relatively, probably explains the 1974 clash over the Paracels. 
China was fighting South Vietnam, and perceived it as a legitimate operation because of 
the North’s acknowledgement of China’s sovereignty over the Paracels.36 As North 
Vietnam moved closer to victory, China fought South Vietnam over the Paracels in order 
to hedge its position and cash in on North Vietnam’s promises.37 Although the PLA did 
not fire the first shot, analyses of this incident reveal that it was a premeditated attack by 
Beijing.38  
After the 1974 naval skirmish, North Vietnam wrote to China’s Foreign Ministry, 
sarcastically thanking Beijing for “assisting by taking back its (DRV) territory (for the 
DRV).”39 After the DRV unified Vietnam under its rule in April 1975, it publicly 
rebuked China, asserting that it “preempted and robbed Vietnam at the time of its 
difficulty.”40 After Vietnam’s reunification, the DRV took over six islands in the South 
China Sea previously occupied by South Vietnam, and adopted South Vietnam’s claims 
over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.41 In December 1976, Hoang Van Hoan, a founding 
member of the Indochinese Communist Party and a Politburo member in unified Vietnam 
(1960-76), was purged for his allegedly pro-China views (Hoang would later defect to 
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China, following the 1979 war). China did not take this action lightly and understood that 
the DRV was turning against Beijing.  
Vietnam and China by this point had already escalated the fight over the Gulf of 
Tonkin. The two countries held the first consultation on the Gulf of Tonkin in Hanoi from 
August to November 1974, but these discussions went nowhere. Following Vietnam’s 
unification, the territorial disputes between Vietnam and China only intensified. In May 
1977, Vietnam articulated and publicized its full claims in the South China Sea, including 
12 nautical mile (nm) territorial waters, a 23 nm contiguous zone, a 200nm EEZ, and a 
200nm continental shelf extending from the Paracel and the Spratly Islands. Less than a 
month later, Vietnam carried out a combined sea-air exercise near the Paracel Islands.  
By 1974, tensions along the Sino-Vietnamese land border had already escalated 
into periodic bloody confrontations between individual civilians and occasionally 
military personnel. North Vietnam accused China of illegally constructing railways over 
300 meters inside the Vietnamese territory.42 Vietnam demanded in 1975 that China 
dismantle the portion of these railways that crossed into Vietnamese border, which China 
dismissed.43 China responded by accusing Vietnam of using organized and deliberate 
provocations to unilaterally change the border. In June 1977, Li Xiannian met with Pham 
Van Dong, hoping to deescalate the border disputes and reduce tensions. China then 
proposed to hold eight follow-up meetings with Vietnam, but these efforts were futile. 
Incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese border increased in both number and intensity.44 
In early 1977, Vietnam started to clear the Sino-Vietnamese border by driving out 
its ethnic Chinese citizens and Chinese citizens who had been living in Vietnam. This 
policy was partly an extension of Vietnam’s attempt to confiscate its rich citizens’ assets 
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and thus purge the country of its wealthy citizens, since at that time its rich were 
predominantly ethnic Chinese. This policy further escalated tensions between the two 
countries.45 After the second border conference in Beijing in October 1977, Vietnam 
expanded this policy’s scope, as it began expelling its ethnically Chinese citizens from 
Northeast Vietnam. Many ethnic Chinese in the South were publicly humiliated, 
imprisoned, and lynched, and some attempted to escape by boat. Then, in March 1978, 
Vietnam further intensified this campaign, which led to the confiscation of at least 50,000 
Chinese firms and the deportation of 320,000 ethnic Chinese to a special zone of 
concentration.46 In response, through its low-profile Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs 
(OOCA), China published its first condemnation of Vietnam. This led to a verbal 
counter-attack from Vietnam, to which Deng Xiaoping publicly responded, for the first 
time condemning Vietnam for mistreating not only Vietnam’s Chinese residents, but also 
China itself.47  
 
Forging of the Soviet-Vietnam Alliance 
Once Vietnam unified, the Soviet Union intensified its competition with China to 
court Vietnam. In November 1955, seven months after Vietnam’s unification, the Soviet 
Union promised a five-year aid program that totaled three billion dollars. In 1978, 
Vietnam joined the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 
and signed the Soviet-Vietnam Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, in which the Soviet 
Union promised to aid Vietnam in times of war. This put China in a precarious position, 
as there was the possibility that it could have two hostile fronts – the Soviet Union and 
Vietnam – combining to act like pincers against China. Thus, the Soviet-Vietnam Treaty 
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provoked a strong reaction by China, as Vietnam’s territorial “provocations” took on a 
strategic dimension for China’s leaders. A People’s Daily editorial articulated this view 
when it wrote that Vietnamese provocations were “supported and directed by the Soviet 
Union.”48  
As China and the U.S. moved towards the normalization of diplomatic relations, 
the Soviet Union felt threatened and escalated tensions with China. In 1978, the Soviet 
Union reinforced its military units directed against China and strengthened its nuclear 
deployment that targeted China. The Soviet Union strengthened its forces stationed along 
the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian border by deploying SS-20 intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles (IRBM), their most advanced missile system, for the first time in the 
Soviet Far East. The SS-20 missiles had a maximum range of 5,000 kilometers, which 
was much greater than that of the previously deployed SS-5, which had a range of 4,100 
kilometers, and the SS-4, which had a range of 2,000 kilometers. Moreover, each SS-20 
missile had three multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) nuclear 
warheads. Additionally, the Backfire bomber, which replaced the Blinder, had nearly 
twice the combat radius (5,500 kilometers), which meant the Soviet Union had the ability 
to hit targets anywhere in China, as well as most of Southeast Asia and parts of North 
America. In 1978, China became aware of the Soviet’s addition of MG-24D attack 
helicopters and its increase of fighter aircraft to 1,200 (from 210 in 1965).  
A series of events in 1978 made China feel enormously threatened. In April 1978, 
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and Minister of Defense Dmitriy Ustinov visited 
Khabarovsk and Vladivostok to monitor a joint military exercise that was modeled on a 
potential Sino-Soviet war, in an effort to intimidate China. On May 9, while President 
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Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski was visiting Beijing, the 
Soviet border troops entered Chinese territory under the pretense of arresting a fugitive. 
The Soviet Union later apologized to China for crossing the border, but Beijing did not 
believe it was an accident. In the “Sino-Japanese Friendship and Cooperation Treaty” that 
normalized China’s relationship with Japan, signed in August 1978, China added a clause 
on anti-hegemony in order to target the Soviet Union. On August 1, during a ceremony 
commemorating the anniversary of the PLA’s founding, Defense Minister Xu Xiangqian 
stated that the goal of the Soviet military exercise was to practice invading China, and 
that the biggest threat China faced came from the Soviet Union. In Xu’s statement, he 
indicated that China needed to prepare for war with the Soviet Union.49  
While the Soviet Union was not directly involved in the 1979 war, it lurked in the 
shadows throughout. China wanted stability along its borders, and it recognized that the 
Soviet Union could destabilize its borders. One of the reasons that Deng fought this war 
was “to weigh the weight of the Soviet Union” (cheng yi cheng su lian).50 In this strategic 
shadow-boxing game, the Soviet Union lost by failing to live up to its commitments to 
Vietnam.51  
 
The Last Straw – Vietnam Invades Cambodia 
By 1951, Ho Chi Minh had already made it clear that the DRV’s goal was to 
“liberate the people” of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and “eventually establish an 
independent, free, strong and prosperous Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia Confederation.” China 
consistently opposed this goal and clearly supported Cambodia’s wish to be independent 
from Vietnam. In 1977, Vietnam signed several treaties with Laos, including a 25-year-
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long friendship and cooperation treaty. By the end of 1978, over 50,000-60,000 
Vietnamese soldiers were stationed in Laos, while Laos’ army numbered only 40,000 
troops.52 
Cambodia relied on China’s support to resist Vietnam’s pressure to form a 
political union. China initially supported Cambodia only begrudgingly, as it wanted to 
avoid an open clash with Vietnam on this issue. In December 1977, Cambodia suspended 
its diplomatic relationship with Vietnam, accusing Vietnam of attempting to occupy its 
territory. In January 1978, China openly clashed with Vietnam by issuing a diplomatic 
statement, urging a ceasefire between Vietnam and Cambodia and calling for Vietnam’s 
withdrawal from Cambodia. China also promised more aid to Cambodia, but declined to 
send its navy to Cambodia or offer security assurances.53  
China had long foreseen Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, but China did not 
expect Cambodia to be defeated so quickly.54 By September 1978, China had detected 
Vietnam’s deployment of forces on the Cambodian border. In early October, Xinhua 
News Agency reported that Hanoi was “busy making preparations for a large-scale armed 
invasion of Cambodia in the coming dry-season.”55 Even as the evidence mounted, the 
PLA did not want to consider the possibility of intervening militarily in Cambodia for 
three reasons: First, Pol Pot was committing atrocities so outrageous that even Beijing 
was hesitant to align itself too closely with the Khmer Rouge.56 Second, it would be 
difficult for the PLA to send the necessary armaments and material support to Cambodia 
because it was too far away from Cambodia and both the railway and the sea routes were 
exposed to attacks by Vietnam.57 Third, and most critically, China was in the middle of 
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launching drastic economic reforms and a political rectification movement and had no 
stomach for a military intervention that could undermine these efforts.58 
In mid-November, Deng visited Thailand in order to reassure Thailand that China 
would not sit idly by if it was attacked by Vietnam. In an attempt to stabilize the region 
and encourage greater resistance to Vietnam, China adjusted its policy toward Southeast 
Asian countries and openly supported their military cooperation with the U.S. Through 
these word and actions, Deng was attempting to send a warning to Vietnam. Vietnam, 
however, did not heed this warning and launched a large-scale invasion of Cambodia on 
December 25, 1978. Vietnam swiftly took over Cambodia’s capital in two weeks 
(January 7, 1979). Chinese leaders were well-informed by their diplomats stationed in 
Cambodia regarding the atrocities Pol Pot committed on his own people and the chaotic 
situation in Cambodia.59 However, China did not expect that Vietnam could capture 
Cambodia so soon.  
 
The PLA’s Mindset  
After a decade of chaos due to the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao’s defection and 
death, and the arrest of Gang of Four, the PLA was more demoralized and divided than it 
had ever been since been since the Long March of 1934-35. There was no quicker or 
more efficient way to unite the PLA than to fight a war. That said, the PLA’s senior 
leaders still held considerable reservations, if not outright opposition, to the decision to 
launch the 1979 war. 
The PLA Before 1979: Broken and Divided 
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Prior to the 1979 war, the PLA was in serious disarray, as training and 
professionalization lagged behind and it became increasingly politicized. It was an army 
deeply embittered and internally divided, not only because of its extensive political 
involvement and therefore its contribution to a massive social catastrophe, but also 
because of a series of purges directed against various parts of the officer corps. At this 
stage, the PLA was stuck in a malaise, and Hua Guofeng, one of the last of the old guard 
from the Mao era, perpetuated this situation by introducing the “two whatevers” policy, 
thus supporting the status quo.60  
The PLA’s direct and prolonged intervention in the Cultural Revolution, which 
Mao Zedong ordered, was catastrophic for both Chinese society and the military. Mao, 
and not the military leadership, instructed the PLA to intervene during the Cultural 
Revolution, but the military could not object to Mao’s wishes and had to carry the 
Cultural Revolution forward. In most regions, the PLA tried to do the right thing by 
stabilizing the society and restoring order. However, the military also committed 
unspeakable crimes in places like Guangxi and Yunnan. In Guangxi Autonomous Region, 
more than 80,000 innocent people were killed during the Cultural Revolution, according 
to the official government figure.61 According to the personal account of Yan Lebin, a 
retired Public Security officer who was a member of the government’s investigation team 
afterwards, by confirming names and addresses they identified a total 89,700 people who 
were killed during the Cultural Revolution in Guangxi. Of this number, 3,700 were killed 
in armed factional fights, 7,000 committed suicide, and 79,000 were executed in an 
organized fashion by the PLA and local militias involved under General Wei Guoqing’s 
direction.62 In Yunnan Province, Tan Furen, Political Commissar of the Kunming 
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Military Region (KMR), supported “rebel factions” to seize power, which resulted in 
more than one million people displaced and/or attacked. Among them, 17,269 people 
committed suicide. Tan was assassinated in 1970 in Kunming. Tan’s successor, General 
Wang Bicheng, did nothing but continue the bloody factional fights.  Without the 1979 
war with Vietnam, the factional war in Yunnan would probably have continued for much 
longer.63 
Although some military leaders personally benefitted from the military’s active 
political engagement, the majority of the officer corps suffered greatly. Radicalism and 
factionalism led to repeated purges and the continued suffering of officers. For example, 
Guo Xingfu, a symbol of the PLA’s professionalization movement in 1960s, was 
condemned as a “bourgeois method” as soon as the Cultural Revolution began in 1966.64 
Guo was imprisoned, badly tortured, and openly humiliated.65 Guo’s experience was not 
atypical, as hundreds of thousands of PLA officers and soldiers were mercilessly 
persecuted during purges within the military.  
Radical campaigns not only brought turmoil to PLA officers’ lives since 1966-67, 
but also greatly undermined the PLA’s combat readiness and its strength as an institution. 
According to a regulation publicized by the CMC in 1966, half of the PLA’s time was to 
be spent on political education, while military training occupied only 40 percent of full-
readiness troops’ time, 20 percent of half-readiness troops’ time, and ten percent of the 
time of troops dedicated to non-military affairs such as agricultural production.66 The 
PLA had sent 2.8 million officers and soldiers to “support the left.” In 1964, the 
PLAAF’s fighter pilot curriculum required annual flight time of 122 hours, while in 1970 
the requirement was lowered to 55 hours. In actuality, pilots, on average, had annual 
 470 
flight training of only 24 hours in 1968, when politicization reached its highest point.67 
By 1972, only 6.2 percent of pilots could complete simple Operations Weather missions 
at night, and only one percent of pilots were capable of undertaking complicated 
Operations Weather missions.68 
After decades of radicalization and endless purges and persecution of officers, 
almost no one in the PLA’s upper echelon was immune from being either victims or 
perpetrators (or both) of personal attacks and purges. Repeated purges and persecutions 
led to bitter factional struggles. Victims of persecution could turn overnight into 
prosecutors or informants on other officers.  
Following Lin Biao’s death in 1971, the PLA endured further organizational and 
morale crises. Lin Biao’s fall brought down the majority of the upper echelon of the PLA 
leadership. In the wake of Lin Biao’s death, an unprecedented purge was immediately 
launched, with Lin Biao’s associates, innocent or not, subjected to humiliating public 
trials and sentenced to long prison terms, or imprisoned without trials.69 Due to the 
PLA’s organizational chaos during this period, the position of Defense Minister was 
vacant between September 1971 and January 1975. There were similar lapses and 
vacancies for positions such as Chief of General Staff and PLAAF Chief. For example, as 
the PLA Air Force was deeply implicated in the 913 Incident, “executive offices and 
troops of the Air Force had little trust in leaders of the PLAAF.”70 The PLA’s crisis in 
morale was much more severe than its organizational crisis. As an institution that lived 
on honor, the PLA became completely disgraced. 
“Whoever went through that period in the PLA smelled foul.”71 The internal 
disunity in the PLA was so deep and pervasive that any senior commanders could play a 
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unifying role without antagonizing the opposing faction. Therefore, Deng transferred 
back to the PLA leadership those who had long served in non-military posts and therefore 
were relatively neutral in bitter factional attacks of the PLA. Geng Biao, who spent 
decades serving in the MFA as an ambassador, was among those transferred, and served 
as CMC Secretary General.   
The replacement of the western front’s commander just prior to the 1979 war also 
exemplifies the PLA’s severe division during this period. One week after the war order 
was issued on 1 January 1979, General Yang Dezhi was assigned to command troops on 
the western front, replacing Lieutenant General Wang Bicheng, then commander of the 
Kunming Military Region (KMR). It was abnormal for the military to change 
commanders as the war drew so close and was only about one month away. Wang was 
replaced because he had been actively representing one faction against the 14th Army, 
which was supposed to be the main force fighting the 1979 war.72 Wang once publicly 
branded the 14th Army as a “traitor army,” which caused the CMC to worry that the 14th 
Army wouldn’t obey Wang’s orders. General Xu Shiyou, Commander of the eastern front 
during the 1979 war, also supported Wang’s reassignment due to personal animosity.73 
Zhang Sheng, son of future Defense Minister General Zhang Aiping, documented 
the following episode to describe how severely divided the PLA was before the 1979 war: 
An enlarged CMC meeting was held at the end of 1978. It exploded into fights and 
quarrels (among the senior PLA officers). What left the biggest impression on me was 
how ugly the General Staff Department, the PLA Navy, the PLA Air Force, the Fuzhou 
Military Region, and the Lanzhou Military Region fought, accusing each other and 
reopening historic feuds. I still remember that my father spoke during that meeting, 
saying that the past was the past and questioning whether quarreling with each other 
helped to clarify anything. My father asserted that all sides needed to examine themselves 
first. In the end, Marshal Xu [Xiangqian] could not bear hosting this meeting. So he 
asked Deng [Xiaoping] to take over. Deng came onto the stage and only said two words – 
“meeting finished.” Luckily, the (1979) war broke out on the border of Guangxi and 
Yunnan. Otherwise, the PLA would have continued this infighting.”74  
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By fighting a war, Deng could justify demoting two groups of officers whose loyalty was 
suspicious: those promoted through a fast track in 1973, and the radicals promoted by 
purging others and spearheading radical movements inside the military. Deng described 
those young officers who were promoted in batches in 1973 as those promoted by 
“helicopter” and “rocket.” “As for cadres who have risen by helicopter or rocket, they 
aren’t good enough…In the army there are company commanders who at a stroke have 
been promoted to the rank of army commander. It would be unacceptable even for them 
to become deputy commanders of battalions.”75 Among the most notable officers 
promoted in such a manner were Sun Yuguo and Chen Daifu.76 Deng was determined to 
eliminate such officers who were promoted due to their dubious political loyalty.77 An 
imminent war was the best pretext to sideline this group of officers, who had negligible 
allegiance to Deng.78 In 1979, three out of four deputy commanders of the PLA Navy and 
one Deputy Commander of the PLA Air Force, all promoted in 1973, were relieved from 
their posts and demoted.79 Also, through the cauldron of war future military leaders 
would automatically rise to the top by proving themselves in actual combat, the very 
group of officers Deng would want to embrace.  
Deng believed that fighting a war in 1979 served the PLA’s interests, as he 
reasoned that it would: reunite the officer corps and force them to work together toward a 
single objective; refocus its attention back onto its own modernization and restructuring; 
filter out the best PLA officers; and flush out the officers promoted due to ideological 
considerations and factional support.80 While these reasons served as important 
motivations for Deng, they were not his primary reason to fight Vietnam. Deng was not 
completely confident in the PLA’s ability to prevail in such a war. Rather, Deng initiated 
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the war with Vietnam in order to test the PLA’s mettle. After the major battles with 
Vietnam were completed in March 1979, Deng explained to the troops his decision to go 
to war with Vietnam by saying: 
The PLA hasn’t fought a war for 30 years. Is our military indeed capable enough? To tell 
the truth, we really don’t have much confidence. The CMC has made a resolution to 
strengthen its training. It seems that routine training has limited results, though it is not 
completely fruitless. But whether the PLA is reliable or not will depend on how it fights 
in actual combat…It won’t do without actual battles. So this is a great chance [for using 
the war with Vietnam to test the PLA]…To tell the truth, since the past decade, the 
military has had a bad name. After this war, its reputation will repair a bit. One has to 
learn how to fight by actually fighting a war. It made a significant difference by going to 
the frontline of war than not. The whole world knows that we haven’t fought a war for 
thirty years, and we didn’t necessarily win the war with Vietnam, as our cadre below the 
battalion-level never fought a war, and only some of the cadres at the regiment level have 
ever been in a battle.81 
 
The PLA’s Support for and Opposition to the 1979 War 
Career PLA officers generally supported Deng’s attempt to shift the nation’s 
focus toward economic reform and political rectification. At the same time, most were 
unenthusiastic about Deng’s decision to fight Vietnam due to the following reasons: 
First, the PLA feared that a war with Vietnam would trigger the Soviet Union’s 
military intervention. By the late 1960s, as Sino-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate, 
Mao had clearly identified the Soviet Union as China’s biggest threat.82 China felt 
threatened by the introduction of the Brezhnev Doctrine, in which the Soviet Union 
insisted on its right to use force to impose its will on its satellites, which was 
operationalized when it invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. Mao feared that during the 
chaos of the Cultural Revolution the Soviet Union would use this doctrine to topple his 
regime. Then, in 1969, the Soviet Union and China had a tense military standoff over 
Zhenbao Island, which led to casualties on both sides and was the only direct military 
confrontation of the Cold War that involved two nuclear powers. Also in 1969, the Soviet 
Union expelled China from the Soviet-led Communist International (Comintern).83 The 
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Soviet Union and Vietnam shared expansionist ambitions, Soviet in Afghanistan and 
Vietnam in Indochina, and were linked through an official alliance treaty, in which the 
Soviet Union vowed to defend Vietnam if it were attacked. China believed that the Soviet 
Union might take advantage of the situation and use the war with Vietnam as a pretext to 
strike China. Many senior PLA leaders opposed this war because it was a high-risk bet. 
Second, the PLA fought alongside communist North Vietnam (DRV) and Ho Chi 
Minh during its wars against France and then the U.S. Many senior and mid-level PLA 
officers were once military advisors to and teachers of the DRV military. Attacking 
Vietnam made many of these officers uneasy. If China fought Vietnam, it would be 
difficult to justify all the material support it had given to Vietnam, and the deaths of 
thousands of Chinese soldiers who died fighting alongside Vietnam. It was difficult for 
these military generals to turn their backs on their former partners, with whom they had 
built bonds that were forged in the crucible of war. 
Third, many officers believed that the PLA was not ready for battle, having just 
gone through decades of chaos and radicalization. The PLA was emerging from a period 
in which a large group of military leaders and officers were purged, which forced the 
military to abandon proper readiness training. According to a survey of 18 division 
commanders and 92 regiment commanders conducted in 1969, half of them did not know 
how to organize a combat exercise. The same survey found that among 109 officers in 
two randomly selected divisions, only ten percent knew how to conduct proper military 
training.84 The PLA was in a weak state because it had a high proportion of new recruits, 
since recruitment took place mostly during the fall. Based on an inspection conducted 
before the 1979 war, one third of the hand grenades could not explode.85 New recruits 
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without sufficient training occupied half of the troops. For example, the Second Company 
of the famous “Tashan Heroic Regiment” conducted only 18-day military trainings after 
accepting the 57 new recruits, which occupied more than half of the total soldiers (108) 
of this company.86 Among the 57 new recruits, only 41 had twice shooting practices, and 
the rest only had only once shooting practice. In this company, only 32 soldiers received 
offensive combat training and none had been trained for defensive combat.87General 
Zhang Zhen, then Chief of the General Logistic Department, inspected the troops on the 
frontlines, concluded that the PLA was severely unprepared, and therefore advised the 
CMC to postpone the date of attack.88 In retrospect, the PLA troops sent to the frontlines 
were so unprepared and lacking in training that some, at least those from the 43rd Army, 
“could not detect and clear mine fields” and “were unable to perform their mission 
because their leaders had a poor understanding of topography and map reading.”89  
Fourth, the PLA had traditionally placed a high value on the principle that any 
war it is engaged in needs to have a just cause. Yet in its eyes the 1979 war lacked such a 
just cause. The PLA found it difficult to brand this war.90 Although Vietnam 
systematically mistreated and expelled ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam, and in China’s 
opinion bit the hand that had been feeding it, Vietnam had not invaded China. Could the 
offensive against Vietnam still be considered a “self-defense counterattack”?91 
Additionally, in order to argue that the war against Vietnam was a punitive war due to its 
invasion of Cambodia, China would indirectly be aligning itself with Pol Pot, whom 
China knew was committing large-scale atrocities against his own people.92 Although 
China had supported Pol Pot for other reasons, to officially link its war with Vietnam to 
supporting an internationally condemned regime was very risky.93 Finally, if the 1979 
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war was viewed as an instrument that China used to punish a country like Vietnam for 
mistreating or expelling ethnic Chinese, this could have caused great panic in Southeast 
Asia, a region in which China was attempting to improve relations with various countries, 
as most Southeast Asian countries treated ethnic Chinese the same way Vietnam did.94  
In 1978, the majority of PLA officers were still preoccupied with their efforts to 
rectify the wrongs they had to endure, or by the purification/cleansing movement that 
Deng launched to remove Lin Biao’s supporters and the Gang of Four from the PLA. 
This is one of the reasons why the PLA’s opposition was not articulated. A few senior 
military leaders, however, were vocal in their opposition. General Su Yu, a top PLA 
leader who was well-respected for his military expertise but was sidelined due to his 
rivalry with Peng Dehuai, clearly opposed the war.95 Su’s opposition was primarily 
premised on two objections. First, how could China attack its ideological comrades it 
once supported so much? Second, this war lacked justification since the PLA strictly 
adhered to the tradition of “war has to be justified” (shi chu you ming), which in practice 
meant “no first shot” and “no aggression.” Su might have also opposed Deng’s war due 
to a personal vendetta against Deng. When Su was sidelined, Deng sided with Peng. Su’s 
case was not overturned until Jiang Zemin intervened in 1994.96 Then-Defense Minister 
Marshal Xu Xiangqian was also not enthusiastic about the war. From 1977-80, Xu 
dedicated himself to reviewing each military region’s strategy and operational focus, as 
well as the PLA’s restructuring and rebuilding programs. Yet once the war began he 
diligently devised and enforced the war plans. However, in Xu’s memoir, curiously, the 
1979 war was not even mentioned.97 
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Both Andrew Scobell and Zhang Xiaoming independently came to the conclusion 
that Marshal Ye Jianying was not enthusiastic about the 1979 war at least initially, but at 
the same time did not strongly oppose it. Eventually, Deng convinced Ye, probably on 
domestic political grounds, that the war was worthwhile and Ye came on board with the 
idea. By the end of 1977, Marshal Ye no longer expressed any opposition to Deng’s war. 
Marshal Ye had repeatedly played the role of king-maker or king-saver during historic 
inflection points. In this instance, however, Ye did not intervene.98 Rather, a small circle 
that oversaw the 1979 war was established, which Deng led and also included Ye, Nie 
Rongzhen, and Li Xiannian.99 
The PLA officers who disagreed with Deng on the war objected on both 
ideological and military grounds. However, they generally agreed with Deng’s domestic 
agenda – the need to rectify the cadres who were wrongly persecuted, overturn Hua’s 
economic and political agenda, and eventually replace Hua as the Party’s top leader. In 
the end, Deng’s arguments that he tailored to his military audience won them over: the 
PLA needed a war to unify it; and this war could be won, was meaningful, worthwhile, 
and could be kept limited in order to keep the Soviet Union out.  
Deng’s proposed war had a few strong supporters, with whom he consulted before 
making the final decision in mid-1977 to launch this war.100 One of Deng’s supporters 
was General Xu Shiyou, a legendary figure in the PLA. General Xu maintained a close 
personal relationship with Hua, but he often clashed with Ji Dengkui and General Chen 
Xilian, both ardent supporters of Hua and opponents of the push to rectify wrongful 
accusations leveled against a large group of PLA senior officers, known as the “two 
whatevers” policy.101 Xu also had a large appetite for war. After Deng appointed him as 
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commander of the eastern front, Xu recommended General Yang Dezhi, then 
Commander of the Wuhan Military Region, to replace Wang Bicheng, the controversial 
Commander of the Kunming Military Region and the presumed commander of the 
western front.  
Those who sided with Deng on the question of the war due to political loyalty to 
him included CMC Secretary General Luo Ruiqing, Chief of General Politics Department 
Wei Guoqing, and Deputy Chief of General Staff Yang Yong. These men were all close 
associates of Deng who, with the exception of Wei, were cruelly purged by Mao and Lin 
Biao.102 In February 1977, Luo told Hua Nan, Editor-in-Chief of the PLA Daily, that he 
believed the “two whatevers” policy was wrong.103 As soon as Luo was reinstated in 
August 1977, he directly instructed the PLA Daily, the most important channel for the 
PLA to deliver its viewpoint to the public, to publish an article entitled “the most 
important principle of Marxism.” This article greatly boosted the elite’s and public’s 
confidence in Deng, as it revealed the PLA’s firm support for Deng’s domestic political 
agenda and his rectification campaign, while also calling for abandoning Hua’s “two 
whatevers” policy.104 Luo, Wei, and Yang were likely fully preoccupied by the political 
struggle against Hua, and therefore supported Deng’s push for war, as it would augment 
their campaign against Hua. 
Some analysts incorrectly concluded, “unlike the discussions that preceded 
China’s entry into the Korean War, no serious debates about Beijing’s decision to go to 
war against Vietnam ever occurred at high levels.”105 Deng did in fact consult his 
military commanders, probably first in a smaller circle in the summer of 1977. Deng also 
spent a year attempting to convince the larger officer corps that war was the proper 
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course of action. Most military commanders were unenthusiastic about the war for 
various reasons, but they did not want to voice their opposition, as such dissent would 
harm Deng politically during an already delicate power struggle. In other words, the PLA 
firmly supported Deng and wanted him to become China’s top leader, and that political 
support outweighed its dislike of the war. “Let’s fight and get rid of the calamity (wo men 
yao da da hui qi),” Deng told Geng Biao, then CMC Secretary General, when Geng 
briefed Deng on the opposition of General Su Yu and other military leaders.106 By 
September 1978, the dust had settled in the PLA and a vast majority of the army accepted 
the war. Once the policy was made, the following months were spent deciding how to 
enforce it militarily.   
Arguably, the PLA’s opposition, voiced mostly behind closed doors, had 
consequences. The earliest deployment of the two regiments (the 121st Regiment of the 
41st Army and the 40th Regiment of the 14th Army) came as late as November 1978,107 
just 70 days prior to the war breaking out, and most troops received notification of the 
impending war during the last two weeks of December.108 In fact, the 58th Regiment of 
the 20th Army received war orders as late as February 19, 1979. After lobbying by Deng 
and his supporters, the CMC finally made it clear in November 1978 that a war with 
Vietnam was necessary. The war machine started rolling, and it was not until December 8 
the order for operations was cut, only two months before the war was to begin. General 
Zhang Zhen, who was in charge of logistics, cited this as a reason that the PLA 
encountered difficulties during the 1979 war.109 
 
Party-Military Relations: Intense Party Power Struggles 
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The Party in 1977-78 was going through a period of intense power struggles. In 
October 1976, after winning Hua Guofeng’s support, the PLA, led by Marshal Ye 
Jianying, arrested the Gang of Four. However, after the fall of the radicals, China was 
still in limbo. On the one hand, Hua was Mao’s designated successor and held the top 
position in the Party; on the other hand, Hua lacked vision, expertise, and the elite 
political and military leadership’s support. His insistence on carrying through Mao’s 
policies prevented a large group of Party cadres and officers from being “rectified” and 
restored to power and therefore alienated a large group of Party cadres and officers, as 
well as intellectuals. Deng, in comparison, had the requisite expertise, vision, and his 
peers’ respect, but had barely started to reenter political life. His power base, though 
sizeable,110 was still largely underground and had not yet been “rectified.” The PLA in 
general firmly supported Deng.111 Hua clearly recognized the challenge that a powerful 
figure like Deng posed, as he could galvanize strong support from both the Party and the 
PLA. It is not an exaggeration to say that as Deng Xiaoping started to make up his mind 
to attack Vietnam in the summer of 1977, he was fighting a political war himself.  
 
Intertwining the April 5th Tiananmen Incident with Deng’s Reinstatement 
From October 1976 to May 1977, Hua butted heads with a group of cadres headed 
by Marshal Ye on whether to reinstate Deng and overturn the judgment on the April 5th 
Tiananmen Incident, a riot against the radicals after Zhou Enlai's death that was repressed 
and labeled a “counter-revolutionary counterattack.”112 The two issues were intertwined, 
as Deng was sidelined following the April 5th Incident because he was deemed the 
mastermind of the riot and Mao alluded to Deng as the country’s foremost “rightist.”113 
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Hua, then Minister of Public Security, loyally executed the campaign of attacking Deng, 
labeling him “the unrepentant revisionist line of the capitalist-roader” in February 1976. 
Mao then promoted Hua from interim premier to the first Vice Chairman of the Central 
Committee and Premier, which thereby consolidated Hua’s position as Mao’s heir 
apparent.114 Therefore, when Deng was unseated, Hua was a major beneficiary. By 
retaining Mao’s judgment on the April 5th Incident, Hua was attempting to block Deng’s 
entry back into Chinese politics.115 In March 1977, Hua told the Central Party Work 
Conference that it was necessary to carry out criticism against Deng because it was in 
accordance with Mao’s wishes. “We should learn the lessons from Khrushchev,” Hua 
said, implying Deng, as “China’s Khrushchev,” could completely undermine Mao’s 
legacy. Some in the State Council even demanded that criticism against Deng  be harsher 
than criticism against the Gang of Four, which “aroused great indignation by almost all 
older cadres and was widely resisted and opposed.”116 
Those who supported Deng exerted pressure on Hua to reinstate Deng in 1976-77. 
They were especially strongly motivated after Hua, while insisting on continuing to 
criticize Deng, presented the “two whatevers” policy formally in the Central Party Work 
Conference in March 1977. This meant, in Geng Biao’s words, “the Gang of Four was 
still in place” and “China would have gone nowhere if it followed this policy.”117 
Marshal Ye, who was officially Hua’s deputy in the Party but was in reality more senior 
and experienced, sent a large number of cadres and PLA leaders to visit Hua and lobby 
him to accept Deng back into the leadership. Hu Yaobang and Geng Biao, who was in 
charge of propaganda, were both clearly against the “two whatevers” policy and vocally 
supported Deng’s reinstatement. Wang Zhen visited various senior cadres and argued 
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against the “two whatevers” policy “as emotionally as a warrior.”118 General Wei 
Guoqing and Xu Shiyou exerted pressure on Hua. Luo Ruiqing (later CMC Secretary 
General) and Yang Yong (later Deputy Chief of General Staff) travelled around military 
regions and lobbied military leaders to support Deng’s reinstatement.119 In the end, a 
political comprise was reached. Hua published Deng’s letter, written on October 10, 1976, 
in which Deng expressed full allegiance to Hua.120 Hua was elected Party Chairman 
during the Third Plenary Session of the 10th CCP Central Committee in July 1977, while 
his supporter Wang Dongxing was elected Vice Chairman. Deng was reinstated as CMC 
Vice Chairman and Chief of General Staff, with a ranking behind that of Hua and Ye. 
 
Deng’s Two-Front War and Building His Power Base 
Soon after he was reinstated in the summer of 1977, Deng made up his mind 
about the war. As he was still an underdog in the political power race, Deng decided to 
“do a few risky but outstanding deeds (piaoliangshi) to send shock waves to this half-
dead political state,” as he told Hu Yaobang.121  
The domestic war Deng launched focused on the struggle against Hua’s “two 
whatevers” policy. Specifically, first Deng focused on providing opportunities for the 
younger generation, rehabilitating intellectuals, and restoring old cadres to power. To 
achieve these goals, Deng postponed and redesigned the just-reinstated university 
entrance institution (gaokao zhidu) in September 1977, by only relying on exams and 
abolishing the “recommendation” portion, which had become a hotbed for corruption and 
backdoor deals. Deng also set up the institutionalized skill evaluation system. All the 
above measures served to establish “a normal mobility structure and opportunity space 
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inside this stratum,” thus bringing hope for further social, economic, and political 
advancement to the younger generation and intellectuals.122 These policies, plus the 
suspension of the policy that sent youth to the countryside to do manual labor in 
December 1978, won Deng support from the younger generation and their families. 
Additionally, in March 1978, Deng vowed to support science and technology 
development, while concluding that the intelligentsia was already a part of the working 
class. Deng’s move politically liberated millions of intellectuals from the imputation of 
“bourgeois intelligentsia.”123 Finally, over 130 cadres above the level of Vice Minister or 
Vice Governor were rehabilitated in 1978. Both the central government and the military 
started to rehabilitate those who had been wrongly accused. In the PLA General Logistics 
Department alone, 2,754 people were rehabilitated in 1978.124 By May 1978, more than 
490,000 “rightists” had their names cleared, and 210,000 went back to work.125 In 
November 1978, the “counter-revolutionary” label attached to the April 5th Tiananmen 
Incident was removed. 4.4 million of those who had been labeled “landlords” or “rich 
farmers” had these labels removed by 1982.126  
Thus, by the end of the 1970s Deng’s power base was composed of two major 
groups: older cadres and older intellectuals who opposed the Cultural Revolution and 
wanted China to return to its earlier, “ideal” state that it experienced from 1949-1957;127 
and young workers and young intellectuals who sought a new, democratic, and 
modernized China.128  
Deng’s power base could only be strengthened by continuous efforts to overthrow 
Hua’s “two whatevers” policy, which would liberate more of Deng’s supporters and 
release their political power. On May 11, 1978, the Guang Ming Daily published an 
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article entitled, “Practice sets the only standard to examine truth,” which Deng’s 
supporters initiated in order to directly criticize Hua’s “two whatevers” policy.129 The 
majority of the top leadership at the PLA GSD and GPD, as well as the CMC, all stood 
behind Deng in his struggle against Hua.130 PLA Daily immediately reprinted the Guang 
Ming Daily article. Deng spoke at the five-week-long PLA political working conference 
and reiterated this criticism of Hua. On June 24, CMC Secretary General Luo Ruiqing 
pushed the PLA Daily to publish an open criticism of Hua’s policy. In the three months 
following this article’s publication, local governors and leaders of military regions began 
to openly support Deng. 
 
The PLA’s Allegiance to Deng 
By the time Deng was reinstated, the Chinese leadership was struggling with a 
domestic crisis, with the economy nearly bankrupt, society battered and deeply divided, 
and the military heavily involved in almost all aspects of China’s domestic life. Two 
central tasks dominated the debate within the Chinese leadership: whether China should 
rectify the wrongs done to numerous innocent people in previous campaigns led primarily 
by Mao; and whether, given that the planned economy was not working, China should 
turn to a new economic development path. As of the start of 1978, even with the 
reinstatement of Deng, the direction of China’s domestic politics was still undecided, 
with Hua Guofeng occupying the three top leadership positions and supported by his own 
four-member “gang” composed of Ji Dengkui, Wang Dongxing, General Chen Xilian, 
and Wu De. The other group, headed by Deng and Marshal Ye, strived to rectify the 
wrongs of the Mao era and restore the names of numerous leaders who were disgraced 
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and persecuted during Mao’s radical campaigns. The line of this division, as well as its 
causes, was clear in the Party: those older cadres and officers, staunch supporters of Deng, 
once they had their names restored, would return to the leadership position they deserved 
and therefore hold enormous political power. This scenario made the rectification of 
wrongs a flash point in the power struggle between Hua and Deng. It was a zero-sum 
game. 
Even after the PLA arrested the Gang of Four, Hua remained a weak figurehead 
and did not have effective control over the military. As the PLA officer corps was 
battered by a series of purges and was bitterly divided into factions, most of the PLA 
officer corps placed their loyalty in Deng’s hands, even though Deng was not yet the 
Party’s top leader. Hua still tried to cultivate his people in the military.  
Among those PLA officers Hua approached in an attempt to gain their loyalty, Su 
Zhenhua, the 1st Political Commissar of the PLA Navy, was the most receptive to Hua’s 
entreaties. Hua approached Su promising that he would take the place of General Chen 
Xilian, then standing member of the CMC, who was unpopular and was being forced out 
by senior cadres (mainly Deng and Ye).131 Tension between Su and Deng was especially 
high after a military vessel from the South China Sea Fleet exploded and then sank in 
March 1978, killing at least two-thirds of the 300 sailors on board. Deng criticized Su as 
being “apathetic,” and in the wake of this incident he ordered the PLA Navy to 
restructure. Su was offended by Deng’s comment and protested it during a five-hour-long 
conversation with Hua on April 12, 1978.132 Su’s relationship with Deng further 
deteriorated after Su planned to hold a naval exercise employing 120 military ships and 
70 fighter jets in Dalian to greet Hua after Hua’s planned return from North Korea in 
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May. However, Su obtained Hua’s approval first and when he then reported this plan to 
his superior, General Xiao Jinguang, Commander of the Navy, the plan was immediately 
suspended. However, Su passed away at age 69 in February 1979, which removed one 
element of opposition to Deng.  
Hua tried especially hard to garner the support of Marshal Xu Xiangqian, who 
came from Hua’s home province of Shanxi and was a well-respected and senior member 
of the PLA. This connection with Hua partially contributed to Marshal Xu’s appointment 
as Defense Minister and Vice Premier in March 1978. Xu, however, had little interest in 
factional politics or power struggles. It is doubtful that Xu lent his support to Hua in the 
political power struggle, despite his opposition toward removing Hua from his top 
position in the Party.133 It is more likely that Xu disagreed with Deng on policy 
positions.134 For instance, from the outset Xu and Deng disagreed with each other on how 
to approach the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As a result, Xu was likely to oppose the Sino-
Vietnam War as well. Fighting a war with Vietnam inherently risked pushing China into 
a war with the Soviet Union, which Xu believed was a dangerous risk to take. However, 
Marshal Xu actively participated in war planning and implementing the war plan as soon 
as the CMC reached a consensus on the decision to go to war.135 Hua also approached Xu 
Shiyou and Geng Biao seeking their support, but they both kept their distance from Hua. 
Therefore, Hua never really cultivated a power base in the PLA. The PLA senior 
commanders were loyal to and reliant on Deng’s leadership instead of Hua’s in 1977-78.   
As the PLA’s morale hit rock bottom following the 913 Incident, Deng brought 
hope to the officer corps. As early as 1974, Deng, who Mao had just reinstated, dedicated 
himself to military rectification (jundui zhengdun).136 “The military has to act like a 
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military,” Deng urged.137 He identified radicalism and factionalism in the PLA officer 
corps as the root problem that caused disunity and combat ineffectiveness. In July 1975, 
Deng emphasized “armament development and strategic prioritizing as the two 
protruding needs for making military preparations for war-fighting as well as guiding 
principles for military reorganization.”138 The 1975 military rectification campaign Deng 
led pursued the mission of rehabilitating and bringing back officers wrongly persecuted 
during previous political campaigns. The campaign simultaneously focused on removing 
those who were close to Lin Biao and preventing the Gang of Four, in particular Zhang 
Chunqiao (Chief of PLA General Politics Department), from building up the radicals’ 
influence inside the military.139 Yet, in 1976, Deng was purged again and put under 
house arrest, which dimmed the desperate officer corps’ newfound hope. Deng’s 
downfall drove many in the PLA to feel a grave sense of crisis. Some even quietly floated 
the idea of a coup against the Gang of Four.140  
Deng’s reinstatement in 1977 rekindled the PLA officer corps’ hopes. Deng made 
the request for the PLA to prepare for a war as early as August 1977, after he had just 
been reinstated.141 Deng asserted, “‘to put the military in order’ is the guideline for army 
building in the next three to five years” and “‘to make the PLA ready for fighting a war’ 
is the guideline before the war breaks out.”142 The CMC meeting in December 1977 
made a formal decision to consolidate the military and prepare for war (zhengjun 
beizhan). This meeting also established detailed guidelines for military restructuring that 
would remove problematic officers and bring back Deng’s former subordinates and 
trusted allies to the military leadership. The reshuffling in 1978 affected half of the PLA 
officer corps at the division level and above, which inevitably hurt some officers’ career 
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prospects and made them resentful. However, Deng kept reiterating the message that war 
was inevitable to his officers in this process to quiet down these “noises.”143 In 1978, the 
PLA reinforced the border with Vietnam with twenty infantry divisions.144 
As China’s top leadership from 1977-79 was bitterly split along political lines and 
locked in a power struggle, Deng had numerous reasons for launching the 1979 war, 
including geographic considerations, territorial disputes, retaliation against an ungrateful 
Vietnam that was repelling ethnic Chinese, and putting the PLA up for a challenge and 
forcing its unity. Deng also employed the same basic logic that China used when 
deciding whether to enter the Korean War in 1950-53 while it was carrying out the 
bloody land reform and repression of counter-revolutionaries. Liu Shaoqi best explained 
this logic: “How could the counter-revolutionary suppression movement flourish in a big 
way? The key is that (we) have the Korean War! The Korean War is very good in many 
ways, making a lot of things easier for us to execute. Because the Korean War drums 
sounded, and sounded so loudly, our drums on the land reform and suppression of 
counter-revolutionaries thus could barely be heard.”145 Fighting a war, which was well 
within Deng’s expertise, would quickly elevate Deng’s prestige in the military and the 
country, rid the PLA of those with questionable loyalty, and remind people of Deng’s 
talents, which Hua could never match. Most importantly, it would make Deng’s “drum” 
of fighting the domestic political war “barely heard,” and thus would allow him to more 
easily execute all of the bold domestic reforms and, eventually, allow him to take power. 
   
Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
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The civilian foreign affairs system played an important role in supporting Deng’s 
decision to fight Vietnam, which was mainly reflected in its leadership standing with 
Deng. The MFA provided analytical reports on the U.S. and Southeast Asian countries’ 
possible attitudes toward the war and played functional but secondary roles in facilitating 
Deng’s trips to Southeast Asia, the United States, and Japan. Wang Youping, then 
Chinese Ambassador to Soviet Union, formed the conclusion that the Soviet Union did 
not plan to intervene in case of a Sino-Vietnamese conflict.146 
In the lead-up to the 1979 war, Deng found staunch allies among civilian leaders, 
primarily in Li Xiannian, who was then Vice Premier overseeing foreign affairs and Vice 
Chairman of the CCP, and Chen Yun, Deng’s political ally who spoke publicly against 
Hua’s “two whatevers” policy. Neither Li nor Chen was considered a military leader, yet 
they both strongly favored the war.  
Deng consulted Li Xiannian early on about the war and obtained his unwavering 
support. Li had several reasons for supporting Deng and his war. Li was actively involved 
in managing China’s aid program to Vietnam before 1970 and then negotiating with 
Vietnam throughout the 1970s.147 Li was assigned to decline the Vietnamese request for 
economic assistance in February 1977, which Premier Pham Van Dong did not take well. 
In June 1977, Li Xiannian had a long conversation with the visiting Premier Pham, which 
revealed a notable deterioration between the leadership of China and Vietnam.148 Premier 
Pham recognized the revision of Vietnam’s stance on recognizing China’s sovereignty 
over the Paracels and Spratlys, but argued that its previous position was made during its 
struggle for independence “fighting American imperialists was above anything else,” 
meaning that Vietnam made those empty promises to get what it needed to achieve its 
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highest priority.149 Therefore, Li understood more than most Chinese leaders how much 
help China provided to Vietnam before its independence, and thus felt a deep sense of 
betrayal. Li’s support for the war was genuine in this sense, which made him Deng’s 
firmest ally in the decision to fight Vietnam. Additionally, Li’s support for Deng and his 
war was politically motivated. Li was later implicated in the widely criticized “Leap 
Outward” policy (yang mao jin) Hua and Li carried out, which was basically a state-led, 
investment-driven program, with a focus on heavy industry. As this policy turned out to 
be a failure, Li, then Vice Premier in charge of economic development, was politically 
weakened. He was relieved of his responsibilities for the economy and shifted to 
overseeing foreign affairs.150 Li therefore had every reason to follow Deng more closely 
in 1979. General Liu Yazhou’s (Li’s son-in-law) speech later revealed Li’s firm support 
for the war.151 
In addition to Li Xiannian, Chen Yun played a crucial role in galvanizing support 
for the war. Chen dismissed the worries some expressed about a possible Soviet 
intervention. Chen noted that the Soviet divisions along China’s northern border were 
“seriously undermanned” and that any attack on China would require diverting forces 
from Europe, which would take more than a month to complete, as Ezra Vogel has 
written.152 Chen even made recommendations regarding war operations, which Deng 
took seriously.153 
The MFA is believed to have exerted considerable influence in the decision to go 
to war, as it had to advise the leadership on whether or not to fight this war, since war is 
in the end an extension of diplomacy.154 In this instance, the MFA mostly followed the 
lead of its head, Li Xiannian. Li clearly supported the war, and his viewpoint trickled 
 491 
down throughout the civilian foreign affairs system, as Li was overseeing the MFA’s 
work. This was reflected in analyses the MFA presented, which corroborated and 
supported the decision to wage this war.155 The MFA’s analyses posited that the U.S. 
would support China’s decision to precipitate this war, and most Southeast Asian 
countries would also side with China. The MFA’s analyses also asserted that this war 
could be kept limited, without spreading to countries friendly to China such as Thailand, 
or drawing in the Soviet Union.156 
Additional evidence of the MFA’s influence over the decision-making process 
can be found with regard to an episode involving Thailand. Thailand’s border with 
Vietnam is so flat and vulnerable that the Thai government was afraid that if Vietnam 
launched an invasion, it would conquer Bangkok in a couple of days.157 Therefore, 
Huang Hua, China’s Foreign Minister, attempted to reassure Thailand when visiting the 
country by promising that if any country invaded Thailand China would not sit on its 
hands.158 Vietnam for a host of reasons ended up deciding not to invade Thailand, which 
helped strengthen China’s relationship with Thailand. During the 1979 war against 
Vietnam, China even invited Thailand’s Commander-in-Chief to observe the fighting at 
close range. To avoid unnecessary attention that would invite Vietnamese attacks, the 
Thai military observers all wore PLA uniforms.159 Additionally, the MFA was concerned 
that if Thai military leaders were killed on Chinese soil by Vietnamese troops while 
wearing their own military uniforms, this would trigger a significant diplomatic crisis and 
give Vietnam an excuse to invade Thailand.160 
The MFA played an important functional role in carrying forward normalization 
negotiations with the United States, which was a crucial precondition for the 1979 war. 
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However, it is clear that Deng still had the final say over the Sino-U.S. negotiations. 
Deng was the person who built the strategic relationship with Washington while also war 
planning against Vietnam. On November 2, one day after Vietnam and the Soviet Union 
formalized their alliance by concluding a treaty, China and the U.S. officially launched 
negotiations to normalize their diplomatic relationship. Five days later, the PLA General 
Staff Department summoned to Beijing all Deputy Commanders in charge of war 
operations, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of War Operations from the Kunming 
Military Region, the Guangzhou Military Region, as well as local PLA troops in Yunnan 
and Guangxi, to discuss war preparations. On December 8, the CMC issued the internal 
order to fight the war against Vietnam. Five days later, Deng personally joined 
negotiations with the U.S. to negotiate with Leonard Woodcock and expedite the 
normalization process. The MFA also informed the U.S. that once negotiations were 
completed, Deng intended to visit the U.S. in January. The frantic negotiations held from 
December 13 to 15 led to the publication of the Shanghai Communiqué, and China 
establishing diplomatic relations with the U.S. on January 1, 1979. On January 28, 1979, 
Deng visited Washington, and the war against Vietnam began two weeks later.  
 
When and Why Did Deng Decide to Fight the 1979 War? 
The 1979 Sino-Vietnam war was Deng’s war. While the conventional wisdom is 
that the “crucial decision time was November/December 1978,”161 by the summer of 
1977 Deng and his small circle of advisors had already decided to launch the war against 
Vietnam.162 General Hong Xuezhi, later Chief of the PLA General Logistics Department 
(1956-59, 1980-87), describes how in August 1977, after he was reinstated and arrived in 
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Beijing, Marshal Ye Jianying told him to head the General Logistic Department (GLD). 
Hong was eventually assigned to supervise China’s defense industry after Deng stressed 
the “great emergency to get the ammunition ready” to prepare to “fight a self-defense war 
(with Vietnam).”163 The timing of Deng’s initial decision provides clues to the reasons 
why Deng made such a decision. 
First, Deng launched the 1979 war to consolidate his power domestically, so that 
he would be able to gain power and rehabilitate those cadres who were wrongly 
persecuted.   In 1977-79, China’s top leadership was divided with regards to the nation’s 
future direction, with Hua, the Party’s formal leader, insisting on the “two whatevers” 
policy, while Deng sought to launch ground-breaking reforms domestically and break 
with Hua’s policy. When Hua reluctantly rehabilitated Deng in mid-1977, Deng had 
much less influence and power relative to Hua. “From the summer of 1977 to the summer 
of 1978, Hua Guofeng still commanded the leading role on the historical stage of 
China.”164 Deng at that time was in charge of science and education, as well as the PLA, 
but did not have a major influence in the Party’s direction and its most debated policy – 
whether and how political rectifications should be conducted. During the summer of 1977, 
Deng did not believe that the debate he led over the criterion of truth and the rectification 
work his supporter Hu Yaobang directed would be enough to undermine Hua’s public 
and political support and provide the opening for Deng to assume power. Fighting a war, 
an area Hua clearly had no expertise and authority over, would be a quick way for Deng 
to substantially increase his prestige and popularity, and would allow him to consolidate 
political power.165 
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Second, Deng believed that for China to reenter the world stage, it needed to show 
its new friends in the West that, despite a shared ideology, it had genuinely split from the 
Soviet Union. Deng also believed that China could gain much-needed respect, and 
technological and material support from the Western world by defeating Vietnam, a 
country the U.S. could not even defeat, and could pose a challenge to the Soviet Union.  
Along this line of thinking, Deng wanted to copy Mao’s success from the Korean 
War.166 Mao’s decision to cross the Yalu River and fight against the U.S. proved to be an 
unqualified victory both in terms of domestic politics as well as China’s place in the 
international Communist movement. China, with a poorly equipped army, was still able 
to push back the highly advanced U.S. army and fight to a standstill, which allowed Mao 
to greatly consolidate his power and prestige. By choosing to fight a war with the U.S., 
Mao secured the Soviet Union’s material support for 156 separate projects, which 
allowed China to start rebuilding its industrial base. Domestically, who could ever doubt 
or challenge Mao’s decisions, when he had accomplished such a great feat of beating 
back the U.S.? After his victory in Korea, Mao even considered Nikita Khrushchev to be 
a lightweight. It was a complete victory for Mao, a lesson Deng took to heart.167 
Deng believed that by fighting the war China could gain political and material 
support from the U.S. 168 While Deng had strong reasons for going to war, he needed to 
be certain of the supports from the U.S. Deng once explained that China’s reform and 
opening-up was primarily intended to open China up to the U.S. because “countries that 
followed the U.S. all become rich and strong” and “it is useless to open up to other 
countries if China does not open up to the U.S.”169 Equally important, Deng thought 
China would have been rewarded by the West, especially the U.S., just as it was 
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rewarded by the Soviet Union after the Korean War. Deng overlearned the lessons of the 
Korean War. Whether the 1979 war actually brought about the benefits that Deng 
envisioned is highly debatable. Even Chinese military historians judge that Deng’s 
approach was out of sync with that of the U.S. in the late 1970s. One Chinese military 
historian attributes Deng’s misperception to his generation’s limitations.170 Even with his 
impressive foresight and wisdom as a statesman, Deng did not understand Americans 
enough to foresee that the U.S. was not the Soviet Union and Carter was not Stalin.171 He 
wrongly believed that the U.S. would react the same way the Soviet Union did after 
China’s victory in Korea by providing generous aid and technological know-how, which 
China badly needed.172 
There are others who argue that Deng achieved his goals with the 1979 war. 
“What did the war bring to China? It brought China enormous time (for development), 
enormous funding (through foreign investment), and enormous technology,” according to 
General Liu Yazhou, Li Xiannian’s son-in-law.173 After the 1979 war, the Sino-U.S. 
relationship enjoyed a decade of a strategic “honeymoon.” However, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) did not begin to takeoff until 1991.174 
Finally, Deng was launching comprehensive military reforms and needed to 
reunify the military, which was fractured as a result of Mao’s political campaigns. When 
facing an exclusively military audience in 1979, Deng acknowledged that using war to 
unify the PLA was his primary consideration as a military commander.175   
 
Conclusion: Decision to Fight  
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1978 was a pivotal year in China’s history – a year in which important military, 
political and economic decisions were made. Deng began laying the groundwork for war 
in September and November 1978, when the CMC held two war operation preparation 
meetings and began the military planning process.176 The formal decision to go to war 
with Vietnam was made by a joint, expanded meeting of the Politburo and the CMC, 
which was convened in the Great Hall of the People in December. Deng, then Chief of 
General Staff, and Li Xiannian, who oversaw foreign affairs, articulated the arguments in 
favor of going to war. Within the Party, the political and diplomatic argument employed 
to justify the war emphasized that China needed to punish Vietnam for threatening 
China’s geopolitical interests and prevent it from doing additional harm. In Li Xiannian’s 
words, China needed “to throw a punch” to warn and punish Vietnam.177 Yet in order to 
gain the Chinese public’s support, Deng and his allies publicly emphasized the war’s 
humanitarian aspects – to defend ethnic Chinese along the border and retaliate against 
Vietnam for expelling ethnic Chinese back to China.  The next day, on December 8, the 
CMC issued the war order and the PLA formally began the countdown and run-up to the 
war. On December 13, the CMC ordered the troops (225,000 soldiers) to start marching 
into position. At the same time, four military regions along China’s northwestern and 
northeastern border (Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, and Xinjiang Military Regions) all 
raised their alert level to first-level readiness in order to prepare for a possible Soviet 
invasion.178 
As Deng continued to move towards war, in December 1978, the domestic 
political war surprisingly resulted in Deng’s full victory. The 1978 Work Conference, 
which was intended as a way to prepare for the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP 
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Central Committee (CCPCC), lasted an unprecedented 36 days (in comparison, the 
historic Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCPCC took only five days). The 1978 Work 
Conference, which ended on December 15, 1978, also unprecedentedly included more 
than 200 local governors, military leaders, and ministers. At this conference, Chen Yun, 
Deng’s political ally who publicly challenged Hua’s “two whatevers” policy in 1977, 
once again launched a ferocious assault against Hua and his leftist camp.179 Because of 
overwhelming support for Chen’s proposal at this Party conference, Hua had no choice 
but to publicly repudiate the “two whatevers” policy and overturn the persecution of 
those who Chen drew attention to.  The Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCPCC was 
held from December 18 to 22, 1978, marking the official moment when Deng became 
China’s preeminent leader and the prelude for Hua to step down. 
While the PLA officially announced that it had launched an attack on Vietnam in 
February 1979, a war China fought for multiple reasons, for Deng Xiaoping, this war was 
a battle to win victory in the real war fought on the domestic front, the political war with 
Hua Guofeng, Mao’s designated successor, who still occupied the highest position in the 
Party. The 1979 Sino-Vietnam border war was Deng’s war. China’s top leadership was 
fragmented due to the ongoing power struggle between Deng and Hua. Hua had a 
political power base and the political legitimacy that Mao’s blessing brought with it. 
Deng’s war with Hua hinged on the “two whatevers” policy – essentially whether the 
Maoist line would be continued. It was both a political ideological war and a war for 
power. With the “two whatevers” policy overturned, those wrongly persecuted during 
Mao’s political campaigns could be liberated and restored, which would endow Deng 
with tremendous political power.  
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Deng and the PLA’s career military officers were bound together by the same 
goal for the PLA’s reform and China’s shifting to a new development path. In order to 
realize these visions, a road block – Hua Guofeng’s “two whatevers” policy, had to be 
removed. The PLA officer corps, distracted and bitterly divided, suffered from low 
morale and disunity. Deng’s power base in the PLA lay with career officers who opposed 
the radicalization and politicization and called for the restoration of wrongly accused 
officers. However, a large number of senior PLA officers were not enthusiastic about and 
even opposed this war. Yet they did not want to make their opposition public, as they did 
not want to undermine Deng’s already delicate position in the Party. These officers in the 
end were loyal to Deng in the power struggle with Hua because of their shared bond and 
vision. Therefore, the PLA’s career officers yielded and sided with Deng in his decision 
to attack Vietnam. This case is illustrative of the PLA’s reliance on and lack of influence 
over a dominant leader, whom they had a political stake in supporting. Deng needed the 
PLA’s support in 1977-79, but the PLA was merely one component of Deng’s broader 
power base that he exercised control over. 
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Chapter Eight: Timetable Strategy and China’s Taiwan Policy Following the 1995-
96 Taiwan Strait Crisis 
 
 
Since 1949, the PLA has been obsessed with and driven by a single mission: 
taking back Taiwan. This preoccupation stems from China’s deep-seated, historic anguish 
over its catastrophic defeat by Japan in 1895, which led to Japan’s occupation and 
colonization of Taiwan from 1895-1945. Additionally, Taiwan’s separation from the 
mainland is a constant reminder to China that its civil war remains unfinished. This case 
study examines the failure of the “timetable” strategy that emerged as a response to the 
1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. According to this strategy, China would set a timetable for 
the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. This strategy would have inherently made 
it more likely that the Taiwan problem would be solved by compellence, coercion, and 
even the use of force.  
The reasons for conducting such a case study are as follows: First, it is not only 
important to examine policies that lead to actions such as wars, but it is also equally 
important why, in compelling circumstances, the decision is made not to go to war. 
Second, the centrality of Taiwan to China’s national security interests is unlikely to 
change, which means that during times of crisis the possibility of war remains. As Shen 
Dingli, a professor at Fudan University, astutely points out, “any (PRC) regime that loses 
Taiwan on its watch would lose its legitimacy of existence.”1 Thus, China’s leaders will 
continue to focus on Taiwan, until Taiwan reunites with China or China fundamentally 
changes its defense calculus on Taiwan. Third, Taiwan remains the single most volatile 
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issue that could lead to armed conflict between China and the U.S.2 Fourth, in this case, 
the PLA strongly disagreed with multiple, non-military actors in the policy process, and 
therefore this case study sheds light on a situation in which the highly-motivated PLA 
faces a group of strong opponents in the policy process. 
This chapter will briefly sketch and analyze the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, but 
will focus more on the policy-making process following this crisis, which led to China 
revising its Taiwan policy in 2003-05. Tensions across the Taiwan Strait eventually eased 
in 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang / KMT) was elected 
as Taiwan’s President. The central question is why the timetable approach failed to 
dominate China’s Taiwan policy during this period. 
 
Context: The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis  
The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis stemmed from China’s deepening suspicion of 
Lee Teng-hui’s pro-independence leanings and its fear that as the Sino-U.S. relationship 
deteriorated and the U.S. imposed sanctions against China in response to the Tiananmen 
massacre, the U.S. might revise its one-China policy.  
 
Chronology of events 
Two factors were the primary catalysts for the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis: 
Beijing’s unfamiliarity with how to handle and respond to the vibrant local politics of a 
democratic Taiwan; and Beijing’s fundamental worry that following the end of the Cold 
War the U.S. might pursue a containment strategy against China and thus change the 
trajectory of Washington’s Taiwan policy.3  
 514 
The Tiananmen Incident provided abundant evidence of Beijing’s clumsiness in 
dealing with populist movements or democratic politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Beijing had never before dealt with an unconventional figure like Lee Teng-hui, who was 
able to skillfully direct and leverage local populist movement. 
Beijing and Taipei maintained secret dialogues from 1990-92, which gave Beijing 
some false sense of hope that the cross-Strait relationship was in a state of détente.4 The 
talks were conducted through a semi-governmental channel, led on Taiwan’s side by the 
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and on China’s side by the Association for Relations 
Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). These discussions resulted in the “92 Consensus,” 
formulated in August 1992, which explicitly acknowledged the “One China” principle, 
and as such both sides recognize there is only one China though they “agree to differ on 
its definition.”5 While Beijing interprets the “92 Consensus” as an agreement by both 
sides to follow a “One China” policy, Taiwan reads it as “one China, respective 
interpretations.”6 As part of this agreement, Taipei believed that “Taiwan and the 
mainland are both parts of China,” therefore emphasizing equality; in contrast, Beijing 
believed that “Taiwan is a part of China,” which means that Taiwan is subordinate to the 
PRC.7  
With this vague but nonetheless groundbreaking consensus serving as a 
foundation, the “Wang-Koo talks” were held in 1993 in Singapore. Despite the positive 
trajectory of cross-Strait relations, Lee Teng-hui’s position on negotiations gradually 
shifted in 1993 as he consolidated his presidency and political power.8 Beijing suspected 
that Lee raised “unrealistic” preconditions in order to put the carriage before the horse 
while earning international sympathy. The alarm was sounded for China when Lee called 
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the mainland government “gangsters” amid Taiwan’s anger toward Beijing for its lack of 
transparency in handling the Qiandaohu tragedy of March 1993.9 Lee, in his April 1994 
interview with renowned Japanese journalist Shiba Ryotaro, likened himself to Moses, as 
he would “lead Taiwan out of a repressive past.”10 This made China doubt Lee’s sincerity 
in negotiating a resolution to the Taiwan issue and suspect that Lee really intended to 
lead Taiwan toward de jure independence. 
In January 1995, Jiang Zemin’s “Eight-point Initiative” was publicized, which 
presented, or at least was designed to present, a much more flexible and conciliatory 
posture toward Taiwan by emphasizing, “Chinese won’t fight Chinese.”11 This public 
position paper should be examined along with the three proposals that mainland envoys 
made when sharing information on the “Jiang Zemin Eight Points” prior to its 
announcement. The “Three Ceasings” agreement proposed by Beijing included: ceasing 
military confrontation, ceasing all hostile activities, and ceasing all activities and remarks 
that endanger cross-Strait relations and unification, as well as initiating political party-to-
party talks on unification.12 As part of this initiative, Jiang revealed his desire to meet 
Lee either in Beijing or Taipei, which reflected Beijing’s principle that “Chinese affairs 
shall be left to Chinese themselves.”13 Two weeks later, Lee sent a secret envoy to meet 
with Xing Kuishan, one of the drafters of Jiang’s Eight-point Initiative, in order to 
understand the essence of Jiang’s proposals.14 As Prime Minister Hau Pei-Tsun resigned 
in early 1993 and Lee’s series of reforms continuously weakened the power of mainland-
born Taiwanese, Lee strengthened his control over the KMT and then quietly but 
methodically pursued independence for Taiwan.15 Beijing began to counterattack as Lee 
vigorously took steps to expand Taiwan’s international space. Lee essentially rebuffed 
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Jiang’s proposal by insisting on meeting Jiang during “an international occasion” such as 
APEC, which the mainland found hard to accept. 
The end of the Cold War, which eliminated the strategic basis for the Sino-U.S. 
relationship, combined with the Tiananmen crackdown, meant that the Sino-U.S. 
relationship was in a free fall. Washington’s China policy was recalibrated and became 
increasingly politicized. In 1992, President George H.W. Bush approved the sale of 150 
F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan, which China asserted violated the 1982 U.S.-China 
Communiqué, in which the U.S. promised to reduce the quantity of U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan. Two years later, the Clinton administration revised the government’s policy and 
raised the protocol level for U.S. treatment of Taiwan’s officials. As a result of these 
policy shifts, Su Chi, the former Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security 
Council, accurately described the U.S. as “the most important third party” in the middle 
of an increasingly intense cross-Strait standoff.16 With the blossoming of Taiwan’s 
democracy and Lee’s skillful manipulation of American democratic politics by 
dramatizing his transit through Hawaii in May 1994,17 new actors and agendas were 
suddenly inserted into what was previously “a simple power struggle.”18 Therefore, the 
changing cross-Strait relationship led to greater uncertainty and levied tremendous 
pressure on China’s fragile post-Deng decision-making system.  
During the 1995 crisis, the U.S.’s role was central to Beijing’s calculus, even 
though the visible confrontations occurred between Beijing and Taipei. According to 
Beijing’s flawed storyline, President Clinton granted a visa to Lee Teng-hui despite the 
State Department’s repeated assurances to Beijing that the U.S. would not do so. The 
reality, however, is that in April 1995, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher sent a 
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subtle warning of the impending danger to Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. 
Christopher pointed out that a visa for Lee would be “inconsistent with (the United 
States’) unofficial relationship” with Taiwan. Qian interpreted Christopher’s message as 
an assurance, although it was intended to be read as a warning. Either Qian didn’t grasp 
the subtle message or he did not want to deliver this bad news to China’s leadership.19 
When in May the Senate voted 97-1 and the House of Representatives 360-0 in favor of 
granting a visa to Lee and President Clinton did not veto the bill, this came as a shock to 
many in Beijing. Beijing’s belief about the seriousness of this action, however, was 
reasonable, since the U.S. government had not allowed Taiwan’s president to visit the 
U.S. since President Nixon’s 1972 visit to China.  
Lee’s inflammatory speech, “The Longing of the People is Always in My Heart,” 
at his alma mater, Cornell University, which called for a more independent role for 
Taiwan in international politics, was the last straw for Beijing. Lee’s talk confirmed the 
beliefs of many in China that Lee wanted nothing but independence for Taiwan and that 
the U.S. was encouraging and supporting Lee as he took steps down the road to 
independence.  After diplomats made the mistake in judging that the U.S. would not grant 
Lee a visa, the MFA no longer had the credibility to advise the top leadership on Taiwan. 
The PLA stepped into the void created by the MFA’s failure. From July 21-28 1995, the 
PLA launched six surface-to-surface missiles that landed in waters approximately 100 
miles from Taiwan. A few days after China’s military exercise, Taiwan conducted its 
own missile and naval exercises, and it announced its intention to conduct live artillery 
tests in August. Taiwan’s defiance led to China’s second round of missile tests and its 
live artillery naval exercises near Taiwan, which were held from August 15-25. 
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The 1995 missile tests and other punitive economic and diplomatic measures 
Beijing launched did not seem to immediately impact U.S. policy. President Clinton sent 
a secret letter to Jiang in August, but then met with the Dalai Lama at the White House in 
September.20 In an October 1995 meeting between Xiong Guangkai and Chas Freeman, 
then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, one PLA officer 
implicitly threatened that China would use nuclear weapons against the U.S. during a 
Taiwan contingency, saying, “you will not sacrifice Los Angeles to protect Taiwan.”21 
Freeman also learned as early as October 1995 that Beijing would carry out military 
exercises in 1996, during Taiwan’s presidential election.22  
In November 1995, Beijing announced another round of exercises for the spring 
of 1996, prior to and coinciding with Taiwan’s three-week presidential campaign period, 
when Lee would run for a second term. After one month of deployments, the PLA had 
amassed 150,000 troops and 300 planes in Fujian Province, which lies directly opposite 
Taiwan. On December 19, the U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz quietly passed through the 
Taiwan Strait, the first such transit by a U.S. aircraft carrier since the normalization of 
U.S.-China relations in 1979. The Nimitz’s passage wasn’t publicly announced until late 
January, when Taiwan revealed it.  
On March 7, 1996, the PLA fired three M-9 missiles into the waters just off the 
coast of Taiwan's two largest port cities, one of which landed barely twenty miles from 
the northern port of Keelung. On March 13, China launched a fourth M-9 missile. Two 
days later, China announced that from March 18-25 the PLA would conduct joint air, 
ground, and naval exercises near Pingtan Island, which would take place within ten 
nautical miles of Taiwan-controlled islands. 
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In response, Washington ordered that the Independence carrier battle group move 
from Okinawa to the waters east of Taiwan, and that the Nimitz carrier battle group travel 
from the Persian Gulf to Taiwan’s vicinity. On March 23, Lee Teng-hui won Taiwan’s 
presidential election by a landslide, proving that the PLA’s attempts to intimidate Taiwan 
were ineffective and even counterproductive. Another consequence of the 1996 Taiwan 
Strait crisis is that the PLA tested and found out the U.S.’s bottom line. The U.S. aircraft 
carriers left Taiwan’s vicinity on March 25.  
The PLA’s military exercises in 1995-96, and arguably its subsequent military 
maneuvers aimed at Taiwan in 2000 and 2004, were primarily preventive actions 
intended to dissuade Taiwan from declaring de jure independence. These actions also 
hedged against a potential declaration of independence: in the event that Taiwan suddenly 
declared its independence during the nationalist fervor surrounding its presidential 
elections, the PLA at least had troops in place.23 Scholarly analyses have mostly 
concluded that Beijing was applying coercive diplomacy during the 1995-96 Taiwan 
Strait crisis. Robert Ross believes “the use of force was a crucial element in Beijing's 
coercive diplomacy. China's large-scale military exercises and missile tests were intended 
to signal to the United States and Taiwan the tremendous risks inherent in their 
policies.”24 However, it is plausible that, with Jiang’s effective control over the PLA not 
yet fully consolidated, Beijing’s decision-making process during this crisis was not as 
united in choosing coercive diplomacy. In recent years, unofficial histories of the crisis 
have begun to emerge, as memoirs and interviews are increasingly published. In these 
materials, some argue that the PLA’s 1996 exercises were originally planned to be much 
more aggressive, as they were a cover for a genuine military operation to seize Taiwan’s 
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offshore islands and thereby punish Lee.25 Although these rather interesting accounts 
may shed some light on the PLA’s decision-making in 1995-96, one cannot yet confirm 
their credibility by checking them against multiple sources on both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait.  
 
Perfect Storm – Analysis from the Angle of Domestic Politics 
China’s domestic politics drove the decision to escalate the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait 
crisis. Following Yang Shangkun’s (the CMC Vice Chairman who headed the TALSG) 
downfall, the PLA’s leading role in the secret envoy communications was largely 
reduced until 1992-93. Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the U.S. and his provocative speech gave 
the PLA an opportunity to attack the MFA for its policy failure on Taiwan. By exerting 
influence over one decision, in this instance the choice to respond to Lee’s visit by 
escalating tensions, the PLA intended to assume more influence over China’s broader 
Taiwan policy.  
Beijing and Taipei, through three years of secret contacts between February 1988 
and December 1990, set the stage for secret-envoy communications in Hong Kong.26 The 
PLA leadership in fact initiated and led these backdoor channels from 1990-92.27 These 
secret talks between Taiwan and China started in December 1990 in the Hong Kong 
residency of Nan Huai-chin, a well-respected Zen master with deep connections in both 
Taiwan and China.28 Through this backdoor channel, Taiwan gave Beijing early warning 
of the United States’ impending 1992 F-16 sales to Taiwan and Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit 
to the U.S. When Tseng Yung-hsien, Lee’s secret envoy, privately asked about Beijing’s 
possible response to the upcoming F-16 sales, Yang Shangkun expressed both his 
 521 
understanding and the necessity of a harsh public response from Beijing due to domestic 
politics. He allegedly calmly replied, “due criticism (from our side) will have to come.”29 
However, with Yang’s political downfall, Taiwan affairs were transferred to Jiang Zemin 
and his close associate, Zeng Qinghong.30 As a result, the PLA’s role in this channel was 
greatly diminished.  
These secret communications gave Beijing a sense of hope for a historic détente 
between both sides of the Strait and incentivized China to be more tolerant toward and 
understanding of Taiwan. The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, however, shattered this 
illusion.31 During a March 1995 meeting, Su Chih-ch’eng informed Zeng Qinghong that 
Lee Teng-hui would soon visit the Middle East and the U.S., and conveyed Lee’s hope 
that Beijing would understand.32 Zeng, however, did not express any opinion on the spot. 
Therefore, Jiang and Lee reached a tacit agreement, at least from the Taiwanese envoy’s 
perspective, on the original plan of “launching name-calling games as a public play” (ge 
ma ge de), according to Su.33 This explained the business-as-usual visit by Tang Shubei, 
Vice Chairman of ARATS, on May 26 to prepare for the second Wang-Ku meeting, 
despite the U.S. announcement that it would grant Lee a visa.34 When asked to comment 
on Lee’s visit to the U.S., Tang said he was fully authorized to prepare for the second 
Wang-Ku meeting and that Lee’s visit should not affect communications and interactions 
between ARATS and its Taiwanese counterpart.35 This begs the question: what in the 
policy-making process had changed in the lead-up to the crisis? The answer lies in the 
PLA and its influence on Jiang during the crisis. 
Between 1988 and 1990, the PLA’s assessment of Lee’s intentions was quite 
benign, as it believed Lee had basically inherited Chiang Ching-kuo’s guidelines 
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regarding the “One China policy” and would continue to open up Taiwan to the mainland 
economically, through people-to-people exchanges, and even politically.36 The PLA’s 
view of Lee became even more positive from 1991-93, as it concluded that the KMT 
under Lee “has made the (unprecedentedly) greatest progress in Taiwan’s policy toward 
mainland.”37 By early 1994, however, the PLA had reversed course, coming to the 
conclusion based on Lee’s name-calling in the wake of the Qiandaohu Incident that he 
was not exerting a positive influence on cross-Strait relations.38  
In contrast, those civilian agencies whose portfolios included Taiwan affairs, led 
by the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and ARATS, focused their attention and efforts on 
pushing forward cross-Strait negotiations on personnel exchanges, communications, and 
trade. Despite the aforementioned negative developments, ARATS met with its 
Taiwanese counterpart three times in 1994 and was prepared to hold the second Wang-
Ku meeting in Taiwan in 1995.39 In July 1994, Tang Shubei promised that Beijing was 
willing to negotiate with Taipei on “ending hostility” and signing a peace treaty, as long 
as the Taiwanese government adhered to the “one China principle.”40 Just three months 
before the 1995 crisis, Wang Daohan, the Chairman of ARATS, was still stating publicly 
that Beijing and Taipei would hold talks over “ending hostility,”41 a proposal that 
encroached on the PLA’s territory.42 
In 1994-95, the PLA and the civilian bureaucracies increasingly diverged over 
Beijing’s Taiwan policy, as they disagreed over their assessment of Lee’s intentions and 
how to respond to the “Taiwan independence force.”43 The PLA in general was not 
happy with what it perceived to be the MFA’s weak punitive measures that it imposed in 
1995. The PLA’s own assessment of Lee became negative at the end of 1993.44 The 
 523 
PLA’s objections to Lee’s visit masked its deeper dissatisfaction with its own plight. One 
senior PLA officer described the PLA as an “underdog” military (ai bing), given its low 
defense budget and the resulting deterioration of soldiers’ well-being and morale, as well 
as its diminished role in Taiwan policy-making.  
In 1995, a series of incidents laid the groundwork for a perfect storm by 
weakening Jiang and the civilian foreign affairs system prior to Lee’s visit to the U.S. 
First, Deng Rong, Deng’s daughter, revealed to the media in early 1995 that Deng’s 
health had deteriorated, and he was gravely ill and unable to walk.45 This was followed 
by Chen Yun’s death in April. The implication was that a strong, authoritative voice of 
moderation would not intervene during a grave crisis. Second, Jiang delivered the 
moderate “Eight Points” in early 1995, on the advice of his political mentor, Wang 
Daohan, but the U.S. still granted Lee a visa. This was a huge diplomatic debacle for 
Qian and the MFA. Many believed that Jiang held out an olive branch, only to be 
humiliated by the U.S. and Lee.46 Third, Clinton personally snubbed Jiang in May 1995. 
The MFA, on behalf of Jiang, tried for months to set up a meeting with President Clinton, 
as both Jiang and Clinton had both been invited to Moscow to commemorate World War 
II.47 Jiang’s request was rebuffed.48 A New York Times editorial on May 10 added salt to 
Jiang’s wounds, explaining that Clinton declined a private meeting with Jiang because he 
did not want to influence “China’s succession politics” by conferring upon Jiang the 
prestige a world leader would have been accorded.49 In other words, Clinton didn’t view 
Jiang as a world leader yet. Lee’s speech at Cornell was the last straw, initiating a 
response from infuriated officers in the PLA who tried to put all the blame on Jiang, who 
was still vulnerable in Chinese politics. Despite a major victory in April 1995 with the 
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unseating of Chen Xitong, his major political opponent, Jiang was again put in a 
dangerous position because his political control and domestic credibility would have been 
undermined if domestic opponents perceived him to be weak on core security issues. 
The PLA built a strong internal consensus in 1995 that China should take a tough 
stance toward Taiwan. Despite decade-long budget cuts and low morale, especially after 
1989, a group of junior to mid-level PLA officers, termed the PLA’s “young turks,” 
rallied behind a cause for which the PLA could stand tall. Members of the Nanjing 
Military Region (NMR), in particular, were particularly motivated to push the leadership 
toward military action because of their military beliefs, personal ambition, and the sense 
that they would play a prominent role in any war over Taiwan. The NMR’s younger 
officers, traditionally in charge of preparing for a war over Taiwan, as well as those from 
the Jinan and Guangzhou Military Regions, created a slogan in 1995-96 that read, “the 
war with Taiwan shall be initiated by us (China), the first war against Taiwan will be 
fought by us, and the first war on Taiwan will be won swiftly” (shouzhan youwo, 
shouzhan yongwo, shouzhan gaojie).50 With this slogan, younger and relatively junior 
PLA officers motivated a large segment of senior PLA officers to support the use of force 
against Taiwan. First-generation revolutionaries, led by Zhang Aiping, Ye Fei and, 
possibly, Zhang Zhen, who was then the CMC Vice Chairman, backed up these “young 
turks” in the PLA, because of their personal roles in the PLA’s preparations for war with 
Taiwan.51 Despite Zhang Aiping’s long hiatus after 1989 due to his dissent over the 
Tiananmen crackdown, Zhang in 1995 lambasted the U.S. for supporting Lee Teng-hui’s 
attempt to separate Taiwan from China.52     
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Michael Swaine has written that Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen’s strong positions 
necessitated the need for a significant military dimension to any response, possibly 
including missile “tests.”53 This may well be true, given Zhang Zhen’s experience 
drafting war plans against Taiwan in 1954 and Liu Huaqing’s own account as to why he 
was so driven to build aircraft carriers. Liu listed Taiwan and the 1993 Yinhe Incident as 
the two drivers that were motivating him to push for China’s aircraft carrier program. In 
August 1995, Liu called for “completion of reunification of the motherland” by “forging 
the third Kuomintang-Communist Cooperation” on reunification of China, which pulled 
mainland’s position back to Ye Jianying’s nine peace proposals (also called “Ye’s Nine 
Proposals) that were introduced in 1981, an evident negation and public snub of Jiang’s 
proposal.54 There is some evidence that Liu and Zhang, together with Xiong Guangkai, 
confronted Jiang, Qian Qichen and Wang Daohan during a TALSG meeting in mid-June 
1995.55 Liu was especially bitter about this incident, as Jiang did not accept his proposals 
to aggressively modernize the PLA Navy, including building its first aircraft carrier, 
which led to the dilemma China faced in 1995.56 In his memoir, Liu did not touch upon 
his role in the 1995-96 crisis, which indicates that either whatever Liu advised, he was 
not as fully engaged and effective as he wanted to be during the decision-making process, 
or that what he would have written was censored.  
The PLA officers who played the most influential role in the decision-making and 
implementation process during the crisis were most likely Zhang Zhen and Zhang 
Wannian. General Zhang Zhen, who Deng assigned, along with Liu Huaqing, to “assist” 
Jiang, maintained a relatively smooth relationship with Jiang during this period. Zhang, 
who headed the GSD’s Operations Department during the 1950s and played a major role 
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in designing the PLA’s actions against Taiwan during the first Taiwan Strait crisis, 
provided strategic guidance during the phase of military planning in 1995-96.57 Zhang 
Wannian, then Chief of General Staff (1992-96) and a former commander of the 
Guangzhou Military Region (1987-90), consistently and ardently advocated shifting the 
PLA’s focus of military preparations to the coastal regions of Southeast China.58 He 
wrote in his memoir that he took instructions directly from Jiang throughout the 1995-96 
crisis, after initially informing Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen of the latest developments. 
Following the 1995-96 crisis, the PLA was the principal beneficiary in domestic 
politics. First, the crisis revealed that Deng’s guideline of “the PLA must refrain” (jundui 
yao rennai), which posited that the PLA’s needs should be put on the backburner, was no 
longer tenable, and that the PLA’s budget needed to increase. China’s defense budget 
increased by 165 percent ($25.5 billion) between 1996 and 2005, while the U.S. defense 
budget increased by 50 percent ($160 billion) during the same period, according to 
SIPRI.59 China’s military burden – its share of military expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP – increased from 1.8 percent in 1996 to 2.1 percent in 2004, a figure that remains 
almost the same through 2013.60 Additionally, following the crisis, the PLA’s influence 
over the decision-making process regarding Taiwan policy increased.61 For instance, in 
2000, Zhang Wannian, then CMC Vice Chairman, joined the TALSG. 
Another major consequence of the 1995-96 crisis in terms of China’s domestic 
politics is that Jiang learned and even over-learned the lesson that he had to be tough on 
Taiwan in order to both win over and control the PLA. Jiang, arguably, also politically 
benefitted from the 1995-96 crisis, as it allowed him to consolidate and expand his power 
base in the PLA. Although initially in 1995 the PLA exerted influence over Jiang, Jiang 
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began to embrace the PLA’s populist calls on Taiwan and became the final arbiter during 
the decision-making process. China’s tough response in 1995 won Jiang popular support 
domestically, particularly from within the PLA. An astute politician, Jiang learned his 
lesson: to win over the PLA’s officers and grow deep roots in the PLA, he needed to take 
on their cause. In 1996, Jiang abandoned his politically defensive posture and took the 
full initiative in handling the crisis.62 Jiang indicated in a meeting with Japanese visitors 
that he ordered for the missile firings to continue, even after the U.S. sent its aircraft 
carriers to the Taiwan Strait in 1996.63 Jiang’s claim during this meeting rings true, since 
it is likely that professional officers would have thought twice and hesitated during such 
circumstances. The PLA may have forced Jiang’s hand at the outset of the crisis, but by 
the end of it, he emerged politically stronger, with closer ties to the PLA.  
 
The Timetable Strategy 
The “unification timetable” strategy was floated and debated repeatedly 
throughout the 1990s, but has never been publicly formulated or articulated as China’s 
official Taiwan policy. According to the “timetable” strategy, China would set a 
timetable for the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. This strategy, by default, 
makes it more likely that the Taiwan problem would be solved through compellence, 
coercion, and even the use of force. This is because, given the natural trajectory of 
development, Taiwan would be unlikely to follow the timeline, and in order to meet its 
stated objectives China would have no choice but to force Taiwan to the table.  
Deng’s ideas were the progenitor of and inspiration behind the timetable strategy. 
During a speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the 
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CCP in October 1984, Deng first stressed that China needed to be patient when dealing 
with the Taiwan issue, but then implied that China would be open to using force if 
Taiwan refused to negotiate with China indefinitely.64 Deng, however, did not define 
how many years he considered to be “indefinite” before the use of force would be 
justified. Deng himself put forward reunification with Taiwan as one of China’s core 
tasks for the 1980s, but as he realized this was an impossible objective to realize, Deng, a 
nimble statesman with unquestionable authority, chose to push it off until later.  
The exact moment when this strategy formally emerged is unclear. It first 
appeared in the public sphere when then Premier Li Peng denied the existence of a 
timetable strategy during a 1989 news conference.65 Li explicitly stated, “on the question 
of whether (we) have a timetable for the reunification of the two sides across the Strait, I 
will reply with a ‘no,’ because we all are realists.”66 Senior PLA officers interviewed 
indicated that in 1993 the timetable strategy was debated and presented internally. The 
importance of this idea was renewed when Jiang Zemin mentioned it explicitly in internal 
meetings in 1996 by claiming, “to solve the Taiwan problem, we may not be able to do it 
in five years. But ten years are plenty for it!” (wunian buxing, shinian zongkeyiba).67 In 
January 1996, Prime Minister Li Peng, flanked by Liu Huaqing, publicly stated, 
“unification can no longer be delayed indefinitely,” which became almost the code word 
for the timetable strategy.68 The MFA spokesman, Chen Jian, then stated, “the settlement 
of the question of Taiwan and the accomplishment of the reunification of the motherland 
will be on the top of the agenda.”69 Departing from his previous public position that he 
adopted in 1989,70 Li also urged that the timetable strategy be adopted in the closed-door 
All-China Taiwan Affairs Office Director Meeting in 1998.71  
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For most of the 1990s, the timetable strategy remained “a controversial internal 
idea, an investigative concept” (tantaoxing tifa).72 This changed in June 1998, when 
Jiang, during a meeting with President Clinton, publicly emphasized for the first time the 
necessity of imposing the timetable strategy. Jiang stated, “frankly speaking, the Taiwan 
problem must have a timetable as it cannot drag on forever.”73 Two months later, Jiang 
reiterated the need to settle the reunification issue within a certain time frame in an 
interview with an American journalist.74 In October 1998, Jiang reiterated during the 
closing meeting of the Third Plenum of the 15th Party Congress that “there must be a 
timetable” for the completion of unification, though Jiang’s speech was not released until 
2006.75 Chen Yunlin, then head of the Taiwan Affairs Office, also fell in line by writing 
in the People’s Daily in January 1999, “the problem of the realization of the complete 
unification of the motherland cannot be delayed indefinitely.”76 Jiang stressed during a 
March 1999 interview with a Hong Kong reporter, “our desire to realize the complete 
unification of the motherland is urgent.”77 A People’s Daily editorial published that same 
month posited, “Based on political as well as strategic considerations, we propose that 
there be a timetable for the resolution of the Taiwan problem. It cannot be dragged out 
indefinitely.”78 An editorial in the People’s Daily in 2000 again claimed that China could 
not tolerate “the endless delay of (solving) the Taiwan problem.”79 
Non-Chinese scholars believe this strategy was introduced and adopted later. A 
Taiwanese scholar asserted that the idea of imposing a timetable on the resolution of the 
Taiwan issue began floating around Beijing’s policy circles following Lee Teng-hui’s 
“special state-to-state relations” declaration in July 1999.80 David M. Lampton has 
written that “Jiang entertained the idea of a ‘timeline’ for unification after Chen’s 
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election” in 2003.81 Having said that, the timetable strategy has never been officially 
adopted as a government strategy.82 A logical follow-up question is why this strategy was 
not pursued in the years following the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. 
  
The PLA’s Mindset During the 1990s 
During the 1990s, the rise of professionally-oriented officers allowed the PLA to 
better define and more effectively pursue its institutional interests. Inspired by the United 
States’ demonstration of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) during the 1991 Gulf 
War and driven by China’s rapidly expanding global economic interests, the PLA in 1993 
officially shifted its strategic guideline to “winning a limited war under high 
technology.”83 The PLA Navy also more aggressively broadened its focus beyond the 
near seas. The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis was, in many aspects, the rallying point for 
this shift in perspective. Taiwan is an issue of such importance that the PLA’s rank and 
file has the broadest consensus that it must be resolved (though, arguably, PLA officers 
are much more divided on how to accomplish this major mission). Additionally, as 
ideology faded with China’s continuous opening-up and the Tiananmen Incident, the 
Taiwan issue became the issue that motivated the PLA the most. As a major combat 
mission, the Taiwan issue forces the PLA to prepare for the worst – to fight a war against 
the best military in the world (the United States), which helps to promote 
professionalization. In other words, the Taiwan issue, which strongly motivates the PLA 
and it views as an internal concern, forces it to prepare for an external threat. The Taiwan 
issue is also a rallying point in terms of China’s civil-military relationship, as the PLA, 
which has blood on its hands following Tiananmen, hopes that by ably completing this 
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mission it can redeem itself and reconcile with Chinese society. The sustained crisis over 
Taiwan in the 1990s provided the PLA the best opportunity to prove its worth to the 
public while serving the PLA’s case for an increased budget and resources, and for 
greater involvement in foreign and security policy-making. 
 
Development of the PLA’s Institutional Interest 
The PLA, despite a short period of intensified politicization from 1989-92 led by 
Yang Baibing, accelerated the pace of modernization in the 1990s. The PLA’s 
modernization coincided with the rise of a professionally-oriented officer corps. This era 
started with the promotion of two elderly but visionary officers, Admiral Liu Huaqing 
and General Zhang Zhen, who were both elevated after the Yang brothers’ fall in 1992. 
For the first time since 1978, professionally-oriented officers rose to the top to run 
military affairs.  
Since 1992, professionally-oriented officers have continually obtained significant 
leadership roles and have become increasingly significant in the decision-making process 
regarding the military’s modernization. In the “bipolar” military leadership system 
regularized after 1992, characterized by two CMC Vice Chairmen, the Vice Chairman 
whose portfolio focuses on army-building (operations, training, and military planning) 
has always officially ranked ahead of the Vice Chairman who leads political work and 
makes personnel decisions. Having professional officers run the PLA has not only led to 
a sharp increase in military professionalization, but has also contributed to the expression 
and furtherance of the PLA’s institutional interests: increased budget and resources, more 
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military (organizational and functional) autonomy in pursuing military modernization, 
and a heightened bureaucratic role in foreign and security policies.  
 
Budget 
The PLA was certainly concerned with its budgetary allocation during the 1990s. 
The PLA had to endure relatively low budgets throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, 
which frustrated professionally-oriented officers’ ambitions to pursue military 
modernization, and led to low morale and a brain drain to booming civilian sectors.84 
Soldiers’ welfare also notably deteriorated.85 According to a survey conducted by the 
PLA Air Force in 1997 that covered ten provinces and regions, military pilots’ income on 
average was less than one-tenth that of civilian pilots.86 General Zhang Zhen and Admiral 
Liu Huaqing, as well as their followers, were acutely aware that China’s greatest national 
priority was to pursue economic development, which forced China’s leadership to neglect 
the PLA’s well-being and its military modernization. Admiral Liu was especially 
frustrated over the lack of funding for advanced weapons systems. Admiral Liu 
repeatedly lobbied Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng, and Vice Premier Yao Yilin, as well as 
bureaucracies such as the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance, to 
increase the PLA’s budget.87 The PLA’s budget temporarily went up after 1989, but went 
back down (when adjusted for inflation).88 The bitter lesson the PLA took from the 1980s 
was that the leadership and public’s attention is directly linked to the resources allocated 
to the PLA.  
The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis revealed how close China was to having to fight 
a war, and how woefully unprepared the PLA was to fight such a war. General Zhang 
 533 
Wannian tried to lobby the expanded meeting of Beidaihe in 1995 to change China’s 
strategic focus from Deng Xiaoping’s concept of “one center” (economic development) 
to “two centers” (economic development and military preparation).89 Although Jiang 
Zemin and Li Peng shot down Zhang’s idea and therefore it was never officially raised 
during the Beidaihe meeting, Jiang and Li conceded that the defense budget had to rise.90  
 
Military Modernization 
The second major institutional interest the PLA tried to express in the 1990s was 
its goal of military modernization to meet the challenges posed by the RMA, and the 
necessity of military autonomy in order to achieve this goal. The steps the PLA took 
toward realizing this goal included revising its strategic guidelines, narrowing its 
activities to military training (away from engaging in the marketplace), and shifting its 
posture toward focusing on external threats (rather than internal stability maintenance). 
Zhang Zhen was a major contributor to the formulation of the PLA’s new 
strategic guidelines that were introduced in the 1990s, which redirected the PLA’s 
training and education, as well as its organizational structure. In late 1991, in a meeting 
with the chiefs of the three general departments and the CMC members, Zhang proposed 
to revise the military’s strategic guidelines to “winning a localized war under high and 
new technology.”91 The CMC Executive Work Meeting studied Zhang’s proposal and did 
not raise any objections. The PLA GSD adopted Zhang’s operational concept in a formal 
proposal that it then submitted to the CMC in January 1993. Jiang Zemin then approved 
the guidelines and publicized them in an enlarged meeting of the CMC five months 
later.92 Liu Huaqing proposed a naval strategy of “active defense and war-fighting in near 
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seas” in 1983 and then developed it into an expansive strategy that would push the PLA 
Navy to: defend the “main war-fighting areas including the Yellow Sea, East China Sea 
and South China Sea”; possess the capability to fight wars in the near seas, including in 
the “Japanese Archipelago, Ryukyu Islands and the broad seas west of the Philippine 
Islands”; and effectively control important sea lanes of communications connected to 
Chinese oceanic territories. Liu’s naval strategy, which he drafted as early as 1986, is the 
first strategy designed by a service of the PLA.93 Although Liu’s vision was not fully 
implemented in the 1990s, it deeply influenced future generations of PLA naval 
commanders. 
The PLA’s exit from the marketplace in 1995-99 was driven by the convergence 
of interests among professionally-oriented PLA officers, who advocated ridding the PLA 
of corruption and increasing the defense budget, the government, which wanted to exert 
fuller control over the economy, and Jiang Zemin, who was motivated to seize more 
control over the PLA. Although many PLA officers criticized this process and questioned 
whether the PLA got a fair bargain,94 visionaries such as Zhang Aiping, Liu Huaqing, 
and Zhang Zhen had called for this type of “surgery” for a long time, and it was generally 
in line with the PLA’s institutional interest. 
 
Rise of the PLA’s professionalization 
Compared to its performance over the three decades preceding the 1995-96 
Taiwan Strait crisis, the pace of the PLA’s professionalization following the Crisis has 
been phenomenal.95 Several factors contributed to the increased speed and scope of the 
PLA’s professionalization: 
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First, the PLA’s commanders had completed a generational shift from the first-
generation revolutionary soldiers-politicians to commanders with a purely military 
background. Almost every general promoted in 1993 and 1994 had fought in China’s pre-
1949 civil war. In contrast, all but one soldier who was promoted to the rank of full 
general since 1996 joined the PLA after 1949. Thus, almost every soldier promoted to 
general after 1996 first experienced combat during the Korean War, in which the PLA 
fought the most advanced adversary on the planet (the United States). Officers at lower 
ranks were not only younger, but were also more educated and received more specialized 
training than their older counterparts.96  
Second, the Tiananmen crackdown was extremely traumatic for the PLA. The 
PLA, which had branded itself as an army of “children of the people,” was ordered to 
repress unarmed civilians and students. Reluctantly, the PLA followed its orders. As 
Michael Swaine points out, this incident “destabilized the military’s relations with society 
and the party, its internal unity, its policy direction, its operational mission, and its overall 
modernization program.”97 While the PLA was still coping with the aftereffects of 
Tiananmen, the 1991 Gulf War, broadcast live on TV, sent shockwaves throughout the 
PLA. This war altered the nature of modern warfare with its display of high-paced air and 
armored operations, use of precision strike systems that struck deep behind the frontlines, 
and demonstration of the superior strength of joint operations. The PLA was taken aback 
by this display of force and technological and operational sophistication. While the Gulf 
War rekindled the PLA officer corps’ enthusiasm for professionalization, it also 
developed a grave sense of crisis that if it did not act, the PLA would fall behind in the 
global competition for military modernization, fail to successfully defend China’s 
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interests, and could even lose Taiwan. At the end of the Cold War, the PLA Navy’s 
armaments and weaponry systems were comparable to the West’s in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy was continuing to push ahead, developing highly efficient 
electronic naval warfare weapons that employed C3I, which integrated modern naval 
warfare with surveillance, control, communication and command.98 The 1993 Yinhe 
Incident humiliated the PLA.99 The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis forced the PLA to 
confront the real possibility that it would need to fight a war with the U.S.100 The PLA 
believed that if it was to redirect itself to focus on an outside military threat, it needed to 
increase professionalization.  
Third, the PLA needed specialized personnel to master the increasingly intricate 
and advanced armaments and command systems that it would need to adopt in order to 
respond to the RMA. Those with better education and training would have to be given 
more opportunities for promotion. Therefore, the increasing specialization and 
standardization of the military, driven by the requirements of the RMA, reinforced the 
trend of professionalization among the officer corps.  
Finally, the power of the market drove the PLA toward greater professionalization. 
As China opens up to the world, becoming a solider is only one of tens of thousands of 
options for a young person with a specialized skillset. In the past, Chinese joined the PLA 
out of a true sense of patriotism and a desire to protect their families and their country. 
There was also a sense of honor and pride in serving in the PLA. By the 1990s, however, 
well-qualified officers had much better career opportunities outside the military. The 
PLA could no longer attract new recruits by tapping into patriotism alone or employing 
the slogan of “protect your families, safeguard your motherland” (baojia, weiguo).101 
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Chinese had to weigh the costs and benefits of joining the military and viewed becoming 
a PLA officer as a profession. The opportunity cost of serving in the military, for well-
educated and capable officers, was much higher in the 1990s than it was in previous 
decades, when serving in the PLA meant enjoying a better standard of living and other 
social privileges. In the 1990s, the income gap between PLA officers and those who 
worked in the booming private sector widened significantly. Therefore, if the PLA 
wanted to keep talented officers, it needed to follow the road of professionalization, while 
also maintaining the adequacy of military salaries.102 
 
Altered Threat Perception 
The Chinese leadership’s 1978 decision to shift the country’s focus to economic 
development and reform and opening up was grounded in Deng Xiaoping’s fundamental 
judgment that the international situation was one of peace and development, a conclusion 
that he made as early as 1975.103 In March 1979, Deng restated his judgment that a world 
war would not be fought for at least the next decade.104 Then, in an April 1980 meeting, 
Deng again stated, “dangers could pass in the 1980s and we believe that it is possible to 
get twenty years of a peaceful environment.”105 Based on his judgment that war was 
improbable in the near future, Deng could logically argue that China should reduce its 
military expenditures and put more resources into economic development. Deng made 
this argument as soon as he was elected Chairman of the CMC in 1981. As CMC 
Chairman, the first order he gave was to cut the military’s budget by RMB 2.7 billion. 
Based on Deng’s orders, the PLA General Logistics Department cut the military’s budget 
from RMB 18.5 billion in 1980 to RMB 15.8 billion in 1981. Thus, the military budget as 
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a percentage of China’s total fiscal expenses dropped from 17.2 percent to 16.2 
percent.106 Deng asked the PLA to “be patient” and endure the hardships that would 
accompany the budget cuts. The PLA loyally obeyed Deng’s order, despite the drastic 
decline in its welfare due to its reduced budget, compounded by the fact that China 
experienced double-digit inflation during the 1980s and early 1990s.  
After experiencing more than a decade of hardships and a loss of direction, the 
PLA officer corps concluded that the military’s economic plight was caused by the lack 
of attention and respect that the top leaders and the public gave to the PLA. To convince 
the leadership to pay more attention and allot more resources to the military, as a starting 
point the PLA had to gradually “correct” Deng’s conclusion that war was unlikely. The 
PLA presented the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis as evidence that the chance of having to 
fight a war over Taiwan was real. If war was likely, the PLA had to be prepared. Since 
the 1995-96 crisis, China’s international environment, in its leaders’ eyes, has continued 
to deteriorate, as evidenced by the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and 
Lee Teng-hui’s introduction of a “two-State theory” in 1999, followed by the election of 
pro-independence Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan’s president in 2000.  
 
The PLA’s Mentality and Its Position on the Timetable Strategy 
The PLA’s continuous separation from the Party, the development of its 
independent institutional interests, and the rise of professionalization within the military 
marked the PLA’s mentality in the 1990s and early 2000s. This mentality had mixed and 
contradictory effects on the PLA officer corps’ position regarding the timetable strategy. 
On the one hand, the PLA was strongly motivated to modernize in order to adapt to the 
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challenges presented by the RMA, achieve a higher budget, and enhance the morale of its 
rank and file. Sustained tension across the Taiwan Strait is beneficial to fulfilling all of 
these needs. On the other hand, the rise of professionalization in the 1990s has made the 
PLA officer corps in general more cautious about tying itself to an ill-designed strategy 
that would make war with Taiwan more likely. Therefore, the PLA formed a broad 
consensus internally on the need to take a tough position on Taiwan, but did not believe 
that Jiang Zemin’s timetable strategy was the proper way to solve the Taiwan problem. 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the PLA was strongly motivated by the 
possibility of a war over Taiwan. Chas Freeman, former Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Security Affairs, accurately explained the PLA’s mentality following the 
1995-96 crisis: 
The major lesson most American observers, including most members of Congress, have 
drawn from the crisis is, however, that the prospect of U.S. military intervention can deter 
a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Beijing reached a different conclusion. China’s leaders have 
always said they would go to war to prevent the permanent division of China. They now 
believe that they are likely to have to do so. China’s armed forces have begun a decade-
long effort to acquire the capabilities and do the planning required to have a serious 
chance of overwhelming Taiwan’s formidable defenses.107  
 
The PLA used the Taiwan issue as an effective rallying point to get a larger budget, more 
resources, and increased attention from the Party, and to restore its image that was sullied 
in 1989. The Taiwan issue served as a “dragon head” (longtou) that spearheaded the 
PLA’s professionalization and military modernization. In 1999, the PLA introduced a 
slogan of “absolute victory in the last war” (juezhan juesheng) in order to motivate its 
officers to intensify military preparations for Taiwan. Yet within the PLA deep 
disagreements and internal debates on how to solve this problem remained. There were 
questions in the PLA as to whether China would corner itself by adopting a timetable 
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strategy. Additionally, different approaches to the Taiwan question called for distinct 
military preparations, which had implications for the budgets of different services.  
The PLA’s military planners and strategists expressed doubts about the timetable 
strategy when it first emerged, since they believed it ran against the military’s logic – as 
Sun Tzu wrote, “just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no 
constant conditions” (bing wu chang shi, shui wu chang xing).108 A fixed timetable risks 
“tying the PLA’s hands and feet” and constraining the PLA’s freedom of operation, as 
one PLA strategist explained.109 According to another PLA strategist, “goals of wars 
should be determined by military threat; otherwise, one would be ‘pigeonholed’ (kuangsi) 
(by goals set subjectively). Sometimes, when threats press closer (toward us), the 
timetable’s ‘clock’ should tick faster.”110 Military strategists were also cautious about 
rushing into a war over Taiwan because they suspected the utility of war in securing a 
sustainable rule over Taiwan. First, a war could cause a catastrophic damage to Taiwan. 
Second, they tacitly agreed with Deng that in order for Taiwan to reunify with the 
mainland, the “(mainland’s) economic development, to a certain degree, had to be 
superior to Taiwan’s.”111 Ruling a Taiwan conquered by force already poses 
insurmountable challenges. Ruling a Taiwan, which was richer than China and a much 
more advanced economy, would pose even greater challenges to China if it sought to 
govern the island.  Therefore, these strategists were not only worried about militarily 
winning the war over Taiwan, but were also concerned with the aftermath and the risk 
that war would damage Taiwan permanently.  
The PLA’s “technocrats,” who were in charge of combat “hardware” – armaments, 
ships and logistics – were most vocal in criticizing the timetable strategy. As one 
 541 
technocrat explained, “we won’t be ready in five years, and we probably won’t be ready 
in ten years.”112 The PLA Navy was also more realistic and conservative when evaluating 
the risks of conducting an amphibious assault against Taiwan and the outcome of a 
possible direct confrontation with the U.S. Navy. This group of critics started to quiet 
down after 2008, as the PLA became more confident in its military readiness (in terms of 
hardware). As one former naval armament officer said, “frontline officers were gung-ho 
on Taiwan in 1995 but we were indeed not ready. The countdown for military preparation 
from 2000 was completed by 2008 and by then we were ready militarily. If Chen (Shui-
bian) declared independence, we would surely use force. However, he didn’t go that 
far.”113 While the PLA’s technocrats rejected the timeline strategy because they did not 
have the hardware to carry out a military operation, the PLA is now confident in its 
capabilities and this interest group is more sanguine about taking a tougher approach to 
Taiwan. 
The rise of inter-service rivalries, as well as bureaucratic turf wars among 
powerful and resourceful military regions, has further complicated this internal debate 
within the PLA. In comparison to the PLA Navy’s cautious attitude, the Second Artillery 
argued for “victory at all costs” and much more aggressively pushed for a tougher war 
strategy.114 Younger officers in the Nanjing Military Region, Guangzhou Military Region, 
and to a certain extent the Jinan Military Region vigorously pushed for intensified war 
planning on Taiwan and insisted that war is inevitable. Some even fully embraced the 
timetable strategy. Those officers who would be heavily involved in a Taiwan conflict 
believed combat experience put an officer on a faster track for promotion. Additionally, 
tensions over Taiwan would translate to more resources for those officers. As a result, 
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they were more likely to support the timeline strategy. Those in the Shenyang Military 
Region and Lanzhou Military Region, which deal with threats on China’s northeast and 
northwest, were neither enthusiastic about this strategy nor positioning the PLA’s 
military preparation around the focus of the potential Taiwan crisis.115 
 
Party-Military Relations 
The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis was also important in that it brought the Taiwan 
issue into the territory of Party-military relations. When the crisis broke out, Jiang was 
still consolidating his political power, and his control over the PLA was expanding but 
remained weak. Through the crisis, Jiang learned (and probably over-learned) that he 
could use the Taiwan issue to win over PLA officers’ hearts and minds. Since Jiang took 
the reins on Taiwan affairs from Yang Shangkun in 1993, he had adopted a two-pronged 
approach on Taiwan: deepening diplomatic/political engagement and economic 
interdependence with Taiwan; and strengthening China’s military deterrent.116 Beginning 
in 1999, Jiang increasingly leaned on the militaristic aspects of this approach because he 
calculated that this was the only way he could remain CMC Chairman after his retirement 
as president in 2002. Hu Jintao, Jiang’s successor, approached the Taiwan issue in a 
different manner. Hu sought to ease tensions across the Taiwan Strait, as this would allow 
him to undermine Jiang’s justification for staying on the CMC past his retirement as 
president. Thus, Hu approached the Taiwan issue in a manner that served his broader 
political goals. Hu succeeded in shifting gears on Taiwan policy. When Ma Ying-jeou 
was elected Taiwan’s president in 2008, the cross-Strait relationship experienced a deep 
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thaw and moved along a more positive trajectory. As a result, Hu’s more conciliatory 
approach seemed to be vindicated. 
 
The Taiwan Issue and Party-Military Relations under Jiang Zemin 
During the Mao era, the PLA had almost exclusive control over the study of the 
Taiwan problem. Military intelligence and counter-intelligence officers monitored and 
studied Taiwan’s development and trajectory, since the Taiwan problem was 
characterized as “struggles with enemies” and the step yet to be taken to complete 
China’s Communist revolution and liberation. Therefore, those responsible for analyzing 
Taiwan came from a background in military intelligence, counter-espionage, and “united 
front” work, which aimed to use propaganda to convince and catalyze Taiwan’s 
population, particularly its government and military personnel, to rebel against the KMT 
government and reunite with the mainland.117 Deng Xiaoping did not have any official 
position on the TALSG, but he was the key person who shifted the focus of Taiwan 
policy away from war-fighting (“liberating Taiwan”) and “struggles with enemies” to 
political negotiations. Therefore, Taiwan policy during the Deng era was much less 
militarized and emotional than it was during the Mao era.  
When Jiang Zemin assumed the presidency, he needed but lacked the PLA’s 
support. During the early stages of his tenure as president, Jiang had weak effective 
control over the PLA. Although Jiang obtained the CMC chairmanship in 1989, Deng 
heavily influenced major decisions and Yang Shangkun controlled the PLA’s routine 
work on Deng’s behalf. Prior to 1992, Yang also controlled Taiwan affairs by presiding 
over the TALSG, which Jiang joined in July 1990.118 Yang directed the cross-Strait 
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secret envoy communications through Lt. Gen. Yang Side, then director of the Taiwan 
Affairs Office (TAO), who met with Su Chih-ch'eng, Director of Lee Teng-hui’s office. 
Although Jiang was the CCP’s official top leader, it was difficult for him to intervene in 
or influence the secret envoy communications with Taiwan.119 
Jiang took over the TALSG’s reins from Yang in October-November 1993.120 
Except for the transfer of Hong Kong, Taiwan policy had the highest strategic and 
security stakes and therefore carried the highest political risk and reward. Since each of 
his predecessors, from Mao to Marshal Ye and Deng, had a significant impact on cross-
Strait relations, it was natural for Jiang to develop a new approach to the Taiwan issue 
and thus make his own mark on this policy. As soon as Jiang took over the TALSG, he 
immediately changed its membership.121 Jiang’s contribution to Taiwan policy was to 
add a transitional period prior to political negotiations on reunification between Taiwan 
and the mainland, which was encapsulated in the “Eight Points” that he presented in early 
1995: “formally ending hostilities” between the two sides as the first step; and jointly 
“making plans for the development of cross-Strait relations.”122 Therefore, according to 
Jiang’s initial formulation, China’s Taiwan policy should be seen as a two-step strategy; 
ending the state of hostility using the principle of “one China,” and then negotiating the 
terms of unification. On Taiwan policy, Jiang initially relied on Wang Daohan, his 
political mentor and the President of ARATS, the 1.5-track channel for cross-Strait 
communication. After the historic Wang-Koo dialogue, which sought to institutionalize 
exchanges across the Strait,123 in January 1995 Jiang publicized his “Eight Points” 
formula. Jiang’s policy focused on how to develop the cross-Strait relationship before 
reunification, therefore implicitly recognizing the possible long-term separation between 
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the two sides.124 Despite ambiguous wording that left space for further interpretation, 
“Jiang’s Eight Points” was in essence an implicit rejection of the timetable strategy. It 
established China’s bottom line with reference to Taiwan, which was to counter Taiwan 
independence, rather than to push for or compel reunification. The key message in 
“Jiang’s Eight Points” was that China would not give up the option of using force against 
Taiwan, but it also would not attack Taiwan as long as Taiwan did not claim to be 
politically separate from China. 
1995 was a crucial year for Jiang, as he consolidated his political power and 
began to establish control over the PLA. Officers close to the Yang brothers were 
sidelined after the brothers’ downfall in 1992, while a group of senior officers loyal to 
Jiang started to expand in both numbers and in terms of influence. Jiang tried every 
method to garner PLA officers’ support.125 It was politically important for Jiang to win 
the respect of the PLA’s rank and file, since the upper echelon, headed by Admiral Liu 
Huaqing, generally kept its distance from Jiang. Based on the PLA’s strong response in 
1995, Jiang quickly learned that to ignore the PLA’s tough position on Taiwan would 
give his opponents an opening and create widespread resistance in the PLA to his nascent 
leadership.126 This led Jiang to order a more intimidating show of force in 1996, when 
one missile was fired across Taipei. 
During the crisis, despite internal dissent, the PLA leadership, then dominated by 
professionally-oriented officers, did not want to assault Taiwan because they were 
woefully unprepared militarily. As one senior PLA officer described the dynamics, “To 
use an analogy: Beijing and Taipei (in that crisis) were like a guy trying to use a wheat 
stalk to ward off a wolf, both man and wolf lacking confidence and scared.”127 What the 
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PLA wanted was to be heard domestically, to correct the policy path that had ignored the 
need for China’s military to modernize for more than a decade. That is why Zhang 
Wannian, Chief of General Staff, pushed to change China’s strategic focus to “two 
centers,” economic development and military preparations, during the Beidaihe meeting 
in the summer of 1995.128 Deng was still alive in 1995, and apparently revising his policy 
of focusing on economic development was not an option. Although Jiang talked the PLA 
down on this proposal, a clear consensus emerged between political and military leaders 
that China needed to increase its defense budget and give the PLA a greater voice in the 
policy-making process. To win hearts and minds in the PLA, Jiang not only made popular 
proposals such as building an “assassin’s mace,”129 but also introduced the timetable 
strategy into internal conversations. This could possibly have been a tactical move that 
allowed Jiang to evade the PLA’s pressure, since no position on Taiwan, except for an 
ultimatum, which was infeasible, could be tougher than the timetable strategy.  
As Jiang started his second and final term as president in 1997, leaving a personal 
legacy loomed large in his mind and no legacy would be bigger than achieving 
reunification with Taiwan. By this point, Jiang had gradually established effective control 
over the PLA, and Hong Kong had been transferred back to Beijing. Jiang, a man 
“ambitious to do showy things” to cement his personal legacy (hao da xi gong), aspired 
to accomplish what even Deng Xiaoping had failed to achieve.130 Jiang became 
increasingly serious about pursuing the timetable strategy, a message he expressed to a 
visiting President Clinton, when he said, “China must have a timetable for solving the 
Taiwan issue.”131  
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At one point following the 1995-96 crisis, the timetable strategy was discussed in 
the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) and possibly the Politburo, in which Jiang had 
certain allies but also faced serious skeptics on this concept.132 Jiang realized that on such 
a vital issue, in which the PBSC remained deeply divided, it had to be sent for 
deliberations to the broad-based CCP Central Committee (CCPCC) in order to be 
formally adopted, where he would surely face more questioning and resistance.133 
Therefore, Jiang never brought this issue to the CCPCC.134 As a political compromise, 
Jiang and the other Politburo members talked about it both during internal meetings and 
on public occasions, and, depending on how supportive these Politburo members were of 
this concept, expressed it in either direct or coded language. In this way, each could 
illustrate this concept without making an official commitment, while adding his own 
unique interpretation. Every PBSC member and 17 out of 22 Politburo members attended 
the 1998 Central Taiwan Affairs Meeting, which was unprecedented. In January 1999, 
Vice Premier Qian Qichen, who oversaw Taiwan affairs, stated, “the Taiwan issue could 
not be dragged on forever,” which CCTV picked up and broadcast but was deleted from 
the later Xinhua News report.135  
Filled with a series of events politically catastrophic for Jiang, ranging from the 
U.S. bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade, Lee Teng-hui’s public articulation of a 
“state-to-state theory,” China’s political campaign against Falungong, to the Cox Report 
released by the U.S. Congress that was critical of China, 1999 was a pivotal year that 
pushed Jiang in a more militaristic direction. Among these incidents, Lee’s speech was 
the most threatening, as the PLA recognized it remained at a military disadvantage vis-a-
vis Taiwan and therefore could not do anything if Lee pushed for independence.136 
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Despite the United States’ efforts to explain that its bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade happened by mistake, the majority of PLA officers were not convinced.137  
Seemingly under siege by international and domestic security challenges, Jiang needed 
the PLA’s support more than ever.  
As the clock started ticking and the end of Jiang’s tenure as president was 
approaching, the Taiwan issue became a political football. Jiang apparently aspired to 
prolong his official political life by remaining CMC Chairman. To achieve this, Jiang had 
to fulfill two conditions: first, Jiang had to have the support of the PLA’s top leadership; 
second, he had to find a reason to remain CMC Chairman beyond his term limit that was 
justifiable to a broad swath of the Party. Jiang had already consolidated his effective 
control over the PLA, as evidenced by his ability to cut 500,000 military personnel in 
1997, divest the PLA from the marketplace in 1998, elevate Cao Gangchuan onto the 
CMC in 1998, and then unprecedentedly promote Guo Boxiong, then Deputy Chief of 
General Staff, and Xu Caihou, then Deputy Director of General Politics Department, to 
members of the CMC in 1999.138 Second, nothing was more convenient than sustained 
tension over the Taiwan issue to justify Jiang’s ambition to stay on as CMC Chairman. 
The U.S. granted Taiwan’s wish to purchase anti-aircraft missiles and SPS-40 radar, 
which added to the tensions emerging over the 2000 Taiwanese presidential election. In 
early 2000, President Clinton partially rolled back ground surrendered in the “Three Nos” 
by revising one aspect of his October 1997 remark from “the relationship between the 
PRC and Taiwan is for the Chinese themselves to determine” to “Taiwan’s future status 
must be determined with the assent of the Taiwan people.”139 As a result of these factors, 
Jiang advanced the assessment that “war across the Strait is inevitable” (taihai biyou 
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yizhan) in closed-door internal meetings,140 which aligned himself with the prevailing 
view within the PLA.141 
The PLA walked a fine line on the timetable strategy. Jiang did have substantial 
support for this strategy from within the PLA. In addition to the Nanjing Military 
Region’s “young turks,” some PLA officers did indeed cater to Jiang’s thinking, among 
whom Xiong Guangkai was identified as the one who “always carried two plans in his 
pockets, and took out whichever plan Jiang preferred.”142 Nonetheless, there was 
certainly a major split within the PLA throughout the latter half of the 1990s on whether 
China should proactively compel Taiwan to reunite with the mainland by use of force 
within a deadline, which was the core of the timetable strategy. The mainstream PLA 
officers who participated in deliberations and planning had been consistently supporting 
military preparations against Taiwan, but opposed a full adoption of the timetable 
strategy because “the military must fight wars commensurate to its military 
capabilities.”143 After the 1995-96 crisis deescalated and as professionalization 
accelerated, more PLA officers voiced reservations regarding the timetable strategy. 
Moderate thinking began to emerge and dominate the PLA. Their opposition was rooted 
in the following arguments: 
First, the PLA’s moderates were worried about the “day after tomorrow,” or the 
aftermath and destruction that destructive attacks would have on Taiwan. Second, if 
China lost the war over Taiwan, the CCP would lose the legitimacy to govern China. 
Additionally, it would likely produce a domino effect and induce Tibet, Xinjiang, and 
Inner Mongolia to undertake efforts to break away from China. Fears about the potential 
repercussions if the war was lost far outweighed the potential gains if the war was won. 
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Third, the PLA’s moderates were convinced, due to the U.S.’s actions during the 1995-96 
crisis, that the U.S. would militarily intervene if China launched an attack on Taiwan. 
Fourth, the PLA was also worried that the Chinese public might have difficulties 
supporting a prolonged and bloody war over Taiwan. Fifth, a large group of PLA officers 
believed that China should continue to focus on economic and military modernization, 
rather than the immediate use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue.  
Among all the services, the PLA Navy adopted the most cautious position toward 
the timetable strategy. Within the PLA Navy, naval armament officers most ardently 
resisted this proposal. A senior PLA Navy officer in charge of naval armament research 
pointed out in December 1999 that serious preparations for an attack on Taiwan would 
force China’s ship-building industry to shift most of its capacity to building amphibious 
assault ships and other military naval vessels. At this point, the focus of China’s ship-
building efforts was still on commercial and civilian ships. This senior officer 
commented: “Everybody could talk tough. But to fight a war, you need enough muscles, 
and the right muscles. Clearly, we haven’t taken that step (to shift the whole shipbuilding 
business to military vessel building). Have a timetable and attack Taiwan? We weren’t 
ready in 1996. And we won’t be ready in five years (unless the overall posture of military 
preparation is shifted).”144 The PLA aggressively sought to gain the “right muscles” after 
1999 and made significant progress in improving its air superiority and missile/artillery 
assault capability. In 2000, Russia agreed and subsequently delivered in the next two 
years approximately 40 Su-30MKK two-seat multipurpose fighters to China.145 China’s 
4th generation J-10 fighters entered service in 2004, followed by the J-11/Su-27, a multi-
role fighter bomber and air superiority aircraft with a maximum operational radius of 
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around 1,500 kilometers. The WeiShi-2 (guardian) multiple launch rocket system started 
to emerge in 2008, with a maximum range of 200 kilometers, which put Taipei and 
Keelung within its reach. China, however, was still lacking in terms of amphibious 
vessels, according to a 2009 Rand Corporation study.146 
The lack of consensus in the PLA on the timetable strategy, compounded by the 
difficulty of building a consensus among the civilian leadership, constituted the main 
obstacle for Jiang to bring this issue to the CCPCC for discussion. Jiang instead sought to 
personally articulate this strategy and have other top leaders expound upon it during 
internal meetings and on public occasions. Jiang’s strategy, however, lacked institutional 
legitimacy and later proved to be the policy’s Achilles heel. The PLA became the biggest 
beneficiary of the rhetoric on the timetable strategy, partly due to the reality of China’s 
security challenges and partly due to Jiang’s political maneuvering. Since the timetable 
strategy is a concept the PLA largely resisted, the fact that it was never institutionalized 
and was instead merely articulated through politicians’ oral statements suited the PLA’s 
needs best.  
The PLA benefited most from China’s deteriorating security environment, which 
began in 1999, as evidenced by the increase in its official budget. China’s defense budget 
over the next decade (2000 and 2009) exceeded China’s combined defense budget for the 
previous 50 years (1949-1999).147 For instance, the PLA’s official budget in 2001 and 
2002 increased by 19.4 percent and 17.9 percent, respectively. Second, with Jiang’s 
support, the PLA gained unprecedented resources, some of which were not reflected in its 
official budget, to make military preparations for a Taiwan contingency within a five-
year timeframe beginning in 1999.148 The PLA, joining hands with China’s defense 
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industry, launched the “995 Project” (995 gong cheng), which was dedicated to 
enhancing the R&D, production, and deployment of a series of new high-tech weapons 
systems, previously described by Jiang as the “assassin’s mace.”149 Through this program, 
the PLA was given almost a blank check to propose and pursue any major weapons 
system that could plausibly be included as part of the “assassin’s mace,” often using 
resources and funds outside of its official budget.150 “Any (Western) weapon system 
under the sun was taken under tireless conceptual and feasibility studies,” according to a 
retired military scientist.151 With Jiang’s support, not only was China’s defense industry 
authorized to make 50-year armament development plans,152 but the PLA also obtained 
enormous funding and support to develop high-tech weapons systems beginning in 1999. 
With this funding and support, the PLA successfully developed the J-20 fourth-
generation stealth fighter jet and a new generation of Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) 
weapons. Besides greater resources for China’s indigenous armament R&D, the PLA also 
strengthened its military capabilities through foreign armament procurement. According 
to SIPRI, China was the world’s largest conventional weapons buyer from 2000-04, 
accounting for 14 percent of global arms transactions and 45 percent of Russia’s arms 
exports during this period.153 
In 2002 and 2003, China underwent a leadership transition, but Jiang held onto 
the key military post, which created the problem of “two centers”: a supreme Party leader 
and a supreme PLA leader, but no single person serving as the final arbiter of power. As 
David M. Lampton has pointed out, this meant, “it may be unclear at times where (or 
who) the authoritative party center is.”154 In November 2002, Jiang transferred the 
position of General Secretary of the Party to Hu Jintao. In March 2003, Jiang transferred 
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the Presidency to Hu, as mandated by China’s Constitution.155 Jiang, however, managed 
to retain the CMC Chairmanship. This move created a dilemma in the Party-military 
relationship known as “two centers,” as there was uncertainty as to who represented the 
Party and to whom the PLA would swear allegiance. In the PLA’s command and control 
system, the CMC chairman is the supreme leader and even the general secretary of the 
Party is subordinate to the CMC chairman within the realm of military affairs. This 
position, however, contradicted the golden rule that “the Party commands the gun.” 
The PLA’s top leadership, which Jiang put in place in 2002, explicitly or 
implicitly supported Jiang’s retention of the CMC Chairmanship. Jiang’s allies in the 
PLA’s top leadership included Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, and Li Jinai, and to a lesser 
extent Liang Guanglie, Liao Xilong, and Cao Gangchuan. Some, such as Liu Zhenwu, 
Commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, were more vocal than others in 
expressing their support for Jiang. In 2002-04, PLA leaders repeatedly and explicitly 
urged the PLA to obey the commands of “the Party Center, the CMC, and Chairman 
Jiang.”156 However, this stance was unpopular among the PLA’s general officer corps, 
which is increasingly professionalized. A retired senior PLA officer who served under 
General Zhang Zhen criticized Jiang’s “greed for power” as he said: 
Having “two centers” breeds politicization and factionalism, poisons professionalization, 
and causes confusion in the officer corps. In the Chinese language, one center (zhongxin/
中心) could mean “loyalty” (zhong/忠), while two centers means “trouble” (huan/患). 
For many officers, Jiang represented nothing but trouble for the PLA after 2002.157 
 
Jiang’s retention of the CMC Chairmanship in 2002 created serious confusion within 
China’s national security policy-making establishment and in particular raised questions 
over China’s Taiwan policy: Is time on China’s side or on Taiwan’s side? What should 
be the basic “line” on the Taiwan issue: a tacit timetable (compellence) strategy, a 
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continuous deterrence and intimidation strategy, or open-ended engagement? Should the 
PLA continue its military preparations?  
 
The Taiwan Issue and Party-Military Relations under Hu Jintao 
Despite his position as the Party’s top leader, Hu remained only Vice Chairman of 
the CMC, and thus was subordinate to Jiang within the PLA from 2002-04. Although 
other members of the PBSC constrained Hu on multiple issues, as the TALSG’s head Hu 
was able to decide who could participate in policy-making, and thus who could take the 
lead on Taiwan policy. As a result, Hu was able to rewrite China’s Taiwan policy if he so 
chose. 
Hu was allegedly critical of how Taiwan policy was handled under Jiang, i.e. 
“offense by pen and intimidation by sword,” which he believed constantly backed Beijing 
into a corner.158 Hu clearly had a different approach to Taiwan policy, as he believed 
China should set a “harder” bottom line but pair this with “softer” engagements with 
Taiwan. First, Hu shifted the focus of China’s Taiwan policy from seeking peaceful 
reunification to preventing Taiwan from declaring de jure independence. This shift was 
further translated from a CCP political policy (if Taiwan proclaims independence this 
means war), into the Anti-Secession Law (ASL), which then eliminated ambiguity and 
room for reinterpretation in case of democratization or regime change on the mainland. 
Therefore, by hardening China’s bottom line on Taiwan, Hu was able to get enough 
support domestically to shift gears toward a more flexible Taiwan policy. Second, in 
order to win over Taiwan’s population, Hu displayed greater flexibility by: removing pre-
conditions for opening the “three links” (transportation, commerce, and communication) 
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between the two sides; removing obstacles that inhibited greater engagement with the 
pro-independence DPP; and adopting targeted policies to influence different 
constituencies in Taiwan. All of these initiatives were reflected in his 2004 “517 
Speech.”159 Through these measures, Hu made it clear that his priority was not achieving 
reunification as soon as possible, but rather was maintaining the status quo with Taiwan. 
In other words, China would be willing to work with Taiwan and develop peaceful and 
stable cross-Strait relations, as long as Taiwan did not move toward de jure independence. 
Hu’s new approach to Taiwan, initially embodied in his “Four Points,” which he 
delivered in a meeting of the CCPCC in March 2003, should be understood as a 
component of his overall conception of China’s broader national strategy. In November 
2003, Zheng Bijian, one of Hu’s close advisors and the former President of the Central 
Party School, presented China’s peaceful rise theory at the Bo’ao Asia Forum. A month 
later, Premier Wen Jiabao gave a detailed enunciation of China’s path of peaceful rise, 
explaining that China’s new national strategy was pursuing development in peaceful 
ways. Therefore, Hu’s more flexible and patient Taiwan policy was in line with his 
overall vision of maintaining the window of opportunity for China’s continuous 
economic modernization and further integration into the international system.  
According to Hu’s thinking on both China’s broader national strategy and its 
Taiwan policy, the PLA’s role was deemphasized and the military would only come into 
play as the last resort. Hu was convinced that Jiang’s Taiwan policy led to a vicious cycle 
whereby the rise of a Taiwan pro-independence force necessitated the consideration of 
military methods, which allowed the PLA’s influence to increase and Beijing’s 
intimidation of Taiwan militarily. All this in turn was presented in Taiwan as evidence 
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for why Taiwan had to declare independence. It was rational for Hu to deemphasize the 
military, since from 2002-04 Jiang was still directly commanding the PLA and Hu had 
weak control over military affairs. Continuation of the provocation-intimidation-more 
provocation cycle could perpetuate cross-Strait tensions, which Jiang could use to justify 
staying in power as CMC Chairman. Naturally, Hu would choose to distance himself 
from the timetable strategy and formulate his own Taiwan strategy, as this would allow 
him to squeeze Jiang and further consolidate his political power. To eliminate Jiang’s 
reason for continuing to serve as CMC Chairman, Hu had to pare back China’s 
militaristic approach and undertake bold measures to achieve détente with Taiwan. 
Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian’s referenda campaigns in 2003-04, however, posed 
a challenge to Hu’s strategy.  
Hu’s approach proved successful in easing tensions across the Strait in 2004-05. 
He unprecedentedly met with more than 100 Taiwanese businesspeople in December 
2004 to emphasize that politics would not influence cross-Strait economic and trade 
relations. Taiwan’s exports to the mainland increased by one-third from 2003 to 2004. A 
series of path-breaking developments took place in 2005: in March, KMT Vice Chairman 
Chiang Pin-kun visited Beijing; in April, two weeks after China passed the ASL, Lien 
Chan, the KMT’s Chairman, visited Beijing on a historic visit; and in May, James Soong, 
the founder of the People First Party (PFP), visited Beijing. 
Hu’s new approach to Taiwan prescribed a much smaller role for the PLA, and 
therefore the PLA resisted Hu’s strategy.160 Yet Hu was able to contain this criticism and 
maintain firm control over Taiwan policy. Hu allegedly snapped at the PLA in an internal 
meeting, urging the PLA’s leadership to “mind the military’s only job, which is war-
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fighting.”161 During Hu’s official first meeting with the PLA, on the day he was elected 
the Chairman of the State Military Commission in March 2005, he did not mention 
Taiwan or the ASL, which was being rolled out. Rather, Hu emphasized the need for 
military modernization typified by “low input but high output,” and stressed that the 
PLA’s mission was “effectively safeguarding (China’s) national security and unification” 
on the basis of economic development.162 Under Hu, “military operations other than war” 
(MOOTW) gradually became a focal point of the PLA’s development. In his speech at 
the 2004 enlarged meeting of the CMC, in which he took over as Chairman of the CMC, 
Hu warned of “social contradictions and problems” and how international problems 
posed challenges to internal security, drawing a link between international terrorism and 
the rise of Uighur separatism in Xinjiang, and went on to put forward “new historic 
missions” for the PLA.163 “New historic missions,” also known as the “three provides 
and one protection” are defined as: “providing an important guarantee of strength for the 
party to consolidate its ruling position”; “providing a strong security guarantee for 
safeguarding the period of important strategic opportunity for national development”; 
“providing a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests”; and “playing 
an important role in protecting world peace and promoting common development.” The 
PLA’s missions in the “three provides and one protection” deemphasized the urgency of 
the Taiwan problem, which was part of Hu’s attempt to push the PLA to look more 
inward to China’s internal stability and outward beyond Taiwan. 
After Jiang officially stepped down from the CMC in 2004, he gave all active-
duty full generals a statue of Zheng Chenggong, who took back Taiwan from the Dutch 
during the Ming Dynasty. Jiang intended to remind these generals that the task of taking 
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back Taiwan had not yet been completed. Given Jiang’s pressure and attempts to 
introduce a more hardnosed Taiwan strategy, it is clear that Hu took a great political risk 
by shifting the most important policy of his tenure toward a “softer,” more 
accommodating path, and abandoning Jiang’s proposed timetable strategy. As Taiwan’s 
DPP-led government began losing momentum to the KMT after Lien Chan’s visit to 
China in 2005, Hu’s approach to the Taiwan issue was increasingly vindicated. 
Additionally, the continuous thawing and increased interaction across the Strait seemed 
to provide evidence that a more accommodating strategy was effective. By 2006, the 
timetable strategy was no longer brought up, and by 2008, when the KMT won the 
presidential election and the cross-Strait dynamics completely changed, Hu had garnered 
solid support for his approach on Taiwan from within the Party.164 As an organizational 
adjustment, the Minister of Commerce was added to the TALSG in 2008, clearly 
indicating that Hu’s main focus was on increasing economic and trade interactions with 
Taiwan. As economic ties and trade were increasingly prioritized, the PLA’s voice 
became weaker on Taiwan policy. The PLA also lost a seat on the TALSG. Before 2008, 
two military members sat on the TALSG – the Deputy Chief of General Staff overseeing 
foreign affairs and military intelligence, and the Vice Chairman of the CMC who also sat 
on the Politburo. Yet after 2008, only the former seat for Deputy Chief of General Staff 
was left. 
 
Policy Process: Multiplication of Actors 
Although the Party’s top leader has always determined the main direction of 
China’s Taiwan policy, the number of actors that participated in the Taiwan policy-
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making process multiplied during the 1990s. Entities at the grassroots level, the semi-
official level, and those that focused on various functional areas began to influence 
Taiwan policy. By the end of the decade, coastal provinces whose companies had 
significant investments in Taiwan and were recipients of Taiwanese investment, local 
branches of the Taiwan Affairs Office, the Ministry of Transportation, and research 
analysts that specialized in Taiwan affairs had all coalesced into an interest group that 
favored greater cross-Strait communication, and increased economic and trade relations. 
The bureaucratic organizations that participated in China’s Taiwan policy-making 
process changed drastically during the early 1980s, after the focus of China’s Taiwan 
policy shifted from “liberation by use of force” under Mao to “reunification through 
negotiation” under Deng in 1978, followed by Deng’s “one country, two systems” policy 
introduced in 1982-83.165 Since Ye Jianying’s presentation of the “Nine Points” in 1981, 
China’s Taiwan strategy fundamentally shifted from reunification by use of force to 
peaceful reunification, with the use of force only considered a method of strategic 
deterrence. In 1988, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) was established under the State 
Council, and was to be overseen by the Vice Premier or State Councilor on foreign affairs. 
TAO was formed in order to plan and coordinate government affairs on Taiwan. In 1991, 
TAO integrated previously established local offices on Taiwan affairs and systematically 
established structures at the provincial, municipal, county, and even district level. These 
substructures would be tasked with: directly handling the resolution of disputes between 
Taiwanese investors and the local Chinese authorities over various issues such as labor 
and land use complaints, environmental concerns, and tax evasion charges; conducting 
research and studies; coordinating economic ties, trade and communication; and 
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participating in the drafting of local laws and regulations related to Taiwan affairs. 
Twenty ministry-level agencies, including the MFA, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of 
Transportation, and the People’s Bank of China (China’s central bank) have an embedded 
Taiwan affairs office or unit that handles issues related to Taiwan.  
With intensifying cross-Strait relations in every sphere that were expanding both 
geographically and in functional areas, a broad spectrum of stakeholders and important 
actors entered the policy process and started to play crucial and increasingly independent 
roles. During the Mao era, the core bureaucratic entities that shaped China’s Taiwan 
policy were the PLA, Central Investigative Department (later the Ministry of State 
Security), Ministry of Public Security, Department of United Front, and the MFA. In the 
1980s and 1990s, however, TAO, ARATS, ministries overseeing economic and trade 
affairs (MOFCOM and then Ministry of Commerce), those concerned with 
communications, as well as local governments were added to this core. Even non-
governmental organizations such as the Taiwanese Business Association (TBA, or 
taishang xiehui), composed of Taiwanese businesspeople who had investments on the 
mainland, started to play an important role in policy deliberations.166 Clearly, there was a 
proliferation of interests and stakeholders in Taiwan policy. 
 
Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) 
The current TAO can be traced to two sources of bureaucratic power, traditions 
and personnel of the Party and the State –The Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group 
(TALSG) of the CCP, and the State Council. The TALSG of the CCP was established in 
July 1954, and its members primarily specialized in military intelligence and “united 
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front” or psychological warfare. Its members included Li Kenong, Luo Ruiqing, Liao 
Chengzhi, Luo Qingchang, and Xu Bing. While the Cultural Revolution interrupted the 
TALSG, it resumed its activities in December 1979 and was headed by Deng Yingchao 
(Zhou Enlai’s widow) and Liao Chengzhi.167 Since Deng, who was at this point old and 
in poor health, left most of the routine work to Liao, conceivably Yang Shangkun, then 
CMC Secretary General, took over the TALSG’s operations after Liao passed away in 
1983. Lt. Gen. Yang Side, a highly decorated military intelligence officer, headed the 
Taiwan Affairs Office of the Central Committee, the executive arm of the TALSG of the 
Party, serving as its Director from 1985 to 1987.168 In 1988, the Taiwan Affairs Office of 
the State Council was established and headed by Ding Guangen. This organization 
primarily dealt with coordination and functional issues, as well as the implementation of 
policies that the TALSG had decided upon.169 It also set up offices at the provincial, 
municipal, and county level, which were dedicated to improving people-to-people 
communications and trade/investment between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The TAO 
under the Central Committee (CC) was much more powerful than the TAO under the 
State Council.170 In 1993, TAO of the CC and TAO of the State Council were integrated 
into one office, but each organization retained its name. With this integration, Jiang 
Zemin brought together bureaucracies of the Party and the State, which would now work 
together to make and enforce Taiwan policy.171 Due to the exponential increase in cross-
Strait economic, trade, cultural and people-to-people ties in the 1990s and 2000s, TAO’s 
portfolio has expanded, to include responsibility for “setting and implementing guidelines 
and policies related to Taiwan.”172  
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In terms of bureaucratic power, resources and talented personnel, TAO was 
weaker than either the MFA or the PLA. However, it has become an indispensible player 
in Taiwan policy-making because of its close communication and engagement with 
Taiwanese businesses that have a presence on the mainland. TAO has a bureaucratic 
culture that is distinctly different than the MFA or the PLA. When TAO of the State 
Council was established in 1988, people-to-people communications across the Strait had 
already been well-developed. Therefore, upon its establishment, TAO absorbed a large 
number of civilian scholars/practitioners outside the system who had experience 
interacting with their Taiwanese counterparts and relied heavily on their opinions and 
advice.173 For example, TAO drafted “Jiang’s Eight Points” partly based on the advice 
and guidance of Taiwanese scholars, visitors, and businesspeople.174 A group of analysts 
led by Xing Kuishan, then director of TAO’s Research Bureau, initially formulated 
“Jiang’s Eight Points” based on the thinking of Wang Daohan, Chairman of the 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).175 However, the document 
changed throughout the drafting process, and the final product incorporated much of the 
advice from Taiwanese interlocutors that TAO interacted with. 
Because TAO is the designated agency that supervises Taiwan affairs and has a 
top-down structure at all levels of the government, it has become the agency Taiwanese 
businesspeople with investments on the mainland choose to interact with most.176 This is 
because TAO’s structure allows Taiwanese businesspeople that operate at the local level 
to reach the TAO at the central government level, which then has the authority to 
arbitrate issues that have strategic significance and influence a large group of Taiwanese 
businesspeople.177 Influence between TAO and Taiwanese business interests flows in 
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both directions. As TAO at various levels is the supervisory agency for the TBA, 
government officials at TAO concurrently hold positions in the TBA and use those 
positions to provide support to Taiwanese businesspeople. Therefore, TAO and its local 
offices have formed a symbiotic relationship with TBA. This is an important two-way 
channel for communications between Beijing and Taiwanese investors, and a key 
platform for Taiwanese businesspeople to collectively exert pressure on the Chinese 
government. For example, in 1991, local TBAs across China successfully lobbied TAO 
of the State Council to pressure the government to abandon a proposed regulation that 
would have had detrimental effects on Taiwanese businesses with operations on the 
mainland by mandating an increase in the value-added tax of 17 percent.178 Conversely, 
TAO also uses its close links with Taiwanese businesspeople to exert pressure on the 
Taiwanese government. TBAs regularly meet with the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC, 
the TAO’s counterpart) and lobby Taiwan’s President, and successfully persuaded the 
Taiwanese government to drop its “Go Slow” policy and open the three direct links 
across the Strait.179 Neither the KMT nor the DPP can afford to ignore the TBAs’ voice, 
since Taiwanese businesspeople constitute a critical interest group and can help sway 
elections on Taiwan.180 
TAO has had a traditional bond with the PLA, which is reflected by TAO’s use of 
military intelligence resources such as satellite images and listening posts on the 
periphery of Taiwan.181 Additionally, PLA officers are embedded in TAO’s personnel 
structure, which is further evidence of the PLA’s links to TAO. For instance, Major 
General Wang Zaixi, a senior military intelligence officer, served as Deputy Director of 
TAO from 2000-05, and Li Qingzhou, whose professional background was in the PLA, 
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served as spokesman and Assistant to Director of TAO from 1991-98.182 After Wang 
stepped down from TAO and was appointed Vice Chairman of ARATS, the PLA still 
placed officers in TAO, though at lower levels and in less public positions.183 The PLA 
has strong ties to TAO, but these bonds may be weakening. 
The PLA and TAO, along with the Ministry of State Security (MSS), collaborate 
on research and share findings periodically, though each has its own channel of 
information collection. In 1984, a Taiwan-focused think tank, the Institute of Taiwan 
Studies, was established and publicly hosted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS), but reports to the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Approximately 80 percent 
of its researchers are from the MSS system, with the remaining 20 percent from the 
military intelligence system.184 Notably, all think tanks dedicated to analyzing Taiwan 
affairs are closely associated with and at least partially funded by the military intelligence 
apparatus and the MSS and its local subsidiary, including the Institute of Taiwan Studies 
under Xiamen University, the Institute of Taiwan Studies under CASS, and the Institute 
of Taiwan Studies under Beijing United University. Beginning in 2008, the ownership, 
funding source, and personnel of these research institutions became more diversified, and 
the umbrella organization exerted more control and provided more support.185 
Nonetheless, these research networks to a large extent still serve the PLA, TAO, and 
MSS.  
It would be a mistake to simply assume that the PLA is pitted against TAO and 
ARATS during policy debates.186 The three organizations share the goal of reunifying 
Taiwan with the mainland. Additionally, it is an oversimplification to assume that the 
PLA automatically pushes Taiwan policy in a more militant direction. For example, 
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General Wang Zaixi was known in the military for his pragmatism and moderate views 
on Taiwan. It is unclear who is influencing whom when PLA officers serve in TAO. 
However, after decades of increased cross-Strait investment and trade as well as people-
to-people exchanges, paired with the PLA’s growing professionalization and the 
increasing specialization of its missions, these bureaucracies’ interests and priorities 
began to diverge. 
Once China’s Taiwan policy shifted to emphasizing “peaceful development” in 
2008, there were notable clashes between TAO and the PLA. When explaining China’s 
Taiwan policy, TAO would only mention “peaceful development,” while the PLA would 
simultaneously mention both “peaceful development” and “military preparations.”187 
Additionally, when teaching at the Central Party School, Rear Admiral Yang Yi criticized 
TAO’s lack of timely and effective counter-measures against Chen Shui-bian, which led 
to a turf war and an unofficial reprimand of Yang.188 TAO filed a formal complaint to Hu 
Jintao through Wang Gang, Director of the General Office of Central Committee, who 
worked in TAO under Lieutenant General Yang Side during the early 1980s. When 
Major General Luo Yuan criticized Ma Ying-jeou’s “three nos” policy (no reunification, 
no independence, and no use of force) as a way of pursuing “peaceful separatism” in 
2009,189 Wang Yi, Director of TAO, called General Liu Yuan, Political Commissar of 
Academy of Military Sciences and Luo’s boss, to criticize Luo’s ideas. General Liu 
responded to Wang by exclaiming, “Ma isn’t supportive of peaceful reunification, so 
what is it if it isn’t peaceful separatism?!”190 Since the significant improvement of cross-
Strait relations beginning in 2008, the PLA and TAO’s disagreements on threat 
assessments and policy prescriptions increasingly differ. These clashes magnified after 
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Wang Yi, then a promising MFA diplomat (and now China’s Foreign Minister), took 
over TAO.   
 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) 
Officially created as a non-governmental organization (NGO) or a social group 
(shehui tuanti), the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) is a 
quasi-alternative government agency or a so-called “white glove” agency under TAO’s 
administrative guidance. Established in 1991 as a counterpart to Taiwan’s Straits 
Exchange Foundation (SEF), ARATS negotiates with SEF in an attempt to resolve 
operational difficulties presented by the expansive economic and people-to-people 
exchanges across the Strait that are conducted without the requisite political foundation. 
This designated negotiation function makes it an umbrella organization for various 
initiatives, such as the “three links” and the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (ECFA). Negotiations on setting up representative offices of SEF 
and ARATS, discussed first in 2012, would possibly complete in 2016.191  
Based in Beijing, ARATS has four division-level departments – secretarial work, 
coordination, general department and consulting (later changed to liaison) – and three 
divisions – a legal consultation center established in 1993, a department of economic 
affairs, and a department of research, both of which were founded in 1994. In addition to 
its Beijing headquarters, ARATS has a Macao office, but does not have other local 
branches. Most of ARATS’ personnel come from TAO.  
As essentially a government-run NGO, ARATS is an organization with weak 
bureaucratic power in China’s policy process. Because ARATS, unlike TAO, lacks 
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nationwide local structures, Taiwanese businesspeople do not use it as frequently to solve 
their practical difficulties. Rather, the pressure exerted on ARATS comes primarily from 
SEF, which Taiwanese businesspeople prefer in comparison to MAC.192 Unlike SEF, 
which facilitates people-to-people exchanges and promotes communication along 
functional areas, ARATS is dedicated to carrying out political negotiations. With this 
mandate, ARATS engages in negotiations geared toward promoting the “three links” 
across the Strait and arranges meetings between senior officials. Therefore, it lacks both 
the interest and the ability to deal with the more practical issues and concrete cases of 
disputes relevant to Taiwanese investment on the mainland. When ARATS, which as an 
organization wants to focus on promoting political negotiations, is tasked with resolving 
issues of a practical nature, it adopts a relatively defensive and conservative attitude. 
Such an approach is evidenced by how it handles the verification of Taiwanese reporters 
coming to the mainland or the “thousand-island-lake accident,” in which criminals 
robbed and murdered dozens of Taiwanese tourists in 1994. During the latter incident, 
ARATS was reluctant to grant access to Taiwanese journalists to cover this incident or 
facilitate the visit of victims’ families to the site.193    
ARATS’ generally conservative nature contrasted with that of its first Chairman, 
Wang Daohan (1991-2005), who advocated a more flexible and open policy position. 
Wang took a creative approach to Taiwan policy, and had the added benefit of having 
Jiang’s ear throughout most of the 1990s. As Taiwan continued to be reluctant to conduct 
official talks, ARATS played a crucial role during cross-Strait negotiations. ARATS’ 
increasing role and Wang’s flexibility were on display in November 1997, when Wang 
made a groundbreaking explanation of “one China” to a Taiwanese delegation. As Wang 
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explained the concept, “one China is not equal to the People’s Republic of China. It is not 
equal to the Republic of China either. It is a reunified China, which compatriots on both 
sides of the Strait established together; one China should be a China that is yet to be 
reunified but (in which) both sides walk together on the path of reunification.”194 The 
essence of Wang’s vision for reunification was that of shared sovereignty. Wang’s role 
was minimized after the MFA and PLA criticized his liberal and flexible policy positions. 
Jiang in fact personally sidelined Wang after 1998.  
With a liberal vision for cross-Strait relations, Wang faced opposition from two 
fronts – the MFA and PLA. The MFA, highly sensitive to sovereignty issues, 
aggressively criticized Wang’s proposal. Former ambassadors criticized Wang by arguing, 
“we have been fighting our whole lives for a new China, but just in one phrase by Wang 
Daohan, the idea of New China we fought for is gone?!”195 As Taiwan subsequently cited 
Wang’s words to defend Taiwan’s position, the MFA criticized Wang for “making 
trouble.”196 The PLA and Wang Daohan’s circle of advisors and associates in Shanghai, 
following the 1995-96 crisis, jockeyed for power. Wang clearly opposed the timetable 
strategy from the very beginning, and also disagreed on the effectiveness of military 
intimidation. In return, the PLA criticized Wang’s approach to negotiations, accusing him 
of putting too much on the negotiating table.197  
When Wang presented his new interpretation of “one China” in a policy proposal 
he presented at a meeting the TALSG hosted in preparation for the 1998 visit by SEF 
President Koo Chen-fu, he was bombarded with criticism.198 The ideas endorsed at this 
meeting turned into the “86 insightful characters,” which Wang presented in his meeting 
with Koo in October of that year. According to this position, there is only one China in 
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the world and Taiwan is a part of China, but it is yet to be united; under the principle of 
“one China,” the two sides across the Taiwan Strait possess equal political positions in 
negotiations and should discuss reunification. Finally, a country’s sovereignty and 
territory cannot be divided and Taiwan’s political status should be discussed under the 
prerequisite of “one China.” Although the “86 insightful characters” made several 
breakthroughs, such as acknowledging the equal political positions of Beijing and Taipei 
in negotiations, it represented a giant step back from Wang’s original thinking.199  
In 1998, Jiang distanced himself from Wang.200 Wang became increasingly 
controversial, due to his seemingly more moderate and flexible negotiating position, as 
articulated in his 86-character enunciation regarding the future of cross-Strait relations.201 
Jiang had to take into account the MFA and PLA’s objections, since their critiques 
resonated with Jiang’s political opponents in the Party.202 Jiang’s relationship with Wang 
also grew more distant as he consolidated his control over the PLA and therefore began 
to lean more toward the military. Lee Teng-hui’s “two State theory,” introduced in 1999, 
further undermined ARATS, and its power remained diminished until 2008.203  
ARATS has maintained a relatively close or at least cordial channel of 
communication with the PLA, despite the fact that they sit on different sides in the cross-
Strait relationship. ARATS was founded in the PLA GSD’s compound, according to a 
PLA officer,204 though the founding ceremony was reportedly held in the Great Hall of 
the People.205 While the PLA and ARATS clashed under Wang, the two have had a 
relatively smooth and respectful relationship with each other.206 Xiong Guangkai, Deputy 
Chief of General Staff in charge of intelligence, was born in Shanghai and had a close 
bond with the political elites of the “Shanghai Gang”.207 Within this clique, Wang was 
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highly respected due to his revolutionary background, previous experience as Mayor of 
Shanghai, and access to Jiang. The PLA maintained regular consultations with Wang and 
his Shanghai-based advisors during and after Wang’s tenure at ARATS.208 The PLA in 
general acknowledged and respected Wang and his advisors’ knowledge and insights on 
Taiwan, as well as their relationships with important politicians on Taiwan. The PLA’s 
“technocrats,” those officers who primarily focus on Taiwan affairs, shared Wang’s 
analysis of the Taiwan situation. The PLA’s own analysts on Taiwan, notably both Wang 
Zaixi of the GSD system and Xin Qi of the GPD system, were pragmatists on Taiwan.209 
They did not, however, necessarily agree with Wang’s policy prescriptions due to the 
PLA’s bureaucratic interests and its differing strategic considerations. 
 
Local Governments, Ministry-level Transportation Authority 
Government actors with important stakes in cross-Strait economic and trade 
relations include local governments, especially those in Jiangsu, Guangdong, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Shanghai and Tianjin, as well as ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation/Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM/MOC) and the Ministry 
of Transportation.  
Taiwanese investments on the mainland have greatly deepened the 
interdependence between Taiwan and China’s economies and these economic ties 
continue to expand. A survey of the thousand-largest Taiwanese businesses on the 
mainland revealed that combined revenues of these businesses on the mainland in 2009 
exceeded one trillion RMB, equivalent to two-thirds of Taiwan’s GDP that year. 
Revenues of this magnitude almost reach the individual GDP of China’s five richest 
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provinces.210 Taiwan’s trade surplus from trade with China (including Hong Kong) 
reached nearly US$12.3 billion in 2004, more than twice Taiwan’s surplus with the rest 
of the world. By the end of 2014, Taiwan’s trade surplus from trade with the mainland 
totaled US$34.1 billion, while its overall trade surplus from global trade was only 
US$4.45 billion (in essence, Taiwan runs a trade surplus with the mainland and a trade 
deficit with the rest of the world).211 In 2014, Taiwan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) 
on the mainland (US$10.28 billion) accounted for 58.5 percent of Taiwan’s overall FDI 
(US$17.57 billion), and this figure does not include Taiwan’s indirect investments in 
China routed through a third country.212 Clearly, Taiwan’s prosperity is increasingly tied 
to continued stability in the cross-Strait relationship.   
Cross-Strait economic relations also fluctuate with the political trajectory of the 
bilateral relationship. In the initial period of cross-Strait economic liberalization from 
1988-91, Taiwanese investment on the mainland reached US$2.68 billion, before 
increasing to US$5.54 billion in 1992 and then skyrocketing to US$10 billion in 1993.213 
During the tumultuous years of 1995-2000, Taiwanese investment in China plummeted to 
an average of US$3.67 billion annually. Then, as the mainland adopted a more open and 
flexible policy toward Taiwan, Taiwanese investment on the mainland rebounded to 
US$10.36 billion in 2005 and has remained steady around this level (US$9.83 billion as 
of the end of 2014).214  
Taiwanese investment has been particularly important to the economies of Jiangsu, 
Guangdong, Shanghai, and Fujian Provinces, which together received three-quarters of 
total Taiwanese investment on the mainland from 1991-2015.215 Notably, Guangdong 
and Jiangsu have been China’s richest provinces for decades, while Shanghai and 
 572 
Guangdong remain key power centers in China’s domestic politics, as their Party 
Secretaries are guaranteed seats on the Politburo. The importance of continued 
investment from these Taiwanese businesses to these provinces’ economic health cannot 
be overstated. From 1979 to 2008, Taiwanese investment accounted for 33.26 percent of 
Jiangsu’s FDI and 14.66 percent of its international trade. Taiwanese businesses in 2008 
employed 7.94 percent of Jiangsu’s labor force, and from 1992-2007 contributed 3.59 
percent of its tax revenues.216 From 1979-2008, Taiwanese businesses accounted for 
13.75 percent of Guangdong’s FDI and 11.22 percent of its international trade, employed 
10.99 percent of its labor force, and provided 4.72 percent of its tax revenues. From 
1979-2008, Taiwanese businesses accounted for 21.44 percent of Shanghai’s FDI and 
12.25 percent of its international trade. In 2008, Taiwanese businesses employed 15.66 
percent of Shanghai’s labor force, while from 1992-2007 they provided 4.89 percent of 
the city’s tax revenue.217  
As Taiwanese businesses continue to play an important role in driving the 
economic growth of China’s most dynamic and wealthy provinces, officials in these 
provinces clearly understand the importance of maintaining these businesses’ presence 
and ongoing investment. Bo Zhiyue, a Singapore-based Chinese scholar who specializes 
in analyzing elite politics, conducted a study that concluded provincial leaders are crucial 
in Chinese politics, since “China is a country of provinces.” Additionally, for these 
provincial leaders encouraging economic growth is critical, since those “with better 
economic growth or revenue contribution records during their tenure are less likely to be 
demoted, and they are also less likely to be retired.”218 Some Taiwanese businesses, 
especially those with international recognition or those that manufacture high-tech 
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products, have particular influence over provincial and municipal leaders. These leaders 
can showcase such companies’ investments as evidence of their effectiveness.219 As a 
result, local governments often cooperate with Taiwanese businesses and “jointly lobby 
the central government to change policies that disfavor Taiwanese businesses or obtain 
preferential policies for them.”220 
Taiwanese businesses’ lobbying power in these provinces and regions is 
increasingly demonstrated in their ability to help shape China’s legislative process. The 
1994 “Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Investment of Taiwan 
Compatriots” has been continuously updated and revised based on Taiwanese businesses’ 
needs. In 2010, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) sent out an inspection team 
headed by two Vice Chairmen of the NPC Standing Committee to examine the 
implementation of the 1994 law and its corresponding regulations, and push through new 
regulations that TAO had failed to pursue due to its lack of bureaucratic power.221 
Taiwanese businesses provided direct input on these measures, not only during the 
drafting phase, but also as the new laws were implemented and enforced. Additionally, 
provincial and municipal governments, as well as “democratic parties” such as the bi-
monthly consultation mechanism of the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, 
regularly hold seminars, hearings, and debates all aimed at articulating Taiwanese 
businesses’ interests and strategizing how to lobby the mainland to respond to them.222 
Local governments are not the only actors that favor Taiwanese businesses. 
According to the State Council’s structure, 20 ministries and 15 agencies directly 
administered by the State Council have an embedded unit or office dedicated to handling 
its designated functional area specifically as it relates to Taiwan. Such ministries and 
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agencies cover education, science and technology, minority affairs, public security, civil 
affairs, justice, finance, environmental protection, transportation, agriculture, commerce, 
culture, banking and monetary policy, aviation, tourism, and religious affairs.223 
Government agencies and State-owned enterprises with direct stakes in the cross-
Strait relationship have taken a more pragmatic posture toward Taiwan than TAO. One 
illustrative example of this was the cross-Strait negotiations on transportation. In 1995, 
the two sides hit an impasse on the characteristics of cross-Strait transportation routes, as 
the mainland pushed for cross-Strait aviation and sea transport routes to be categorized as 
“domestic routes,” and wanted to exclude foreign airlines and sea transport companies 
from running these routes. China’s Ministry of Transportation and its powerful sea 
transport industry “overrode TAO and obtained the drivers seat in cross-Strait 
transportation policy,” which led to compromises and significant breakthroughs in the 
negotiations with Taiwan in 1997.224  During the deadlock over transportation issues, 
Beijing insisted on classifying cross-Strait routes as domestic ones, and only wanted to 
allow mainland- and Taiwan-headquartered shipping companies to participate in such 
business. Taiwan, however, insisted that the cross-Strait transportation routes be 
categorized as international ones and foreign airlines be allowed to participate, and 
rejected the mainland’s proposal on Flag of Convenience (FOC). Taiwan instead insisted 
that cargo ships transiting between the mainland and Taiwan display their respective 
national flags. As a compromise, both agreed to only allow container ships registered 
outside Taiwan and mainland displaying FOCs to transport goods directly between the 
Kaohsiung Harbor in southern Taiwan and Fuzhou and Xiamen of mainland. Also, the 
direct route can only be used to transport goods exported or imported from a third place. 
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Additionally, Beijing categorized the agreement as an “experimental direct 
transportation”, while Taipei posited it as overseas or offshore (jingwai) trans-
shipment.225 
It should be noted that all documented examples of Taiwanese businesses 
successfully lobbying the mainland, or Chinese government officials intervening on 
policy debates in favor of Taiwanese businesses, have been in the economic and social 
realm. Businesses are less likely to conduct political lobbying, as this involves higher 
risks and less concrete rewards. Nonetheless, the multiplication of actors and 
stakeholders in China’s Taiwan policy has made continuous engagement a more 
appealing and popular approach, and it is less likely that China’s top leaders will 
disengage or take a confrontational approach to Taiwan, since such a policy carries with 
it significant political risks. Additionally, policies such as the timetable strategy, which 
involve high stakes and high risks, are now more difficult to pass in the CCP Central 
Committee (CCPCC), since this body has a significant number of members involved in 
cross-Strait relations. Jiang’s difficulty in obtaining a majority of the CCPCC’s support 
for the timetable strategy led him to abandon the idea of bringing it before the CCPCC 




This case study is not about how a policy that requires the PLA’s consent is made. 
Rather, it is about how a policy can fail to be officially adopted, despite the top leader’s 
desires. The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis created a perfect opportunity for the PLA, 
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which had up to this point suffered from budget cuts, which resulted in deteriorating 
hardware and morale. The dishonorable role the military played in the 1989 Tiananmen 
crackdown further shamed and demoralized the PLA. In 1992, the PLA’s routine 
operation was finally transferred to professionally-oriented officers, which accelerated 
the crystallization of the PLA’s independent institutional interest as well as its pursuit of 
its interest. The 1995-96 crisis presented the PLA with a cause from which it could regain 
the public’s respect, lobby for increased resources, and boost its soldiers’ morale. The 
crisis also guaranteed that the PLA would regain its voice on Taiwan policy. The PLA 
was the biggest beneficiary of this crisis, while Jiang Zemin learned that he could not 
contravene, but rather had to manipulate, the PLA’s power to form consensus. 
The PLA has always been strongly motivated by the Taiwan issue, which has 
unparalleled historical significance to all Chinese. All officers interviewed acknowledged 
that they were not ready militarily in 1995-96. The crisis provided the PLA the greatest 
benefit in domestic politics – presenting the leadership with convincing evidence that the 
PLA needed more resources and increased political support for military modernization. 
The PLA leadership did not display military adventurism during the crisis, even though 
lower-ranking officers on the frontlines advocated this route. Jiang Zemin took a more 
opportunistic route, manipulating the calls from a large swath of the PLA for a tougher 
position on Taiwan to win over the PLA.  
Jiang, however, did not solely rely on the PLA to solve the Taiwan problem. Jiang 
clearly relied on a small circle of advisors, which included both those who emphasized 
civilian/commercial interests and others who took a more militaristic approach. His push 
for the timetable strategy was an outgrowth of his political ambition to leave a lasting 
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personal legacy. With this goal in mind, Jiang pursued a multi-pronged approach on 
Taiwan: a militaristic approach characterized by the timetable strategy, an acceleration of 
military preparations, and insistence on the inevitability of a war over Taiwan in closed-
door meetings with the PLA;227 a foreign policy that focused on winning U.S. support to 
pressure Taiwan; and a push for political negotiations in the context of open and 
increasing trade and person-to-person exchanges. Jiang was willing to take any course 
and adopt any combination of policies, as long as it would solve the Taiwan problem and 
thereby establish his personal legacy. 
As one “leg” of Jiang’s two-pronged – engagement and military deterrent – 
approach, Wang Daohan’s liberal thinking on Taiwan was heavily criticized within the 
civilian policy circle, primarily by the MFA. As Jiang’s tenure as supreme leader wound 
down, the emphasis in cross-Strait relations on the military component increased rapidly, 
due to changes in cross-Strait relations and Jiang’s push for the timetable strategy. The 
PLA, however, at this point both professional and realistic about military planning, 
disagreed on the timetable strategy primarily because of the inherent flaws that it 
identified. The PLA expressed its opposition discreetly, so that it could continue to reap 
the rewards of sustained tensions across the Taiwan Strait.  
On the other hand, exchanges between both sides of the Taiwan Strait increased 
extraordinarily in the political, economic, and societal spheres. China’s Taiwan policy 
witnessed the entry of multiple actors that were strongly motivated to depoliticize, open 
up, and sustain economic and people-to-people exchanges across the Strait. Though TAO 
and ARATS are leading players in this policy process, local governments, ministries, and 
SOEs with high stakes in this relationship have exerted influence on and in some cases 
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even overridden TAO in pushing through agreements between both sides. These forces, 
which are represented on the CCP Central Committee, constitute the biggest roadblock 
for any drastic policy that would reverse cross-Strait relations, and therefore any prospect 
of officially adopting the timetable strategy.  
The PLA might not be the primary culprit for Jiang’s timetable strategy, but it 
was at least an accomplice. The difference in the PLA and the civilian advisors’ interests 
centered on the benefits the PLA had obtained by going along with Jiang’s timetable 
proposal. Jiang’s proposal fitted well with the PLA’s institutional interest of increasing 
its budget and strengthening its voice on foreign and security policy debates. Sustained 
perceived threats to its security environment that China encountered during the latter half 
of the 1990s ensured the PLA would get a seat at the table during Taiwan policy-making. 
The goal of economic and people-to-people exchanges across the Strait is more elastic 
and its success more difficult to define during times of sustained security tensions.  
In 2002, after Hu took over political leadership from Jiang, China’s Taiwan policy 
took a drastic turn. Hu clearly understood the political consequences if tensions across the 
Strait persisted. Therefore, Hu had ample reason to shift the cross-Strait relationship to a 
non-militaristic track. His efforts paid off and Jiang had to step down as CMC Chairman 
in 2004. China’s policy of “peaceful development” with regards to Taiwan, which Hu 
adopted in 2008, has left the PLA with much less room to maneuver than it had during 
the mid- to late-1990s. By this point, the Taiwan policy-making process had integrated 
more stakeholders, which makes any drastic revision of policy a much more difficult, if 
not impossible, task. 
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Chapter Nine: The Rise of the South China Sea Dispute: Bureaucratic Bargaining 
in the Internet Age 
 
 
In China, the PLA has been at the forefront of recognizing the importance of 
oceans for China’s strategic interests, while civilians have followed its lead. Deng 
Xiaoping introduced the policy of “setting aside disputes and pursuing joint 
development” in 1979 as a model to handle the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with 
Japan.1 When China normalized relations with Southeast Asian nations during the 1970s 
and 1980s, Deng applied the same model of “setting aside disputes and pursuing joint 
development.” Deng’s policy was essentially one of preserving the status quo and 
agreeing to disagree. Once Deng articulated this policy, unless another top leader 
reversed it, maritime security policy would then be determined within these constraints at 
the level of bureaucratic bargaining. From 1979-2009, this posture greatly constrained the 
PLA Navy’s (PLAN) scope of options and therefore its influence with regard to China’s 
maritime security strategy.  
Within this context, Admiral Liu Huaqing devised the PLAN’s strategy in 1985 
and set the goal of extending the PLAN’s combat capability, so that, during potential 
battles, it could not only seize and maintain control of the seas in the South China Sea 
(SCS), but could also effectively control important sea lanes of communication (SLOC), 
thus allowing it to connect with peripheral seas.2 This strategy document was more akin 
to a vision and a blueprint, rather than an actual operational plan, as its implementation 
was extremely slow under Deng and Jiang. The trajectory of the PLAN’s development 
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has been consistent with what this strategy envisioned, while the pace of its 
modernization has accelerated since 2005-06. The increasing pace of the PLAN’s 
development is due to the fact that Deng’s status-quo policy has increasingly been under 
attack and seriously challenged by a powerful and activist Internet-based lobby of 
“netizens.” Following the 2009 Impeccable Incident, and the stand-off for control over 
Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island) three years later, the Chinese public has paid 
increasing attention to the South China Sea dispute. 
This case study will first analyze the PLA’s role in China’s maritime disputes in 
the 1990s, in order to illustrate the PLA’s changing influence in China’s maritime 
security policy-making, and will then explore the reasons for this change. This chapter 
then examines the incidents that led to the deterioration of support for Deng’s status-quo 
policy, which culminated in the 2012 Sino-Philippine Scarborough Shoal standoff. 
The reasons to conduct this case study are as follows: First, China’s territorial 
disputes with other countries center on maritime claims, since the majority of China’s 
land border disputes (with the notable exception of its dispute with India) have been 
settled. Second, as China is now the world’s largest trading nation, edging out the United 
States in 2012 and accounting for more than one-tenth of global trade in goods in 2013, it 
is only a matter of time before the PLAN decides to advance into the global commons in 
order to protect China’s trading interests.3 If China and the U.S. cannot find a sustainable 
formula for cooperation, this trend will only intensify its structural frictions with the U.S. 
Navy in the long term. Third, with regard to the gradual revision of China’s maritime 
security policy, symbolized by the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, bureaucratic 
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bargaining played an essential role, which marks a fundamental difference between this 
case study and the previous two case studies. 
 
The PLAN and China’s Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea in the 1990s 
Compared to the Army, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is a latecomer, established on 
April 23, 1949 by General Zhang Aiping, with only 12 soldiers but without a single ship. 
The PLAN was established by taking over part of the KMT naval force, which rebelled 
under Admiral Lin Zun.4 After the Korean War started, China’s security focus 
temporarily shifted from liberating Taiwan to Sino-U.S. confrontations on the Korean 
peninsula. As the mission of liberating Taiwan, which would have required substantial 
naval capabilities, was shelved for the time being, the PLAN’s development was slowed 
down. The Cultural Revolution further disrupted the PLAN’s development and its 
training of officers.  
The PLAN’s development picked up speed after Admiral Liu Huaqing, who 
studied at the Soviet Union’s Voroshilov Naval Academy (today the N.G. Kuznetsov 
Naval Academy) from 1955-58, was appointed PLAN Commander in 1982, a position he 
held until 1987. As early as 1975, Liu proposed that China should develop large 
submarines that could be equipped with ICBMs and aircraft carriers, and that the PLAN’s 
mission should shift to preparing for waging war in the far seas.5 The PLAN’s 
submarines, Liu also proposed in 1975, “must be active in the northeast and central 
Pacific, as well as the Indian Ocean.”6 As commander, Admiral Liu pushed the PLAN to 
become a strategic force and shift its strategy from coastal defense (jin’an fangyu) to 
offshore active defense (jinhai jiji fangyu). Liu also expanded the traditional concept of 
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“offshore” (200 nautical miles off China’s shore) to include “China’s Yellow Sea, East 
China Sea, South China Sea, the Spratly Islands, Taiwan, and the inside and outside seas 
of the Okinawa Island Chain.”7 Liu believed that the PLAN faced two potential 
battlefields: a war over Taiwan, and a conflict to resolve the Spratly Island disputes. 
Between these two possibilities, Liu put more emphasis on the Spratly Islands dispute, 
since he believed it posed a greater challenge to the PLAN’s war-fighting capabilities.8 
With the PLAN’s accelerated transformation and modernization under Admiral 
Liu, China’s naval capabilities progressed significantly. The PLA’s influence in China’s 
maritime security policy, however, remained extremely weak throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. This was partly due to the traditional division of power that made the ground 
forces the predominant force among all services, which led to internal divisions within 
the PLA when the PLAN sought a greater share of resources. Deng’s prioritization of 
economic modernization also led to the overall deterioration of the PLA’s well-being and 
the relative decline of China’s defense budget, which exacerbated the competition for 
resources among the services. The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis further focused the 
PLA’s attention on the Taiwan issue, which Jiang Zemin, who had a rocky relationship 
with Admiral Liu, used to advocate the development of an “assassin’s mace.” Therefore, 
the PLAN, lacking both capability and political support, was not in a position to weigh in 
on China’s maritime security policy in the South China Sea in the 1980s and 1990s, 
despite the fact that Admiral Liu sat on the Politburo Standing Committee from 1992-97. 
Two incidents in the South China Sea in the 1990s are evidence of the PLAN’s 
weak influence on China’s maritime security policy during this period: the Wan’antan 
Incident in 1992 and the Mischief Reef Incident in 1992-94. 
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The 1992 Wan’antan Incident 
In the Wan’antan Incident, when Vietnam challenged China’s oil exploration 
activities in the South China Sea (SCS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) ignored 
the PLAN’s suggestion to send naval forces to escort and protect China’s scientific ship 
that was conducting oil exploration from Vietnamese intimidation and chose to 
deescalate due to its own bureaucratic interests. 
China started comprehensive scientific exploratory research in the SCS in 1984, 
which the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology, under the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences (CAS), conducted on petroleum surveying ship Experiment 2.9 The scientists 
concluded that the SCS could have up to 35 billion tons of petroleum reserves. This 
discovery interested an American company, Denver-based Crestone Energy Corporation, 
which negotiated with the State Oceanic Administration’s (SOA) South China Sea 
Institute to undertake joint exploration in 1991. As a result, China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) and Crestone signed a contract in 1992 to jointly explore the 
Wan’an Bei-21 block, a 25,155-square-km section of the southwestern SCS that includes 
the Spratly Island area.10 In April 1994, five Vietnamese boats armed with machine guns 
surrounded and harassed China’s petroleum survey ship, the Experiment 2, and forced it 
to leave the area. The scientists on the boat reported the incident to the South China Sea 
Institute of Oceanology by satellite phone, which then reported the developments to its 
supervisor, CAS. CAS replied that under these circumstances it no longer had the 
authority to give further instructions.  
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Since China’s petroleum surveying ships reported to the PLAN’s South China Sea 
Fleet, the PLA General Staff Department (GSD), and the MFA each time prior to their 
departure, these three agencies were the main stakeholders during this incident, with the 
MFA acting as the lead agency for dealing with maritime disputes.11 Therefore, 
command and control of Experiment 2 belonged to the MFA.12 Communication between 
Experiment 2 and the MFA was a one-way street during this incident due to protocol, so 
only the MFA could initiate contact. The PLA GSD was kept informed during this 
dispute, but could not dictate its handling. The PLA GSD suggested sending the South 
China Sea Fleet to protect Experiment 2. The MFA disagreed and overruled the PLA 
GSD. The MFA initially instructed Experiment 2 “to sit tight and wait for the support and 
protection of the South China Sea Fleet,” but more than 23 hours later reversed course 
and ordered the ship to “evacuate (now).”13 Experiment 2 followed the MFA’s 
instructions, departed Wan’antan, and never returned.14 
The MFA disagreed with the PLA GSD and scientists on Experiment 2 due to its 
bureaucratic interests. In 1992, the MFA was preparing for landmark negotiations with 
Vietnam aimed at resolving the two countries’ territorial disputes. In October of that year, 
China and Vietnam would hold the first round of negotiations over disputed land territory, 
which the MFA had been working toward for over a decade. More importantly, the MFA 
was arranging then Chinese Premier Li Peng’s upcoming visit to Vietnam, to be held 
from November 30 to December 4 of that year. The two governments were set to issue a 
joint communiqué, which would have been a highlight of Premier Li’s groundbreaking 
visit. Taking a hardline approach in the Wan’antan Incident would surely torpedo these 
diplomatic overtures. If its efforts collapsed because of an oil deal with Crestone Energy 
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and the Experiment 2’s confrontation in Wan’antan with Vietnam, the MFA would pay 
the price by making Premier Li lose face and risk losing its own decade-long hard 
work.15 
Although CNOOC’s deal with Crestone Energy remains valid in a purely 
contractual sense, following this incident it has yet to be implemented. The MFA clearly 
drew a red line: not one oil well could be drilled, and all Chinese assets had to leave the 
territory in the sea that was hotly contested with and disputed by Vietnam.16 The 
Continental Oil and Transportation Company (CONOCO), which merged with Crestone 
Energy, signed a deal with Vietnam in 1996 on joint petroleum exploration, which 
covered the area that CNOOC and Crestone were contracted to explore.17 The Wan’antan 
Incident damaged the PLA and MFA’s relationship and ability to cooperate on maritime 
security policy in the SCS, with SOA, then still a small and powerless agency, standing 
firmly with the PLA.  
 
The Mischief/Meiji Reef Incident in 1992-94 
As early as 1988, soon after China built a marine observation station on Fiery 
Cross/Yongshu Reef, Lu Shouben, then chief of SOA’s Management and Command 
Division (1980-88), the predecessor of China Maritime Surveillance (CMS), proposed to 
establish two “marine observation stations” on Scarborough Shoal, one on its southwest 
coral reefs and the other on its northeast coral reefs. Neither the MFA nor the PLA GSD 
approved of this proposal. The PLA GSD and PLAN had just had a bitter fight over the 
justification of the 314 Sino-Vietnamese Naval Clash in 1988, which possibly led to the 
PLA GSD’s reluctance to support any initiative in the SCS.18  
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In 1990, Lu, then Chief of SOA’s Management and Surveillance Division (1989-
94), applied the lesson he learned from his failure in 1988 as he proposed to occupy 
Mischief Reef. He consulted with the PLA GSD first and got its quiet approval. Then, he 
convinced the Ministry of Agriculture, which oversaw China’s fishery industry, to send 
in a joint proposal on establishing both a marine observation station and a fishery 
transition hub/supply and storage center for fishermen. With multiple players supporting 
this proposal, the MFA eventually decided to give it the green light.19 The MFA made the 
decision favorable to SOA probably because it realized if it were to oppose the proposal 
it would have to fight an uphill battle against multiple bureaucracies, and it was unlikely 
to win such a battle. As a result, over the following years China built a harbor and a 
storage warehouse on Mischief Reef, which the Philippines did not discover until 1994.20 
Once the Philippines found out about China’s construction on Mischief Reef, it lodged a 
strong protest against China, but it was already too late to push China out. The 
Philippines’ protest, however, still had an impact on the MFA. The MFA issued a 
bureaucratic “opinion,” instructing the fishermen and the SOA ships to stop visiting 
Mischief Reef. These facilities were then abandoned for a decade, until 2004, when 
Chinese fisherman Hu Donghai proposed to take over the facilities, which was approved. 
Hu, motivated by commercial interests, invested RMB 20 million to convert the facilities 
on Mischief Reef into a fishery.21 A typhoon later completely destroyed Hu’s fishery. 
Nonetheless, this process bought China time to build a consensus on protecting its 
maritime interests, which it operationalized in 2012 by occupying Mischief Reef.22 In 
2015, China expanded Mischief Reef through land reclamation, filling in with sand and 
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coral cuttings an area of approximately 2.42 square kilometers that previously had 
virtually no above-water terrain.23 
The two incidents in the 1990s indicate that as China’s maritime security policy 
was decided and implemented at the bureaucratic level, the MFA, the leading agency in 
dealing with maritime disputes, effectively boxed out the PLA and did not allow its more 
assertive policy proposals to be adopted. These incidents also indicate that an alliance of 
powerful bureaucracies could exert more influence in obtaining its desired policy 
outcome than any single bureaucracy could achieve by acting alone.  
 
Why the Consensus Behind Deng’s Policy Broke Down 
For almost three decades following Deng Xiaoping’s first articulation of it in 
1979, the policy of shelving territorial disputes in exchange for peace at sea, joint 
development of natural resources, and good relationships with maritime neighbors was 
lauded domestically in China as a new model to deal with maritime disputes. Deng 
presented this policy during a time in which a poor and weak China was embarking on a 
new path of groundbreaking reform and opening-up. Given Deng’s authority as 
paramount leader, his policy was accepted without question and went unchallenged. 
Deng, however, never prescribed how long China should shelve its maritime disputes. 
Three decades after Deng enunciated this policy, the consensus behind it began to 
deteriorate. Why did Deng’s policy work in the 1970s and 1980s, and even the 1990s, but 
not in 2009? Factors ranging from a shift in the global distribution of power, to China’s 
deteriorating external environment and its changing domestic political landscape, all 
contributed to the policy’s breakdown.  
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China emerged from the 2008-09 global financial crisis (GFC) in relatively good 
shape, with greater relative comprehensive national power than it had prior to the crisis. 
As a result, Deng’s status-quo policy faced severe challenges from inside and outside of 
China, as analysts believed that China should use its increased power to pursue its 
national interests in the maritime domain. According to Barry Naughton, a leading 
analyst of China’s economy, the GFC “marked a fundamental turning point in China’s 
global economic position.”24 The GFC hit the U.S. and European economies hard but left 
China’s economy largely unscathed thanks to its quick, massive, and effective stimulus 
plan. China became the world’s second-largest economy in 2010, and would surpass the 
U.S. to become the world’s largest economy, measured in real purchasing power parity 
(PPP) terms, by the end of 2014. Even though China’s per capita GDP is still less than a 
quarter of the U.S. level, China’s seeming economic success and its social pluralization 
enhanced Chinese citizens’ “political awakening” on issues ranging from problems of 
governance and the government’s legitimacy to the soundness of its policies.25 One-third 
of China’s traded goods, worth US$1.3-1.4 trillion annually, are transported through the 
South China Sea, making sea lanes of transportation in this area an important Chinese 
national interest. This has greatly reinforced the ongoing shift in the Chinese 
government’s orientation, which started in 2003 when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took 
power, from focusing on economic growth above all else to concentrating on social issues, 
the government’s legitimacy, and public opinion. 
China’s strengthened global economic position after the GFC sent a wake-up call 
to China’s maritime neighbors with which it had unresolved territorial and maritime 
disputes. China’s continued economic growth, paired with the U.S.’s economic downturn 
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during the GFC, has deeply worried Asian countries. Although most Asian countries have 
benefited economically from China’s rise, they fear that, with China’s economy on a path 
to overtake the U.S. economy, and its commitment to devoting more resources to its 
naval modernization, time is on China’s side in terms of the SCS disputes. Out of fear 
and deep anxiety over their security, these countries responded by what is known in the 
international relations literature as hedging: simultaneously urging the U.S. to reinforce 
and strengthen its engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, while also expanding and 
deepening their economic ties with China. The former response actively pressured the 
U.S. to look east, while the latter made the U.S. anxious about the future direction of an 
Asia that is dominated by China and might even exclude the U.S.26  
China and the other SCS claimants differ over who is causing tension in the 
region. From the perspective of the U.S. and China’s neighbors such as Vietnam and the 
Philippines, China’s increasing assertiveness has forced them to respond.27 From the 
Chinese perspective, the U.S. rebalance or pivot to Asia is a veiled attempt to contain 
China, and has stirred up tensions by encouraging claimants to resist China.28 Thus, some 
Asian countries might manipulate the situation in order to gain support from the U.S. and 
a strategic advantage over China. China believes that the U.S. is leveraging these 
maritime disputes in its pursuit to contain China, while it neighbors are manipulating the 
delicate Sino-U.S. competition for power and influence for their own benefit.29 Therefore, 
the dynamic regarding the SCS disputes after the GFC differs from that of the 1970s and 
1980s, as good will has been replaced by insecurity, mutual mistrust, and a lack of 
compromise on both sides. Some in China have argued that since its external 
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environment has changed, China needs to respond by likewise adjusting and 
repositioning its strategy toward the maritime disputes.30  
The change in China’s external security environment contributed to the decline in 
consensus around Deng’s policy prescription for handling China’s maritime disputes. 
Changes in China’s domestic political environment also played an essential role in 
changing its maritime policy position.  
First, Chinese leaders’ weakening authority has decreased the public’s confidence 
in and increased its doubts about the government’s policies. During Mao’s era, when 
Chinese leaders were worshiped almost like gods and dissent on policies could lead to 
ones’ political purge, nobody dared to openly doubt or challenge the wisdom of their 
policies. Deng, during his tenure as China’s supreme leader, did not possess the same 
absolute authority as Mao. Yet the major strategic shift in the trajectory of China’s 
national development and its foreign and security policy that Deng initiated went largely 
unchallenged. During Jiang Zemin’s era, Deng’s legacy still dominated and guided 
Chinese foreign policy, even after Deng passed away in 1997. The MFA faithfully 
implemented Deng’s thinking on maritime disputes, often using Deng’s lingering 
authority to silence opponents to this approach. As Hu Jintao was even weaker than his 
predecessors, the Chinese public began to seriously doubt the wisdom of maintaining 
Deng’s status-quo policy on the SCS. 
In addition to the weakening of China’s top leader, the concurrent spread of the 
Internet has magnified each crisis, making each one much more urgent and pertinent.31 
During Mao, Zhou Enlai and even Deng’s era, information available to the leaders was 
much greater than the information available to the public. In comparison, nowadays the 
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public sees the same information as the leaders in many cases, and the leaders feel 
pressure to respond immediately. As such, mistakes and errors are inevitable, since 
decisions need to be made with such rapidity. This in turn exacerbated the Chinese 
public’s suspicion that their leaders may not be right and are not infallible.  
Second, the decentralization of power in the policy formation and implementation 
process and the pluralization of policy actors has increasingly weakened the MFA’s 
authority.32 The MFA sat in the drivers seat and held firm control of the steering wheel in 
handling China’s maritime security policy involving its territorial disputes and 
negotiations throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This contributed to the MFA’s success in 
resolving almost every territorial dispute on land. Since 2009, however, the MFA’s 
control over China’s maritime security policy has faced tremendous challenges from a 
variety of policy actors. These policy actors, with their own resources and specialized 
knowledge in a particular functional area, are strongly motivated to expand their 
bureaucratic powers and realize their own policy visions in areas the MFA used to 
dominate. These actors formed a natural political/policy alliance with the PLA. Unlike 
the PLA, these new actors are not constricted by taboos such as “the Party commands the 
gun,” and are therefore more aggressive in pushing the envelope during bureaucratic turf 
wars with the MFA. 
Third, since 2003, when they obtained the government’s permission to post a 
series of online petitions against Japan, Chinese netizens have become an active force in 
China’s foreign and security policy and increasingly constrain the government’s room to 
compromise over maritime disputes.33 The Internet’s diffusion has greatly empowered 
netizens, which represent a small cross-section of Chinese society, consisting of mainly 
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young, inexperienced, poor, and less educated Chinese. These netizens can, when 
strongly motivated, act collectively and swiftly to place pressure on the government.34 
The very nature of their targeted, “actionable” voice has made netizens a formidable 
social force that the Chinese government cannot ignore. On maritime security issues, 
netizens clearly advocated China adopting a more assertive policy against its neighboring 
countries. Their voice is inflammatory, inviting the Chinese public to question, “we were 
bullied when we were weak and poor, but why are we still being bullied when we are rich 
and strong?” As Chinese politics continued to fragment and Chinese society became 
increasingly empowered, Deng’s vision for how to handle maritime disputes was bound 
to be challenged at some point. Netizens precipitated this process and strengthened the 
challengers’ power. 
The change in China’s global economic position, deterioration of China’s external 
security environment, and China’s domestic politics combined to precipitate the fracture 
in the consensus behind Deng’s policy of shelving disputes and pursuing joint 
development.  
 
The State Oceanic Administration’s (SOA) Ascendance 
When explaining the PLA’s influence with regard to maritime disputes in the SCS, 
one must take into account the State Oceanic Administration’s (SOA) ascendance to the 
center of the policy-making process and its complicated relationship with the PLA. As 
Deng’s status-quo policy encountered tremendous difficulties, the PLA forged an 
important alliance with SOA, an organization that was even more motivated than the 
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PLA to break the MFA’s monopoly over maritime security policy and push China to 
prioritize protecting its maritime interests over pursuing regional stability. 
SOA was established in 1964 and, despite the fact that it was listed directly under 
the State Council, the PLAN hosted and supervised it as soon as it was founded. In 1993, 
SOA started to report to the State Science and Technology Commission instead of the 
PLAN. After 1998, SOA changed its “mother-in-law” (ministry in charge) again to the 
Ministry of Land and Resources. In 1983, China Maritime Surveillance (CMS), with a 
staff of around 2,900, was established under SOA, which had evolved from SOA’s office 
of Management and Command (guanli zhihui shi).35   
SOA and its armed branch, CMS, are strongly motivated to counter the MFA’s 
influence over China’s maritime security policy process because of their bureaucratic 
“personality.” SOA traditionally relied on its professional and scientific expertise to 
supervise and manage China’s maritime territory, enforce coastal environmental 
protection regulations, and organize scientific and technical research of China’s territorial 
waters. Three groups of people largely constitute SOA: scientists, international law 
experts, and military veterans. The first two groups have firm convictions about historic 
and legal facts that support China’s claims to sovereignty over disputed areas of the SCS. 
SOA’s military veterans, mindful of the importance of protecting China’s security and 
sovereignty, are highly motivated and passionate to protect China’s maritime territory 
and rights. This bureaucratic “personality” leads SOA to have unusually strong 
convictions and motivations, and demand to provide its professional expertise and 
opinion during any negotiation regarding maritime territory and rights, a demand that the 
MFA has not always respected. Two generations of SOA officials and CMS officers 
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consistently shared the strong conviction that China’s maritime sovereignty and interests, 
rather than its interest in regional stability, needs to be China’s first priority when 
formulating its maritime policy. This thinking is distinctly different than the MFA’s. 
Despite its overriding concern for protecting China’s maritime interests and 
territory, SOA was traditionally a weak political bureaucracy in areas where China’s 
maritime policy overlapped with its broader foreign policy. SOA officials indicated that 
they deeply resented the fact that in their view the MFA did not sufficiently consult with 
it in the past, especially during negotiations with Vietnam on land border disputes, the 
signing of the Sino-Republic of Korea fishery agreement in 2000, and the 2002 signing of 
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).36  
SOA played an active role in pushing Chinese leaders to pay attention to the 
development of China’s maritime economy and the goal of “devising a national maritime 
development strategy.”37 SOA was instrumental in drafting the State Council’s National 
Maritime Economy Development Plan of 2003 and the National Maritime Science and 
Technology Development Plan for the 11th Five-Year Plan, which was implemented 
beginning in 2006. These efforts achieved significant results. In 2006, Hu Jintao publicly 
categorized China as “a major maritime power” (haiyang daguo), which formed a 
contrast with Jiang Zemin and previous leaders’ emphasis on “China as both a major land 
power and a major power on the shore” (binhai daguo).38  
As China’s maritime economy becomes a strong engine for its overall economic 
development, SOA has also become a powerful bureaucracy. As China became the 
world’s second-largest economy in 2010, and the world’s largest trading nation in 2012, 
maritime interests have become essential to China’s continued economic growth.39 China 
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estimated the production value of its marine economy in 1978 at approximately US$878 
million, while thirty years later, in 2008, this estimate rose to US$439 billion, an increase 
from less than one percent to 9.8 percent of China’s GDP.40 The increased strategic 
importance of maritime affairs to China and the ever-expanding spectrum of maritime 
issues have helped SOA, a weak and unnoticed bureaucracy in the 1980s and 1990s, gain 
bureaucratic power. 
SOA became one of the primary policy actors in China’s maritime security 
policy-making process after Liu Cigui, who was closely associated with Xi Jinping, the 
heir-apparent who was tapped to become China’s supreme leader in 2012, became its 
Director in 2011. SOA’s increased statue allowed it to challenge and break the MFA’s 
monopoly in this policy area. Xi served as an official in Fujian Province from 1985 to 
2002. Liu, two years younger than Xi and also a part of the generation of youths who 
were sent down to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution, probably crossed paths 
with Xi around 1985-88, when Xi was the Deputy Mayor of Xiamen, Fujian Province and 
Liu was in a junior position in the same province in Shaowu. Xi and Liu are said to have 
maintained a close personal relationship throughout the years.41 In 2011, Liu was plucked 
from Xiamen and promoted to Director and Party Secretary (therefore the top leader) of 
SOA. Xi is said to endorse Liu’s approach of taking a firmer position in maritime 
disputes and prioritizing the protection of China’s maritime rights/interests (haishang 
weiquan) over the maintenance of regional stability (haishang weiwen).42 
SOA intervened in China’s maritime security policy-making process through its 
subsidiary, CMS, a paramilitary law-enforcement force with missions that include 
environmental protection, scientific research, and enforcement of exclusive economic 
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zone (EEZ) rights and interests. Both SOA and CMS had a strong bureaucratic incentive 
to perform, as the push to streamline institutions and the competition for power and finite 
resources brought intense pressure on these organizations. In particular, SOA was 
motivated to perform as it sought greater bureaucratic power and elevated bureaucratic 
status to that of a full ministry (it had traditionally been a vice minister level agency, 
receiving supervision from a “mother-in-law” ministry), and CMS needed to impress its 
peers and bosses as it looked for a way to justify its existence. China’s maritime law-
enforcement milieu was at this point fiercely competitive, with five forces existing under 
strong bureaucracies, with overlapping policy mandates, strong enforcement capabilities, 
and lucrative economic interests, and all vying for an enlarged role. Lyle Goldstein 
accurately described this bureaucratic competition as “five dragons playing in the 
water.”43 If CMS did not prevail against the four other competing agencies in this race, it 
faced the real possibility of being absorbed by another agency. If SOA and CMS excelled 
in this competition, it would not only secure CMS’s survival as a bureaucracy, but also 
greatly strengthen SOA’s bureaucratic power and resources. More importantly, law-
enforcement power in China means an agency has greater access to discretionary 
resources, as it has partial control over a certain percentage of the fines it collects. For 
example, one sting operation, Maritime Shield 2013, which lasted five weeks, collected 
RMB 670 million.44 Although a major portion of the fines law-enforcement agencies 
collect has to go into the state coffer, the agency collecting these fines is normally 




From “Impeccable Incident” to “Scarborough Shoal Standoff” 
The PLAN has a natural blood bond with SOA, as SOA’s personnel includes 
many veterans, and due to its bureaucratic history, as SOA reported to the PLAN after its 
birth. CMS has an even higher percentage of veterans among its staff because of the 
necessary expertise it needs to perform its duties. CMS inherited all of its ships and 
facilities from the PLAN. CMS and the PLAN naturally share an understanding that the 
importance of protecting China’s sovereignty and its maritime interests exceeds the 
importance of maintaining regional stability, or that the goal of weiquan (protecting 
maritime rights/interests) supersedes that of weiwen (protecting stable relations with other 
countries). Since the 1992 Wan’antan Incident, the PLA and CMS under SOA have been 
allies and sympathetic to each other’s policy positions. They communicate with each 
other much more frequently than each of them does with the MFA.45  
Although the PLAN shares SOA’s strong convictions, due to various factors it is 
heavily constrained in pushing through its agenda. First, the PLAN is only one service of 
the PLA, and therefore it has to go through procedures to build a consensus with other 
bureaucracies within the PLA in order to translate its proposition into official PLA policy. 
Second, any provocative action the PLAN takes may result in a much more explosive 
impact, thereby inviting international criticism. Third, as a military that has made 
substantial progress toward professionalization, the PLA is hesitant to take actions that 
directly contradict or confront the MFA. The PLA, however, has no reservations about 
offering its support to a policy ally, either through its own channels that reach the top 
leader or through bureaucratic bargaining. The PLA’s support is also important since it is 
the only actor that provides hard-power protection during times of armed conflict.  
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CMS’s Lessons From The Impeccable Incident 
From 2009-12, a series of maritime incidents between China and other countries, 
including the United States, took place, highlighting the gradual adjustment of China’s 
maritime security posture toward a more aggressive approach. One incident – the 2009 
Impeccable Incident involving the U.S. Navy – in particular influenced the pattern of 
CMS’s maritime behavior.  
On March 8, 2009, a U.S. Navy ocean surveillances ship, the USNS Impeccable 
(T-AGOS 23), was operating approximately seventy-five miles south of Hainan Island in 
the SCS, within China’s EEZ but under UNCLOS is considered the high seas. Five 
Chinese vessels then surrounded and harassed the Impeccable. The fishing trawlers 
reportedly maneuvered within twenty-five feet of the Impeccable and then intentionally 
stopped in front of it, forcing it to take emergency actions in order to avoid a collision.46 
The following day, the official U.S. statement identified the five Chinese vessels 
involved in the incident: “The Chinese ships involved in the March 8 incident included a 
Chinese Navy intelligence collection ship (AGI), a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries Patrol 
Vessel, a SOA/CMS patrol vessel, and two small Chinese-flagged trawlers.”47 
This incident came after China’s repeated protests to the U.S. regarding the U.S. 
Navy’s close-in surveillance of China, because China disagreed with the U.S. on whether 
it is acceptable for foreign naval ships to operate in another country’s EEZ without pre-
approval by the country. This difference between the U.S. and Chinese military, which 
culminated in the 2001 EP-3 Incident, had continued to be a contentious issue between 
the two sides. Wu Zhuang, the Director of the South China Sea Branch of the Fishery 
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Administration, under the Ministry of Agriculture, initiated the actions against the 
Impeccable. Wu only informed the lowest level of the PLAN, the fleet in that area (haiqu 
jiandui), before the ships’ departure, which explains the presence of the PLA intelligence 
collection ship, based on the U.S. account.48   
Despite the diplomatic tension this incident caused to U.S.-China relations, 
Chinese netizens roundly applauded China’s actions during the Impeccable Incident. 
China’s hosting of the 2008 Olympic games and the strengthening of its global economic 
position after the GFC stoked nationalism among the Chinese public. The Chinese 
government assessed this incident positively, even though Chinese leaders consciously 
avoided such provocations in the past for fear of escalating such incidents. Based on this 
post-incident assessment, the outcome favored SOA/CMS and the Fisheries Law 
Enforcement Command (FLEC): if China could be seen to stand up for and uphold its 
principles, even when high-level officials did not plan to precipitate such incidents, as 
long as they did not cause a spiral of escalation it was then a big win for the Chinese 
government.49  
Chinese netizens’ overwhelming support and the positive post-incident 
assessment inspired the FLEC and CMS to continue their provocative actions. In May 
2011, three CMS ships cut the survey cables of a Vietnam Oil & Gas Group (also known 
as PetroVietnam) ship in lot 148 in the SCS, which both Vietnam and China claim.50 
These three CMS ships belonged to its South China Sea Branch, and Wu Ping, the 
Deputy Chief of CMS, initiated this operation.51 Less than a month later, three FLEC 
ships did the same thing. The public always applauded these random, spontaneous and in 
some cases reckless actions taken by lower-level government and military entities and 
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individuals, which left their supervisory authority and the MFA no choice but to support 
them. The PLA consistently played a supporting role by providing vocal backing to such 
initiatives during inter-agency consultations, and also giving intelligence that helped 
facilitate these actions.52 
China’s provocative actions, beginning with the Impeccable Incident, repeatedly 
targeted countries that had maritime disputes with China. The Chinese public, and 
netizens in particular, overwhelmingly approved of this reckless approach, as it was seen 
to have better protected China’s maritime interests, and became the precursor to the 2012 
Scarborough Shoal standoff. 
 
The Scarborough Shoal Incident 
The standoff over Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island), a traditional fishing 
ground used by both Chinese and Filipino fisherman, started on April 10, 2012, though it 
had been brewing for at least two months before the actual stand-off took place.53 The 
Philippine House of Representatives approved the Philippine Baseline Law (House Bill 
4153) in February 2012, which delineated which sea lanes in archipelagic waters the 
Philippines claimed and included Scarborough Shoal. According to this law, foreign 
ships/aircraft passing the Philippines’ archipelagic sea lanes are prohibited from fishing 
in these areas, and foreign military aircraft and warships are barred from using any type 
of weapons/ammunition for any war game exercises.54 In February, the Philippines’ 
Secretary of Energy also announced plans to develop 15 hydrocarbon blocks in the Reed 
Bank area, which forms part of the Philippines’ continental shelf off Palawan Island but 
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is also within China’s nine-dashed line (NDL), which resulted in a war of words between 
the two countries.55  
The process that led to the Philippines’ seizure of a Chinese fishing vessel began 
when a Philippine Air Force (PAF) reconnaissance plane spotted eight Chinese fishing 
boats engaged in “illegal fishing in Philippine waters” around the shoal on April 8. The 
Philippines deployed its recently-purchased U.S. patrol cutter, the BRP Gregorio del Pilar, 
on April 10, and the Philippine Navy attempted to arrest these Chinese fishermen and 
confiscate their fishing vessels.56 Previously, during similar incidents, China did nothing 
in response but send oral protests through its embassy in Manila. For instance, in 1998, 
the Philippines intercepted four Chinese fishing vessels around the shoal, arrested 51 
fishermen, and put them in prison for nearly half a year. In May 1999, a Philippine 
warship sank one Chinese fishing vessel. According to a Philippine source, China’s 
ambassador in the past even made an “apologetic” explanation to the Philippine 
government that “the number of Chinese fishermen in the area has increased 
tremendously and that the government had difficulty controlling them.”57 According to 
this unconfirmed source, after previous arrests of Chinese fishing vessels, “the Chinese 
MFA even disclosed to the Philippine government that it had started looking for 
alternative sources of livelihood for the arrested fisherman so that they would stop fishing 
at the Scarborough Shoal.”58 This time, however, CMS and FLEC broke with China’s 
pattern of behavior and chose to intervene, which led to the standoff. 
When the Chinese fishermen saw the Philippine airplane, they knew that a 
Philippine warship would be coming soon. They reported to the FLEC’s local subsidiary 
in Hainan Island, which is under the Ministry of Agriculture. FLEC then notified CMS’s 
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local branch in Hainan, since at that time two CMS ships happened to be patrolling close 
to the shoal. CMS Hainan decided to send its ships to protect the fishermen, reasoning, “it 
doesn’t matter if it is a FLEC ship or a CMS ship. They are all Chinese ships.”59 Each of 
these decisions was made at the local level of FLEC and CMS. The Philippine 
government was caught by surprise when these two CMS ships arrived and placed 
themselves between the Philippine warship and the Chinese fishing vessels at 
Scarborough Shoal. The two CMS ships effectively prevented the Chinese fishermen’s 
arrest and then ordered the Philippine warship to move out of China’s territorial waters. 
CMS’s South China Sea Branch reported back to CMS headquarters in Hainan, 
which then reported to the MFA and the PLA GSD. As the crisis had a real possibility of 
escalating into a war with the Philippines, the MFA reported it immediately to the 
Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG). The MFA opposed China’s changing 
pattern of behavior during such incidents and proposed not to escalate or continue this 
confrontation with the Philippines. The PLA GSD disagreed and provided a military 
contingency plan. The FALSG, led by Hu Jintao, was hesitant to make a decision and did 
not do so for one day. CMS waited with great anxiety and thought it would be penalized 
for rocking the boat without getting the MFA’s pre-approval. Then, finally, Xi Jinping 
allegedly spoke up, probably during the FALSG meeting. Xi was still just Hu’s anointed 
successor, but beginning in 2008-09 he had already started to oversee China’s maritime 
policies. Xi believed that even if the economy may be negatively impacted in the short 
term due to blowback, CMS and even the military had to take the steps necessary to 
protect China’s maritime interests.60 
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As Manila decided to deescalate the crisis and replaced its warship with a smaller 
coast guard vessel, Beijing sent the Yuzheng-310, FLEC’s most advanced patrol ship, to 
join the two CMS ships already stationed at the shoal. According to their respective 
bureaucratic responsibilities, FLEC, rather than CMS, was tasked with protecting 
Chinese fishermen. The stand-off lasted until mid-June. The PLAN’s South China Sea 
Fleet and the Guangzhou Military Region were fully prepared to go into action once the 
Philippine side fired the first shot. The PLA has prided itself on a long tradition of not 
firing the first shot, and thus many officers were hoping the Philippine side would make a 
mistake and fire the first shot.61 The Philippines, however, did not take the bait. 
Meanwhile, in the U.S., Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, was secretly serving as mediator between China and the 
Philippines.62 Campbell was initially under pressure to reach a deal, as such a deal could 
be used as a deliverable during Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino III’s upcoming 
visit to Washington, scheduled for June 6, 2012.63 It was not in the U.S. interest to see 
China and the Philippines slide into an armed conflict, as the U.S. might be forced to 
intervene on behalf of the Philippines due to its 1951 mutual defense treaty with the 
Philippines (although the U.S. has not definitively stated whether it considers offshore 
islands in the SCS to be covered by this treaty). In reality, the negotiations dragged on 
much longer. The upcoming typhoon season had facilitated the secret negotiations and 
increased the incentives on both sides to pull back before a typhoon hit the area.  
On June 16, President Aquino pulled back all Philippine vessels. While Beijing 
seemed to follow suit two days later, China’s MFA spokesman Hong Lei on June 18 
denied that China had ever made a promise to remove its assets from the area.64 It seems 
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that China did indeed withdraw all but one of its civilian patrol boats.65 Then, Chinese 
patrol boats from at least two government agencies continually returned to Scarborough 
Shoal, and eventually so did some Chinese fishing vessels.66 A Philippine government 
official told The Associated Press that six Chinese government ships and 30 Chinese 
fishing boats were sighted at Scarborough Shoal on June 19.67 On June 26, the Philippine 
Navy detected from the air that China had six fishing vessels and 17 boats in the lagoon, 
and three CMS ships and several fishing vessels outside the lagoon. By September 2012, 
China held actual control of the shoal, and was preventing Philippine fishing boats from 
entering. 
 
China’s South China Sea Dilemma and the Scarborough Shoal Model 
The intensification of crises and competition in the SCS, despite the 2002 DOC, 
produced the “South China Sea Dilemma” (nanhai kunju) in China’s eyes. Deng’s policy 
of shelving disputes and pursuing joint development has not prevented China’s 
neighboring countries, in China’s opinion, from seizing actual control of disputed waters 
and features and exploring resources unilaterally. China believes that its public 
commitment to pursuing a path of peaceful development further incentivized smaller and 
weaker countries to take a series of aggressive actions, as they do not believe China will 
retaliate by using force. Therefore, China was faced with a dilemma in the SCS: China 
wants to maintain the status quo while others do not; and China’s emphasis on peaceful 
development, which ties its hands and limits the range of actions it can take, only 
incentivizes other countries to unilaterally seize features and exploit their resources. 
China could keep this dilemma under wraps when it was weak, and therefore had an 
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easier case to make to its domestic audience that there was nothing it could do. As China 
becomes richer and more powerful, however, such a policy is unsustainable. 
The Scarborough Shoal Incident symbolizes a revision of the dominant thinking 
in China’s maritime security policy. Under the Scarborough Island Model, based on 
China’s handling of the 2012 standoff, multiple approaches, with the diplomatic option 
serving as just one tool in China’s toolbox, are applied to achieve actual control over 
disputed islands and waters.68 Through the Scarborough Shoal Incident, China set the 
precedent that if it believes any country is attempting to alter the status quo, it will 
respond by escalating the situation and exacting a punishment against the offending 
country. By increasing the penalty to the side that makes the first move to change the 
status quo, China increases the cost of other countries’ aggression. By doing this, China 
not only pushes its opponent back to the original “line of control,” but also has the 
opportunity to seize the territory under its opponent’s control. By doing this, China hopes 
to deter any country from trying to change the status quo. Therefore, the Scarborough 
Island Model aims at breaking China’s South China Sea dilemma and “stopping China’s 
bleeding.”69 Even the People’s Daily openly hailed the Scarborough Island Model for 
“forcing opponents to withdraw without fighting a war.”70  
When examining the Scarborough Shoal Incident, a difficult question needs to be 
answered, namely: What happened when China evidently accepted mediation from the 
U.S., but seemed to violate its promises by not withdrawing all of its ships?  
Bonnie Glaser, an American analyst at CSIS, offered two possibilities of how this 
happened: either China’s MFA negotiated in bad faith when it agreed to pull back 
China’s ships in tandem with the Philippine pullback; or the MFA made the deal in good 
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faith but could not convince other actors such as the PLA to stick to the deal.71 The latter 
hypothesis, if true, has great bearing on this chapter’s hypothesis that the ground is 
shifting in favor of SOA and the PLA (the “weiquan” camp) and away from MFA (the 
“weiwen” camp). A diplomat at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, who was present 
during the negotiations, offered a third possibility: China did not violate its promise. 
According to this diplomat, China lived up to its promise to evacuate all Chinese ships 
from Scarborough Shoal in tandem with the Philippine pullback, but never verbally 
promised not to send its ships back to the area.72  
 
Conclusion 
From the Impeccable Incident to the Scarborough Shoal Incident, bold actions 
undertaken by paramilitary forces such as CMS and FLEC did not end badly in China’s 
postmortem analyses. Neither of these incidents ended in war, but the risk of war was 
very high. China’s Scarborough Shoal Model, which has been partially accepted though 
not finalized, prescribes an escalatory response to penalize countries that intend to change 
the status quo, which, arguably, is in line with Deng’s thinking on the need to preserve 
the status quo, but in spirit contravenes his policy prescription.  
Since 1979, the PLA has never been the lead agency that handles China’s 
maritime security contingencies in the SCS. In the 1980s and 1990s, it had major 
disagreements with the MFA on how to handle maritime contingencies and China’s 
general maritime strategy in the SCS. As Deng’s maritime security policy dominated 
China’s foreign policy, and the MFA dominated the implementation of this policy, the 
PLA had little influence over the actual policy outcome.  
 623 
The PLA’s level of involvement in China’s maritime security strategy began to 
change when other, more motivated policy actors, such as SOA and CMS, broke the 
MFA’s monopoly as the policy process’s leading agency. In the policy process, as 
evidenced during the Mischief Reef Incident, an alliance of multiple policy actors (SOA 
and the Ministry of Agriculture, with the PLA’s pre-approval and backing) on the policy 
proposal could more easily obtain the MFA’s support and face less resistance from the 
agency. SOA and CMS also created political space and the precedent for unilateral action, 
supported by the following conditions: favorable public opinion that brings pressure to 
bear on the top leader; a sympathetic new leader who wants to demonstrate change and 
personally identifies with both the PLA and the need to protect China’s maritime territory 
and rights; and the PLA’s loyal backing and its effective protection. As CMS and SOA 
actively pursued a policy agenda that suited their bureaucratic interests, but received the 
PLA’s favor and support, the MFA’s control over policies was undermined. Therefore, 
although the PLA more willingly receded to the “second line” (er’xian) to act as the last 
resort in the SCS after 2009, the paramilitary forces carry out the PLA’s preferred policy 
agenda. As the “weiquan” camp gains momentum and support from the leaders and the 
public in handling China’s maritime security policy, the MFA has been increasingly 
sidelined. Therefore, in analyzing the evolution of China’s maritime security policy from 
2009-12, the clear winners are SOA and CMS, followed by the PLA, whose influence is 
relatively unchanged but has increased relative to the MFA.73  
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Chapter Ten: Conclusion 
 
 
This dissertation developed a “dynamic bargaining” thesis, which examines the 
two-level bargaining game among the PLA, the Party, and civilian foreign affairs system, 
in order to analyze the PLA’s role in China’s foreign and security policy-making process. 
The level and type of policy influence the PLA exerts on China’s foreign and 
security policy after Deng Xiaoping’s initiation of reform and opening up in 1978 results 
from the complex interplay between two sets of bargaining interactions affecting “high” 
and “low” policy issues, and a changing mix of policy-related values and beliefs within 
the PLA. The “high” policy issues are those that require the top leader’s personal 
intervention. Such policies are typically those with strategic significance to China’s core 
national interests and overall international well-being, contingencies that have a direct 
bearing on the imminent threat of war, and those in which bureaucracies cannot reach a 
consensus without the top leader’s intervention. The “low” policy issues are those tactical 
policies, which constitute the majority of policy decisions.  
The basic level of policy influence the PLA exerts on the “high” policy issues – 
core contents or strategic guidelines for foreign and security policy – results from the 
workings of a “reliance-control model” that describes relations between the top Party 
leader and the PLA leadership. This relationship largely determines the degree of policy 
access, and hence direct influence, that the PLA enjoys over basic policy outcomes.  
At lower levels of the policy process, which bureaucracies try to control through 
mechanisms and procedures, the PLA’s influence over the “low” policy issues results 
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primarily from a near-autonomous process of bureaucratic bargaining centered primarily 
on the changing dynamics of the PLA-MFA competition for influence. This bureaucratic 
interaction operates according to its own rules and logic, largely independent of the 
Party-military dynamic. In both areas of policy bargaining (“high” and “low”), but 
especially in “high” policy areas, the content of the PLA’s policy preferences largely 
reflects the relative priorities that the PLA places over three sets of values: an inherent 
inward-oriented versus outward-oriented outlook; the overall level of professionalization 
versus imposed politicization; and the extent to which a notable inter-service rivalry 
exists. 
In order to properly evaluate the PLA’s influence in foreign and security policy, it 
is imperative to examine the evolution of the PLA’s mindset, the trajectory of Party-
military relations, and the bureaucratic bargaining process itself. This study rejects the 
notion that the PLA, or any other bureaucratic actor, has a fixed set of interests that are 
incontrovertible. By emphasizing that bureaucracies have an historic legacy, that their 
“mentality” evolves, and that bureaucratic power waxes and wanes, all of which need to 
be factored into an analysis of institutions’ roles, this dissertation argues for a more 
complex approach. While this approach adds uncertainty to the analysis, given that 
multiple variables are at play and they can move in different directions, the merits of this 
approach greatly exceed its shortcomings. Any scholarly endeavor needs to be honest 
about what happens in the real world, rather than constructing a compartmentalized 
virtual world for the convenience of parsimony. This basic starting point is also the core 
of the “dynamic bargaining” thesis that this study puts forward to examine the PLA’s 
bargaining behavior.  
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Review of the “Dynamic Bargaining” Thesis 
The “dynamic bargaining” thesis has three components: the PLA’s “mentality,” 
Party-military relations, and the bureaucratic policy process.  
 
The PLA’s Mentality: Three Dynamics 
The PLA is a military force in transition, with dynamics – three sets of trends and 
countertrends – that will decide its motivation to intervene in the policy process: inward-
oriented versus outward-oriented mentality; professionalization versus politicization; and 
unity versus the rise of inter-service rivalry.  
First, the PLA is torn between its interest in exerting influence on China’s foreign 
and security policies, and its preoccupation with its internal mission. Holding a 
progressive and moderate view toward the necessity of China’s continued economic and 
political reforms, the PLA officer corps is at the same time cognizant of the difficulties 
China will face as it continues to enact reforms. Therefore, preoccupied with its mission 
to serve as the Party’s last line of defense, the PLA does not have the desire to seek 
enemies to slay. Instead, given its political orientation as a “progressive moderate” force 
in China’s domestic politics, the PLA has an acute sense of the daunting domestic 
challenges China faces and the potential catastrophic impact that these challenges can 
have on China’s future if they are not addressed. Therefore, the PLA is conservative and 
realistic about the efficacy of using force and lacks the motivation to lead the country 
down a path of aggression and expansion.  
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Both the first and second case studies – the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war, and 
China’s failure to readjust its Taiwan policy in a more militaristic and confrontational 
direction by adopting a timetable approach – reflect the PLA’s cautious tendency. In both 
instances, senior PLA commanders held reservations about going to war or committing 
China to a trajectory of war (although the PLA was more cautious in the first case and 
less so in the second one). The PLA’s continuous professionalization has mixed effects 
on its propensity to advocate war. Although professionalization elevates the principle of 
civilian centrality, it makes the PLA more budget-conscious, “no-war anxious” (anxious 
about military inertia and its potential lack of military effectiveness since it has not 
fought a war in over three decades), and sensitive to its institutional interests. Therefore, 
the PLA is more “outward-oriented” and attuned to external threats. It is likely not 
seeking major armed confrontation, but may be more welcoming to continuous friction 
and low-intensity war of limited scope, if it is highly confident in its ability to prevail. 
Second, the rise of services, especially the Navy and the Air Force, opens up the 
possibility of increasingly independent behavior that is not typical of the PLA as a whole. 
These two services are relatively new and are more insular to the outside world in terms 
of international exchanges and engagements to discuss strategic thinking and policy 
deliberations. However, they represent the tip of the spear of the PLA’s power projection, 
benefiting from the PLA’s external missions by receiving greater resources, prestige, and 
more space for self-expression. Therefore, both the Navy and the Air Force are more 
supportive of an “outward-oriented” outlook for the PLA as a whole.  
Inter-service rivalry, in the Western sense, will take years or decades to develop 
in the PLA. The competition for resources and attention occurs mostly between land-
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locked and coastal military regions, which impacts the PLA’s military planning and 
preparations. That said, the PLAN, strongly motivated to pursue a strategy emphasizing 
power projection, is gaining both more resources and a more exalted status among the 
services. The third case study, on China’s maritime security policy, demonstrates the 
PLAN’s strong motivation since 1985 to steer China’s maritime policy in a more 
assertive direction, but at the same time highlights its weak influence throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s. Yet in recent years the PLAN’s influence over the final policy 
outcome has been growing, especially relative to the MFA. 
Third, the PLA has a shorter decision-making chain, and its bureaucracies that 
participate in the decision-making process are more hierarchical and rank-conscious 
compared with those within the civilian foreign affairs system, which means the PLA can 
more easily and quickly reach an internal consensus than its civilian counterpart. Such 
efficiency matters, particularly during a quickly evolving crisis when, under time 
constraints, issues need to be put in context, narrated, and presented to the top leadership. 
Those organizations that have the ability to assess the context and formulate policy 
recommendations first can frame the issue and seize the initiative, thereby raising the 
probability that its preferred policies will be implemented.  
 
Party-Military Relations: The Reliance-Control Model 
The level of policy influence the PLA can exert on basic foreign and security 
policy issues is a function of the state of Party-military relations, as generated through the 
workings of the reliance-control model. This model is governed by seven tenets:  
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First, the political and power relationship between the top leader and the PLA 
largely determines the level of policy influence the PLA can exert. Second, this 
relationship varies on the basis of the top leader’s political reliance on the PLA for 
political support and the top leader’s ability to establish effective control over the PLA. 
Third, the PLA has the greatest ability to influence foreign and security policy when the 
top leader is highly reliant on the PLA’s political support and yet is able to establish 
effective control over the PLA, exemplified by Jiang Zemin’s later years and the Xi 
Jinping era (judged by the limited evidence available thus far). Fourth, the PLA is least 
able to influence such policies when the top leader is not strongly reliant on the PLA’s 
political support and yet exercises effective control over the PLA, for example in Mao’s 
and Deng’s era. Fifth, the PLA largely gains influence over policy formation from its 
access to the “high” policies that the top leader provides to the PLA, and therefore access 
largely leads to influence. Sixth, the PLA is also able to influence policy in an indirect 
and less predictable, and often negative way, when the top leader relies on the PLA for 
support but is unable to establish effective control, as demonstrated by Jiang’s early 
period and Hu Jintao’s era. During such times, the PLA often acts to exercise its relative 
power, including by stalling the implementation of policies, attempting to mold public 
opinion to undermine the top leader’s policy preferences, and acting uncooperatively with 
other policy actors.   
China’s Party-military relationship must maintain a delicate balance. The Party 
and the PLA share the same bottom-line, namely that stability needs to be maintained at 
all costs. However, the PLA differs from the Party in its sense of urgency and overall 
approach to reforms. Given that polarizing internal debates within the Party have largely 
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ceased, the Party is more likely to carry out reforms while trying to hold on to its power 
and continue its dominance, even if challengers enter China’s political landscape. The 
PLA is generally open to all approaches to reforms, as long as stability is maintained. 
Such differentiation between the PLA and the Party is a result of the Party’s decay and 
weakening authority, as well as the ongoing process in which the PLA modernizes, 
professionalizes, specializes, and increasingly transforms its identity away from a Party-
Army in spirit, which further weakens the Party’s rule.1 In the post-Deng era, the top 
leaders do not have the same deep and organic bonds with the PLA that Mao and Deng 
had. As a result, these leaders face far more difficulties establishing authority and 
effective control over the PLA. Therefore, this tug of war for control and influence 
emerges as leaders seek to control soldiers in order to serve their political needs, while 
soldiers seek access and influence, as well as the realization of their institutional interests. 
Under the reliance-control model, which can only be employed to assess China 
after 1978, the top leader’s political reliance on the PLA serves as the basic condition for 
the level of the PLA’s influence in policies. In order for the top leader to grant the 
military influence, he must be assured that during times of need – intraparty struggles, 
political jockeying to consolidate and sustain his political power, and large-scale social 
upheavals – he can rely on the military’s allegiance and political support. Political 
reliance is the first and foremost necessary condition for such Party-military bargaining to 
occur.  
The extent to which the top leader is able to establish effective control over the 
PLA during his tenure is the second condition that helps determine the access the top 
leader provides the PLA with, and hence the level of influence the PLA exerts in policies. 
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Political interference from previous CMC chairman or chairmen necessitates politicized 
campaigns in the PLA to sideline officers. Unless the top leader establishes effective 
control, the PLA listens to other master(s), which in Chinese politics constitutes the most 
serious political danger to the top leader. Therefore, together with political reliance, the 
extent to which the top leader is able to build effective control is the second necessary 
condition for the top leader to give trust and access to the PLA leadership.  
Simply put, unless the top leader is sure that the PLA will stand with him when he 
needs its support, he will treat the PLA as a threat rather than as a neutral factor. If the 
top leader both politically relies on and effectively controls the military, the military will 
become one of the leader’s strong power bases, and therefore the leader will naturally 
empower the PLA to a certain extent, granting it trust and access and thus allowing it to 
exert influence over policies. If the top leader is unable to establish effective control, he 
will treat the military as a threat and minimize or obstruct its influence. The Party-
military influence is in this sense mutual and dynamic.  
The top leader’s establishment of effective control over the PLA does not 
necessarily result in the top leader pursuing policies that the PLA desires. The PLA is a 
huge bureaucracy, with a top layer of leadership and then middle-to-senior officers who 
all count to a certain extent in shaping the PLA’s policy positions. Arguably, the 
leadership of the PLA counts more than lower-ranking officers. However, even so, the 
PLA leadership still needs to transform personal preferences through organizational 
procedures into a bureaucratic position. In this process, many officers will have an input, 
and it will be difficult for the PLA leadership to completely control it. Therefore, if 
officers in functional capacities significantly disagree on a certain policy position, and if 
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that disagreement is pervasive and broad across agencies, then even the PLA leadership 
will find it hard to control the result. Thus, supporting the top leader does not make the 
PLA leadership a willful tool of the top leader. This is supported by the second case study, 
which analyzes the timetable strategy. After Jiang established effective control over the 
PLA, the PLA leadership provided political support for Jiang’s leadership but nonetheless 
resisted the timetable strategy Jiang tried to advocate. Even though Zhang Wannian was 
loyal to Jiang, as a professional soldier, Zhang could not make such an adventurous, 
high-risk military decision. That is where the top leader and a military loyal to him differ: 
the PLA never openly opposed the timetable strategy, but it resisted it while 
simultaneously leveraging it to obtain a higher budget and accelerate military 
modernization programs. 
The top leader establishes effective control over the PLA generally in two ways. 
First, it is fundamentally important to replace officers, especially those in the top military 
leadership, with generals he has cultivated and trusts. Second, it is crucial to obtain 
popular support among the PLA’s rank and file, since military leaders emerge from 
among the rank and file and have to lead the lower-ranking officers and soldiers.  
The establishment of effective control, through subordination of the military, can 
be facilitated by two factors: the level of the previous top leader or leaders’ lingering 
influence, as well as the strength and cohesiveness of the networks of interests forged 
under their influence; and the degree to which the military is generally willing to accept a 
particular leader’s control.  
Xi Jinping established effective control over the PLA relatively quickly because 
he had advantages with regard to both of the aforementioned factors. First, Xi had a 
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relatively easier time consolidating his power in the PLA because Jiang and Hu competed 
with each other for control over the PLA during Hu’s tenure, and by the end of Hu’s 
tenure Jiang was already weakened and Hu had no interest in holding on to power after 
he retired in 2012. Therefore, Xi did not have to contend with his predecessors’ lingering 
influence. Second, the PLA had a greater willingness to be put under Xi’s control due to 
several factors. Xi was the son of a reform-minded first-generation leader who had 
legitimacy and seniority in the PLA’s eyes. Additionally, Xi had brief experience as 
former Defense Minister Geng Biao’s secretary, and surrounded himself with a wide 
network of personal friends and advisers who understood military affairs, which earned 
him the PLA officer corps’ respect before he took office. PLA officers widely perceived 
Xi as being reform-minded, a message transmitted before Xi took office through his 
preexisting power base in the military, composed mostly of princelings who are close to 
Xi. Xi’s ability to implement “eight rules” for tightening military discipline helped him 
win PLA officers’ respect. These traits gave Xi clear advantages in quickly establishing 
control over the military, which both Jiang and Hu lacked when they assumed power. 
That said, Xi ultimately consolidated his effective control over the military not 
just by making a favorable impression, but also by launching a politicized anti-corruption 
campaign, which removed opposing factions’ powerful supporters. Therefore, removing 
the networks of officers who were loyal to previous master(s) is still the most important 
method for the top leader to establish effective control. However, it should be recognized 
that Xi’s relatively easy path to establishing effective control reinforced his willingness to 
rely on the military’s support and treat it as a core power base of his leadership in 
pushing through bolder reforms and systematic changes. 
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Bureaucratic Policy Process: Four Rules of the Game 
The bureaucratic process through which China makes foreign and security 
policies is complicated by the Party’s initial intention to make the military “organically” 
separated from the government. Due to the PLA’s history of guarding the Party’s victory, 
ensuring its survival, and supplanting it as the top authority during times of national 
chaos, soldiers enjoy a place in the Party-dominated power structure that diplomats 
simply cannot match. However, this does not mean that the military wins every policy 
battle, as there are examples in which diplomats outflanked the military during policy 
debates. As the MFA, the leading bureaucracy in the civilian foreign affairs system, 
continuously professionalizes, its policy positions increasingly differ from the PLA’s. 
Due to the organizations’ distinct mandates, bureaucratic interests, and cost/benefit 
calculations, the PLA and the MFA are increasingly arrayed against each other in the 
lower-level process of foreign and security policy-making.  
Since 1978, China has developed a set of sophisticated and inclusive foreign and 
security policy-making mechanisms and platforms that reflect the interests of 
stakeholders. Most decisions on foreign and security affairs at the tactical level are 
reached through a process of consensus-building and interactive bargaining. The PLA’s 
level of influence over tactical and operational levels of policy relative to the MFA 
depends largely on its bureaucratic bargaining with the MFA. The struggle has operated 
on the basis of four rules of the game, namely the advantage of: early entry during times 
of overwhelming external threats; strong allies/weak opponents (disadvantage of strong 
opponents); strong motivations; and supportive public opinion. 
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Overall, the increasing importance of the bureaucratic struggle and the specific 
rules of the game have together affected the PLA’s influence on foreign and security 
policy in a number of ways: first, the PLA’s influence increases during times of sustained 
militarized tensions; second, the PLA’s influence increases when it is joined by strong 
allies that support its position; third, when the PLA advocates an assertive approach to an 
issue, it can increase its influence in the policy-making process by mobilizing netizens; 
fourth, when the PLA prefers compromises and a de-escalation of tensions, netizens 
constrain its influence; and finally, the PLA’s influence increases when it is motivated by 
a particular issue to such an extent that the MFA decides not to oppose the PLA and 
instead goes along with it. 
 
“Dynamic Bargaining” Thesis: Findings 
The overall workings of the above three sets of variables suggest several valuable 
findings:  
First, the level of PLA influence over high-level foreign and security policy from 
the Mao/Deng era to the present has not changed in a linear fashion from low to high. 
Initial low levels of (generally cautious) PLA policy influence evident during the 1960s 
and 1970s have given way to alternating cycles of low-high-low-high influence during 
the two Jiang Zemin (pre- and post-Deng consolidation), Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping eras, 
though the analysis of Xi’s era is still partial and rudimentary. 
Second, the PLA’s bureaucratic competition with the MFA has become more 
intense since the first-generation of revolutionary leaders has passed away – the 
“interlocking directorate” – and continues to do so, reflecting increasing differences 
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between PLA and MFA views and interests, and the malfunctioning and even 
dysfunctional “trinity” (Party-State-Military) arrangement, which organically separated 
the two bureaucracies. Both vertical and horizontal policy coordination and consultation 
mechanisms, though multiplied in numbers, could hardly bridge the deepening divide. 
The rise of new and powerful policy actors has accelerated the decline of the MFA’s 
control over foreign and security policy. Even as the PLA had a lower level of influence 
under Hu Jintao, this competition still became more favorable to the PLA because the 
MFA’s bureaucratic power and influence declined even more drastically than that of the 
PLA. As such, the PLA’s influence was weak, but the MFA’s influence was even weaker. 
Third, the PLA exhibited mixed tendencies in policy interventions, displaying 
increasingly “outward-oriented” policy preferences but at the same time constrained by 
its internal mission. The PLA’s continuous professionalization has mixed effects on its 
propensity to advocate war. Although professionalization elevates the principle of 
civilian centrality, it makes the PLA more budget-conscious, “no-war anxious,” and 
sensitive to its institutional interests. Therefore, the PLA becomes more comfortable 
interacting with foreign militaries, but is increasingly attuned to external threats. The 
PLA’s policy preference is increasingly more reflective of inter-service differences, with 
the more “outward-oriented” PLA Navy and Air Force gaining more resources and higher 
status than in the past, but remaining less sophisticated and open than the Army. As a 
result of its own evolution, the PLA is likely not seeking major armed confrontation, but 
may be more welcoming to continuous friction and low-intensity war of limited scope, if 
it is highly confident in its ability to prevail.  
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“Dynamic Bargaining” Thesis: Implications  
This dissertation examines the two-level bargaining game of the PLA in both 
Party-military relations and in lower-level bureaucratic politics. The bargaining in Party-
military relations is conducted on terrain that is fundamentally different from that of 
bureaucratic politics, in terms of the significance of this relationship to Chinese politics. 
The following section will examine the implications of this thesis for China’s civil-
military relations, the PLA’s influence on policy, and U.S. policy-makers. 
 
Implications of the “Dynamic Bargaining” Thesis for China’s Civil-Military Relations 
Since 1978, the Party has faced increasing challenges to its legitimacy and 
authority from an empowered society, while the existing political structures the Party 
dominates could not effectively solve the problem of systematic corruption, ineffective 
governance, and a lack of officials’ accountability. The Party’s crisis of legitimacy and 
authority has thus far been ameliorated by China’s rapid economic growth and 
modernization and the emergence of a middle class that owes its newfound wealth to the 
existing system. While this crisis has not come to a head due to China’s economic 
modernization, the root cause remains. As China’s society is empowered and its citizens 
become aware of their rights, the delayed crisis could violently erupt if a solution is not 
found and enacted in time. More than ever, the Party in the post-Deng era needs the PLA 
to serve as its last line of defense during any potential social and political upheaval. 
Within Party-military relations, the PLA differs with the Party over two areas, 
namely the direction and pace of political reform. The PLA officer corps is open to a 
wide range of political reforms, as long as they meet one absolutely necessary condition: 
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the maintenance of China’s overall stability. The Party realizes it is faced with a crisis of 
governance and legitimacy, and therefore it recognizes that it must enact further political 
reforms, but it will still try to hold on to its power and dominant position in Chinese 
politics. The PLA officer corps has a deeper sense of crisis and the urgency of reforms 
than the Party, and does not believe the Party is moving quickly enough to enact reforms. 
This disagreement between the Party and the PLA over reform’s direction and pace 
makes the Party even more reliant on the PLA. 
The PLA officer corps’ support for political reform results from its political 
nature as a group of “progressive moderates” in Chinese domestic politics, its realism 
about the legitimacy and governance crisis the Party faces, and the PLA’s institutional 
interest in full professionalization. The PLA officer corps aspires for professionalization 
and, except for the political officers, loathes the political commissar system. The political 
commissar system’s removal would undermine an indispensible piece of the Party’s 
foundation. The PLA supports and encourages political reform, but it is wrong to assume 
that it will take any action to rebel against the Party. The PLA will not be the first mover 
in this complicated and consequential game. Therefore, the only way to remove the 
system of politicization, which obstructs the PLA’s professionalization, is through 
nationalization of the PLA, which, the PLA insists, has to be one component that is 
crucial and necessary to China’s democratization either in the western sense or a limited 
inter-Party competition. However, the PLA agrees that it is the Party that has to make the 
decision and chooses that path. The officer corps is the largest organized interest group 
that is supportive of China’s political reform, if the Party chooses to advance it. That is 
why, even if nationalization of the army could mean that the PLA will lose a certain 
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amount of privilege in terms of resources and influence, the PLA officer corps still 
embraces it. 
It is fair to ask whether by differentiating itself from the Party and advocating 
becoming a professional national army the PLA is moving toward professionalization. In 
the Western literature on civil-military relations, a professional military, ideally, is one 
that is “politically sterile and neutral,”2 “with the degree of its professionalism measured 
as the inverse of its military intervention”,3 and “a healthy state (of civil-military 
relations) is that its military establishment shall remain merely the executive will of the 
sovereign power.”4 In the real world, Huntington recognized that after World War II 
“national security policy became primarily a matter of negotiations conducted among the 
different executive agencies – both civilian and military.”5 Even Huntington’s normative 
theory that a high degree of professionalism and corporate orientation incline the military 
professional toward a low political posture is challenged by several Western analysts, 
including W. H. Morris Jones.6 As Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett argued, 
Huntington’s concept that professionalism removes the military from politics can no 
longer hold because of the fusion of bureaucracy and politics.7 In the literature on 
China’s civil-military relations, Jencks, Joffe, and others agreed that Huntington’s 
objective/subjective control thesis is not applicable to China.8 Joffe specifically argued 
that Mao and Deng ordered the PLA’s political involvement in the Cultural Revolution 
and the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, and that the PLA loyally followed its orders.9  
This dissertation explains that professionalization drives the PLA to further 
differentiate itself from the Party, which makes the Chinese case of how its military 
developed and strengthened its professionalism distinctly different than that of Western 
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democratic countries. Professionalization of a Party-Army like the PLA has to include 
two parts: differentiation/separation, and civilian control, which are intimately inter-
related. The PLA's professionalization starts with the differentiation and separation of its 
professional/institutional interests from the Party. Otherwise, it would be merely a tool 
for the Party and an extension of the Party bureaucracy, which violates the military’s 
“corporate spirits” and “expertise,” two of the three foundations of military 
professionalism, as defined by Huntington.10 The case of the Soviet military illustrates 
how professionalization interacts with differentiation from the Party. The Party’s control 
over the Soviet military was much less pervasive than the CCP’s control over the Chinese 
military, and thus the Soviet military was widely viewed as a more professional force 
than the PLA, which partly explains its lack of intervention to save the Party as the Soviet 
Union collapsed in 1990-1. Thus, is the Soviet military more or less professional than the 
PLA? In the Western sense, the Soviet military was not. However, if judged from the 
angle of protecting the sovereign state, the Soviet military was then indeed professional.  
The gold standard for a professional army in the Western sense is whether high-
level civilian control is realized over the military. In the Chinese case, this black-and-
white picture becomes blurry, as “civilian” in the Chinese context is a more complex 
concept because this category includes both the Party and the State/government. If the 
“civilian” means the Party, no doubt the “civilians” still have pervasive, tight control, 
despite the cracks in Party-military relations. However, if “civilian” means the 
State/government, the growing trend seems to disfavor the government bureaucracies in 
relative power. It is not only confusing for outsiders, but also for the PLA itself. China’s 
Constitution stipulates that the National People’s Congress holds the ultimate sovereign 
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power. However, in reality, only the Party’s control is mandated, while the 
state/government is viewed as a peer of the PLA. The political power structure is 
arranged in accordance with this principle. The PLA encountered this Party-State tension 
in 1989 when Zhao Ziyang, the Party’s nominal head, intended to use the NPC’s official, 
though hollow, ultimate authority to pass a resolution in order to override Deng, which 
eventually failed.11 Some PLA officers who were supportive of Zhao chose inaction or 
vocal opposition to the establishment of martial law, and were subsequently court-
martialed, discharged, or sidelined. The PLA has upheld the principle of civilian control, 
if one deems that the ultimate civilian authority is legitimately placed in the hands of the 
Party.12 Civilian control has, however, been broken if one judges that the 
State/government, by China’s Constitution, holds the ultimate sovereign power in China. 
The reliance-control model presented in this dissertation accepts some of the 
factional politics model’s conclusions, namely that the top leader’s effective control over 
the PLA is still fundamentally established through and embodied by placing trusted 
officers in the PLA leadership. It also accepts the professionalization model’s conclusion 
that the PLA officer corps and the PLA as an institution develop political and policy 
preferences based on the internalization of the tenets of professionalization and its 
corresponding transformation. Professionalization further deepens the differentiation 
between the PLA’s and the Party’s goals and interests, and increases professional 
soldiers’ discontent with the continuation of the Party’s political indoctrination of the 
military, as represented by the PLA’s political commissar system. However, 
professionalization also explains the PLA’s reluctance to play a more aggressive role in 
pushing the Party to reform, even though that is the direction the PLA supports. This 
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dissertation also accepts the main thesis of the conditional compliance or “give-and-take” 
model on the increased bargaining behavior between the Party and the PLA. The 
reliance-control model attempts to explain Party-military relations by pulling in the 
aforementioned models’ arguments to explain the dynamics of the bargaining relationship 
between the Party and the PLA, as both of them are evolving internally, with their goals, 
interests, power, and reliance upon each other changing. 
 
Implications of the “Dynamic Bargaining” Thesis for the PLA’s Influence on Policy 
As this dissertation indicates, the PLA’s influence in foreign and security policy 
has both a “ceiling” and a “floor”: the influence the PLA exerts in high-level politics is 
governed by whether the top leader politically relies on the PLA and has established 
effective control over the military; and the PLA operates as the last line of defense and 
deterrent even when the top leader does not accept its policy preference. In the lower-
level policy process, where bureaucratic bargaining determines the level of the PLA’s 
influence, the PLA has to seek allies, namely other powerful policy actors or supportive 
public opinion, in order to prevail in the competition with the MFA. This indicates the 
limit (ceiling) of the PLA’s influence in the bureaucratic bargaining process, which is 
shaped by procedures and mechanisms. The PLA has a strong organizational capacity in 
intelligence gathering and policy implementation, which establishes the “floor” of its 
influence in this process.  
The PLA’s influence in foreign and security policy will increase significantly 
when the top leader has a high-level of political reliance on the PLA’s support, and 
manages to establish effective control over the PLA. If China adequately reforms and 
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modernizes its political system so that its economic prosperity and political stability 
could be secured in a sustainable way, the PLA will become more committed to its 
external mission and it will have a stronger motivation to intervene in China’s foreign 
and security policy. Even in these circumstances, it does not mean that China will 
become an aggressive, expansionist power, as the PLA is probably more realistic about 
military options and its capabilities than civilians. However, the continuous rise of 
nationalism among the Chinese public and the further fusion of the military with the rest 
of society, would constitute a real danger for the world and China itself. 
 
Implications of the “Dynamic Bargaining” Thesis for American Policy-makers 
As China and the U.S. enter a new age of deepening interdependence but an 
intensifying power imbalance, many in the U.S. are alarmed by China’s “assertive 
behavior” and worried more about its intentions.13 Although some analysts conclude that 
the two are not fated to enter either a hot or cold war, others predict the return of “great 
power competition.”14 Prescriptions given to Washington based on the above assessments 
then vary from a cautious approach of not “add(ing) to instability”15 and a moderate 
engagement-and-hedging approach,16 to aggressive balancing/countering against China’s 
rise17 and “cost-imposition” to punish “China’s bullying.”18 This dissertation’s findings 
offer several insights for American policy-makers: 
While this research is not the first to make this point, it does support the thesis 
that due to a wide range of actors and internal dynamics influencing China’s foreign and 
security policy-making process, policy outcomes are often not necessarily consistent with 
China’s strategic goals and interests. Not dissimilar from U.S. policy-formulation, in 
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which a focused and highly mobilized interest group can make a significant difference in 
a certain policy area, in China a bureaucracy that is strongly motivated by its parochial 
bureaucratic interest can hijack the debate over a particular policy. Thus, a strong 
reaction by the U.S., taken without understanding the motivations and actors behind 
seemingly provocative actions, may have unintended consequences. Such actions could 
empower the segment of policy actors that the U.S. actually wants to undermine and 
diminish. 
This study points to other, more nuanced applications. Perhaps most importantly, 
it is fundamentally mistaken to assume that the PLA is the source of aggressive 
nationalism. The PLA’s own policy-making suffers from the pressure – often unwelcome 
– that radical netizens bring to bear on many policy areas. The PLA does manipulate 
public opinion to advance certain agendas, but by and large it is burdened and 
constrained by Chinese netizens’ hypernationalistic expressions. The increasing fusion of 
domestic and foreign audiences creates great obstacles to the PLA’s public expressions, 
making regular closed-door, high-level consultations the most effective way of engaging 
the PLA.  
Third, the U.S. should open its military education institutions to PLA officers. 
The PLA is a military force in transition and there is no better way to influence such a 
force than by training its young and promising officers. Systematic exchange and training 
programs should especially target junior-to-mid-level PLA officers. Most foreign-trained 
PLA officers have received their overseas training in Russia, which inevitably translates 
into their deeper personal affinities for Russia.19 About 2,000 mid- to senior-level PLA 
officers received training in Russia between 1996 and 2002. Although these Russia-
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trained PLA officers were relatively junior when receiving training in Russia, some have 
already been promoted to major positions at the level of deputy commander of a major 
military command and corps commander.20 For example, two consecutive corps 
commanders of the PLA’s most reputable 38th army from 2007 to 2013 were trained in 
Russia.21 As of 2013, three out of seven military regions were headed by Russia-trained 
officers.22 These PLA officers trained in Russia have served as a strong bond between the 
Chinese and Russian militaries, which bolstered bilateral political relations, despite 
various difficulties and challenges. In comparison, from 1996 to 2015 there have been no 
Chinese PLA officers studying at U.S. military academies. 
Fourth, U.S. policy-makers should assume that any prolonged, intensified friction 
that potentially poses a severe security threat to China would guarantee a seat for the 
PLA at the table and may strengthen its influence relative to other policy actors. Based on 
the PLA’s previous behaviors, examined in this dissertation, the PLA showed substantial 
caution and reluctance to engage in military confrontations. For instance, in the 1979 case, 
the PLA was not prepared to fight a large-scale war. In the Taiwan timetable case, the 
PLA was also not ready in the 1990s and early 2000s for a major confrontation, and 
many officers agreed with Jiang’s goal but disagreed, based on the military logic, on the 
best path to reach the goal.  
The past has proved that the PLA, though holding the most lethal capability, is not 
necessarily the most dangerous actor in the process. However, based on this dissertation’s 
study of the PLA’s mentality and motivations, as well as the changing landscape of the 
policy process, the PLA would be both prone and pressured to be more risk-taking. The 
budget pressure, hostile external environment, the PLA’s internal changes, and the rise of 
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other, more vocal and motivated actors, make the PLA, though still militarily cautious 
and keenly aware about the escalation redline, probably increasingly welcoming to low-
level, manageable conflicts. However, where the firewall between low-level conflicts and 
hot wars stands and whether such a firewall even exists merit further examination. 
 
“Dynamic Bargaining” Thesis: Applications 
This study employed three case studies to examine what perceptions China’s 
soldiers, leaders, and diplomats held, and what the policy outcomes were, in order to 
determine whether the “dynamic bargaining” thesis worked in reality. One important 
finding from these three case studies is that the PLA is no more bellicose, but is probably 
more realistic, than either China’s leaders or its civilian bureaucracies.23 During the 1979 
Sino-Vietnamese border clash, the PLA’s last large-scale conflict, senior military leaders 
had considerable reservations about the use of force against Vietnam. During the debate 
on Taiwan in the wake of the 1995-96 crisis, a policy that has always strongly motivated 
the PLA, the PLA was cautious not to rush into war. Despite its open demand for a tough 
stance during the crisis and its persistent push for an increase in its budget, the PLA was 
unwilling to go down the path of war. The third case study highlighted the PLA’s 
lobbying for more intervention in the South China Sea in the 1980s, only to lose the 
debate to the MFA. The PLA gained the upper hand only after 2010, when it allied with 
the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), the powerful State-owned petroleum companies 
and, to a lesser degree, the Ministry of Agriculture, as well as the increasingly influential 
Netizens.  
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Among these three cases, the PLA was least motivated to intervene in the debate 
leading up to the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war, but went along with Deng due to domestic 
political considerations. The PLA was most successful in realizing its primary goal in the 
debate over Taiwan, as China avoided a war that the PLA was determined not to fight 
and the top leadership decided to increase the PLA’s budget. The third case had mixed 
results for the PLA, despite the fact that the policy outcome was consistent with the 
PLA’s primary objective. In this case, it is less clear whether the other actors, primarily 
SOA, pulled the strings, or if this policy direction was undertaken because the top leader-
in-waiting, Xi Jinping, advocated it.  
This study is primarily dedicated to the period from 1978 to 2012 (Deng Xiaoping 
to Hu Jintao). The “dynamic bargaining” thesis, validated based on the PLA’s past 
behavior, may offer some useful insights into the future under Xi Jinping. The son of Xi 
Zhongxun, who was a reform-minded first-generation leader with both legitimacy and 
seniority, Xi briefly served as Geng Biao’s secretary, the former Secretary General of the 
CMC and Defense Minister. As a princeling, Xi had a wide network of personal friends 
and advisers in the PLA who counseled him.24 PLA officers widely perceived Xi to be 
reform-minded, down-to-earth, and detail-oriented. The PLA clearly approved of Xi, as 
he was able to establish a power base within the military even before he assumed 
power.25  
Xi’s background and personal style allowed him to more easily gain the PLA 
officer corps’ acceptance. Xi’s ability to implement “eight rules” for tightening military 
discipline helped him win the PLA rank and file’s respect.26 As a result, Xi had clear 
advantages over his two immediate predecessors in quickly establishing and 
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consolidating control over the military. That said, Xi would ultimately consolidate his 
effective control over the military not just through favorable impressions, but also by 
initiating a politicized anti-corruption campaign, which removed opposing factions’ 
powerful supporters. In 2014, Xi publicly arrested General Xu Caihou, the former CMC 
Vice Chairman, and launched an investigation into Guo Boxiong, the other former Vice 
Chairman, both of whom were well-known supporters of Jiang Zemin. Commanders and 
Political Commissars of seven Military Regions publicly vowed allegiance to Xi in 2013. 
In December 2014, under Xi’s orders, Song Puxuan, President of National Defense 
University, switched positions with Zhang Shibo, Commander of the Beijing Military 
Region who Hu appointed in 2012.27 In the same month, Wang Jianping and Xu Yaoyuan, 
Commander and Political Commissar of the People’s Armed Police (PAP), were 
transferred and replaced at the same time by Wang Ning and Sun Sijing, respectively.28 A 
move with more far-reaching implications was Xi’s decision in 2013 to draft plans for a 
sweeping, systematic organizational and command-control reform of the PLA, which 
may restructure and streamline the redundant system of general departments and military 
regions. In the post-Deng era, such moves are unprecedented, which signifies that Xi is 
assuming effective control over the military.  
This study put forward the “reliance-control model” to analyze how Party-military 
relations impact the PLA’s influence over policies. It concluded that the PLA’s influence 
in the policy-making process was at its lowest point under Deng Xiaoping, as Deng’s 
political reliance on the PLA was minimal. The PLA’s influence under Jiang Zemin was 
initially weak, but got stronger as Jiang strengthened his effective control over the 
military. Given its distanced relationship with Hu Jintao, the PLA had negligible direct 
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influence, though it attempted to push back by seeking support in the media and public 
domains, while stalling the implementation of policies. Yet the MFA’s position and 
influence declined even more than the PLA’s. If one were to apply the “reliance-control 
model” to analyze Party-military relations under Xi Jinping, one would conclude that the 
PLA would enjoy greater influence because Xi both relies on the PLA’s support and has 
effective control over the military. This would allow Xi to rely on the military’s support 
and treat it as a core powerbase of his leadership. Xi could thus use the PLA to aid him in 
pushing through wider and bolder reforms and systematic changes in China. 
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This dissertation, though built on over 260 interviews with Chinese military 
officers, government officials, diplomats and academic researchers, has inescapable 
limitations. The most convincing data are government documents, policy memos, written 
communications among agencies, and military orders, which would be invaluable 
resources to understand policy deliberations and bargaining.29 Though it is evolving and 
pluralizing in some realms, China is still an authoritarian state that regards transparency 
with a grave sense of insecurity. Though some parts of the Chinese government are more 
open and transparent than others, any issue, from security and foreign policy to labor 
disputes and environmental pollution, could be the spark that starts the fire, and can 
therefore be deemed by the regime to represent a threat to its continued rule. Incidents 
such as the 1997 detention and 2001 sentencing of Hua Di, a former PLA missile expert 
who defected in 1989 and subsequently worked at Stanford University, for 15 years, aim 
to intimidate academic researchers and make them less likely to explore the topic of the 
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PLA’s influence in foreign and security policy-making.30 The arrest of Xu Zerong (David 
Tsui), who received his PhD in Political Science from Oxford University in 1999, further 
alarms academics who seek to understand China’s foreign and security policy even from 
a purely historic perspective. Xu was arrested in 2000 and sentenced to 13 years in prison 
for “illegally providing intelligence to overseas organizations.” However, the two 
documents in question, internal publications on the Korean War (1950-53), were 
classified after he obtained them and used as evidence to convict him.31 Some speculate 
that it was Xu’s writings about the history of China's support for Malaysia’s Communist 
Party through secret radio stations it set up in Yiyang, Hunan Province, from 1967-81, 
which China had denied in the past, offended the Chinese government and led to his 
arrest.32 Clearly, the Chinese government does not want scholars to dig into any records 
that are available to explore the topic that this dissertation seeks to analyze. 
This dissertation has to work with all above constraints and tries its best to put the puzzle 
together. This study of the PLA’s influence in China’s foreign and security policy-
making suggests that the bureaucratic politics model needs to study policy stakeholders 
not as a constant, but rather as a dynamic, evolving force with institutional memory and a 
decision-making style that is influenced by its bureaucratic culture. This study also lends 
support to the neo-institutionalist argument that the power arrangement in a regime could 
lead to an institutional design that obstructs and challenges bureaucratic cooperation and 
gives certain actors strategic advantages in bureaucratic bargaining.33 Future research 
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Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter Three: The PLA’s Political Representation  
 
 
This appendix explains the PLA’s political representation, as well as the Party’s 
formal power structure (CCP National Congress, CCP Central Committee, Politburo, 
Politburo Standing Committee). Changes in the PLA’s political representation are a 
reflection of its varying influence in China’s foreign and security policy-making process. 
However, the degree to which the PLA’s formal position in various policy-making 
structures impacts its influence is not as significant as previously judged.1 Rather, the 
PLA’s political representation in the Party’s formal power structure provides insight into 
how the PLA interacts with other bureaucracies. 
“Political representation” refers to the legitimate sphere of political activity in 
which the PLA is allowed to operate as an organized interest or institution inside China’s 
Party-dominated political system. The Party leadership explicitly delineates the PLA’s 
legitimate boundaries through formal political arrangements. The PLA’s representation in 
the formal power structure such as the Politburo Standing Committee or other Party and 
political organs is often mistakenly interpreted as a proxy for the PLA’s influence in 
decision-making.2 Rather, the PLA’s political representation in the Party’s formal power 
structure indicates the degree to which the Party perceives the military to be important. 
Thus, the PLA’s political representation indicates the state of the Party-military 
relationship. However, the PLA cannot leverage such representation to exert influence on 
or to mold the Party. Neither does such representation equate to the military’s influence 
in policy-making.  
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Formal Power Structure: The Party Leadership After 1978 
China’s Party-dominated political structure could be likened to the Russian 
Matryoshka dolls. It is composed of concentric layers of power. At the core is the CCP 
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). The next layer is the CCP Politburo and then the 
CCP Central Committee (CCPCC). Finally, at the outer layer is the CCP National 
Congress (or the Party’s Congress).3 Obtaining a position at the core of the power 
structure requires one to go through each layer, which is decided through a partially 
competitive election or selection system. The partially competitive election system, in 
which designated candidates outnumber the posts, is mainly applied to the outer layers of 
the power structure (from the Party’s Congress to the CCP Central Committee). This 
system entails both being nominated and getting onto the list of nominated candidates, 
and receiving enough votes from representatives of the CCP National Congress in order 
to win out in the preparatory and formal elections.4 Advancing onto the Politburo or the 
PBSC requires an internal selection process, which is basically a black-box operation, 
with few formal rules and virtually no transparency to the outside world.5 The publicly 
written rules stipulate that candidates must: adhere to the Party’s policies and guidelines; 
possess a strong leadership capability; have the ability to unite other comrades and 
consciously safeguard the unity of the central leadership; and be clean and self-
disciplined, with a good reputation both inside and outside the Party.6 The unwritten but 
real rules based on precedent maintain that candidates are required to retire by 70 (qishi 
daxian).7 A candidate can join the PBSC if he/she is 67, but loses the chance if he/she is 
68 or older (qi shang ba xia).8 This informal rule is accepted by all sides.9 Political 
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activity increases in frequency from the outer to the core layers of this concentric power 
structure — the Party Congress is held every five years, CCPCC meetings are held on 
average once per year, while Politburo meetings occur once a month and PBSC meetings 
once a week. 
The institutionalization and function of China’s Party-dominated power structure 
has gone through different stages. During Mao’s and Deng’s eras, which were 
characterized by strong-man politics, the formal power structure did not contain the 
highest-level decision-making bodies. Mao’s will and Deng’s preferences (in consultation 
with Party elders) dictated China’s decision-making regarding major policies.10 Since the 
1990s, when collective leadership was established, the Party-dominated formal power 
structure has become a leading decision-making mechanism.11  
 
CCP Central Committee  
The CCP National Congress is nominally the highest organ of the Party’s power. 
The CCP Central Committee is the official leadership of the CCP, or commonly called 
the “Party Center” (dang zhong yang) as “the CCP Central Committee is the top 
leadership of the Party while the National Congress of the CCP is not in session.”12 The 
National Congress of the CCP, which convenes every five years, elects the CCP Central 
Committee’s members. Procedurally, one has to first be elected as a Central Committee 
member in order to qualify for Politburo or PBSC membership or to become a candidate 
for the position of the top Party leader. The top Party leader occupied the position of 
Chairman during Mao’s era, and since then the top leader has been the Secretary General 
of the Party.13 The Central Committee is also officially charged with deciding the 
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membership of the Party Central Military Commission (CMC), which is the military’s 
highest-ranking body.14  
  
Politburo 
The Politburo is composed of the 25 chiefs and deputies of China’s core 
institutions. For instance, the current Politburo, formed under Xi Jinping’s new leadership 
during the 18th Party Congress held in 2012, includes: all members of the PBSC (7 
persons), Vice President (1 person), Vice Chairman of the National People’s Congress (1 
person), Vice Premiers of the State Council (3 persons), heads of the CCPCC agencies in 
charge of policy research, political and legal work commission, General Office, personnel, 
propaganda and united front work (6 persons), local Party Secretaries (5 persons from 
Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, Xinjiang and Guangdong), and the PLA (2 persons).15 
Politburo membership typically has two important implications: elevation and 
recognition of one’s political status and ranking in the Party leadership; and the 
opportunity to advance onto the PBSC or the highest echelon of leadership.16 However, 
there have been several instances in which Politburo membership is not a reflection of 
one’s power.17 In these exceptional cases, entrance into the Politburo has meant 
promotion in appearance but demotion in actual political power, which is known as an 
“honorable sidelining.” For example, Hu Yaobang cultivated Wang Zhaoguo, the 
Director of the Central Committee General Office between 1984 and 1986, as his 
successor. However, after Hu’s political downfall, Wang’s political career experienced 
serious setbacks. In 2002, Wang entered the Politburo, which appeared to be a promotion, 
but he was actually sidelined politically, as indicated by his transfer from Governor of 
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Fujian Province to a sinecure position as Chairman of the All-China Worker’s Union and 
First Deputy Chairman of the National People’s Congress.18 Another example is Wang 
Gang, who was the Director of the Central Committee General Office from 1999 to 2007. 
Although Wang became a member of the Politburo in 2007, he was also transferred to the 
People’s Political Consultative Conference, which was interpreted as a sign that Wang 
had actually lost power. The above two cases are rare, exceptional cases, in which 
Politburo membership does not equate to political power granted but rather is a political 
maneuver to elevate someone in appearance but strip his real power. 
During Hu Jintao’s era, the Politburo was said to have held monthly meetings to 
discuss issues of strategic importance.19 Under Jiang Zemin, the Politburo was largely 
left out of the decision-making process. However, upon his ascendance to the political 
power center in 2002, Hu required the PBSC to inform the Politburo of the topics and 
agendas of its discussions, which in essence expanded the latter members’ access to 
crucial information and greater participation in policy discussions.20 Hu’s efforts to 
strengthen the Politburo were undertaken mainly to negate the influence of the nine-
member PBSC, in which Hu could not obtain a majority vote given that it was stocked 
with officials whose primary allegiance was to Jiang.21 Jiang’s legacy was also strong in 
dictating that more decisions had to be made through the PBSC’s voting mechanism. 
Therefore it was in Hu’s interest to seek other formal institutions to resist the PBSC’s 
power. 
 
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) 
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The Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), since the establishment of collective 
leadership, has been designated as the Party’s highest decision-making body. Politburo 
and the PBSC are meant to enforce the authority of the Central Committee when it is not 
in session. Given the political ranking of PBSC members over Politburo members, 
PBSC’s authority goes beyond that of Politburo. In 1980s, elders, despite not holding 
government positions, played a crucial role in decision-making. In reality, the PBSC was 
not the highest decision-making body and was occasionally even dysfunctional during 
this period.22 The PBSC started to truly function as the top collective leadership in 1992, 
after the elders-dominated Central Advisory Committee ceased to exist. After 1992, the 
PBSC started to hold much more policy-making power and represented five 
constituencies – the Party, government, NPC, People’s Consultative Conference, and the 
military.23 In 1997, a disciplinary committee was added to the PBSC, and in 2002, the 
propaganda and the legal systems were both given representation on the PBSC. Each 
PBSC member retains his own portfolio, which he has ultimate authority over. Other 
PBSC members, including the top political leader, usually do not encroach on a fellow 
member’s portfolio. How people are appointed to the PBSC is a black box. However, 
observers do know that it is a combination of credential-based selection, election by 
Central Committee members, and consultation with retired State and Party leaders and 
current PBSC members. 
Officially, the power of foreign and security policy-making is ultimately 
controlled by the Politburo and its Standing Committee.24 The clarification of this 
principle goes back to the establishment of the foreign affairs management system 
(waishi guikou guanli zhidu) in 1958, which stipulated that while government agencies, 
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in terms of foreign policy, have the right to advise the Party, the Party Center (or 
CCCPC), the Politburo and the PBSC have the final say.25 China’s collective leadership, 
the Politburo, and the PBSC, approve major foreign policy decisions according to this 
outline. Issues that reach this level would include China’s grand strategy, major foreign 
policy guidelines, issues directly concerning peace and war, and incidents and 
contingencies with critical strategic implications for China’s future.26  
The above is the principle on paper. In reality, China’s foreign and security 
policy-making was still highly centralized during Mao’s leadership and he always had the 
final say on policies, which he would give after consulting with the senior leadership.27 
Deng was an institution- and consensus-builder, but he still towered over his colleagues 
sitting on the Politburo and the PBSC in the area of foreign policy. During Deng’s era, 
the elder leaders had great influence and articulated major disagreements with Deng on 
economic reform. Therefore, Deng did not rely on the PBSC as the major mechanism to 
decide on policies of strategic importance. Instead, Deng consulted with elder leaders and 
others in informal settings or mechanisms such as the Central Advisory Committee, 
which had the mandate of advising on foreign policy, but not deciding it. Deng always 
played “a pivotal role” and maintained the final say over important foreign and security 
policies.28  
In the post-Deng era, the PBSC became more of a “collective decision-making 
body with a division of labor.”29 The Politburo and its Standing Committee can wield 
their power to impact the ultimate decisions over foreign and security policies. However, 
from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao and now Xi Jinping, top leaders have always sought to 
maintain the strongest influence over two components in their portfolios: foreign policy 
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and military affairs. In the division of labor, on foreign policy, the top leader is at least 
the first among equals. The top leader can and does weigh in on foreign policy, 
depending on his authority and political power vis-a-vis others on the PBSC. On military 
affairs, the top leader, as CMC Chairman, often has legitimate and monopolistic authority. 
Having said that, as Lu Ning points out, the Politburo generally deliberates on key 
strategic decisions such as “making peace or war or major shifts in foreign policy 
orientation” in order to add legitimacy to such decisions.30 Additionally, by bringing the 
Politburo and the PBSC into the decision-making process, the top leader can distribute 
responsibility among all members of the PBSC, especially when the policy involves great 
risk and controversy.31 
The PBSC generally follows the principles of consensus-building and decision by 
a majority. The PBSC’s voting mechanism in the decision-making process did not start to 
function until 1989, when there were major divisions within the top leadership regarding 
how to handle the Tiananmen protests. Reformers such as Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili had 
major disagreements with conservatives such as Li Peng and Yao Yilin, while Qiao Shi 
and Yang Shangkun (who could attend the PBSC meetings but did not have voting rights) 
were undecided but initially leaned toward Zhao.32 The PBSC’s voting mechanism was 
used with increasing frequency once Hu Jintao took power. According to Hu Angang of 
Tsinghua University, the PBSC under Hu was more like a board meeting principally 
because his political authority was simply insufficient to push through his agenda.33 
The Party general secretary, China’s top political leader, will not initiate a vote on 
certain policies unless he is sure the result will be in favor of his preferred policy. In 
order to get a sense of where other PBSC members stand on issues, the top leader will use 
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informal channels, known as “feeling the bottom”(mo di) or “blowing the wind” (chui 
feng). When the Secretary General knows the majority of the PBSC members’ positions 
are consistent with his preference, he will use the voting mechanism to translate his 
personal position into a collectively made official decision.  
An example of not bringing an issue to a vote in the PBSC, because such a vote 
would lead to a policy that the top leader didn’t favor, is when Jiang did not initiate a 
discussion in the PBSC on how to handle the Falungong movement in 1999. Jiang 
understood that since Zhu Rongji and Li Ruihuan opposed severe repression of 
Falungong, even if he initiated a vote, it would not pass. When 100,000 Falungong 
members surrounded Zhongnanhai, the compound where China’s top leadership work 
and live, Zhu invited three Falungong members into Zhongnanhai for a chat and 
promised that as long as Falungong operated within the confines of the law, the central 
leadership would not suppress the movement. Zhu’s moderate position convinced the 
Falungong to withdraw immediately. However, Zhu’s success in using words – not force 
as Jiang had advocated – to persuade Falungong members to back off upstaged Jiang and 
made him even more determined to turn up the heat against the movement. Since Jiang 
knew he could not get a vote to pass in the PBSC, he chose to circumvent it by writing a 
letter to all members of the Politburo, warning of the grave danger of a moderate policy 
toward Falungong. Jiang warned that the Falungong movement, if left unaddressed, could 
transform overnight into China’s “color revolution” if it chose to. Jiang’s letter touched a 
nerve in the Politburo and trumped the opposition of Zhu Rongji and Li Ruihuan. In the 
end, Jiang’s strategy prevailed and a majority of the Central Committee supported the 
persecuting of the movement and arresting of its followers.34 
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The PLA’s Political Representation in Party Leadership 
PLA Representation in the Party Central Committee 
An examination of the PRC’s history indicates that the military’s representation 
on the CCP Central Committee is a reflection of how much the Party needs the military, 
rather than an institutionalized method for the military to exert influence through its 
representation in this body. Military representation in the 6th Party Congress in 1928 
accounted for less than 10 percent of the Central Committee. This increased to 36 percent 
in 1934 and reached 60 percent in 1936, a trend that reflected the situation of the time. In 
1936, the Nationalist Army’s encirclement campaign threatened the CCP’s survival. The 
military’s political importance grew, along with its role as the Party’s ultimate protector. 
The PLA’s representation on the Central Committee in 1938 rebounded to 35 percent and 
peaked at above 60 percent at the 7th CCP National Congress held in 1945, when China 
descended into Civil War and the only hope for CCP victory depended on the military.35  
The military’s representation on the Central Committee stood at 56 percent in 
1954, but declined to 32 percent in 1955 as Chinese leaders’ focus shifted from military 
struggle to economic construction, a policy formalized by the 8th Congress held in 1956. 
The military’s representation further declined to 26 percent in 1967-68 because of the 
chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Then, because the military played a crucial role in 
maintaining social order during the Cultural Revolution, this representation rose to above 
50 percent in 1969-71. After the 913 Incident (Lin Biao’s death), the military’s 
representation on the Central Committee dipped to 40 percent between 1973 and 1980.  
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After China shifted its focus to economic development in 1978, the military’s 
representation on the Central Committee fell to 24 percent between 1982 and 1984 and 
then down to 20 percent and below afterwards. The number of PLA representatives in the 
13th CCP National Congress in 1987 totaled 259 (13.4 percent). The percentage of 
military representatives in the last two CCP National Congresses, the 17th congress in 
2007 and the 18th congress in 2012, was consistently 13 percent, while this representation 
reached 28 percent in the 9th congress in 1969 while the PLA was pulled in the political 
whirlpool to stabilize the whole nation. Thus, the importance of the military to the central 
mission of the CCP at the time determines the military’s representation on the Central 
Committee. 
The Central Committee’s meetings almost exclusively focus on China’s domestic 
affairs rather than foreign and security affairs. Central Committee meetings in the past 
have focused on personnel arrangements, economic development policy, and Party affairs. 
If defense was briefly mentioned, for example in the publicized strategy document from 
the 5th plenary meeting of the 17th Party Congress, it would be with regard to commonly 
agreed upon and noncontroversial goals such as “strengthening military modernization” 
and “enhancing capability to conduct multiple military missions with a focus on winning 
local wars under informationized conditions.”36  
Each member of the Central Committee serves a five-year term, during which the 
Central Committee on average holds seven plenary meetings. The first plenary meeting, 
which is usually held immediately following the Party Congress, always focuses on 
personnel arrangements (election, selection, and approval of Party leadership such as 
PBSC members and Secretaries of the Central Committee Secretariat). The second 
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plenary meeting is usually held before the National People’s Congress (NPC) which 
convenes each March. This plenary meeting focuses on personnel arrangements of 
government agencies. Then, in the year following the Party Congress, four plenary 
meetings (3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th plenary meetings) are held. The 3rd plenary meeting usually 
publicizes important decisions on economic development, which is used as the guideline 
for economic development for the next several years.37 The 4th plenary meeting focuses 
mostly on building the Party. The 7th plenary meeting, held in the last year of the term, 
always focuses on the next Party Congress.38 
There is one case in which the PLA banded together to influence the CCPCC 
election result. In 1997, Bo Xilai, at this time the mayor of Dalian, was not elected to the 
Central Committee at the 15th CCP National Congress — not even as an alternate 
member – because the military representatives had blocked his selection. Bo offended 
Dalian’s local military units by kicking them out of Dalian’s downtown district, where 
real estate had dramatically increased in value. The Party Congress’s military 
representatives totaled roughly 13 percent, and proved to be a powerful body within the 
Central Committee when they took a unified stance on an issue. However, this was a rare 
case and proved to be the exception rather than the rule in terms of the PLA utilizing its 
collective presentation in the Party system.39 
 
PLA Representation on the Politburo and PBSC 
Since the 13th CCP National Congress in 1987, the PLA has consistently 
maintained two seats on the Politburo.40 Yet since this time, with the exception of 1992-
97, the PLA has not had any representation on the PBSC. However, the military’s 
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representation or lack thereof on the Politburo and PBSC is not an accurate reflection of 
the PLA’s policymaking power. It is highly doubtful that the Politburo is the appropriate 
platform for the military to influence the political leadership on certain policies. Since 
1979, almost all Politburo members, with a few notable exceptions such as Qian Qichen, 
lack interest and expertise in foreign affairs. If anything, the military’s representation on 
the Politburo demonstrates its power relative to the civilian foreign affairs system. 
Neither the Foreign Minister nor the State Councilor on Foreign Affairs has been a 
Politburo member since 1998.41  
Though the military has had only minimal representation on the Politburo and 
PBSC since 1987, it has two important roles within these bodies: observing and speaking 
without voting; and providing intelligence for certain members. During Deng’s era, Yang 
Shangkun, the CMC’s Secretary General and later its Vice Chairman, sat in on PBSC 
meetings but did not have voting power. Some have alleged that after Yang declined 
membership to the PBSC, Deng offered this arrangement to him and Yang not only sat in 
on PBSC meetings but also acted as the connection and liaison point between Deng and 
PBSC prior to 1992.42 Deng also could have proposed this setup since beginning in 1978-
79 he pursued a reduction in the military’s representation on the Politburo and PBSC.43 
Admiral Liu Huaqing was the last PLA officer to sit on this body (1992-97). CMC Vice 
Chairmen were consistently invited to join PBSC meetings, but this was an ad hoc 
arrangement and was not part of a formal institutional design. The PLA’s intelligence 
organ, mainly the PLA GSD 2nd and 3rd Departments, has its own channels to send 
reports of high strategic value to PBSC members of the PLA’s choosing.44 
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The following table lists the PLA’s representation on the CCP Politburo, PBSC, and 
Central Committee from 1956 to 2012:  
 
Appendix A.2 The PLA’s Representation on the CCP Power Structure (1956-2012) 
Party 
Congress 
Year  PLA Rep. in 
Party 
Congress45 



























































































































Source: Name List of 1st-6th CCP National Congress Representatives, Shanghai People's Congress, 2007; 
Dictionary of CCP Central Committee (1921-2003), CCP Party History Press, 2004; and CCP 
Organizational History Resources (1921-1997), CCP Party History Press, 2000; transcripts of Party 
Congress spokesmen’s Q&As with journalists; various scholarly papers.49 
*Author’s note: The figures on PLA representation in the Party Congress are incomplete due to lack of 









Organs that Serve the Party Leadership  
Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
From 1956-66, the PLA and the government worked together through the 
mechanism of the Secretariat. All reports to the PBSC, from the government, military and 
lower-level Party entities, had to go through the Secretariat. The Secretariat dealt with the 
Party’s routine operations by making decisions and planning and overseeing the 
implementation, unless the issues in question were too significant and needed to be 
discussed by the PBSC. Before any major policy recommendations were sent to the 
Politburo and PBSC, the Secretariat would often hold initial discussions and 
consultations, provide its own opinion, and draft initial policy documents. For example, 
the Secretariat determined how the 1986 student movement was to be handled.50 Also, as 
Bao Tong, Zhao Ziyang’s key adviser, reminisced, the Secretariat once dealt with the 
reform plan concerning the relationship between the Party and the Worker’s Union, as 
well as the Party and the Chinese Youth League.51 Wu Jiaxiang, a clerk who once 
worked for the Secretariat in the 1980s, pointed out that was dealt. The Secretariat was a 
flexible mechanism, convening both weekly and ad hoc meetings depending on the issues 
at hand.52  
Between 1956 and 1966, the Secretariat had two Secretaries who dealt with PLA 
affairs. Secretary Tan Zheng managed the PLA’s political and personnel affairs, while 
Secretary Huang Kecheng dealt with the CMC’s affairs. After a hiatus during the Cultural 
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Revolution, the Secretariat’s function was reinstated in 1980, with Hu Yaobang serving 
as the Secretary General, and 10 others serving as secretaries to the Secretariat. At this 
time, the Secretariat was “a Secretariat of the Party leadership (Central Committee), not a 
Secretariat of the Politburo, nor of the Standing Committee.”53 This meant that the 
Secretariat was on the front line of decision-making, while the Politburo and even the 
PBSC were in secondary positions.54 Additionally, all members of the Secretariat were 
equals and had one vote. But by September 1982, the Secretary General of the Secretariat 
had also become the Secretary General of the Central Committee, making him the 
supreme leader of the Party, and thus presiding over the Secretariat. As such, his power 
went beyond the Secretariat, allowing the Secretariat to reach the peak of its power.  
The power of Secretariat as an institution had been an indicator of the power of 
the Party Secretary General, till the rules of games were significantly changed under Xi 
Jinping.55 Following the Secretary General of the Central Committee Hu Yaobang’s 
downfall in 1987, the Secretariat, often seen as Hu’s power base, was significantly 
weakened as an institution, with its number of secretaries reducing to five to seven, which 
was roughly half that of the past (11-12).56 Since the 13th Party National Congress in 
1987, Secretaries have no longer been chosen through elections by the Central 
Committee, but instead through nominations by PBSC and approvals by the Central 
Committee.57 More importantly, its powers in decision-making were drastically reduced. 
Secretariat has been transformed into an executive body to implement policies rather than 
make policies. Secretariat has been clearly put in a position subordinate to Politburo and 
PBSC, with no overlapping area of work and then no friction with State Council.58 Thus, 
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the Secretariat was no longer a relatively independent power center separate from 
Politburo and PBSC.  
Secretariat’s power resurged in 1997 when Jiang Zemin consolidated his political 
power, but declined again in 2002 when Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang as Party Secretary 
General and President. Secretariat’s importance as an institution revived in 1997 under 
Jiang Zemin, with all its secretaries unprecedentedly most chosen from Politburo and 
PBSC members. Secretariat’s portfolio was also unprecedentedly expanded to cover 
discipline inspection, military affairs, economic affairs, personnel, public security and 
legal affairs. In 2002, after Jiang transferred the political power to Hu, members of 
Secretariat kept generally lower political status. Three out of seven Secretaries were not 
members of Politburo. Financial and economic affairs were cut out from Secretariat’s 
portfolio. More importantly, these non-PBSC Secretaries had to answer to PBSC 
members who were in charge of their line of work, a measure which significantly 
weakened the Secretary General of the Party and strengthened PBSC as a collective 
leadership.59 For example, Minister of Propaganda, Liu Yunshan, who sat on Secretariat 
as a Secretary, answered to Li Changchun, the PBSC member who oversaw propaganda 
and education. Similarly, when Secretary General of Discipline and Inspection and 
Secretary General of Political and Legal Affairs Commission elevated to be members of 
PBSC since 2002 (16th Party Congress), their deputies, Deputy Secretary General of 
Discipline and Inspection and Minister of Public Security joined the Secretariat as 
Secretaries. As Party Secretary General has only one vote on PBSC, despite the more 
political “weight” his vote carries, this institutional arrangement greatly constrained 
Secretary General’s power. 
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Secretariat under Xi Jinping (2012-2017) faced a completely revamped political 
game. Xi established new venues to exercise his highly concentrated power while 
existing mechanisms were kept but weakened to the core. Secretariat during this period 
was to a large degree limited to managing Party affairs. Secretariat members could still 
regularly attend Politburo meetings, while Secretaries as non-Politburo members have no 
voting rights. Secretariat, as an institution, had diminished its influence over decision-
making. 
 
General Office of the CCP Central Committee 
Traditionally, the General Office of the Central Committee (zhonggong 
zhongyang bangongting) has been a locus of power in China’s elite politics. With Zeng 
Qinghong (Director, 1993-99), Wang Gang (Director, 1999-2007) and Ling Jihua 
(Director, 2007-13) as its directors, there was a dynamic whereby the General Office 
gradually overpowered the Central Foreign Affairs Office (zhongyang waiban) in foreign 
and security policy making. The General Office is primarily in charge of safety, logistics, 
and secretarial (organizing meetings, entering documents sent from lower-level Party 
entities into the record) work for the Party Secretary General, but also accomplishes such 
tasks for other PBSC members.60 The General Office also: gathers information on 
important and dynamic domestic and international situations; integrates research; drafts, 
revises and proofreads major Party documents and speeches; and deals with complaint 
letters from the public. 
Zhao Ziyang was the director of the General Office between 1978 and 1982. His 
successor and close follower, Hu Qili, was director from 1982 to 1983.61 After Hu was 
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Qiao Shi (1983-84), Wang Zhaoguo — regarded as Hu Yaobang’s designated successor 
— (1984-86), Wen Jiabao (1986-1993), and Zeng Qinghong — Jiang Zemin’s right-hand 
man — (Deputy Director in 1989, became Director in 1993). From 1999 to 2007, Wang 
Gang took over the directorship after serving as Deputy Director for five years. 
Following him was Ling Jihua, a close associate of Hu Jintao (Director, 2007-13), and Li 
Zhanshu currently serves as the current Director under Xi (2013-).62  
The General Office’s directors usually hold crucial political power because they 
control the agenda and facilitate the Politburo and the PBSC’s process of decision-
making. Directors often consult with and inquire the opinions of retired and current 
PBSC members on particular policies or personnel decisions, in order to assist the top 
leader in making a decision. Directors also actively collect information for decision-
making, draft certain documents, and supervise the implementation of decisions made by 
the top leader or the PBSC. They are the gatekeepers in terms of information and people 
the top leader has access to. Directors also maintain the top leader’s public image, as they 
have the authority to censor any news report relating to the top leader. Directors also play 
a secretarial role by arranging meetings, archiving documents, and taking responsibility 
for the security and health of PBSC members. 
Beginning with Hu Qili, every director of the General Office later became a 
Politburo member, which reflects the office’s power.63 During Xi’s era, the General 
Office’s director has assumed even more importance. Upon becoming Director of the 
General Office under Xi in 2013, Li Zhanshu was immediately admitted to the Politburo. 
In 2014, Li became the Executive Director of the State Security Council, one of the three 
superstructures Xi Jinping established as a result of the Third Plenum and an organization 
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that observers liken to the U.S. National Security Council. Additionally, the General 
Office will house the State Security Council. This further indicates the General Office’s 
importance and continuing power under Xi. Having said this, the General Office has been 
primarily focused on domestic issues such as personnel/cadre promotion, legislation, and 
the economy. The only areas in foreign and security policy the General Office has a stake 
in are China’s policies toward Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, all of which are regarded 
as internal affairs of China with international implications.64  
With regard to such areas of foreign or quasi-foreign policy, the General Office 
played a central role in the bureaucratic turf wars during the 1980s and early 1990s 
between the Hong Kong-Macao Work Committee and the State Council’s Hong Kong-
Macao Office.65 The General Office, since Zeng Qinghong became its Director in 1993, 
has also consistently exerted influence over the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group 
(TALSG). The General Office’s influence on Taiwan affairs and its close proximity to 
the top political leadership could tilt the balance decisively in any policy debate between 
the MFA and the PLA. This happened when Yang Yi, Rear Admiral and Director of the 
Institute of Strategic Studies of PLA National Defense University, criticized China for 
not taking a harsher position toward Chen Shui-bian earlier. Yang’s criticism triggered a 
turf war between the PLA and the civilian foreign affairs system (MFA), which 
advocated a more patient and moderate stance toward Taiwan. In this instance, Wang 
Gang, then Director of the General Office who had direct access to Hu Jintao, was said to 
have played a key role in shaping China’s policy and directing it more toward the civilian 
foreign affairs system. 
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PLA Representation in the Secretariat and General Office  
The PLA traditionally has no representation in the General Office.66 While the 
PLA had representation on the Central Committee Secretariat from the time it was 
revived in 1981 until 2002, since 2002 it has been sidelined from this organization. Since 
the founding of the PRC in 1949, the PLA has traditionally had regular representation on 
the Secretariat. Luo Ruiqing, then Chief of General Staff, was the Secretariat’s Secretary 
in the 1950s. After the Secretariat was resurrected in 1981, Yang Dezhi, then-PLA Chief 
of General Staff, was included as one of its Secretaries, and in 1989 Yang Baibing, then 
CMC Secretary General, joined this body.67 In 1997, Zhang Wannian, then CMC Vice 
Chairman, and in 2002, Xu Caihou, First Deputy Director of the GPD and then Vice 
Chairman of the CMC, joined the Secretariat.  
After Hu Jintao came to power, he effectively removed Xu Caihou from the 
Secretariat. Following the 16th Party Congress in November 2002, the Secretariat 
required its members to attend its office in Zhongnanhai together once per week. This 
new arrangement “created an inconvenience for the work of Zhou Yongkang, then 
Minister of Public Security and Xu Caihou, the PLA GPD Chief” who was on the way to 
the CMC Vice Chairmanship, and so neither attended. Therefore, since 2002 the PLA no 
longer has actual representation on the Secretariat.68  
 
PLA Representation in CCP and State Leadership 
Who counts as a member of the leadership? In China, “Party and State leaders” 
refers to the top two levels of public servants, which are those at the State Principal and 
State deputy levels. Officials at the State principal level (zhengguoji) or Class I Cadres 
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(yiji ganbu) have an administrative rank equal to heads of state and presidents in other 
countries. Officials at the State Principal level include the Secretary General of the 
CCPCC, President, CMC Chairman, Chairman of the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
Standing Committee, Premier, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Vice President, and all members of 
the PBSC. Additionally, the CMC Vice Chairman, who runs the CMC’s daily operations, 
normally enjoys the status of a top-level public servant.  
“Party and State leaders” also includes officials at the State Deputy level (fuguoji), 
which falls immediately below the State Principal level. This category includes Vice 
Premier, State Councilor, Vice Chairman and Secretary General of the NPC, Vice 
Chairman and Secretary General of the CPPCC, Vice Chairmen of the CMC, Politburo 
members, and Alternative members and members of the Secretariat. Prior to 1982, the 
CMC’s Standing Members (changwei) were included in this category. However, in 1982, 
this position was abolished. Since 1982, only Vice Chairmen of the CMC, which 
numbered four in 1982 and two after 1987, were counted as “Party and State leaders.”69 
Members of the CMC have enjoyed a status above that of the Minister Principal level 
(zhengbuji), but below that of the State Deputy level. Therefore, members of the CMC 
are not officially counted as “Party and State leaders.”  
Among officials at the State Principal level, the PLA’s representation declined 
significantly between 1977 and 1987, but slightly rebounded between 1987 and 1997. 
However, among officials at State Deputy level, the military’s representation fell more 
drastically.70 In 1977, two senior PLA officers sat on the five-member PBSC.71 In 1982, 
there was only one PLA representative on the PBSC.72 By 1987, there was no longer any 
 682 
professional soldier officially sitting on the PBSC. As Deng receded from official power 
and Jiang worked to consolidate his position as China’s top leader (1989-94), the 
military’s lost seat on the PBSC was compensated for by another position at the State 
Principal level – Presidency. After the 13th National Congress of the CCP in 1987, Deng 
gave up his membership on the Central Committee and in 1989 transferred the 
Chairmanship of the CMC, his last official position, to Jiang. In 1988, Yang Shangkun, 
the CMC Vice Chairman who was running its daily operations, took over the Presidency 
from Li Xiannian.  
When the position of the Presidency was created under the 1982 Constitution, it 
was widely understood among legal experts that the President “shall not undertake 
legislative, administrative or military prerogatives in order to protect the status of 
President as the highest symbol of the state” and “shall prevent the unduly concentration 
of power.”73 Therefore, one may conclude that Deng, politically weakened in 1987, was 
attempting to create platforms from which the PLA, and Yang Shangkun in particular, 
could increase its voice. After the Yang Brothers’ political downfall at the 14th Party 
Congress in 1992, the Presidency was transferred from Yang Shangkun to Jiang Zemin. 
Additionally, Liu Huaqing, then Vice Chairman of the CMC, was nominated by Deng 
and served as a member of the PBSC from 1992 to 1997. Thus, the PLA, with relative 
consistency, held a seat at the State Principal level during the 1980s and most of the 
1990s till Liu’s retirement.74 The PLA’s seats at the State Deputy level decreased from 
four in 1982 to one from 1987-89, and then went back two after 1989, which it has 
consistently remained at.  
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Analysis and Summary of the PLA’s Political Representation 
Three conclusions can be reached on the nature of the PLA’s political 
representation: 
First, the PLA’s political representation in China’s power apparatus does not 
equate with its political influence. Rather, the PLA’s political representation largely 
indicates how the Party assesses the military’s importance in meeting the nation’s most 
important or urgent needs.  
The PLA’s political representation has been declining since the 11th Party 
Congress in 1977. The PLA’s shrinking political representation in the 1980s was largely 
a result of China’s increasing focus on economic modernization, which came at the 
expense of military modernization. This national priority was derived from a Party-
military consensus that formed after the catastrophic Cultural Revolution, which 
highlighted the need for China to drastically change course. In addition, Deng’s dominant 
control and leadership over the military after 1978 helped to implement this decision. 
Deng relentlessly pushed the PLA to return to the barracks, and strengthened the 
government’s institutionalization and ability to govern. The military acquiesced and 
receded from the political stage, and its opinions in opposition of the top leadership were 
only voiced privately. The PLA understood that the disastrous politicization of the 
military during the Cultural Revolution, as well as the 913 Incident, sullied the PLA’s 
image. As a result, Deng deliberately pushed military officers out of the Politburo and 
reduced the military’s representation in the Party’s power structures.75 In the 1980s, it 
was also difficult for the military to speak out on almost any issue related to policy 
without raising eyebrows.76 As Deng exerted a dominant influence in the foreign and 
 684 
security policy-making arena during this period, he worked hard to strengthen institutions, 
which allowed for the MFA’s professionalization and the expansion of its influence. 
A close look at the CCP’s formal power structure and the Party’s supporting 
agencies indicate that the bureaucratic structure of the CCP leadership has followed a 
basic rule: an organization’s authority can be adjusted depending on the degree of power 
and authority it possesses vis-a-vis other political actors. In general, an organization that 
is closely associated with a top leader is often neglected or even completely abolished by 
his successor, as a way for him to sideline political opponents. Then, a new position or 
institution is established to take over the abolished or sidelined one’s power and 
responsibilities. Despite the formal mandate of certain institutionalized decision-making 
mechanisms, top political leaders often bypass them or use procedural obstacles to push 
through alternative agendas. This is the fundamental reason why the PLA’s political 
representation is more symbolic than substantive under the CCP’s current governing 
structure, typified by limited intraparty competition. In the PBSC, the top decision-
making mechanism, even when a professional soldier held a full seat from 1977 to 1997 
this turned out to have little, if any, impact on the PLA’s influence.  
If a competitive electoral mechanism is introduced into the CCP or the overall 
political system in the future, the relationship between the PLA’s political representation 
and its political influence may fundamentally change. The PLA’s political representation 
could become crucially important if the selection of each layer of the CCP’s power 
structure becomes fully competitive, as was suggested by reformers such as Zhao Ziyang 
in 1980s. In such a circumstance, the PLA’s collective representation could indeed 
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fundamentally impact its influence in both the composition of the CCP’s power structure 
and the policy-making process.77    
Second, the PLA’s political representation in the Party power apparatus plays an 
important role in the bureaucratic bargaining that takes place with bureaucracies in other 
realms, particularly the government system. In any cross-system coordination platform, 
those who hold the highest ranking in the Party often take the lead. For instance, the 
Arms Exports Leading Group (later renamed the Arms Trading Leading Small Group), 
established with supervision from both the PLA CMC and the State Council, was co-
chaired by Admiral Liu Huaqing, CMC Vice Chairman and PBSC member, and State 
Councilor and Vice Premier Zou Jiahua.78 Because of Admiral Liu’s high political 
ranking in the Party, he took the actual lead in both decision-making and implementation. 
Therefore, a new office, the Arms Trading Office, was established and housed under the 
CMC as the executive arm of this leading small group. 
Third, the PLA’s greater political representation may not positively contribute to 
its overall political influence. It could be more difficult for a top civilian leader to 
establish effective control over the military if the military has substantial political 
representation, and the top leader could feel threatened by this dynamic. In such a 
scenario, the top leader could take steps to cut the military out of the power structure and 
minimize its influence over the policy-making process. Thus, the military’s greater 
political representation could in fact hinder its ability to influence policies. 
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officials based in Hong Kong after 1949, dedicated to publicity, publication, culture, education, managing 
united front organizations in industrial and trade circles as well as in financial and business institutions 
funded by the CCP. It used to be the sole channel which the CCP used to pass on its guidelines on Hong 
Kong affairs. After mid-1950s, it started to report directly to CCP Central Committee’s Foreign Affairs 
Office. See Kam, "Decision-making towards Hong Kong,” pp. pp. 101-10. 
66 As the GO weighs in on Taiwan policy-making, the PLA leadership and the General Office interact 
directly with regard to important Taiwan-related policies. 
67 Lu Ning, Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking, p. 11. 
68 Hu Jintao maneuvered this step and justified it as a way to “enable the senior PLA generals to 
concentrate more on military affairs, which facilitated the CMC’s control and supervision over troops”, 
according to Hu. See “Big Highlights on New Team of the CMC,” Wenhuipao, November 1, 2007.. 
69 Between 1987 and 1989, only one professional soldier was CMC Vice Chairman as the other Vice 
Chairman, Zhao Ziyang, sat on that position because he was then the designated successor of Deng. After 
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1989, the CMC always kept two professional soldiers as Vice Chairmen while the “apparent heir”, always a 
civilian, was added in as the third CMC Vice Chairman.  
70 As Vice Chairmen and Standing Members of the CMC were counted as “Party and State leaders”, the 
military representation at State deputy level declined even more drastically after 1982. The statistics of the 
make-up of the CMC structure between 1977 and 1982 below is based on Yu Jie’s article. See Yu Jie, 
“Evolution and Change of the CMC,” jun shi shi lin (Military History Circles) 5 (2004) 
1977, 5 Vice Chairmen, 8 Standing Members of the CMC 
1978, 6 Vice Chairmen, 8 Standing Members of the CMC 
1979 6 Vice Chairmen, 8 Standing Members of the CMC 
1980, 6 Vice Chairmen, 13 Standing Members of the CMC 
1981, 6 Vice Chairmen, 14 Standing Members of the CMC 
1982, 4 Vice Chairmen, 0 Standing Members of the CMC 
The abolishment of the Standing Members of the CMC in 1982 indicated the drop of military 
representation at the State deputy level from 13 in 1977 to 4 five years later.  
71 The two senior PLA officers sitting on PBSC in 1977 are Deng Xiaoping, Chief of General Staff, and 
Marshal Ye Jianying, Vice Chairman of the CMC.  
72 Marshal Ye Jianying, Vice Chairman of the CMC, was on PBSC in 1982; Because of reasons listed in 
reference 131, Deng was not counted as a professional soldier on PBSC. 
73 Li Buyun, “Analysis of China’s institution of Presidency,” sixiang zhenxian (Ideology Front), June 30, 
1983. 
74 After Jiang consolidated his power, the PLA permanently lost a seat at the State Principal level.  
75 Zhang Sheng, Walking From Wars. 
76 The sensitivity of the PLA speaking up about foreign and security policies is partly due to Mao and 
Zhou’s legacy of top leaders exerting firm control on foreign policies themselves, and partly due to the 
PLA’s negative image in the nation’s nascent memory. 
77 The PLA’s representation in the Central Committee is 20-22%. There is no other larger organized 
interest group. The representation of either central government agencies or local governments are 
nominally larger than that of the PLA. However, their interests, even categorized in one group, are more 
fragmented and more prone to clashes.   
78 Zou Jiahua is son-in-law of Marshal Ye Jianying. 
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Appendix B: The Evolution of the PLA’s Soldier’s Oath 
 
 
(Emphasis throughout author’s own): 
The 1956 version of the PLA’s Soldier’s Oath: 
“I am a citizen of the People's Republic of China. To join in the People's Liberation Army, 
to take the glorious duty of a revolutionary soldier, I solemnly swear: First, under the 
leadership of Chairman Mao, I will become a brave, loyal and resourceful solider who 
strictly abide by disciplines, comply with regulations, obey the command of the military 
and sacrifice everything in order to defend the motherland; Second, I will work hard and 
learn modern military science, improve my political and educational level, become 
skilled in mastering weapons, get ready to fight at anytime, overcome all difficulties, and 
resolutely destroy the enemy; Third, I will uphold the people's government, love the 
people, take care of weapons and state property, and adhere to national and military 
secrets, bear eternal allegiance to the motherland and the people; Fourth, upon 
violation of the oath, I am subject to punishment by law of the state and the military.”1  
 
The 1984 version of the PLA Soldier’s Oath:  
“I am a citizen of the People's Republic of China and thereby perform the honorable duty 
by serving in the military service in accordance with the law. In order to take up the 
sacred duty of a revolutionary soldier, I swear: I love the Chinese Communist Party, 
love the socialist motherland, love the People's Liberation Army; I will observe the 
military doctrine, regulations and rules, obey orders, follow the command, try to learn 
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military, political, scientific knowledge, work hard to sharpen skills of killing enemies, 
and take good care of weapons and armaments, protect military secrets, carry forward the 
fine tradition of participating in construction of socialist material and spiritual civilization, 
fight battles bravely, fear no sacrifice to defend the motherland and safeguard the 
socialist construction. Above oath, I am determined to fulfill my oath and never violate 
it.”2 
 
The 1997 version of the PLA Soldier’s Oath:  
“I am the People's Liberation Army soldier, I swear: to obey the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China, to serve the people wholeheartedly, to obey the order and 
observe the discipline, to fight heroically and fear no sacrifice, work hard to practice 
skills of killing enemies, resolutely complete the mission; under no circumstances betray 
the motherland the military.”3 
 
The 2010 version of the PLA Soldier’s Oath: 
“I am a People's Liberation Army soldier, I swear: to obey the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China, to serve the people wholeheartedly, to obey the order and 
strictly abide by disciplines, to be brave and persevere, fear no sacrifice, and work hard 
on skills of killing enemies, always be ready to fight, never renegade the military and 
fight to safeguard the motherland to my death.”4 
 
                                                 
1 PLA GSD and General Politics Department, “Regulation on Work and Oath of Enlistment for New 





                                                                                                                                                 
斗，克服一切困难，坚决消灭敌人；三、拥护人民政府，热爱人民，爱护武器和国家财产，严守国
家和军事机密，永远忠于祖国和人民；四、我如违背誓言，愿受国法和军纪的严厉制裁。” 














Appendix C: Reflections on Interviewing and Interviews 
 
 
This appendix provides a brief explanation and statistics concerning the 260 
interviews, especially those conducted with 138 active-duty and retired PLA officers, as 
well as reflections about conducting interviews in China.   
I began learning to conduct interviews in 1994, when I started working for China 
Daily as a reporter and op-ed writer covering China’s foreign and security policies, 
Chinese politics, and military affairs. During this period, it was relatively easy for me to 
get interviews with members of sensitive government and military agencies, since China 
Daily, often seen as an English-language counterpart to the People’s Daily, the 
government’s mouthpiece, was part of the government, and therefore I was viewed as 
part of the system or an insider. Many important policy-makers in the government and 
military felt comfortable speaking freely with me, and it fell to me to interpret the 
information and publish only those views that were clearly “legitimate” to publish under 
the strict censorship and self-censorship of China’s official media. Therefore, I often had 
too much information to handle. My situation formed a sharp contrast to the state of 
almost all non-Chinese journalists and researchers.  
I accumulated a large network of contacts within the government and the PLA 
due to my experience as a journalist from 1994-2000 and then as a researcher at 
American think tanks (World Security Institute and later Global Zero), where I was 
responsible for developing collaborations with Chinese government and military entities. 
I founded Washington Observer Weekly, a successful Chinese-language e-magazine with 
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320,000 subscribers in the Greater China Region in 2002, and co-founded China Security 
Quarterly, an English-language policy journal dedicated to bringing Chinese voices to 
Washington. Both projects helped me resume and maintain active interactions with many 
of those I got to know during my years at China Daily. As I started my field research in 
2010 as a PhD candidate at Johns Hopkins SAIS, I was facing a very different situation, 
as I was no longer an insider of the system. Nonetheless, I was able to draw upon my 
wealth of contacts, many of whom I have known since the mid-1990s. 
Between 2010 and 2015, I conducted interviews with 260 Chinese contacts for 
this dissertation, and based on my experience have a few thoughts on best practices for 
conducting research based on interviews. First, trust is the first and foremost prerequisite 
for Chinese people within the system to talk to me, thanks to my previous work 
experience.1 I have known many of my interviewees for two decades, and I respect and 
care immensely about their own work and their families. I also understand the difference 
between façade and substance, a perception from inside and outside. It is always 
worthwhile to investigate whether a view is expressed strategically and is intended to 
deliver a certain message to the audience, or whether the interlocutor actually holds this 
belief. The protection of one’s sources is the first priority of research, as my advisor 
Professor David M. Lampton has warned.2 That said, it is a struggle for me not to give 
credit to those who have offered me their invaluable insights and thank them by name in 
this dissertation.  
There are a few techniques I found useful when conducting my research 
interviews. First, the interviews should be conducted in circumstances that are as relaxing 
as possible. I find, just as Professor Lampton does, that recording is not helpful and 
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interviewees often reject being recorded.3 Also, using a structured questionnaire does not 
go well. Repeated interviews with the same interviewee over a period of time is the best 
method to gain a more complete picture of the interviewee’s perceptions. Second, as a 
researcher, one needs to “triangulate” – finding ways to fact-check by digging into 
publicly available information and interviewing multiple unrelated sources on those facts. 
Important facts in particular need such triangulation. Third, the researcher needs to “learn 
and challenge” – learning sufficient facts and in the end challenging certain interviewees 
when contradictions arise. When the researcher conducts sufficient interviews, a picture 
on the subject under study begins emerge, but there will surely be contradictions, 
especially when interviewees come from opposing camps. The researcher then needs to 
return to certain interviewees and raise the alternate views, especially those provided by 
opposing camps, or those that the researcher believes will provoke a reaction, which 
could drag out more facts and evidence. In the end, it is up to the researcher to decide 
how to interpret contradictions. 
Among the 260 interviewees, 138 are active-duty, retired, or decommissioned 
PLA officers, and 122 are government officials and policy researchers. I conducted a 
dozen interviews with Western-based China observers, including retired policy-makers 
and military officers, to gain their insights about the PLA and China’s foreign and 
security policy-making based on their interactions with China.  
Among the 138 PLA officers, a considerable number of them had the experience 
of being stationed with combat troops. A majority of them have a ranking of senior 
colonel and major general, who participate in different stages of policy deliberations, 
coordination, policy-making, and implementation. Several of them directly serve the PLA 
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leadership. Among the 138 PLA officers, several of them specialize in training and 
evaluating officers, and therefore are exposed to a large number of officers, especially at 







                                                 
1 Trust is listed by David M. Lampton as the “coin of the realm.” See David M. Lampton, Following the 
Leader, p. 243 
2 Ibid, p. 242. 
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